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PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE ULTIMATE 
CHALLENGE  
 
Michela ARNABOLDI1, Irvine LAPSLEY2, Ileana STECCOLINI3 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Performance Management is the challenge confronting public service managers. 
However, the enduring research focus on performance measurement in public services, 
without resolution, does not offer neat solutions to performance management in public 
services. This drawback of measurement difficulties has not abated interest in 
performance management. But there are significant adverse outcomes associated with 
the clumsy use of performance management systems in public services, particularly 
negative effects on staff morale. The lack of ready-made answers to performance 
management makes this task complex and demanding for public service managers. 
This paper identifies critical dimensions of effectiveness in performance management 
systems. 
 
 
Keywords: Performance Management; Complexity; Public Services; Employee 
Impacts; Management Challenges 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There are relentless pressures on managers in public services to act on the quality of 
their services. The idea of ‘more with less’ has become a slogan, as managers seek to 
maintain or improve the quality of service delivery. This phenomenon is pervasive – 
an international trend from which there is no escape for public service managers. This 
global interest has attracted the attention of key world institutions such as the OECD 
(see Perrin (2003) and Curristine (2005, 2007, 2008) on the fostering of performance 
budgeting and monitoring systems) and the World Bank (see the Talbot (2010) study 
of UK performance management for the World Bank as the promulgation of best 
practice). And yet there is no single solution as the public sector has many variations 
in scope and features in the 196 countries of the world, all shaped by economic 
performance, political philosophy, the involvement of external agencies and demands 
for public services (CIMA, 2011). These layers of complexity complicate, but do not 
lessen the interest in, and need for, performance management systems in public 
services. 
 
                                                 
1 Politecnico di Milano (Michela.Arnaboldi@polimi.it) 
2 University of Edinburgh (Irvine.Lapsley@ed.ac.uk) 
3 Bocconi School of Management (Ileana.Steccolini@sdabocconi.it) 
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The financial crisis of 2007–2008 is still unfolding and we do not yet know its 
outcome. The fiscal pressures have intensified the need for making best of use of 
reduced resources in public services. This is in the midst of an uncertain environment 
in which traditional paradigms for public policy have experienced policy reverses 
(Coen and Roberts, 2012). However, the genesis of performance management systems 
is the global impact of three decades of the new public management (NPM) 
phenomenon which drives the focus on results oriented public services. The global 
financial crisis has accentuated the longstanding need for effective performance 
management of public services. There has been considerable research activity on 
performance management systems across a range of services to the extent that we 
may have a performance measurement industry (Johnsen, 2005). Nevertheless, that 
research effort is diffuse and has not been consolidated into a coherent body of 
thought (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). Indeed, the activity of performance 
management has been characterised as risky for public service managers (Cuganesan 
et al., 2014).  
 
This paper contributes to the debate on performance management by offering a 
nuanced interpretation of the nature of this activity in public services. First, this paper 
discusses how complexity in public services may be theorised.  Then it addresses the 
topic of performance management in public services by examining three dimensions 
of processes and impacts: (1) The key pitfall of performance management (2) 
Performance technologies: An accounting problematic and (3) Performance 
management in a complex setting. The paper concludes with closing comments on the 
challenges facing performance management in public services and with a future 
research agenda. 
 
 
THEORISING COMPLEXITY 
 
 
The public sector is widely recognised as a complex setting for study. The public 
sector has been described as an area of inherent complexity (Lapsley and Skærbæk, 
2012), stemming from the location of managerial culture in a sector which 
experiences many political influences. This, in turn, may confound managerial 
discretion and complicate levels of accountability, especially in a sector which is 
repeatedly reformed, with uncertain outcomes, and where expectations are high on the 
delivery of social justice, social responsibility, equity in society, democratic 
entitlements and pressures for social change. 
 
So, the concept of complexity abounds in the public sector. But how can we study this 
phenomenon for public services? There is now an increasing focus on the idea of the 
development of complexity theory which has captured the imagination of many 
researchers in public policy settings. The early work of Axelrod (1997) seeks to build 
a theory of complexity of cooperation based on the classic case of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. In this work, Axelrod stresses its difference from conventional inductive or 
deductive theorising, in which he describes his work as a modelling to ‘aid intuition’ 
(Axelrod, 1997, p.4). Fundamentally, the Axelrod approach is based on simulation 
and attempts to study the actions and interactions of individual agents in society and 
then observe patterns which occur at the total society level (Axelrod, 1997, p.3). In 
subsequent work, Axelrod collaborated with a public policy specialist, Cohen, to 
8
  
address how ideas of complexity could be harnessed by organisations (Axelrod and 
Cohen, 1999). They saw diversity of effort in the study of complexity, but also 
identified recurring themes which informed their framework which they describe as a 
unified view of complexity studies for the analysis of complexity in organisations 
(Axelrod and Cohen, 1999, p.18). In this elaboration of their approach they made the 
following observation (Axelrod and Cohen, 1999, p.19): 
 
‘…complexity research does not make detailed predictions. Rather it is a framework 
that suggests new kinds of questions and possible actions’. 
 
The complexity theory framework as elaborated by Axelrod and Cohen (1999, 
passim) had the following elements:  
 
1. Complex adaptive systems 
2. Co-evolution (and self organization?) 
3. Dynamic systems 
4. Non-linear relationships 
5. Emergent properties 
6. Edge of chaos (and strange attractors?) 
 
The concepts in italics refer to common elements in contemporary complexity theory 
which were not explicitly mentioned by Axelrod and Cohen (1999). The complex 
adaptive systems are those in which agents and or populations actively seek to make 
adaptations (Axelrod and Cohen, 1999, p.7). This is a building block in their analysis. 
The idea of co-evolution is the way in which the actions of some change agents may 
spill over and affect the practices of other agents. This is a process which may never 
settle down (Axelrod and Cohen, 1999, p.8). The related concept of self organisation 
refers to the manner in which agents within organisations can shape the nature of the 
organisation by their actions and interactions. While this concept was not explicitly 
included in the Axelrod and Cohen framework, it is entirely consistent with their 
elaboration of dynamic agents in systems. The dynamic systems feature of complexity 
often arises because of the varieties of agents at work in organisations and in total 
systems (Axelrod and Cohen, op.cit., p.32). The non-linearity of systems means that 
small actions can lead to disproportionate larger differences in subsequent actions 
(Axelrod and Cohen, op.cit. p.36). The idea of emergent properties is that systems 
may exhibit traits which are distinct to the system and which are not a characteristic 
of the individual parts of the system (Axelrod and Cohen, op.cit. p15). The idea of the 
edge of chaos refers to interactions between organisations and their environment, 
which exist in a delicate balance between order and chaos. This phenomenon occurs 
as evolutionary systems structure interaction patterns to achieve a balance between 
exploration and exploitation (Axelrod and Cohen, op.cit. p.72). A related idea which 
features in current thinking on complexity theory is the strange attractor. This idea is 
often attributed to the work of Lorenz (1995). In complex systems the initial starting 
conditions can influence the dynamics of interactions, but as systems evolve they may 
be attracted to other properties (or attractors). The strange attractor is particularly 
complex: chaos may be present, but strange non-chaotic properties may also coexist at 
the same time and point.  
 
This set of concepts in complexity theory underlines its systemic approach to the 
study of phenomena. This approach to the study of complexity is an endeavour to take 
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a holistic look, not only at the system dynamics, but also at the constituent parts of 
systems. This systems thinking is a distinctive feature of modern complexity theory. 
While this theorising originated in the natural sciences and has been used in, for 
example, forecasting weather patterns, there is a movement recommending its use in 
the social sciences. This use includes public administration (Klijn, 2008), public 
management (Teisman et al., 2009; Rhodes et al., 2011) and public policy (Geyer and 
Rihani, 2010; Room, 2011; Haynes, 2012). 
 
While there are advocates of the merits of complexity theory in the investigation of 
the management of public services (Lin and Lee, 2011), reservations can be expressed 
over its mobilisation in this study setting. In the first instance, this thinking originated 
in the natural sciences and there remain questions over the applicability of models 
derived from natural to social sciences. The translation of ideas from different 
disciplines introduces the likelihood of misrepresentation or misinterpretation or 
ambiguity. This seems particularly likely with a theory which introduces concepts 
with names like edge of chaos, strange attractors, co-evolution, all of which look 
particularly susceptible to managerial capture and reinterpretation. Another dimension 
of this is whether there is indeed a unified theory of complexity theory. Klijn (2008) 
identified complexity theory as a collection of different theories: complex adaptive 
systems; dissipative structures; autopoiesis theory; chaos theory; path dependencies. 
However, Klijn did acknowledge the commonalities of systems thinking and non-
linearity. The significance of Klijn’s observations is that they intensify the potential 
for misrepresentation or misinterpretation of complexity theory. The Klijn critique has 
attracted observations that the underlying model of complexity theory offers a theory 
which needs to be tested empirically and which does not lend itself to such testing 
(Pollitt, 2009). There are proponents of complexity theory who see the idea of self 
organisation as a basis for enhanced democracy in public organisations (Blackman, 
2001), but this does not sit well with the realpolitik of centralised control and a results 
focus in many governmental settings. There is also concern over the tensions between 
complexity theory and the need for evidence-based policy to inform policy making in 
public services (Parsons, 2002). More importantly, there is a deterministic tendency 
within systems thinking which does not sit well with the highly influential view of 
postmodernism, which emphasises social construction, the frailty of causality, the 
importance of power relationships, stresses the relational and interpretive nature of 
human activity, the proliferation of the contested nature of knowledge and ideas (see 
Best and Kellner, 1991, passim). 
 
Therefore the application of complexity theory is not so self-evident or 
straightforward as it might appear. While complexity theory has not been advocated 
specifically to examine performance management in public services, it has been 
recommended for the study of the closely related phenomenon of NPM (Lin and Lee, 
2011). This is an important area of research which we mobilise to test it out below in 
the challenges facing performance management in a complex public service setting 
and which we reflect on in our conclusion. 
 
 
THE KEY PITFALL OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
The single largest pitfall for performance management systems in public service 
organisations is a negative side-effect which undermines the motivation, morale and 
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 behaviour of human resources. The key resource in many public services is their 
human capital – the staff employed, their expertise, their capacity for problem solving 
and policy implementation. There are distinct, adverse outcomes for the human 
dimension of performance management. This paper examines research on this facet of 
performance management, which traces human resource issues arising from its 
implementation. The most trenchant critique of the adverse impact of NPM on public 
service staff is made by Diefenbach (2009). Diefenbach (2009, p.905) made the 
following observation: 
 
‘NPM’s impact on employees and corporate culture of public sector organizations 
comprises a whole range of negative psycho-sociological and organisational effects, 
such as: increase in occupational stress, illness, low morale, decline in job satisfaction 
and motivation, alienation, fear, resentment, the distorting intellectual effects of 
writing for audit, a competitive, adversarial and punitive ethos, as well as wasteful, 
stressful, over-bureaucratic, and expensive audit procedures, increased tensions, more 
distrust between people, forms of symbolic violence and institutional bullying, a 
rougher working climate, an invisible net of managerial power and domination.’ 
 
There is a body of literature which supports this critique of NPM impacts on 
employees. The primacy accorded to audit in the NPM world has led to Power’s 
famous observation that we now live in an audit society (1997) in which the need to 
respond to audit controls, procedures and practices can shape the day-to-day life of 
organisations. This has the deleterious consequences of additional work and the 
subsequent displacement of the primary purpose of organisations so affected. In this 
NPM world, organisations grapple with the bureaucracy of the audit society, in which 
boxes must be ticked to demonstrate compliance with diktats whether this compliance 
is for real or merely legitimating activity (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2008; Lapsley, 
2009). The roles and expectations of performance auditors continue to grow (Funnell, 
2015). 
 
Within a variety of public services there is evidence of the adverse impact of NPM 
reforms on employee welfare. One such service is policing where new managerialism 
has increased workload and pressure on officers (Butterfield et al, 2004, p.176). This 
has led to a significant majority of UK police officers reporting stress and overwork 
(UNISON, 2014). The corporate language of mission, commitment and strategy in 
public services is claimed to sit uneasily with, and promote disillusion in, public 
services which experience cost reductions with increased job insecurity, larger class 
sizes, fewer nurses (Hoggett, 1996). In health and social services, NPM reforms have 
resulted in increased intensity of work practices, with fewer staff, increasing levels of 
stress, demoralised staff, high absenteeism and labour turnover (Kirkpatrick et al., 
2005, p.98, p.120). Although Kirkpatrick et al. (2005, p.150) do report that workers 
within social housing have more readily embraced the managerialism (its language, its 
logic) of NPM.  
 
Within universities, the advent of NPM has resulted in a more adversarial working 
environment (Newton, 2003, p.434) in which tolerance for independent thinking by 
academics and collegiality is marginalised by management agendas (Saunders, 2006). 
The NPM focus on quantification and results has spawned a wide range of metrics 
within universities including measures of quality (Pettersen, 2015). It has been 
suggested that these are mobilised to manage and control academics (Burrows, 2012). 
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 These metrics include citations, workload models, research assessments, teaching 
quality assessments and league tables for university activities and performances, 
including commercial activities. Gill (2010, p.228) has observed that the impact of 
this managerial regime has had wide ranging adverse effects: 
 
“Many academics are exhausted, stressed, overloaded, suffering from insomnia, 
feeling anxious, experiencing feelings of shame, aggression, guilt, hurt and ‘out of 
placeness’.”. 
 
It has been suggested that this state of affairs is widespread in universities as part of a 
‘deep, affective somatic crisis which threatens to overwhelm us’ (Burrows, 2012, 
p.355). It has been observed that the strength of this phenomenon is such that 
academics have been unable to challenge a universal focus on calculative practice and 
audit culture in universities stemming from NPM practices (Shore, 2008). This 
primacy accorded to performance management systems is attributed to NPM thinking, 
in which managerial elites have a vested interest in legitimising an audit culture 
focussed on constant assessment at the expense of collegiality and scholarship (Craig 
et al., 2014). 
 
The above observations demonstrate the potential negative outcomes when public 
organisations implement clumsy performance management systems which are not 
geared to the key human actors engaged in the delivery of services. On balance it 
should be noted that the policy design and implementation intensity of NPM varies 
between countries, and that much of the literature and research is scarce when it 
comes to studies of net effects of NPM reforms including performance management 
(Bouckaert and Halligan 2008; Helden, Johnsen and Vakkuri 2012; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011). Next we comment on the range and quality of tools available to 
public service managers.  
 
 
TECHNOLOGIES OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT: AN ACCOUNTING 
PROBLEMATIC 
 
For the managers there are significant problems in the selection of management tools 
to mobilise in the name of performance management (see for example, Hope and 
Player (2012)). The quality of available techniques is a particular problem for public 
service managers. There have been various attempts at devising models of 
performance management. These include the idea of global measure of performance. 
The failure to achieve this and the difficulties of operationalising the resultant partial 
performance indicators are discussed below. The classic Anglo-American NPM 
approach of seeking appropriate private sector models has led to the introduction of 
Benchmarking, the Balanced Scorecard and Lean Management into many public 
services, with mixed results. These initiatives resonate with the classic phenomenon 
of following the latest managerial fads and fashions (Abrahamson, 1996). The early 
attempted solution of managerial checklists as a reductionist treatment of complexity 
is revived here and considered as a potential way forward for public services. The 
range of commonly used tools in public services performance management is set out 
in Table 1. We identify 5 such possibilities for public service managers and as Table 1 
shows there is no obvious choice from the set of available technologies. Each of these 
approaches to performance management is discussed, next 
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Table 1: Performance Management Technologies 
 Technology Key Attributes Comment 
1. Budgetary Control Traditional Accounting  Crude, limited 
2. KPIs & Benchmarking Partial performance 
indicators in comparable 
settings 
What gets 
measured gets 
included 
3. Balanced Scorecard The Harvard model of 
performance management 
Identifies multiple 
dimensions but is 
over specified 
4. Lean Management The Toyota Production 
model 
Negative side 
effects 
5. Managerial Checklists An exercise in 
reductionism 
Susceptible to box 
ticking legitimation 
 
 
1. Budgetary Control as a Performance Tool 
 
The first technology identified in Table 1 is budgeting. This inclusion is recognition 
of the significance of the accounting function within public service organisations. It is 
also recognition of the longstanding centrality of the budgetary process in public 
sector organisations (Henley et al., 1992, p.56). However, while tradition, the size of 
public sector organisations and the level of sophistication in financial management 
may lead public service organisations to rely on budgets for performance control, this 
option has many disadvantages. This technology ignores non-financial performance 
indicators and can therefore be seen as very narrowly focussed on financials. In this 
way, the budget can be seen as offering crude cost control. However, the reluctance to 
refine the historical budget setting practices of public sector organisations by adopting 
activity-based measures undermines the rigour of budgets. Furthermore the 
achievement of budgetary equilibrium may be seen as a kind of success, but it is 
limited. The achievement of balancing the books does not equate to meeting all 
service demands nor does it mean the organisation has operated efficiently. However, 
the downside of all this is that whatever performance management system is 
implemented within any public sector organisation, it will have to relate to the budget 
system given its centrality in the life of the public sector organisation, a facet of 
performance management which is often overlooked and is neither simple nor 
straightforward. 
 
2. Private Sector Technologies for Performance Management 
 
The next three technologies in Table 1 all fit the ‘fads and fashions’ (Abrahamson, 
1995) idea of management diffusion. All of them have private sector origins: 
Benchmarking came from Rank Xerox (Cross and Iqbal, 1995); the Balanced 
Scorecard came from Analog Devices, an electronics company (Schneiderman, 
undated); and Lean Management came from Toyota, the Japanese car manufacturer 
(Womack et al., 1990). The practice of looking to the private sector for management 
ideas is a fundamental element of NPM. The appropriateness of this practice is 
13
  
contestable, given the difficulties of translation from the private to the public sector. 
In the following sections each of these private sector imports is discussed and then we 
revisit the idea of managerial checklists. 
 
In this paper we link Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Benchmarking as 
technologies of a similar vintage, which are used in concert. They can both be seen as 
technologies which have emerged in response to the lack of the commercial bottom 
line for performance assessment in public services. Efforts to mobilise value for 
money or the 3Es of economy, efficiency and effectiveness as a bottom line have 
failed to deliver a global model of performance measurement (see, for example, 
National Audit Office (1988), FEE (undated), Mayston (1985)). Efforts to devise a 
public sector bottom line have degenerated into the generation of many partial 
performance indicators (Lapsley and Pong, 2000). The relationship of these partial 
indicators is not self-evident in many cases, without a hierarchy of performance 
indicators which form an articulate statement of performance. The decision to identify 
KPIs for performance assessment focuses on what can be measured rather than 
necessarily capturing key dimensions of organisational performance (Bevan and Hood, 
2006). The forced nature of this selection process and the arbitrary manner of choices 
made is captured by the following statement by an elected member of a legislative 
assembly (cited in Ezzamel et al., 2007): 
 
‘We are fabulous at firing arrows at walls, drawing targets around them and then 
saying it was a brilliant shot.’ 
 
The shift from organisations devising their own KPIs to a benchmarking arrangement 
in which comparable organisations are identified in which performance information is 
exchanged creates further complexity. While public service organisations are not in 
competition and therefore open, in principle, to sharing performance information, 
there have been difficulties from the beginning in identifying appropriate comparators, 
focussing on performance and embracing the concept of benchmarking (Bowerman et 
al., 2000; Bowerman et al., 2001). This concept of the contested field in which actors’ 
own interests prevail over a common or shared purpose remains a major obstacle to 
effective benchmarking (Siverbo, 2014). 
 
The Balanced Scorecard has achieved widespread interest in the public sector in the 
last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century. This 
technology was claimed to be first devised in the electronics firm, Analog Devices, by 
Schneiderman (Schneiderman undated) and subsequently developed by Kaplan and 
Norton (1992, 1993). The attraction of this technology was its focus which was 
broader than narrow financials by including consideration of financials, internal 
processes, customers and learning. This configuration appeared to offer a 
comprehensive basis for linking corporate financial planning and strategic planning, 
unlike the proliferation of partial and so called key performance indicators. However, 
this particular management fashion has started to encounter considerable criticism. 
Notably, the Balanced Scorecard has been criticised because its four dimensions 
understate the complexity of many organisations (especially in public services) and it 
offers little more than lists of metrics (Norreklit, 2000). Also it has been argued that 
the key dimensions in the Balanced Scorecard are not as tightly coupled as they 
appear in the writings of Kaplan and Norton (Modell, 2004). A scrutiny of 20 years of 
research studies of Balanced Scorecard systems reveals implementation difficulties 
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with little integration with accounting information systems (Hoque, 2014). While the 
Balanced Scorecard has had immense popular appeal, it looks like this management 
fad is now, or may be becoming, out of fashion.  
 
Lean Management, however, has become the choice of performance management 
technology of many public services. This is somewhat surprising as Lean 
Management is an earlier technology than both Benchmarking and the Balanced 
Scorecard as it was developed by Toyota in the 1960s (Womack et al., 1990) as the 
Toyota Performance System (TPS). Within the UK the pressure of ‘more with less’ 
has led to widespread attempts at Lean Management in universities, hospitals and 
health care, and local government. At the centre of the TPS are the concepts of the 
standardisation of work into repeatable processes and the elimination of unnecessary 
stages in the production process to eliminate waste and reduce costs in a process of 
continuous improvement. A report commissioned by the Scottish Government argued 
that Lean Management was applicable to the public sector (Radnor et al., 2006). 
Government ministers have identified the potential of Lean Thinking in reducing 
public sector waste (Murden, 2006). Universities UK (2011, p.37) has acknowledged 
what it regards as the successful use of Lean Management in universities and 
advocates its wider use. Health care has been at the forefront as a suitable case for 
Lean Management. It has been argued that there is no lack of resources in health care 
and the core issue is the uniform application of best practices to reduce costs and 
increase quality. The TPS is ideal for this purpose and the UK NHS Institute for 
Innovation and Improvement has developed guidance on Lean Thinking for health 
care managers (NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement, 2013). 
 
However, the rapid spread of Lean Management has been questioned on a number of 
levels. There have been reservations about the efficacy of Lean Management at 
Toyota. In particular concerns have been expressed that the constant focus on cost 
reduction has affected the safety of their vehicles. On February 3 2010, Chris 
Lastrella, an off duty Highway Policeman in California was driving his Toyota Lexus 
with his family on board when the accelerator pedal jammed (Frean and Lee, 2010). 
All of the car occupants were killed in the ensuing crash. There were a further 30 
reported deaths in the US from sudden unintended acceleration on Toyota vehicles at 
this time (Frean and Lewis, 2010). At a subsequent hearing of the US Congressional 
Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Roy LaHood, the US Transport 
Secretary said Toyota was ‘safety deaf’ and Akio Toyoda, the grandson of the Toyota 
company founder apologised for the accidents (Frean and Lewis, 2010). However, a 
senior US executive challenged Toyota’s handling of safety issues as it expanded its 
operations (Lewis, 2010). These outcomes undermine the application of Lean 
Thinking as a relentless driver for cost reduction without due consideration for other 
important issues such as safety. 
 
There are other concerns over the application of Lean Management in public services. 
There are issues over the portability of lean – how many public services are like car 
factories? Also many public services exhibit high levels of interdependence in service 
delivery which may confound the standardisation of public services. By focussing on 
segments of public service organisations, local star optima may be devised which do 
not yield overall improvement. There is evidence of a high failure rate for Lean 
Management in the National Health Service (NHS) which may be attributed to the 
lack of supportive information systems at project level, inter-unit level and 
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organisational level (Kinder and Burgoyne, 2013). More fundamentally, it has been 
suggested that the Lean Management approach adopted within the UK public sector is 
doomed to failure, in theory and practice, given its piecemeal application without an 
overarching service model to inform its adoption and design (Radnor and Osborne, 
2013).  
 
3. Managerial Checklists 
 
The final strand of performance technologies which we discuss here, is the use of 
managerial checklists. At one level this might be seen as a relatively unsophisticated 
management tool. For example, an early attempt at devising a managerial checklist for 
performance management was Jackson (1988). Jackson introduced 9 key concepts for 
managers to manage performance. Some of these are beyond criticism (consistency, 
comparability, clarity, controllability) but others are in contradiction (comprehensive 
versus bounded). While this contribution is well intended it lacks precision, is not 
readily operational and, most importantly, it looks susceptible to the tick box 
mentality of the Audit Society (Power, 1997).  
 
A more promising offering is the managerial checklist from Likierman (1993). This is 
a somewhat neglected study. Likierman’s work is based on a three year research 
project in which 500 middle and senior public services managers were interviewed. 
All of those interviewed were managers who used performance indicators. This paper 
looks at performance from multiple dimensions, looking at the trajectory of 
performance systems through the concepts underpinning the system, the preparation 
of the system, the implementation and the use of performance information. This study 
was not fully exploited as its completion coincided with the author becoming a senior 
member of the UK Government Civil Service. However, this study offers a potential 
way forward. It points to the need for evidence based studies rather than the 
fragmented policy of snatching at the latest management fashion as the solution to 
performance management. 
 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN A COMPLEX SETTING 
 
The complex setting analysed in this paper is the UK NHS. The NHS has an immense 
workforce of many different health care professionals and sits firmly within those 
public services which have human capital as a key resource, as outlined in the third 
section of this paper. In terms of technologies of performance management, budgetary 
control remains a central mechanism for the NHS. There has been some limited use of 
the Balanced Scorecard in the NHS, but there has been more sustained use of KPIs 
and benchmarking and for the past few years there has been a strong use of Lean 
Management. In terms of the NHS as a study setting, Lapsley and Schofield (2009) 
highlight the complexity of the UK’s NHS, which makes it of particular interest for 
public service performance management. This includes the distinctive origins and 
ethos of the NHS and their financial implications. The density of NHS organisation 
and the scope of the services which it delivers, also present difficult challenges for 
financial planning and control. The sheer scale of NHS operations, with it often being 
considered one of, if not the, largest organisation in the world, presents significant 
challenges for financial accountability and control. There is also the fundamental 
issue of the efficacy of a national health care system funded from general taxation. 
These general contextual issues heighten the complexity of the NHS but other factors 
16
  
at work impinge directly on NHS performance management, as Lapsley and Schofield 
(op.cit. p.367) express it: 
 
‘Furthermore, and particularly in times of financial restraint, the existence or 
otherwise of formal or informal rationing systems in health care presents significant 
ethical and financial dilemmas. Most importantly, the enhanced visibility and 
significance of accounting numbers and performance measures in NHS management 
processes and accountability mechanisms over the course of its life continues to 
attract the attention of researchers.’ 
 
This is the context which we use to illustrate the challenges confronting performance 
management in public services. It is interesting to note that a number of complexity 
theory advocates have identified health care as a suitable context for study (Arndt and 
Bigelow, 2000; Geyer and Rihani, 2010; Rhodes et al., 2011) and performance 
management in health care is as complex and elusive as ever (Chang, 2015; Kelly et 
al., 2015). 
 
It was noted above that in many public services, what can get measured gets counted 
(Bevan and Hood, 2006) and this can form the basis of performance management 
systems and this is the case with the NHS. The key performance measure in recent 
years has been the use of waiting lists for patients in need of health care treatment. 
Successive governments have set targets for achieving reductions in waiting lists. The 
waiting list is a capacity utilisation indicator, which may appear sensible in a service 
which is free at the point of use and for which there is an excess demand in the 
absence of a pricing system. However, there is a longstanding critique of waiting list 
indicators as soft performance targets which are easy to manipulate. In his critique, 
Williams (1985) raised questions over the criteria by which patients are admitted to 
lists, the uniformity of such criteria across the NHS, the frequency with which they 
are updated, the discretion in the alteration and admission of patients in targets.  
 
In this section of this paper we examine the experiences of two health care 
organisations in the NHS: (1) Lothian Health, and (2) Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust. The experiences of these health care bodies resonate with the 
Diefenbach (2009) critique of NPM type performance management systems. 
 
(1) Lothian Health 
 
In the National Health Service in Scotland, Health Boards have targets that specify 
that 90% of their patients must be treated within 18 weeks of referral by their general 
practitioner. At Lothian Health, there was a major inquiry initiated by the Cabinet 
Secretary for Health over claims in the press from a whistleblower that Lothian 
Health was routinely manipulating its waiting list numbers. This report was prepared 
by PWC for the Scottish Government (Scottish Government Directorate, 2012). Its 
findings confirmed the systematic manipulation of waiting list information. As a 
public entity the governance mechanisms at Lothian Health included both a 
management and a board (with lay persons appointed by the Cabinet Secretary) to 
oversee its activities. The Board also had a Finance and Performance Review 
Committee (FPRC) drawn from its membership, which reported to the board. Within 
the management team there was an Executive Management Team (EMT) at the 
highest level, which reported to the Board and this top management tier had a Senior 
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 Management Team which reported to EMT. Beneath the Senior Management Group 
there are the departments and hospital specialties. Each month a Performance 
Management Report was prepared by NHS Lothian as a standard agenda item for all 
four parts of Lothian Health governance structure as outlined above. This report stated 
(op.cit, p.17) that: 
 
‘The EMT, the Board and the FPRC were not presented with a comprehensive picture 
of waiting time management or data, for example, as there is an absence of any detail 
on periods of unavailability data or full waiting list size. In addition there is no trend 
analysis of performance.’ 
 
The absence of this information hindered the EMT and the FPRC in making informed 
decisions on waiting list issues and the Board may not have been able to identify that 
there was an issue (op.cit, p.17). 
 
The lack of information presented to the top was based on routine manipulation of 
waiting list figures. The PWC investigation (Scottish Government Directorate, 2012, 
p.5) highlighted this: 
 
‘ ...highlighted excessive and inappropriate use (and apparent misuse) of periods of 
patient unavailability, in particular retrospective creations and changes, which 
removed patients from waiting times breach (i.e. missing target) reports. This 
inappropriate use has masked the number of breaches (failures to meet targets) 
reported at a number of month ends and has resulted in certain patient journeys being 
longer than have been formally reported.’ 
 
These inappropriate adjustments involved offering patients treatment in England at 
short notice and if they refused they were removed from waiting lists. There was also 
lots of retrospective alteration, manually, of patient records. For example, this report 
(Scottish Government Directorate, 2012, p.6) identified examples of this: 
 
‘On 30 May 2011 (just before breach or target failure reporting) a member of staff 
made 124 amendments to periods of unavailability, retrospectively, and then on 1 July 
2011 (just before target failure reporting) another member of staff made 154 
amendments to periods of unavailability, retrospectively, between 0800am and 
0900am.’ 
 
It is also noteworthy that many managers in Lothian Health received detailed waiting 
list information from weekly waiting time position reports but this information was 
not included in formal reports to the EMT, the FPRC or the Board. 
 
How did this happen? Interestingly, given the Diefenbach (2009) critique of bullying 
resonates with other findings in this report. It observed that many of these staff 
members were put under unacceptable pressure to manipulate waiting list figures in a 
culture of ‘no bad news’ about waiting list figures (Scottish Government Health 
Directorate, 2012, p.21).  
 
However, senior figures within Lothian responded strongly to these suggestions 
(Lothian Health, 2012): 
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‘Bullying and harassment have never been tolerated in NHS Lothian and we will be 
following up immediately any claims of this through our own internal inquiry, which 
is already far advanced’ (Chief Executive), and: 
 
‘We do not tolerate any form of bullying and harassment and this is monitored by 
annual surveys. This is a message sent out to all employees when they join us and any 
time such behaviour is proven we are robust in tackling it’ (Director of Human 
Resources). 
 
However, despite such protestations, the Cabinet Secretary for Health initiated a 
further report into the management culture at Lothian. This report confirmed a 
bullying management culture at Lothian which manifested itself in an extreme form 
around the performance management of waiting list targets (D.J. Bowles and 
Associates, 2012). In this report there are comments by members of staff which 
illustrate the nature of this bullying culture (D.J. Bowles and Associates, op. cit., p.19, 
p.23): 
 
‘Some senior managers bully us with constant targets, targets, targets… shouting and 
relentless pressure’  
 
‘A macho culture that has lasted for some time’ 
 
‘Shocking… an atmosphere of fear’ 
 
‘There is a blame culture, particularly for senior managers and I see it cascade and 
leak out to the lower graded staff’ 
 
‘If you don’t reach your targets, you can collect your P45’ ( i.e. lose your job) 
 
‘Those of you with mortgages and career aspirations had better be afraid’. 
 
The report by Bowles and Associates (op.cit.) described this as a dominant culture 
(p.21) in which the general leadership and management style is based on ‘command 
and control’ (p.19) in which there is an almost total concentration on targets and the 
tasks required to achieve them (p.19) and in which there is an ‘emphasis on targets 
and predominantly autocratic leadership’. This report also observed that the 
‘obsessive focus’ on targets for performance management meant that the organisation 
had lost sight of policy objectives (op.cit, p36). 
 
Despite these reports, Lothian Health has just reported yet more difficulties over 
waiting list targets (Pickles, 2014). Indeed, Lothian Health has longstanding 
difficulties over the achievement of waiting list targets for many years. There are 
distinct circumstances which accentuate this problem. There are the general issues of 
a system which is stretched by no pricing or rationing systems. There are the 
increasing numbers of elderly patients with multiple medical conditions. Perhaps most 
importantly Lothian Health is a regional centre of excellence with world leading 
medical specialists which always seem to attract more referrals than they can handle. 
The major issue here is the way complex systems are reduced to simple performance 
systems with all manner of deleterious consequences, particularly for staff 
implementing them. 
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 (2) Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
 
There have been two major, highly critical reports published on Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust, the report of an Independent Inquiry (Francis, 2010) and the 
report of a public inquiry (Francis, 2013). These follow other critical reports by 
oversight bodies in health care. The initial concerns over the management and quality 
of care at Mid Staffordshire were aroused by mortality rates which were significantly 
worse than at other hospitals (Health Care Commission, 2009), which observed 
(p.137): 
 
‘In this report, we have drawn together the different strands of numerous, wide-
ranging and serious findings about the trust which, when brought together, we 
consider amount to significant failings in the provision of emergency healthcare and 
in the leadership and management of the trust.’ 
 
Concerns expressed by patients and patients families led to the Secretary of State for 
Health establishing the first Independent Inquiry (Francis, 2010). A subsequent 
Secretary of State for Health commissioned a second, public inquiry to be led by 
Robert Francis (Francis, 2013). In addition to the concerns over mortality rates, these 
reports were extremely critical of the poor quality of patient care. The following 
instances (Francis, 2013, para 23, p.13) illustrate the woeful standards of patient care: 
 
1. Patients were left in excrement in soiled bed clothes for lengthy periods 
2. Assistance was not provided with feeding for patients who could not eat 
without help 
3. Water was left out of reach 
4. In spite of persistent requests for help, patients were not assisted in their 
toileting 
5. Wards and toilet facilities were left in a filthy condition 
6. Privacy and dignity, even in death, were denied 
7. Triage in A&E was undertaken by untrained staff 
8. Staff treated patients and those close to them with what appeared to be callous 
indifference 
 
How did an NHS hospital ever sink to such low standards of care? The Francis 
Reports (2010, 2013) identify a culture in which the needs of patients were, at best 
marginalised, and in which the management of this hospital gave primacy to 
performance targets and to good news stories. The following extract illustrates this 
point (Francis, 2013, p.43): 
 
‘Those with the most clear and close responsibility for ensuring that a safe and good 
standard of care was provided to patients in Stafford, namely the Board and other 
leaders in the Trust, failed to appreciate the enormity of what was happening, reacted 
too slowly, if at all, to some matters of concern of which they were aware, and 
downplayed the significance of others. In the first report, this was attributed in large 
part to an engrained culture of tolerance of poor standards, a focus on finance and 
targets, denial of concerns, and isolation from practice, elsewhere. Nothing I have 
heard in this Inquiry (i.e. the Public Inquiry) suggests that this analysis was wrong. 
Indeed the evidence (from the Public Inquiry) has only reinforced it.’ 
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The above critique of the negative impact of performance management on the central 
mission of this hospital trust is accentuated by its ‘good news’ culture which sought to 
negate or play down setbacks and celebrate whatever minor successes were 
experienced. A further extract from the Francis Report (2013, p.44) underlines the 
insensitivity of management in its handling of challenges: 
 
‘The Trust culture was one of self promotion rather than critical analysis and 
openness. This can be seen from the way the Trust approached its Foundation Trust 
application, its approach to high Hospital Standardised Mortality Rates and its 
inaccurate self declaration of its own performance. It took false assurance from good 
news, and yet tolerated or sought to explain away bad news.’ 
 
Despite the management preoccupation with financial matters to the exclusion of 
standards of patient care, this hospital trust managed to survive numerous reports 
from a variety of oversight bodies (Francis 2013, pp48-64), which challenged its 
fundamental practices of health care. Yet this hospital trust managed to stagger on like 
a zombie organisation, still focussing on its performance targets, before it was closed. 
This adverse impact of performance management systems goes beyond the 
Diefenbach (2009) critique which identifies adverse impacts on staff rather than the 
totality of the organisation and those it has a duty of care for. It could be discussed 
whether the adverse effects were the results of a flawed performance management 
system designed and used too much for financial matters and too little for 
performance, an incompetent management, a dysfunctional organisational culture, or 
a combination of all these issues. Using the lenses of complexity theory one could 
describe this case as a complex adaptive system organising itself top-down into a 
system with emerging properties crossing the edge of chaos. In effect, the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust may have had too little performance 
management rather than too much.  
 
The initial starting point in this section was the implicit reference by Lapsley and 
Schofield (2009) to health care as a complex adaptive system. Rhodes et al. (2011, 
p.112) deploy complexity theory to demonstrate how health care information systems 
can be modelled as a complex adaptive system. Also, Geyer and Rihani (2010, 
pp101–103) see the above kinds of adverse outcomes as an inevitable consequence of 
policy makers viewing the complex NHS as a mechanistic system which can be 
controlled from the centre. This approach fails to recognise the modernisers proposing 
cycled and recycled reforms through a single attractor, which limits the organisation 
in self organisation and co-evolution. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There is a clear need for effective performance management systems in public 
services. The NPM modernisers see this as a way of providing public services more 
efficiently. The era of austerity has reinforced the need for more effective 
management of performance. Yet, despite the very significant efforts by key actors 
within public services and by related agencies and experts, there is no unanimity on 
what constitutes best practice. Indeed, this paper has documented significant failures 
of existing practices when managers become so obsessed with managerial targets and 
21
  
appearance that they lose sight of the more fundamental issues of organisational 
mission and performance. This paper suggests that the underlying dimension which 
makes performance management so difficult is the sheer complexity of, and the often 
over-simplistic approach to performance management in the public sector. 
 
 
This paper has elaborated upon the potential of complexity theory to be mobilised by 
researchers within public services management to address the nature of public sector 
complexity and its impact on performance management.This conclusion is not 
without caveats as the origins, aims and expectations of complexity theorists may 
differ from the realities of policy making in everyday life. However, this perspective 
offers a definite research agenda for empirical studies of performance management 
practice, as set out below. 
 
1.  For performance management to be effective it must mitigate or eliminate the 
negative side effects on the key resource of human capital. There is scope for 
exploratory research in study settings where successful performance 
managements appear to operate to determine where and how this advance 
might be made. 
2. Much of the extant literature on performance management tools and 
technologies seems to be based on specific applications of particular practices. 
There is much to be gained from closely grained case studies of practice. But 
it would be interesting to see studies which undertook a more holistic 
evaluation of performance management by paying attention to the details and 
instability of systems. Such investigation potentially opens the way for 
developing a new, specific, framework for examining performance 
management in the public sector. 
3. In their writing Axelrod and Cohen (1999) refer to complexity theory as an aid 
to thinking. It would be interesting to see if managers of public services can 
relate to and make sense of the ideas in complexity theory in their everyday 
tasks. There is scope for experimental work in this area. 
4. Within an era of rapid technological development the role of social media 
which gives free access to global web communication to every individual 
thereby opening opportunities and risks for the public sector. The role of 
social media in enlisting, enrolling and mobilising different perspectives on 
how public services are delivered and performance managed offers a fruitful 
area of research.  
5. There is a longstanding issue within public services of remuneration, reward 
and incentives for exceptional performance. This is an important element of 
performance management and needs careful evaluation in work on public 
services. 
6. Within many public services there are many short-term pressures to deliver. 
There is scope for the receptivity and feasibility of longer planning horizons in 
future performance management modelling. 
7. Within performance management in public services there is silence on 
‘management’ – what it is and what it means. This paper suggests that 
performance management in public services is more complex than in other 
settings such as non-profit or private sector activities. Yet there is a 
presumption within existing literature that the ‘effective public manager’ 
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exists and will deliver. This is a key part of performance management which 
merits careful research and analysis. 
 
In addition to the above agenda focussed on performance management practices, there 
is scope for further theoretical research in this area. In particular we suggest the 
following issues: 
 
1. Complexity theory builds on the idea of agents within systems who detect the 
need for change and cluster to make change happen. Within this thinking the 
idea of the agent appears to presume homogeneity. Research on the manner in 
which agents act in complex adaptive systems merits careful evaluation. 
2. The raison d`etre of complex adaptive systems in complexity theory is an 
aversion to what is perceived as a mechanistic concept of how organisations 
function. However, the top down, command and control model reflects the 
need to deliver successful policy outcomes. It may be argued that this does not 
achieve its objective. But the self organisation, bottom up thinking in 
complexity theory needs to be reconciled with realpolitik for policy makers to 
endorse its use.  
3. There are strands of complexity theory which resonate with other ideas within 
the social sciences which have been used widely in the public sphere. This 
includes the idea of the street level bureaucrat which mirrors the purposeful 
agents depicted in complexity theory. Another example is isomorphism which 
has parallels with ideas of co-evolution. The idea of unintended consequences 
features too. There is scope for the study of this phenomenon to see if a 
melding of different approaches may be feasible. 
 
This paper suggests that performance management is a big challenge facing public 
services. It is the intention of this paper not only to encourage a rethink of existing 
practices to avoid the negative side effects documented in this paper, but to encourage 
researchers to undertake more nuanced research in this most difficult, complex, 
testing area for researchers and practitioners alike. 
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Introduction 
The Danish Public Accounts Committee (DPAC) is amongst the world’s oldest 
parliamentary account oversight committees, having been established in 1849. The 
longevity of the DPAC’s existence and the strength of its continued importance 
during that history are testaments to its significance in a society that now prides itself 
as being one with high levels of transparency (Williams, 2014). This chapter analyses 
how the DPAC and the National Audit Office of Denmark (NAOD) interrelate with 
each other in the acquittal of transparency of government in the performance audit 
regime
1
. It is within this field that we find an intricate interface between political 
controversy and audit standard malleability forming a tango of relations and identities 
around the enduring complexity of how Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) and 
oversight bodies behave in the intertwined flux of SAI independence, audit quality, 
and parliamentary oversight of the audit function. In providing this analysis, a 
contribution is made to understandings of institutional arrangements between 
parliamentary transparency mechanisms. 
 
The singularly important concept in the discussion of the DPAC and NAOD (and 
indeed this book) is that of SAI independence. Since the INTOSAI ‘Mexico 
Declaration’ regarding independence, good practice has been prescribed by ISSAI 10 
(INTOSAI, 2007). However, as noted in various studies, compliance to ISSAI 10 is 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘performance audit’ (‘forvaltningsrevision’ in Danish) is described by the NAOD’s website 
to include ‘large audits’ and ‘progressive audits’. We do not pursue that distinction but instead limit our 
enquiries to non-financial audits. 
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not uniform and at least 60 variables (Robertson, 2013) can be tested to assess 
compliance so achievement of absolute independence can be considered as a ‘holy 
grail’ for auditors, auditees and oversight bodies. Nevertheless, the degree of 
executive influence over exercise of audit powers is the core of independence and 
Thomas (2003, p. 297) identifies five structural features of independence in a 
parliamentary system that can assist to narrow our focus: 
 The nature of the agency, including how it is defined initially and how it is 
updated periodically; 
 The provisions respecting the appointment, tenure and removal of the 
leadership of the agency; 
 The process for deciding budgets and staffing for the agency; 
 Whether the agency is free to identify issues for study and whether it can 
compel the production of information; and 
 The reporting requirements for the agency and whether its performance is 
monitored.” 
For the purposes of assessing SAI independence, Thomas’ five features can be 
distilled into three primary issues, as are reflected in many Auditor-General Acts 
around the world. For example, these three features are captured in Section 7 of the 
Western Australia Auditor-General Act, 2007: “the Auditor General is not subject to 
direction from anyone in relation to whether a particular audit is conducted, how it is 
conducted or what is included in an audit report”. To those three aspects of 
independence can be added the issue of SAI conduct such that it avoids involvement 
in system change in order to be free of consequential bias for future audits. In the 
DPAC-NAOD relationship, we see institutional elements that are not in the normative 
prescription for SAI independence and as a result we set out to determine if public 
sector performance audit in Denmark is affected by issues related to the NAOD’s 
independence. 
 
The chapter utilizes the following structure: first it presents an overview of the DPAC 
and its relationship with the NAOD; second, having identified potential reasons to 
question the independence of the NAOD, the chapter examines evidence relevant to 
that issue and does so using a macro-view of the performance audit portfolio before 
examining secondary sources in a form of meta-analysis of relevant literature; third, a 
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 discussion is provided to better understand how the tango of relations impacts on the 
reality of practise within Danish performance audit; finally, the chapter concludes and 
provides some suggestions for fruitful further research. 
 
A Danish conquest: an oversight capture of independence 
“According to the Danish Constitution, Parliament appoints the members of the 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) to carry out the audit of the Danish public 
accounts.” Statsrevisorerne, 2012, p. 3). This extract from the Preamble of the 
DPAC’s official English-language overview of itself provides a simple encapsulation 
of the DPAC’s vision that it is the ultimate auditor of the Danish public sector. 
Indeed, in contrast to other PACs where members are given the title of 
‘Commissioner’ or ‘Member’, the DPAC is constituted of ‘State Auditors’ (in Danish: 
‘Statsrevisor’); this title has been in place since the PAC’s inception in 1849 including 
when first incorporated under the Danish Constitution. The concept of the DPAC 
being an integral part of the Danish audit function is further elaborated by the DPAC: 
“the Danish public audit organisation comprises 2 independent institutions 
under Parliament: the PAC and the Auditor-General’s Office. The Auditor-
General’s Office carries out the majority of the audit work. The Auditor-
General’s Office reports to the PAC in the form of reports and memoranda. 
The PAC is the only authority with the right to direct the Auditor General to 
carry out specific audit activities.” (Statsrevisorerne, 2012, p. 12, emphasis 
added). 
The explicit inclusion of the DPAC in the singular ‘Danish public audit organisation’ 
is a characteristic that demands attention in this chapter. However, other elements of 
what makes up the DPAC are notable and explained below. 
 
The DPAC consists of six State Auditors elected by Parliament with the six largest 
political parties each electing one State Auditor. These State Auditors do not need to 
be Members of Parliament and the present Chair who has served the DPAC for 22 
years (16 years as Chair) is not a Member of Parliament. Each State Auditor is elected 
for a four-year term but can be re-elected without maximum term., The Chair is the 
State Auditor with the longest serving DPAC membership (Knudsen, 2001) and is 
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 typically not a member of the main political party supporting the Government and 
perhaps this is related to two further interesting features of the DPAC’s workings: 
1. A principle of consensus: "Individual PAC members often express views on 
audit reports and upcoming investigations to the media and the public. 
However, such views are always based upon unanimous decisions in the 
PAC.” (Statsrevisorerne, 2012, p. 12). The principle of consensus in particular 
“applies in cases where the PAC makes the request that specific investigations 
be carried out by the Auditor General” (Statsrevisorerne, 2012, p. 11). 
2. In camera meetings with only associated staff (the DPAC has a staff of three) 
and the NAOD: during these meetings State Auditors have confidence that 
they will be heard on confidential matters before having to comply with the 
unanimous decisions of the DPAC (J.G. Christensen, 2009). 
 
Holding meetings in camera and maintaining its principle of consensus may be seen 
as tactics to minimize political gamesmanship within the DPAC. As a result the 
DPAC argues that it has high credibility (Statsrevisorerne, 2012) and this claim is 
supported by J.G. Christensen (2009) The DPAC’s credibility within the overall 
political process of Denmark is a fragile achievement belied by its more benign and 
uncontroversial four-part mission as stated in the 1849 Danish Constitution, viz: 
1. “to verify that all revenue is correctly reflected in the accounts and that all 
expenditure has been paid in accordance with the legislation, 
2. to verify that the accounts are correct, 
3. to assess whether the public funds have been managed properly, and 
4. to submit the audited public accounts for parliamentary approval” 
(Statsrevisorerne, 2012, p. 1) 
Notwithstanding the apparent account and accounting foci in that mission, the more 
politically contentious performance audits bring the DPAC into unavoidably 
controversial areas. Attached to those controversies come a range of consequential 
questions such as whether a performance audit is appropriate, whether the audit’s 
scope and terms of reference are suitable, whether the conduct of the audit is 
professional, whether the audit of one matter eventuates in the omission of other 
matters from the performance audit portfolio (given constrained resources) and so on. 
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It is those questions and their ilk that potentially can lead to attacks on the functioning 
of the DPAC as well as the alleged independence of the NAOD.  
 
The DPAC relationship with the NAOD begins with its role in the appointment of the 
Auditor-General: the DPAC nominates an individual to the Speaker of Parliament for 
an indefinite appointment not beyond a mandatory retirement age of 70 years. In 
addition, the DPAC provides the NAOD with an outlet for its reports in that the 
NAOD is not empowered to release its reports to the public or media. Instead, the 
NAOD’s reports are forwarded to the DPAC which is empowered to present the 
reports to Parliament and to do so with an accompanying commentary and 
recommendations for ministerial action. A further mode of significant DPAC 
influence with respect to performance audits is in the process determining the audit’s 
terms of reference: the NAOD provides a draft for the DPAC to consider. These 
aspects of the DPAC-NAOD relationship, together with the power of the DPAC to 
mandate NAOD conduct of specific performance audits form some of the most 
important aspects of the DPAC-NAOD relationship. However, given the nuances of 
the relationship between an oversight committee and a SAI, it remains an empirical 
question as to whether the NAOD’s independence is limited in the Danish pursuit of 
audit supervision. It is to that question that we turn next. 
 
The empirical corpus of this chapter is captured in Table 1 as discussed in the 
remainder of the chapter. 
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Independence 
characteristic 
Evidence drawn upon Source 
NAOD ability to 
determine its audit 
portfolio plan 
Statistical analysis of the 
implementation of past 
audits 
NAOD audit reports for 
1998 to 2013 
Freedom to determine an 
audit’s Terms of Reference 
Police reform audits 
(2008-2010) 
Skærbæk and Christensen 
(forthcoming) 
Audit report writing 
without external influence 
Audits of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (2001-
2002) and Ministry of 
Transport (1998-2004) 
Justesen (2008); Justesen 
and Skærbæk (2005; 2010) 
Impartiality: avoidance of 
decision making 
involvement 
Audits of Defence (1989-
2006) and Denmark’s 
Radio controversy (2001-
2008) 
Skærbæk (2009); NAOD 
and DPAC public 
announcements 
Table 1: Overview of empirical corpus 
 
Dimensions of the NAOD’s independence 
In this section we assess if the NAOD is unfettered in its performance audit planning. 
We present an overview of the relative importance of DPAC-mandated performance 
audits compared to the remaining audits that are programmed by the NAOD. The 
importance of this is found in ISSAI10 Principle 3 requiring a broad mandate and full 
discretion for the SAI in its functions. 
 
Relative importance of DPAC-mandated performance audits 
It is a difficult empirical issue to determine relative importance of audits when they 
differ significantly in terms of size, impact or precedence. Since performance audits 
are by nature variable in their terms of reference, it is challenging to assess the 
significance of a specific collection of audits (for example, those audits not mandated 
by the NAOD in their portfolio of audits). However, it can be presumed that as the 
number of performance audits mandated by the DPAC increase as a proportion of the 
total number of performance audits, other things being equal, it is likely that the level 
of interference in the NAOD’s independence may be higher. In accordance with this 
presumption we have extracted data (Table 2) showing the number of audits mandated 
by the DPAC under Section 8.1 of the Auditor General’s Act (amended 2006). 
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Year Audits mandated by 
DPAC 
Audits not mandated by 
DPAC 
% of annual audit 
programme mandated 
by DPAC 
1998 5 8 38% 
1999 4 13 24% 
2000 7 8 47% 
2001 5 12 29% 
2002 6 11 35% 
2003 6 8 43% 
2004 6 12 33% 
2005 6 11 35% 
2006 5 10 33% 
2007 7 11 39% 
2008 7 11 39% 
2009 5 5 50% 
2010 7 17 29% 
2011 5 18 22% 
2012 6 15 29% 
2013 5 15 20% 
Table 2: Quantum of performance audits mandated by the DPAC, 1998-2013 
 
From Table 2 it is notable that in 10 separate years, a third or more of the NAOD’s 
performance audit topics were chosen by the DPAC. On a simple measure of topics, it 
would seem that the NAOD cannot argue that the first simplified feature of 
independence (that is unfettered freedom to choose audit topic) is met. In no single 
year has the NAOD been able to determine more than 80% of its performance audit 
program
2
 and so it can be concluded that a materially significant number of topics or 
devotion of audit resources are not of the choice of the NAOD. Clearly, Section 8.1 of 
the Auditor General’s Act which empowers the DPAC to interfere in the NAOD’s 
audit program, is not a hollow power but instead is operating to ensure that party 
political forces have an active say in what issues are subject to performance audit. 
 
The NAOD’s unusual legislated framework has led to independent commentary of the 
NAOD on issues of independence (NAOD, 2006a) in a peer review conducted with 
the assistance of INTOSAI. That peer review noted that the legislative framework 
“makes the NAOD unique, compared to other SAIs” (NAOD, 2006a, p. 6). Further, 
the review noted that the NAOD has a need to enhance its “ability to set the correct 
                                                 
2
 2013 seems to be an outlier in this data set in that it is the lowest proportion of DPAC-mandated 
audits; however, 2013 marked the first complete year under the current (new) Auditor-General. Below, 
we will return to the issue of impact from longevity of Auditor-General and Chair, DPAC. 
34
  
long-term priorities in performance audit” (p. 9). These comments recognise the dual 
interference in audit planning quantum and timing that means the NAOD is 
significantly challenged in its ability to determine an audit portfolio plan on any 
timeframe. 
 
Arising from oversight interference in the NAOD is its inability to follow its desired 
audit plan since it can be disrupted at any time and to any extent decided by the 
DPAC. The difficulty of this situation is noted by Knudsen (2001, p. 141): “The 
Auditor-General has to find a balance between requested audits and self-determined 
audit work. This requires that the resource consumption to the various tasks is made 
explicit. This also requires that the Auditor-General draws attention to circumstances 
where requested work becomes an impediment to other tasks”. However, to date there 
is no known public expression of dissatisfaction by the Auditor-General – including in 
the years 2000, 2003 and 2009 when the DPAC mandated 47%, 43% and 50% of the 
whole performance audit regime. It is difficult to contemplate how a planned program 
of performance audits can absorb such magnitudes of unplanned audits without 
destroying the audit plan in topic or depth. Thus the issue of priority setting in 
determining the program of performance audit is clearly an issue with which the 
NAOD must grapple given the annual and ad hoc mandated audits directed by the 
DPAC. 
 
Whilst the Auditor General’s Act allows DPAC mandate of audit, there is evidence 
that the powerful Parliamentary Finance and Budget Committee also directs the 
NAOD to conduct audits. This evidence is found in a report by the consulting firm 
Rambøll (2009, p. 35) noting that “The Parliament’s Finance and Budget Committee 
is also requesting more reviews to be done” (p. 35). Although the magnitude of such 
requests is unknown, Skærbæk and Christensen (forthcoming) also document an 
instance of direction from the Finance and Budget Committee to the NAOD via the 
DPAC for conduct of a performance audit.  
 
Given the NAOD’s inability to fully program its audit plan, it faces difficult choices 
in resource allocation and indications are that one choice is to lessen the depth of 
audits. That is, an observed tendency to compliance audit rather than performance 
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audit has been documented by peer review (NAOD, 2006a) and agreed by the NAOD 
(NAOD, 2013). This tendency means that the NAOD’s performance audit program 
has less emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness than would be expected of a truly 
independent SAI. Arising from this observation is an interest in the other aspects of 
independence to which we turn next. 
 
Freedom to determine an audit’s Terms of Reference 
Crucial to an independent SAI is the ability to focus planned performance audits on 
specific matters where justified by the Auditor’s-General judgement on materiality 
and risk without external pressure to include or exclude certain matters. The final 
expression of that judgement is the audit specification documented in Terms of 
Reference defining the scope of the audit. Implicit in good performance audit practice 
is the understanding that the auditor will determine the audit’s Terms of Reference 
and other aspects of the audit’s specifications (INTOSAI Professional Standard 
Committee, 2010). 
 
In order to understand the NAOD’s situation with respect to audit specification, it is 
necessary to consider the process by which a performance audit is conceived, planned, 
executed, reported upon and subsequently audited. That process is depicted in Figure 
1 wherein it is shown that NAOD performance audits are subject to a routine draft of 
an audit specification which needs to be agreed to by the DPAC before the 
commencement of the audit. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Performance audit procedure 
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In this section, we review evidence that audit specifications do not always comply 
with ISSAI Principle 3. Rarely can we see behind the closed doors of the DPAC and 
NAOD in their audit planning but in the case of multiple performance audits of the 
Danish police reforms from 2008 to 2010, revealing data is produced. As documented 
by Skærbæk and Christensen (forthcoming), draft Terms of Reference were prepared 
by the NAOD after receiving a DPAC notice of requirement of a performance audit. 
The draft Terms of Reference were sent to the DPAC with the Auditor’s-General 
request: “If the DPAC wants, I can initiate the investigation in accordance with the 
sketched above” (NAOD, 2008, p. 4) and final audit specifications were approved by 
the DPAC. In a major performance audit, the specification was narrow such that 
instead of a performance audit in which evaluations of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness would be reached there was a “decision to focus on the management of 
the reform (which) framed the audit and this can be identified as an instance of blame 
purification provided by the auditing profession” (Skærbæk and Christensen, 
forthcoming). 
 
Whilst the police reform audits can be considered to be a single case where political 
controversy was extreme (refer Skærbæk and Christensen, forthcoming), it is notable 
that the formalised process of determining Terms of Reference as shown in Figure 1 is 
apparently designed to ensure the NAOD does not commence a performance audit 
with only its independent judgement determining the issues to be subject to audit. A 
review of DPAC requests for audits under Section 8.1 of the Auditor General Act 
reveals that the DPAC uses a standard format in which it specifies questions or issues 
to be investigated which subsequently appear in the audit’s Terms of Reference. 
Indeed, it is documented that the DPAC holds its meetings with the Auditor-General 
waiting outside the meeting room in case he (now she) is required for discussions with 
the DPAC (Rambøll, 2009, p. 29). The consequential smooth flow of non-
documented directives from the DPAC directly to the NAOD does not reinforce the 
image of the Auditor-General exercising absolute independence. Further, there is no 
evidence of a lack of unanimity between the DPAC and the NAOD on the Terms of 
Reference for performance audits. Instead, it seems that the process is designed to 
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privilege political influence over the NAOD’s judgement and in contravention of 
ISSAI Principle Number 3. 
 
Performance audit report writing without influence external to the NAOD 
Performance audit reports are invariably controversial in their findings. Such 
controversy raises issues of political risk to government, agencies and senior 
managers such that there is heightened sensitivity to the written word of the eventual 
audit output: a final report. It is in that context that INTOSAI (2007) has pointed to 
the importance that the SAI is not subject to influence in writing of the performance 
audit report. It is within that issue we now consider evidence arising from the 
NAOD’s recent activities. 
 
The extant literature reveals strong evidence that the NAOD subjects its audit reports 
to a degree of co-authoring. For example, Justesen (2008) presents an in-depth study 
of the writing of a performance audit regarding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She 
finds that a “multiplicity of authors” (p. 214) give birth to audit reports under the 
name of the NAOD. 
 
Comparable to the analysis of Justesen (2008), Justesen and Skærbæk (2005; 2010) 
analyse of a series of audit reports between 1998 and 2004 in the Ministry of 
Transport (MoT) portfolio and identify instances of co-authoring of audit reports. In 
that six year period, the DPAC mandated seven audits related to specific issues arising 
in the MoT’s responsibilities. These audits can be seen as a series in which issues 
from prior audits influenced audit reports in the subsequent audits. By recognising the 
seriatim nature of these reports, Justesen and Skærbæk (2010) point out that the ways 
in which media, politicians and auditee managers have treated prior reports seem to be 
influencing subsequent report writing and selection of future audit topics. 
 
In the package of information presented by Justesen and Skærbæk (2010) it is notable 
that the series of audits reached a culmination in a DPAC-mandated audit on the 
"corporate management’ responsibility of the MoT Secretariat (Rigsrevisionen, 2004). 
The evidence suggests that the DPAC had taken target on the cause of its concerns 
regarding transport issues across multiple agencies over a six year period: the senior 
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 managers. Both these managers and the NAOD were aware that media reaction to 
audits is positively correlated with the extent of criticism expressed in the audit 
reports and so the number of rounds of report revision seemed to increase as the 
seriatum audits emerged. In the latter audit report writing, six drafts were discussed 
before the NAOD felt confident to provide the DPAC with its report (Justesen and 
Skærbæk, 2005, p. 334). Such an incidence of drafting indicates a degree of co-
authoring or negotiation rather than the prescribed ‘check for accuracy’ process 
whereby an auditee is invited to comment on a draft report. As Justesen and Skærbæk 
(2005, p. 334) note: an “important external factor that influenced the process was the 
PAC who initiated the writing of the report (and) … in this sense the PAC is clearly 
an active co-writer in this particular audit process”. Thus, the ideal image of an audit 
report being an unbiased and independent output of a scientific process of enquiry is 
damaged by Justesen’s (2005) and Justesen and Skærbæk’s (2010) demonstration of 
co-authoring and the determination of audit targets in a series of progressive audits. 
 
Decision making involvement 
ISSAI 10 and ISSAI 12 provide sound argument as to why auditors should avoid 
involvement in the management or decision making processes of auditee entities. A solid 
principle is that such involvement will necessarily reduce the SAI’s independence if 
conducting future audits in those affected entities. In this regard, we sought to identify 
whether there is evidence of the NAOD breaching this good practice whereby auditors 
should “not be involved or be seen to be involved, in any manner, whatsoever, in the 
management of the organizations that they audit.” (ISSAI 12, p. 5).  
 
At the time of the cases referred to in Table 1, the NAOD English-language webpage 
unintentionally revealed the potential for danger in regard to involvement in decision 
making. It sought to establish a twin identity which, if implemented, would bring the 
NAOD close to involvement in auditee decision making. The webpage stated that 
NAOD’s mission covered both a ‘control’ and an ‘encourage’ role (NAOD, 2005 
however the NAOD did not seem to recognise the inherent contradiction between 
controlling auditees without having involvement in management or decision making – 
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as would be the case if change was ‘encouraged’.3 Whilst that inherent contradiction 
was present, a ‘trap’ seemed to be present for NAOD auditors such that their 
enthusiasm for change might blind them to the dangers attached to auditors becoming 
too closely associated with planning and/or implementation of new systems. It is to 
that danger that we turn in this section. 
 
At least two documented cases exist where evidence points to NAOD auditors being 
accused of involvement in management decision making within an auditee entity. One 
case is documented by Skærbæk (2009) and relates to the Danish Defence Force 
(DDF) in a series of eight audits conducted by the NAOD from 1989 to 2006. Over 
such a large number of audits it is shown that the NAOD’s desire to see management 
accounting reform resulted in their exposure to decision making about the precise 
design of that reform. Thus one interviewee recalled when the decision was being 
made to implement the new accounting system named DeMars: “the NAOD was 
sitting at the end of the table when DeMars was decided” (quoted in Skærbæk, 2009, 
p. 981). Further, in the Auditor’s-General 1996 annual report to parliament, he 
assured that DeMars “will solve all significant problems” (quoted in Skærbæk, 2009, 
p. 981). In this evidence we see the NAOD assuming an identity not consistent with 
ISSAI Principle 3 since it became active in the DDF as a ‘modernizer’ rather than an 
independent auditor. The modernizer was keen to support and implement what it 
considered to be improvements to the DDF’s accounting system. Consequential to 
that, the DPAC expressed concern that the NAOD “was involved with the DeMars 
project as a consultant giving advice” (Skærbæk, 2009, p. 981). 
 
The NAOD’s exposure to a self-inflicted impairment to its independence in the DDF 
audits did not act to prevent it from much greater reputational damage in 2006 when it 
became embroiled in criticism of its active support of management decision making in 
the Denmark’s Radio (DR) building cost-overrun scandal. Although peer-reviewed 
analysis of the NAOD’s involvement in the DR scandal is yet to appear, we rely here 
on source documents that reveal matters relevant to our endeavour in this chapter. 
                                                 
3
 Sometime between 2012 and the time of writing, the NAOD revised its webpage and removed the 
words ‘control’ and ‘encourage’ from its mission. The more recent mission statement is: 
”Rigsrevisionen audits the government accounts on behalf of the Danish parliament and supports the 
development of efficient administration in order to create maximum value for the citizens” (NAOD, 
2014)’. 
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DR is Denmark’s national broadcaster and the case here emerged from serious cost 
overruns that developed as DR was managing the construction of a new domicile 
intended by the government to be a major piece of infrastructure underpinning a new 
urban extension of Copenhagen in previously undeveloped land. The new building 
and concert hall was to be a landmark and thus was politically important from the 
beginning of its conception. During the construction phase, the NAOD made annual 
financial audits and various commentaries “on a running basis” (KPMG and Grant 
Thornton, 2008, p. 161) on the DR construction project between 2002 and 2006. 
Indeed to do so, the NAOD’s allocated staff frequently attended the premises of DR 
during the construction management period. From this close relationship between the 
NAOD and DR management one eventual result was that the NAOD was challenged 
as to whether it had breached the impartiality principle of avoiding decision making in 
auditee entities. 
 
The controversy surrounding the very large cost overruns (around 600 million DKK 
in 2006) of the DR project led to growing commentary in the Danish media. The 
amount of money involved  became a political embarrassment and the NAOD 
responded by announcing in early September it would conduct a major review of the 
DR project. However, this action generated criticism that the NAOD lacked 
impartiality because it had previously supported budget allocations with advice to the 
DR Board in April 2006 that those allocations encompassed known risks. That is, 
commentators drew attention to the NAOD’s lack of independence on the matter of 
DR’s management as a consequence of its provision of advice regarding future 
eventualities. The severity of this criticism motivated the Parliament’s Culture 
Committee to seek advice from Parliament’s Legal Secretariat as to the reality or 
appearance of the NAOD’s lack of impartiality, independence or competence to audit 
the DR. In December 2006 the Secretariat brought its report to Parliament noting that 
the NAOD had provided advice and support to the DR in its management of the 
construction project (Folketingets Lovsekretariat, 2006) however a case of partiality 
sufficient to warrant dismissal of the Auditor-General was not found. Nevertheless, 
the Auditor-General decided to cancel the proposed audit and instead KPMG and 
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 Grant Thornton were commissioned, by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, to conduct a 
performance audit of DR from which they eventually produced a 389 page report. 
 
The notable outcome of the DR case, from the audit point of view, was that it 
produced a very rare moment in Denmark’s long history of the DPAC: the DPAC 
issued a criticism of the NAOD. Even though the KPMG/Grant Thornton extensive 
report concluded that DR’s management could not rely only on the NAOD’s advice, 
the DPAC’s secretariat was more damning in its conclusion that “there was an 
expectations gap (we) had expected that the NAOD had audited the budgetary 
assumptions and had compared them to the degrees of actual accomplishment” 
(Statsrevisorerne Sekretariat, 2008, p. 8). Further, the DPAC noted that it found “it 
unsatisfactory that the NAOD for a number of issues had not carried out its audit task 
on the DR’s construction (project)” (Statsrevisorerne, 2008, p. 1). This observation of 
the DPAC reveals an expectation that the NAOD could in some way have prevented 
the cost overruns. Such an expectation appears to be reflective of a faith in the power 
of audit which is clearly beyond what can be delivered and if it were possible, would 
imperil the NAOD’s impartiality. As will be noted, the DPAC would achieve more if 
it invoked other arms of government machinery to implement change where the 
DPAC perceived change was required. 
 
The DR case is enlightening, not simply for its alert to the NAOD of the importance 
of independence. Additionally, it revealed that the decision to conduct performance 
audits in Denmark, at that time, was a political outcome and that the DPAC is 
superior to the NAOD. Further, it revealed involvements of Parliamentary 
Committees beyond the DPAC and Finance and Budget Committee in the selection of 
audit topics and the crafting of Terms of Reference (even after the commencement of 
the audit, since the NAOD audit was altered by request of the DPAC and the Culture 
Committee, after the audit had commenced and before it was later aborted) (NAOD, 
2006b). These observations are consistent with aspects of the abovementioned Police 
and Defence audits. 
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Conclusion: ‘something rotten in the state of Denmark’, or an open and 
transparent society? 
The above discussion presents strong evidence that the relationship between the 
NAOD and the DPAC leaves the NAOD in a situation of weakened or impaired 
independence. The NAOD cannot determine its audit plan without interference by the 
DPAC and other Parliamentary bodies; the audit specifications are negotiated and 
eventually approved by the DPAC; audit reports are the consequence of a co-
authoring process and subject to overarching comment by the DPAC before being 
released for public consideration; and, there are known instances of the NAOD 
providing advice to auditee entities where that advice relates to management decision 
making which may be subject to future audit. Each of these matters is in contradiction 
to ISSAI Standards or good practice. 
 
The evidence noted herein seems damning of Danish institutional arrangements for 
public sector audit. However, an arguable case can be made that the Danes have 
established legislative and precedential conventions that make open (or relatively 
open) what happens by way of hidden reality in most other countries. That is, it is 
naïve to expect that audit oversight bodies do not exert varying levels of influence 
over SAIs in terms of their performance audit planning and in terms of interpretation 
of the audit results, including crafting of a politically sensitive audit report (for a 
comparable example, refer Radcliffe, 2008). By legislating the DPAC’s right to 
mandate audits and by creating the convention that audit Terms of Reference are 
influenced and approved by the DPAC, Denmark has made open the fact that SAI’s 
cannot operate with absolute independence whilst Parliament remains supreme. Of 
course, the ‘balancing act’ that is required is for Parliament to ensure that the 
Executive does not turn Parliament into a ‘rubber stamp’ approving body. In that 
regard, the Danish mechanism of the six largest political parties electing one 
individual each (and not necessarily a Parliamentarian) means that audit oversight is 
enacted by a political mix close to that which characterizes Parliament, and not the 
Government which is constituted by the single largest political party or a coalition 
commanding a majority of votes. 
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Against the efficacious design features of the DPAC-NAOD ‘tango’ can be noted 
some risks which demonstrate that Denmark could nevertheless improve matters 
related to public sector audit. In particular there is a risk of impartiality impairment as 
the tenures of the DPAC Chair and the Auditor-General stretch into long – sometimes 
decades long – concurrent tenures. In the period from 1998-2012 the same DPAC 
Chair and the same Auditor-General held their respective roles and during that period 
it is notable that the degree of DPAC-mandated audits rose to 50% of the total 
performance audit program. Such proportions cannot be seen as conforming to the 
right of the SAI to determine what is audited but they may indicate the relationship 
between DPAC Chair and Auditor-General had reached levels of mutual confidence 
and understanding that do not serve the interests of Parliament nor independent audit. 
In such a close relationship, it is possible that both institutions begin to rely on each 
other’s support to the point where mutual co-dependency causes dysfunctions in the 
acquittal of independent audit. Thus we observe the NAOD failing to preserve its 
impartiality in cases such as the DR audit and we observe the DPAC involving itself 
in audits as they proceed even to the effect of altering Terms of Reference during an 
audit. 
 
The time honoured principle of ensuring auditors do not develop a close personal 
relationship with auditees could be equally applied to the tango of relations between a 
DPAC Chair and an Auditor-General. In order to obviate the likelihood of co-
dependency reaching levels comparable to nepotism, it would seem desirable to set 
maximum terms of Chair tenure for the DPAC. Such a system would be a contrast to 
the current arrangement whereby the DPAC Chair is the longest serving State Auditor 
thus there is no mechanism to prevent a long serving Chair from serving a concurrent 
period with a long serving Auditor-General. In fact, the current arrangements 
guarantee the DPAC Chair and the Auditor-General will work closely together for 
long periods unless either relinquishes their appointment. Thus we see the current 
DPAC Chair and the previous Auditor-General were in their respective positions 
concurrently for 14 years. Given the controversial nature of public sector audit it 
seems likely that a series of ‘crises’ in which the performance of both the DPAC and 
the NAOD come under pressure and scrutiny, may result in the DPAC Chair and the 
Auditor-General, as individual human beings, being compromised by favours, 
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 exchanges and administrative accommodations that will necessarily arise. This 
observation leads to another that also arises from the examination of DPAC and 
NAOD relations: the concern as to how the NAOD’s activities are influenced by the 
NAOD’s subservient relation to the DPAC. 
 
The NAOD appears to have become a tool of investigation for the DPAC which also 
acts as its administrative supervisor and conduit to Parliament. Whilst the NAOD is 
administratively a rather recent institution (commencing in 1976), the DPAC is 
remarkably longstanding with its history, dating from 1849. These comparative 
histories add to the exercise of control by the DPAC over the NAOD with respect to 
performance audits. However, that control, at least under the 14 year period of 
concurrent tenures of the current DPAC Chair and the previous Auditor-General, has 
seen the NAOD performance audit criticized by peer review for excessive focus on 
compliance at the expense of considerations of efficiency and effectiveness (NAOD, 
2006). It has also seen up to 50% of the NAOD’s annual audit program being 
determined by the DPAC (refer Table 2) and evidence of other bodies’ influence over 
the NAOD’s audit program is also found. These findings are coupled with the finding 
that Danish public sector performance audits arising from the political process are 
characterized as exercises in blame (Skærbæk and Christensen, forthcoming) in which 
that blame turns focus on to individuals and thus diverts attention from system issues 
of efficiency and effectiveness. As a result it is observed here that the NAOD’s 
performance audit function is less effective than is possible. 
 
In addition to the abovementioned observations with respect to the NAOD’s 
performance, this chapter concludes with the observation that the DPAC is itself not 
well served by its control over the NAOD. First, the DPAC has a confidence in the 
power of audit that exceeds the reality of audit: instead of invoking the use of relevant 
arms of government (such as the Ministry of Finance), the DPAC seems to rely on the 
NAOD for accounting expertise. Second, the disservice to the DPAC results from the 
manner in which the DPAC has diminished the NAOD’s independence such that the 
oversight of the NAOD is also diminished. Since the DPAC Chair and the Auditor-
General are likely to spend a number of years in close cooperation over controversial 
matters of intense interest to the political parties of Denmark, the DPAC’s oversight 
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 of the NAOD is also compromised. As a result, instances of NAOD transgression of 
normal audit principles designed to preserve impartiality have been shown to arise. 
Perhaps with a less compromised oversight, the NAOD’s service to the DPAC would 
be improved. Indeed, the dramatic drop in DPAC-mandated audit in the first full year 
of the new Auditor-General (refer Table 2, 2013 data) may indicate that the new 
Auditor-General has observed the dangers pointed out above and has also been able to 
persuade the DPAC of her need to control the NAOD’s audit program in order to 
preserve her independence. Another interpretation of this limited data emergence is 
that the previous DPAC Chair and Auditor-General tango also allowed the NAOD to 
use the cover of DPAC-mandate to persuade agencies that the necessity for a 
performance audit in their realm of responsibilities was ‘independently’ determined 
from outside the NAOD. In doing so, the room to negotiate timing and scope of the 
audit would be eliminated since the legislative and political power of the DPAC 
would overwhelm any considerations that an agency may be able to marshal. 
 
A final comment is worthy here: the abovementioned cases and data relate to the 
Danish public sector audit tango of relations between SAI and audit oversight body, 
yet these observations can throw light on the generics of this difficult relationship. 
Clearly, SAI independence is crucial. However, SAI’s do not have some god-like 
existence but they are drawn necessarily into the human and non-human networks 
within which they must operate. As a result, they need to preserve their reputation and 
identity as experts with the purity that is associated with independence and 
impartiality yet they also need to have allies in government and in the public sector. 
To marshall support will sometimes require being supported and, perhaps later, being 
supportive. Such ‘deals’ can thus influence the context within which SAIs necessarily 
operate – including their relationships with the parliamentary oversight of their 
operations. The Danish situation may be uniquely Danish with its unusual legislative 
framework and its long history, but it does involve principles that are necessarily 
unavoidable in most SAIs.  
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Beyond What? 
- on the diffusion of Beyond Budgeting 
Trond Bjørnenak 
 
 
Abstract 
‘Beyond budgeting’ (BB) is a practice-defined concept that has received increased attention in 
recent years. Evidence of why it is diffused and how it is adopted in practice seems to be more 
anecdotal. The purpose of this paper is to describe and compare different adoptions of BB. 
Drawing on diffusion theory, these differences are related to the various actors driving such 
adoption. The findings show that there are major differences in how BB is adopted. In the 
controller-driven version, an advanced set of management accounting practices replaces the 
budget, and the fixed core of the accounting system is extended significantly. There are clear 
indications of a tension between corporate and local controllers. At the other extreme, the 
CEO-driven adoption dramatically diminished the role of the centralized controller function 
and redefined a fixed core based on hard financial performance measures. In the forced 
selection case, budgets became a local system and not a part of the fixed core of the system. 
The systems with and without budgets had common features, and the main differences lay in 
balance between the central and local, and the temporary and continuous elements of the 
system, not in whether budgets were used or not.  This paper contributes to our understanding 
of the concept of BB, introduces a framework for describing changes in management 
accounting systems, the role of controllers in BB and calls for the prompt rethinking of 
traditional management accounting diffusion studies.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Beyond Budgeting (BB) has become an increasingly important management model in large 
organisations all over the world. A BB movement has been launched in recent years, mainly 
driven by practitioners and other non-academic institutions (see e.g. Kaplan in Bogsnes, 
2009).  Network organizations like the Beyond Budgeting Roundtable (www.bbrt.org) have 
attracted significant corporate membership, with participating companies differing greatly in 
size and origin. 
Despite being known about for over two decades, the BB phenomenon has not attracted much 
academic interest. With a few, mainly Scandinavian exceptions, there seems to have been 
limited systematic research on the diffusion, implementation and effects of BB. In fact, there 
is little evidence both of what actually constitutes BB and of how management control 
systems are implemented in organizations departing from traditional budgets. Management 
accounting textbooks (e.g. Horngren, Datar and Rajan, 2015) seem either to more or less 
ignore the concept or to limit themselves to the case of the Swedish bank, Handelsbanken, in 
conjunction with rhetoric gleaned from the Beyond Budgeting Roundtable (e.g. Burns et. al., 
2013).  
One plausible explanation for this gap between academia and practice is the lack of 
understanding of the concept per se. Management accounting innovations like ‘balanced 
scorecard’, ‘activity based costing’ or ‘target costing’ all have a technical core that can be 
related to traditional systems. So what is new in BB? Is it the design of the control systems? 
Or is it just a critique of traditional models? In a number of publications, Hope & Frazer state 
that BB is neither a tool nor a technique, rather a management model or management 
philosophy (see e.g. Hope and Frazer, 2003). BB is a practice-defined concept, and as such 
involves much more than management accounting tools and techniques. But at the same time 
BB is still perceived in practice as a management accounting-related topic (Becker, Messner 
and Scäffer, 2010).  Thus, it is also about how companies replace budgets with other 
management accounting tools. According to Charles Horngreen: 
‘Most of the solutions generally proposed for management problems involve putting 
something new into the organization. In this regard, beyond budgeting is very different. 
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Perhaps uniquely, it proposes taking something powerful out to make room for something new 
and even more powerful.’ (Horngren, in Hope and Frazer, 2003) 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate how companies operate when they remove budgets, i.e. 
what they are changing and why they do these changes. It is also aiming at an improved 
understanding of why the BB companies differ in the design of their control system. The roles 
of top management and controllers are of particular interest, since they are seen as the drivers 
of change. Thus, these actors are given close attention in the study. We will also investigate 
the potential effects of different actors introducing the idea to an organization.  
 
This investigation of how and why BB is spread and implemented is based on three non- 
randomly selected cases. This selection was informed both by diffusion theory, and by the 
role of different actors in their adoption of new ideas. However, it is not diffusion per se that 
is the focus of the study; rather, the relations between the drivers of the adoption and the ideas 
which they adopt. In order to describe the latter, the study applies a framework for unbundling 
management accounting ideas.  
 
The following section presents the pioneers of BB and outlines previous BB research. Section 
three presents a framework based on diffusion theory and a model for unbundling 
management accounting innovations. This is followed by a discussion of the research method 
applied in the study. Section five presents the findings from the three cases, followed by a 
discussion section and conclusions.  
51
2. Beyond Budgeting – pioneers and previous research 
 
In 1970, Jan Wallander took over as CEO of the Swedish Handelsbanken. One of his first 
moves was to abandon budgeting (Wallander 1994, 1999). This case has been cited in a 
number of books (e.g. Burns et al 2013) and articles as a classic case of BB, and Wallander is 
often described as the BB pioneer (Hope and Fraser, 2003; Bogsnes 2009). However the case 
did not get much attention prior to the late 1990s, when Wallander published Budgets – 
unnecessary evil (1994). The book was written in Swedish, but a shorter, English version was 
published in the Scandinavian Journal of Management in 1999 (Wallander, 1999).  
 
Wallander was inspired to abandon budgets having worked for many years as a professional 
economist leading a research institute specialising in making long-term forecasts for different 
variables (demand for cars, TVs etc.). These forecasts were based on historical trends, and 
breaks in the curve were generally not foreseen. Wallander saw a similar problem with 
budgets: they prevent management from identifying the important issues. Wallander’s 
proposed alternative was to ‘keep it simple’:  
 
‘It is evident that the kind of information I am talking about are the figures that to a large extent you already 
have or should have in your profit and loss account and balance sheet and your ordinary information systems. 
What you have to do is to organize and construct them in such a way that they fit the demand …..’ 
Wallander, 1999, p. 413 
 
The solution chosen by the Swedish Handelsbanken was to focus on relative financial 
performance (benchmarking branches on costs, profit and losses) and a profit sharing bonus 
plan. This simple system was not in any way a secret. Nevertheless, Handelsbanken has 
outperformed all other large Scandinavian banks. In every year since 1972, they have reported 
a ROE that is above average for the industry, and their annual total shareholder return has 
been more than 20% over the same period. The most obvious profit driver has been cost 
efficiency, with a cost-to-income ratio of approximately 45% (average in the industry is above 
60%). 
 
The other pioneer in Scandinavia is the Norwegian oil company, Statoil, as presented by 
Bjarte Bogsnes in his book Implementing Beyond Budgeting (2009). Bogsnes is also chairman 
of Beyond Budgeting Round Table Europe. Statoil’s experience of BB began in the 
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petrochemical company Borealis (partly owned by Statoil), where Bogsnes and his group of 
controllers ‘blew up the budget’ in 1995. This decision was not informed by any other 
projects: 
 
‘We were actually far down the road before we heard about Handelsbanken, even if the bank already had been 
operating without budgets for 25 years, and only some 100 miles away!’ (Bogsnes, 2009, p. 68) 
 
At Borealis, the traditional budget was replaced by four tools: ‘rolling financial forecasts’, 
‘balanced scorecard’, ‘ABC’, and an investment management system. The ‘success’ of the 
system was presented at different seminars in Scandinavia. However, the performance 
statistics were based on perceived benefits within the company and not on actual outcomes. 
Borealis came under new shareholders in 1999, and Statoil sold its stake in 2005.  
 
Bjarte Bogsnes returned to Statoil in 2002 as a corporate controller. In 2005, Statoil’s BB 
program was approved by the executive committee, and Bogsnes became the full-time BB 
project manager: 
 
‘Steve Morlidge, who held a similar role in Unilever, claims that there were only three of us in such roles at the 
time…. I am glad that the number is on the way up. Right now there are actually three of us in Norway alone.’ 
(Bogsnes, 2009, p. 109) 
 
Statoil’s board has not approved a budget since 2004, and many (but not all) units currently 
implement the new Statoil model. The company implemented a large-scale Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) system in the late 1990s, and for a long time used balanced 
scorecards (known as Management Information in Statoil (MIS)). Key performance indicators 
(KPIs) and target setting are also essential in the new model: 
 
‘Ambition to action is our version of the balanced scorecard…’ (Bogsnes, 2009, p. 114) 
 
KPIs are measured ex-post and integrated into forecasting. Ambition targets are set for the 
KPIs. These are measured ex-post and in some cases are forecasted ex-ante.  
 
The purpose of this short presentation of these two pioneering companies implementing BB is 
not to give a full description of the new models and systems, rather to highlight some 
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differences and similarities between them. First of all, in both cases, the introduction of BB 
was based on a harsh critique of the traditional budgeting system. In both of their books 
(Wallander 1994, Bogsnes, 2009) a significant amount of room is given over to describing 
problems with traditional systems. These problems are also based on the authors’ outside 
experiences. Wallander drew on his previous work in research and long-term prognoses. 
Bogsnes brought experience of a company which operated in a totally different setting. Note 
that Statoil was, and remains, a (mainly offshore) oil company with very high profitability; 
whereas Borealis was a manufacturing company with low profitability.  
 
Another important similarity can be seen in the roles of Jan Wallander and Bjarte Bogsnes. In 
both cases, the projects are channelled individually through their creators. The changes 
implemented are not based on consultants or textbooks, but internally driven by a clear leader 
with high legitimacy. 
 
The most obvious difference between the companies is the economic conditions under which 
they operate. When Wallander took over, Handelsbanken was in a challenging position with 
rather low profitability. Statoil’s situation, however, was the opposite. High oil prices meant 
that the company had the highest operating income of all companies registered in 
Scandinavia.  
 
Another important difference is in the alternative models introduced. At Statoil, a version of 
the ‘balanced scorecard’ was mixed with the use of rolling forecasts. At Handelsbanken, 
however, the focus was mainly on financial performance measures. This system was very 
simple compared to those of Borealis and Statoil – the latter’s being more consistent with both 
the guidelines presented in modern BB literature (Hope and Fraser, 2003; Hope 2006) and the 
versions presented at conferences and in BB networks (bbrt.org). The differences between the 
two cases were also an important motivation for this study, with the central question being: 
Are BB solutions as diverse as the two example cases seem to indicate, and what are the 
potential explanations for this heterogeneity?  
 
Previous BB research has mainly focused on the perceived relevance of the budget critique. 
Studies have shown a rather low support for BB claims about budgets (e.g. Ekholm and 
Wallin, 2000; Libby and Lindsey, 2009; Becker, 2011). This has been put forward as an 
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explanation for BB’s lack of popularity. Budgets are seen as very useful, although with some 
perceived weaknesses. However, in-depth investigations of companies that claim to have 
implemented BB are scarce. One notable exception is Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe’s (2013) 
study of two multinationals choosing to adopt BB. The study shows how BB practices helped 
design a new type of management control system and information supply, with the aim of 
moving decision makers from a ‘comfort zone’ to a ‘stretch zone’. The authors also call for 
further research in order to better understand the changes driven by BB adoption. The current 
study complements that of Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe in focusing more explicitly on changes 
in management accounting practices, the central-local system dimension, and the role of 
controllers in BB companies.   
 
3. Theoretical background: Unbundling, controllers and diffusion 
 
This study draws on two groups of theories. First, management accounting as a set of design 
characteristics. In order to describe and analyse changes in management accounting systems, 
a framework is required. Secondly, the aim of the study is to understand why we may get 
different solutions. In the cases selected, this enquiry is informed by diffusion theory. More 
specifically, we are interested in the associations between how and why the idea was adopted, 
and the corresponding changes in the design of the control system. 
 
Unbundling management accounting innovations 
 
Bjørnenak and Olson (1999) introduced a framework for analysing management accounting 
innovations. The framework is based on two dimensions: scope and system. The scope 
dimension describes the objects for which we are accounting (descriptive objects, e.g. 
customers, department or products), describes and gives explanations for variations in the 
descriptive object (e.g. cost drivers or performance measures), and includes the time period 
over which the objects are accounted for (e.g. a month or year). The main descriptive object in 
this study is responsibility centres (budget units).  
 
According to Bjørnenak and Kaarbøe (2013), the system dimension can be decomposed into 
two categories: lifetime and focus. The lifetime of a system is not given much attention in 
existing management accounting, control and cost management literature. One exception is 
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Pike et al (2011), which shows that activity based costing, implemented as stand-alone or ad 
hoc systems, is seen as more useful than the embedded ABC systems that are frequently 
updated and integrated into the financial reporting process. The reason for this may be that the 
stand alone or ad hoc system are understood to be more target oriented when addressing a 
specific problem. The properties of temporary systems may be quite different from continuous 
ones. As they are designed for a short lifetime, they may get more attention, they may 
include more complex data sources than traditional management accounting systems, 
and they may be designed and used on a trial and error basis (Bjørnenak and Olson, 1999). 
However, organizations cannot operate using only temporary systems. Some systems also 
have to operate continuously. It is hence important that organizations find the right balance 
between temporary and continuous systems.  
 
The focus dimension concerns the question of whether systems should be global or local. A 
global system is one used by the whole organization, such as product costing systems. The 
annual budget is also normally a global system. Local systems, conversely, are developed and 
used in a business unit (BU) or smaller part of the organization. The idea of LS introduces an 
alternative to the central, and institutionalized, logic of conventional management accounting 
systems (Grönlund and Jönsson, 1988). Instead of focusing on the need of symmetry of 
information, LS argues that information systems should be designed for local information 
needs, which means that accounting systems produce asymmetric information. For larger 
organizations, it is possible to have both global and local systems. The different combinations 
of the two dimensions are shown in figure 1. The set core of the management accounting and 
control system is the fixed global set of cost and performance measures used throughout the 
whole organization. This can, for example, be a number of global and continuously measured 
financial (e.g. ROI) and non-financial (e.g. customer satisfaction) measures applicable to all 
BUs. In addition, some BUs or even smaller entities within the organization may have their 
local problems. For example, there may be specific interest in a particular customer group 
whose profitability has to be identified, explained and understood. A local, temporary system 
may hence be developed in order to understand the cost development in that area. An example 
of a mixed local and continuous system could be the continuous benchmarking of particular 
activities at a local level. 
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 Figure 1. System dimensions (adopted from Bjørnenak and Kaarbøe, 2013). 
 
The aim of this study is to understand the dynamics of BB in the system dimension. Central to 
our enquiry will be the questions of what happens to the fixed core when budgets are 
abandoned, and whether this abandonment leads to the creation of more temporary or local 
systems. 
 
 
Diffusion of management accounting innovations 
 
The questions of why and how companies adopt new management practices and new 
management accounting techniques has been a central topic in the literature of both 
management and organizational theory (e.g. Abrahamson, 1991, Kennedy and Fiss, 2009) and 
management accounting (Ax and Bjørnenak, 2007).  
Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels 
over time among the members of a social system (Rogers, 1995). Traditionally, diffusion 
studies have focused on organizations’ demand for innovation, with the communication 
process driven by potential adopters of these innovations. The information field characterizes 
the extent of contacts that a potential adopter has made at a given point of time. Torsten 
Hägerstrand (1967) introduced the concept to describe the probability of contact at different 
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distances and directions. The exposure patterns among potential adopters in a society may 
vary substantially, and the information may be an interesting independent variable to explain 
the diffusion patterns. For example, institutional relations may play an important role in the 
definition of a company’s information field. While the demand side driven studies view the 
information field as a passive factor in the diffusion process, more recent studies have seen 
the supply-side as actively trying to control the information field of potential adopters 
(Abrahamson, 1991, 1996; Abrahamson and Fairchild, 1999). This modern perspective has 
also inspired studies regarding the diffusion of management accounting innovations 
(Bjørnenak, 1997; Gosselin, 1997; Malmi, 1999). In this study we are interested in how the 
information field and the supply side may inform the content of the diffused idea, i.e. what is 
spread and not only why it spreads.  
Potential adopters may seek different types of benefit from an innovation. The decision to 
adopt an idea may be motivated by both opportunities and threats (Kennedy and Fiss, 2009). 
Early adopters are assumed to be more motivated by social and economic opportunity, while 
late adopters are assumed to be motivated by the perceived threats of social and economic 
loss.  
The idea adopted may have a strong technical core or be a combination of many technical and 
rhetorical elements. BB can be seen as a ‘housing innovation’ (Ax and Bjørnenak, 2007), i.e. 
an idea that may house a number of different ideas and techniques (Alvarez, 1998). Mazza 
and Alvarez (2000) stress the importance of making innovations compatible with the societies 
to which they are transmitted (diffused). They also argue that cultural discourses and 
legitimization are the main resources needed to make the popularization of an innovation 
possible. One means by which the supply-side can popularize an innovation in a specific 
location is by fitting the innovation’s design characteristics and rhetorical elements (i.e. 
bundling) to the preferences and knowledge of potential adopters.  
 This study draws on these streams of diffusion research. First, we will attempt to identify 
what constitutes the core of BB in a management accounting setting, and thus arrive at an 
understanding of what is being diffused. Second, we will investigate early adopters and 
examine the types of gain being sought. Third, we will focus on the often neglected role of 
human agency (Birkinshaw, Hamel and Mol, 2008), where agents initiate and drive the 
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process of change. Forth, we are investigating the design characteristics of BB, and how these 
characteristics fit the change agents’ role in the organization.   
 
4. Research Method 
 
This study draws on concepts and empirical findings from the design of management 
accounting systems and from diffusion studies. The main purpose is to explore what BB 
actually comprises and how it is implemented in real-world situations. The fact that only a 
small number of companies have implemented BB, and the requirement for in-depth 
information on these companies’ control systems, calls for a non-randomly selected study 
sample. The cross-sectional case study approach can broaden our understanding by detecting 
cross-case patterns for specific issues that are otherwise embedded in detailed single case 
write-ups. Cross-sectional case studies can, for example, detect and document variations in 
practice for defined variables such as BB (Lillis and Mundey, 2005).  
 
Informed by diffusion studies, we will investigate the role of different agents in the adoption 
of BB. We have actively searched for the following three different settings for the adoption 
process: 
 A CEO driven adoption inspired by the Handelsbanken example. We have identified 
another financial institution were the idea of removing budgets was clearly initiated by 
the new CEO in 2000. The information field for this adoption was Handelsbanken. 
However, there was no direct contact between the two organizations and the case 
company was to our knowledge the first to implement the idea in Norway (in 2000).  
 The second case is an example of controller-driven BB adoption. Despite having 
support from top management (the CFO), the adoption was clearly driven by a group 
of headquarter controllers in active communication with other companies already 
implementing BB.  
 The third case was chosen as an example of ‘forced selection’ adoption. The company 
in question is a subsidiary of a BB adopter, and the idea came down from the parent 
company. The subsidiary was not formally forced to adopt the idea, but the board and 
the CEO (who came from the parent company) still decided to abandon budgets at a 
central level.   
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 Table 1 sums up some of the characteristics of the three selected companies. Note that in each 
case the driver of the adoption was the main criteria for selection. The size of the company 
relates to the industry average in Scandinavia. The time when BB was implemented is an 
estimation of the year a decision was made at a high level in the organization, not an exact 
date. In two of the cases, different units introduced the idea at different points of time. For the 
purposes of this study, we have named the three companies TOP, Controller and Daughter. 
 
Case  TOP  Controller Daughter 
Driver of the BB 
initiative  
CEO Corporate 
controllers 
Parent company 
(Owner) 
Information field Handelsbanken Beyond Budgeting 
network 
Parent company 
Industry Financial services Telecom Retail 
Size Medium Large Large 
BB from when? 2000 2008 2005 
Table 1. Key data on case companies.  
 
Data collection 
 
Data from the selected companies were collected in the following four ways: 
 We obtained access to reports and measures (KPIs) at company level and BU level. 
All companies were followed for at least one year and changes in reports were 
discussed and described.   
 Questionnaires were sent to controllers in Controller (100 questionnaires) and 
Daughter (70 questionnaires). The companies identified relevant respondents. We did 
not include TOP, due to its low number of controllers. The constructs were manly 
adopted from earlier studies of the relevance of the critique of budgets (e.g. Libby and 
Lindsey, 2009), but extended with more specific questions related to the role of the 
controllers. The questionnaires were pre-tested and modified using Executive MBA 
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students. Response rates were 48% (48/100 in Controller) and 44.3% (31/70 in 
Daughter). We followed up non-respondents twice, and did not find any significant 
differences between early and late respondents.  
 We interviewed the CFO and a number of controllers. In TOP, the CEO and a BU 
manager were also interviewed. We conducted four interviews in TOP, six in 
Controller, and five in Daughter. The interviews took between 15 and 45 minutes, and 
were transcribed.  
 We attended a workshop in each of the companies with the CFO and a group of 
controllers. The workshops were organized in collaboration with the companies, and 
different aspects of the findings from the surveys and interviews were discussed. The 
workshops were not recorded, but notes were taken.  
 
These four methods in combination served to strengthen the validity of our research. First, we 
tried to understand the control system design by investigating the reports and KPIs currently 
in use. We used the questionnaire to get an overall picture of BB and the new ‘tools’ that 
these companies were using. This was followed up by interviews with CFOs and controllers 
for a deeper understanding of different roles. Finally, we presented and discussed some of the 
findings at a meeting with controllers and the CFO. This significantly improved our 
understanding of the reasons behind their adoption and adaptions of BB. 
 
5. Findings 
 
This section presents the findings in two parts. The first part outlines arguments for a 
company choosing to adopt BB. The second part shows the changes that the companies 
underwent after removing the budget, and the models in use at the time of our investigation.  
 
Motives: The relevance of the budget critique 
 
Our study of the reports obtained from the BUs showed that only two of the three companies 
had in reality abandoned budgets. In Daughter, the budgets were still alive and well. In one of 
the BUs, these budgets were even linked to a bonus plan. The CFO was aware of this, but did 
not see any problems with it. His view was that as long as the BUs delivered on the KPIs 
decided by headquarters, they could use whichever systems they wanted. However, the 
61
budgets were not approved or discussed with headquarters controllers, as was common 
practice prior to the decision to go beyond budgets.  
 
Even more surprising was that headquarters controllers were found to be using cost budgets: 
‘We have a cost budget. Not at first, but we decided to implement it. We do not agree on what Beyond 
Budgeting is. I don’t see the problem with cost budgets, on the contrary, it is great tool. Budgets are 
difficult for items that are volatile and unpredictable. But your costs are, first of all, mostly fixed costs, or 
you can in fact control them…. Cost budget is an excellent tool, thus we have implemented it at 
corporate..’ – Corporate controller, Daughter. 
The budgets were hence removed in the first instance, but only at the corporate level. They 
were then reintroduced at a later date, but only for costs and at a more aggregated level 
(involving less detail) than was formerly the case. The CFO accepted this, but nevertheless 
made it clear that the top management group and the board did not require a budget and did 
not refer current costs to a budget in the course of their discussions. The same view was 
expressed by the CFO in Controller: 
 
‘My focus is on the financial results. The units may design systems with or without budgets, as long as 
they deliver financial results.’ CFO, Controller 
 
The main motive in Controller for adopting BB was the need for quicker responses to changes 
in the business environment. The questionnaire was used to ascertain a more general view of 
the budgeting critique in Controller and Daughter. Table 2 shows the results from this part of 
the questionnaire. 
 
 
Statement Respondents Agree Disagree Median Average Std 
 [Daughter] Budgets improve allocation 
of resources between BUs 
27 33 % 26 % 4.00 4.04 1.32 
[Daughter] Abandoning budgets gives 
less control 
30 67 % 20 % 5 / 6 5 1.65 
[Controller] Abandoning budgets gives 
less control * 
46 22 % 61 % 2 3 1.65 
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[Daughter] Abandoning budgets gives 
poor coordination between BUs 
27 37 % 37 % 4 4 1.77 
[Controller] Abandoning budgets gives 
poor coordination between BUs * 
44 14 % 66 % 1 3 1.44 
[Daughter] Without budgets the BUs 
can respond faster to changes in the 
business environment 
28 46 % 39 % 6 5 1.78 
[Controller] Without budgets the BUs 
can respond faster to changes in the 
business environment 
46 67 % 20 % 7 5 1.91 
Table 2. Survey results on the relevance of the budget. Linkert scale 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). Disagree = 1 - 3; agree: 5 - 7. Significant differences between companies are 
marked with * (0.05 level, t-test).  
 
The results show significant differences between the two companies. In Daughter, the great 
majority (67%) of controllers agree with the statement that abandoning budgets will result in 
less control, while the figure for Controller is 22%. The results regarding the use of budgets 
for coordination is also consistent with the different views within the two companies. 
However, the controllers in Daughter agree to some extent with the argument regarding 
quicker responses to change.  
 
The critique of the budget is firmly established in Controller. However, some controllers still 
disagreed with the arguments in favour of BB. The interviews confirmed this: 
‘The higher up you sit, the easier it is to be critical of budgets. At lower levels in the organization, it gives 
you comfort to have budgets.’  Business performance manager, Controller  
 
This shows that there were some differences in opinion between different groups of controllers. 
A determining factor in this was their level within the organisation; another was experience: 
‘Tenure and experience is important in relation to how people take changes in budgeting. Newcomers 
have a fresher mindset that we try to exploit until they are eaten by the system.’ Financial controller, 
Controller.’ 
Whilst resistance to change was seen in all three companies, this was less in evidence in TOP: 
 
‘The only resistance we got was from the persons responsible for the budgeting process. They wondered 
what they should do now.’ CEO, TOP 
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 However, we did not find any BUs with budgets in TOP. There was no doubt about who 
introduced the idea of abandoning budgets (the CEO), and unlike the two other companies, 
the BUs did not get the option to retain the budgets. This decision was supported by the CFO: 
‘I never really missed the budget.’ CFO, TOP 
But not all of the BU managers were totally convinced: 
“I see that we are delivering good results. Better than ever….. However, I think it was useful to set up a 
plan for the coming year. It gave us an opportunity to go through the whole business.” BU manager, 
TOP. 
Our meetings with CFOs and controllers also supported the general findings. There were no 
discussions about returning to budgets in TOP and Controller. In Daughter, there was a clear 
disagreement about budget at the corporate level, but full acceptance of local budgets.  
 
Case  TOP Controller Daughter 
Main motivation Budgets are 
unnecessary 
The need to respond 
to changes 
The parent wants us 
to implement BB 
Change in budget 
practice 
Abandoned Removed yearly 
budgets (voluntarily)  
Removed, then 
reintroduced budgets 
at corporate level. 
Kept budgets at BU 
levels. 
Tension / resistance Some in the 
beginning / low 
Some, higher among 
local controllers and 
experienced 
controllers 
Strong support for 
budgets 
Table 3. Main motives, changes and sources of resistance in the three companies 
 
The new models 
In this section, we describe the main changes in the management accounting models. Included 
here is a general scheme of how a management accounting system is designed. The design 
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characteristics are described according to the framework in figure 1. Models are used to 
increase precision when discussing these changes, with tools and techniques being integrated 
into the framework. Rolling forecasts, benchmarking and balanced scorecards are described in 
BB literature as tools that are used in order fulfil the budget purposes (e.g. Hope and Frazer, 
2003; Bogsnes, 2009). These tools can be both local and global, and continuous and 
temporary.  
 
In TOP, the budgets really were removed from the all reports that we were shown. In the early 
years (2000-2001), the company used the same report as before the change, only with a ‘0’ in 
the budget column. Later, a new report was designed and gradually refined. At the point of 
investigation it looked as follows: 
 
 
Table 4. P/L Benchmarking report in TOP. Each BU has a column showing different revenue 
and cost items, total profit or loss, and changes compared to previous years.  
 
All 14 BUs were listed on one page every month. Some detailed revenue and cost items were 
included. More details could always be asked for. There was full transparency between BUs, 
and the reports were used by both the top management group and the board. They also 
designed a bonus system based on relative improvements in the P/L compared to the same 
period for the previous year.  
 
This systematic benchmarking between BUs is in line with that of the Handelsbanken 
example. One important difference is that Handelbanken ranked its BUs, whereas TOP did 
not explicitly do this. TOP also benchmarked itself against other companies in the same 
industry. This was done on a more ad hoc basis. They also introduced local customer 
BU A BU B BU C … BU N
Profit/Loss 
2013
Profit/Loss
2012
Change
Change in %
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accounting systems, but no rolling forecasts (only a yearly aggregated forecast at corporate 
level) or balanced scorecards.  
 
While TOP was clearly informed by Handelsbanken and introduced a management 
accounting system with low complexity, Controller’s implementation of BB had obvious 
similarities to that of Statoil. Consistent with the company’s primary motivation for 
implementing the new solution, the main new tool was rolling forecasts. Every quarter, a 
report was produced containing a forecast for the next five quarters. The same solution was 
introduced in Daughter. The difference between a forecast and a budget was in both cases 
seen as the difference between a target (as in budgets) and a ‘best estimate’ (forecast). Also, 
in both cases, there was the intention to make the forecasts more aggregated (less detailed). 
However, the distinctions become less and less clear over time, as shown in table 5.  
 
Statement Respondents Agree Disagree Median Average Std 
[Daughter] Rolling forecasts are budgets 4 
times a year   
31 42% 45% 4 3.94 171 
[Controller] Rolling forecasts are budgets 
4 times a year   
48 56% 33% 5 4.33 1.72 
Table 5. Rolling forecasts vs. budgets.  
 
A majority of the controllers in Controller saw rolling forecasts as budgets four times a year – 
a view also shared by many of the controllers in Daughter. This was discussed at the 
workshops. The need to explain variances between actuals and forecasts was seen as the main 
factor in their taking up this viewpoint. 
 
“In the beginning, the forecasts were less detailed. Then they [BU managers] told us they needed to 
explain why we were not hitting the forecasts. We couldn’t. In the next forecast we included more 
details. And now we are doing budget four times a year!” Business performance manager, Controller 
 
The other major tool related to budgets were balanced scorecards (BSC). Both Controller and 
Daughter had versions of BSC.  Table 6 shows the results from the survey.  
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Statement Respondents Agree Disagree Median Averag
e 
Std 
[Daughter] BSC is a success in our company 28 43% 43% 4 3.89 1.55 
[Controller] BSC is a success in our company 38 39% 42% 4 3.79 1.42 
[Daughter] Top management is more 
interested in financial performance measures 
31 77% 13% 5 5.13 1.31 
[Controller] Top management is more 
interested in financial performance measures 
42 48% 45% 4 4.36 1.83 
[Daughter] Should focus on a lower number 
of KPIs  
31 81% 6% 6 5.61 1.20 
[Controller] Should focus on a lower number 
of KPIs 
44 73% 20% 5,5 5.23 1.63 
Table 6. Statements on the relevance of BSC 
 
In both cases, there was a clear link between the BB initiative and BSC. In Daughter, the 
version of the BSC was introduced by the parent company as part of the BB process. 
However, the CFO confirmed that he saw this more as a tool to be used within the individual 
BUs. His major concern was to ensure that each unit felt accountable for their performance. 
Thus, he introduced a stronger focus on ROI, with less attention paid to the large set of non-
financial performance indicators. A clear tension in the workshop was between the local BU 
controllers and corporate management. The local controllers claimed that they had to follow a 
system that was not used by the top management team. Corporate controllers also introduced 
an activity-based management model as a part of the fixed core. It used a standard set of 
activities for all BUs, and attempted to track resource consumption at an activity level. There 
was a significant tension at the workshop between corporate controllers and BU controllers 
regarding the use of this system. The CFO became involved, and he decided to abandon the 
system in order to increase the focus on BU accountability and local autonomy.  
 
In Controller, the BSC model got more attention at the corporate level. However, both the 
local and the corporate controllers agreed that the number of KPIs was too high, and that the 
relevance of many of them was too low. Table 7 summarizes some of the changes following 
the BB initiative. 
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Case  TOP Controller Daughter 
Main new tool Benchmarking  Rolling forecasts, 
Balanced Scorecard 
Rolling forecasts, 
Balanced Scorecard, 
Activity Based 
Management 
Tension related to 
the new solution 
Low Some on the 
relevance the new 
tools 
High, between 
Corporate and BU’s 
Table 7. Main changes following the BB initiative.  
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
This study aims at an improved understanding of what BB is. A clear finding seem to be 
different solutions in different organizations. From a solution were they still are using budgets 
to a case were there actually were no budget lookalikes. On the other hand there are also some 
similarities. One is the redefinition of the fixed core of the management accounting system. 
 
In the TOP case the budget were removed from the fixed core and replaced with 
benchmarking and an increased focus on improvements in financial performance. The fixed 
core was in this way reduced and gave room for more ad hoc customer profitability analyses 
etc. This has clear similarities with the changes in the Daughter case. On the surface, the 
solution is very different, where budgets are kept at local levels and reintroduced at corporate 
level. However, the recent changes are based on re-defining a simplified fixed core without 
budget and the activity based management system. The CFO also wanted to simplify the 
rolling forecast process with more aggregated estimates, without involving the BU’s. The 
system structure of the Daughter case is shown in figure 2. Even the balanced scorecard is 
moved to a local system, with an option to make some of the KPI’s temporary. As for the 
TOP case, an ad hoc customer profitability analysis was introduced, organized as a project 
managed by corporate controllers. This was project was linked to the removal of the ABM 
project, as it was seen as “a more constructive way” to use corporate controller resources 
(CFO in Daughter).   
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Figure 2. The differentiated system structure in Daughter case. 
 
While, both the TOP and Daughter company reduced the fixed core, the story was different in 
the Controller case. The fixed core of the Controller company increased significantly. By 
adding detailed rolling forecasts to the high level of KPI’s there was not room for more local 
systems. However, the critique of too detailed forecasts and too many KPI’s may also lead the 
Controller case towards a simplified fixed core.  
 
The changing role of the controllers 
The role of the controller is claimed to be in a state of transition, from dull “scorekeeping” 
activities to more exiting and proactive “business consulting” (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 
2007). BB initiatives could be seen as consistent with such a change (e.g. Bogsnes, 2009). 
The TOP version of Beyond Budgeting involves marginalizing some of the routine based 
tasks of the controller. Improved efficiency is also the main argument in this case, but not by 
introducing rolling forecasts, balanced scorecards or other solutions, but by replacing the 
controllers with benchmarking and transparency.  
 
In the two other cases the controllers were asked about changes in the controller role. First we 
looked at the overall workload following the BB initiatives. The results are shown in table 8. 
The Daughter company partly kept the budgets and introduced rolling forecast and BSC, and 
thus it is not surprising to see mixed results regarding the total workload. For the Controller 
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case more than 50% of the controllers claimed that the workload increased significantly. This 
was mainly explained by the increased work on rolling forecasts.  
 
Statement Respondents Agree Disagree Median Average Std 
[Daughter] Abandoning budgets 
reduces the controller workload   
31 35 % 48 % 2 4 1.79 
[Controller] Abandoning budgets 
reduces the controller workload * 
47 19 % 72 % 1 2 1.76 
Table 8. Perceived changes in controller workload following BB initiative.  
 
 
Diffusion and gains 
The differences between the BB initiatives highlight a number of important issues in the 
understanding of how and why management innovations diffuse to new locations. The first 
has to do with motives for adopting new ideas. 
 
In diffusion studies a two stage model is often adopted. This model claims that early adopters 
seek efficiency and technical gains from innovations, while later adopters seek legitimacy 
through social gains. Kennedy and Fiss (2009) argue that “social and economic motivations 
for adopting diffusing innovations are not mutually exclusive concerns; that is, wanting to 
look good does not preclude also wanting to do better” (p. 911). Thus, they challenge the 
traditional diffusion model and claim that logic of efficiency and legitimacy are more 
compatible than generally assumed and both motives can be found for early and late adopters.  
 
All cases in this study are among the early adopters group, but it is difficult to classify their 
motives in the economic or social gains dimension. On the one hand, they are all using the 
efficiency argument, i.e. wanting to do better.  It is not a matter of whether or not the 
efficiency argument is important, but the content of it. In the Controller case the world is seen 
from the controllers’ perspective. Efficiency for them is to be more involved, to perform more 
important and intelligent tasks, in short to be adding more value to the company. This is done 
by giving more room for creativity, by being more dynamic. This is not solved by decreasing 
the workload of controllers, but by changing and increasing the workload by introducing new 
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tools. Thus controller efficiency is the motive for the controller driven diffusion of beyond 
budgeting. This may of course also give them social gains.  
 
 
The Daughter case seems to be an example of what Abrahamson (1991) would call a “forced 
selection”. The BB initiative came from outside the organization and was not a part of an 
imitation process. We observed only minor changes in the budgeting process, which indicates 
that diffusion in this setting is problematic. On the other hand, the BB initiatives were 
interrelated with other management accounting issues, like the role of forecasts and the 
number of KPI’s. This shows that it is not that easy to distinguish between ideas coming from 
outside or inside the adopting organization and prompts rethinking of the classical model of 
fashion and forced selection in the diffusion of management accounting innovations.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
We have seen that Beyond Budgeting not necessarily means companies without budgets. The 
most important finding in this study is that we need to decompose changes in order to 
understand what is going on. The local – global dimension play a significant role, and BB 
initiatives may increase or decrease the fixed core in an organization.  
 
Another contribution is the association between the dominating actors and what is adopted. In 
two of the cases (TOP and Parent) the driver of the system were searching solutions for 
increased accountability. The fixed core was streamlined to increase the focus on 
improvements in financial performance. BU’s were given autonomy to develop their own 
local systems. In one case they did, in the other they did not. In the controller driven solution 
things got more complicated. The logic of efficiency was different from the controller 
perspective.  
 
This cross sectional case study also highlights a number of issues for future research. First of 
all we still have little evidence of what Beyond Budgeting is. Broader cross sectional field 
studies, including different setting and different industry could improve our understanding of 
why companies abandon budgets and what they actually do instead. This is only a first 
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attempt and may together with Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe (2013) provide a first indication one 
what is going on. However, they are both describing companies with a Scandinavian origin, 
and studies of companies in other settings should follow up this and other studies.  
 
Another line of research is the link between Beyond Budgeting and Conventional Wisdom. 
Why are textbooks ignoring new practices like Beyond Budgeting? Is it a time lag or a bias 
against practice-defined concepts? Finally yet importantly, this paper shows a tension 
between the Beyond Budgeting movement and Balanced Scorecard models. What are the 
functions of scorecards and how are they effected by budgets or no budgets decisions.  
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Abstract 
Contracting out publicly funded welfare services has become increasingly common. This also holds 
for low contractibility activities such as education, care and health. Previous research theorizes that 
this practice requires trust and information sharing which calls for trust-based control patters and 
using accounting to create trust. At the same time the institutional environment demands market 
orientation and formal control. This could be problematic since formal control may be a threat to 
trust. In this paper we investigate the impact of inter-organizational controls – results control, 
behavior control and social control – on trust and information sharing. We develop and test a 
theoretical model with survey responses from 125 managers of privately provided elderly care units 
in Sweden. Our results show that results control is positively associated with suppliers’ trust in 
buyers and that behavioral and social control is positively associated with information sharing. We 
also show that results control has an indirect effect on information through suppliers’ trust in buyers.  
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Introduction 
Many public sector organizations have problems with increasing costs and demands, e.g., due to an 
ageing population (Roberts 2001; Lapsley & Schofield 2009; Cardinaels & Soderstrom 2013). In 
several countries outsourcing and competitive tendering has been one response for restructuring 
service delivery. The intention behind outsourcing – at least rhetorically – is to use the market 
mechanism to reduce cost and increase productivity and quality in services (Brown & Potoski 2003a; 
Siverbo 2004). Whether outsourcing has been good or bad for society is still debated; both 
advantages and disadvantages have been reported (Romzek & Johnston 2005; Hodge 2000). 
Some public sector responsibilities can been judged as challenging or even inappropriate to 
outsource. The argument is that activities characterized by high task uncertainty, absence of 
functional markets, political sensitivity and, sometimes, high asset specificity cannot be outsourced 
without causing substantial transaction costs (Williamson 1985). Examples of such low contractibility 
services are activities within education, health care, social care and elderly care (Brown & Potoski 
2003b; Johansson & Siverbo 2011).  
Still, these activities are contracted out in many countries, which entail challenges when it comes to 
management accounting and control. On a general level it is necessary to have inter-organizational 
management accounting and control systems to deal with cooperation and coordination challenges 
(Dekker 2004; Caglio & Ditillo 2008). However, to be efficient, these systems must be adapted to the 
specific control situation; in this case the task of controlling low contractibility activities. In previous 
theorizing, trust based and (possibly) bureaucracy based control patterns have been suggested in this 
control situation (Van der Meer-Koistra & Vosselman 2000). This means that the accounting and 
control system, to be effective, should be designed to foster trust (Coletti et al. 2005; Caglio & Ditillo 
2008; Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra 2009; Anderson & Dekker 2010) and willingness to share 
information (Jones 1999; Selnes & Sallis 2003; Cooper & Slagmulder 2004; Dyer & Hatch 2006; 
Mahama 2006; Cäker 2008; Brown et al. 2010; Dekker et al. 2013). However, our knowledge about 
the relationships between inter-organizational controls and trust and information sharing when 
outsourcing low contractibility activities is incomplete (Coletti et al. 2005; Vosselman & Van der 
Meer-Kooistra 2009). Most research has focused on how the buying party controls its suppliers so 
that they can be trusted. In this article we instead focus on the effect of control on suppliers’ trust in 
their buyers and how this relates to information sharing in the buyer-supplier relationship. 
Furthermore, rather than focusing on control, and most often formal control, as one concept we 
differentiate between behavior, results and social types of controls and investigate their individual 
effects on trust and information sharing.  
We develop and test a theoretical model with survey responses from 125 managers of privately 
provided elderly care units in Sweden. Our results show that results control is positively associated 
with supplier trust in buyer and that behavioral and social control is positively associated with 
information sharing. We also show that results control has an indirect effect on information through 
supplier trust in buyer.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we define core concepts and 
develop our theoretical model and hypotheses. In section 3 we describe our sample and survey 
methodology. Section 4 contains our results. Section 5 completes the paper with discussion and 
conclusions. 
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Theory and hypotheses 
In Figure 1 we illustrate the overall theoretical model to be tested in the study. 
[Figur 1 about here.] 
The figure summarizes the theoretical discussion below. Our model builds mainly on “frame theory” 
and relational signaling (Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999; Lindenberg 2000; Vosselman & Van der Meer-
Kooistra 2009) as the base for linking management controls (behavior, result and social) to supplier 
trust in buyer and the sharing of information in buyer-supplier relationships. The model contributes 
by theorizing on the individual effects of different types of controls and place trust as an important 
mediator between control and information sharing. Below we develop each path (hypothesis) in the 
model in detail.  
Inter-organizational control mechanisms 
Researchers with an interest in outsourcing in the public sector have argued that efficient contracting 
presupposes control, especially if the contractor is a for-profit company (Brown & Potoski 2003a; 
Brown et al. 2006; Padovani & Young 2006). Based on agency theory and transaction cost theory, it is 
assumed that post contracting control increases the likelihood that the contractor will perform well 
(being aligned to contract agreements). 
For this purpose, public sector buyers can use formal and less formal control mechanisms. Three 
mechanisms – or control constructs – are commonly used in the inter-organizational control 
literature: results control, behavioral control and social control (Langfield-Smith & Smith 2003; 
Dekker 2004; Emsley & Kidon 2007; Kraus & Lind 2007; Langfield-Smith 2008; Cäker 2008; Dekker & 
van den Abbeele 2010; Cäker & Siverbo 2011; Johansson & Siverbo 2011; Anderson & Dekker 2010). 
Results control is when the buyer sets goals for the activity and the supplier’s goal fulfillment is 
evaluated. In this measurement and evaluation process, financial and non-financial accounting 
information has a key role. Behavior control means securing a positive supplier behavior by specifying 
rules and regulations in policy documents and procedures. Social control is harder to explicitly design. 
It involves the measures the buyers take to create relations with the suppliers and induce vision, 
mission and value commitment among them. Social control is attempts to affect the norms and 
culture of the suppliers. The combinations of these three control mechanisms are expected to have 
different emphasis depending on the control situation at hand. 
 
Inter-organizational control mechanisms and suppliers’ trust in buyers 
The reason why the relationship between inter-organizational control and trust is interesting is that 
previous research on the public sector setting (Fernandez 2007; Fernandez 2009; Lamothe & 
Lamothe 2012) and the private sector (Zaheer et al. 1998; Selnes & Sallis 2003) shows that trust 
between buyers and suppliers is crucial for contractual performance. Research on the public sector 
setting has paid attention to the control systems launched to monitor contractor performance 
(Brown et al. 2006; Brown & Potoski 2003a; Brown & Potoski 2003b; Padovani & Young 2006) but it 
has not primarily been geared towards elucidating how control affects trust. This is unfortunate 
considering that trust (trust based control patterns) has been argued to be necessary when 
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 outsourcing low contractibility activities (Van der Meer-Koistra & Vosselman 2000) and such 
activities are often responsibilities of public sector organizations. Instead, the research conducted on 
these inter-organizational control systems has almost exclusively focused on the determinants of 
control scope and intensity (Brown & Potoski 2003a; Cristofoli et al. 2010; Marvel & Marvel 2007; 
Amirkhanyan 2010).  
Most researchers see trust as one party’s psychological state of accepting vulnerability in situations 
when it has positive expectations on the other party’s behavior (Emsley 2008; Nooteboom 2002). 
Also, a commonplace suggestion in extant research is that there are different dimensions of trust. 
Goodwill trust is trust in another party’s intentions and capability trust is confidence in a supplier’s 
competence. Institutional (or system) trust is the conviction that the failure of one party to comply 
with the contract agreements will be dealt with in the legal system. Calculative trust (which may be a 
contradiction in terms) is when a buyer or supplier calculates that the other party will honor an 
agreement since the long term consequence for not doing so will be devastating for its reputation. 
Moreover, it is common to separate organizational trust from interpersonal trust (Nooteboom 2002; 
Kamminga & Van 2007; Langfield-Smith 2008; Barretta et al. 2008; Cäker & Siverbo 2011). 
Even if trust may be a key to outsourcing success, a common opinion is that outsourcing can hardly 
be efficient unless the buyer imposes accounting and control arrangements on the supplier. There 
are at least four reasons for this. First, even when the relationship is characterized by trust, controls 
may be necessary for coordination purposes (Gulati & Singh 1998; Dekker 2004; Dekker 2008; Dekker 
& van den Abbeele 2010). Second, trust is hardly a feature of a relationship that can be commanded; 
if it is absent, accounting and controls are necessary (Dekker 2004; Caglio & Ditillo 2008). Third, and 
related, it is hard to rule out that for-profit suppliers – and to some extent also non-profit suppliers 
(Amirkhanyan 2010) – have their own missions and goals which give them quality shading incentives 
which must be dealt with (Domberger & Jensen 1997; Hart et al. 1997). Fourth, and central to this 
paper, control may be a prerequisite for trust since it increases the likelihood that the relationship 
will survive the early phase of a business relation (Tomkins 2001). This gives the contracting parties 
time to learn to trust each other (Coletti et al. 2005; Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra 2009). 
According to Vosselman and van der Meer-Koistra (2009), formal controls create “thin” trust which 
over time may grow into genuine “thick” trust. This is shown in an experiment by Coletti et al. (2005) 
that displays that control systems enhance the level of trust between collaborators.  
A complicating circumstance, however, is the fact that a vast amount of studies warn that the 
introduction of accounting and controls in inter-organizational relationships may instead impair trust 
(Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra 2009). The reason is that control may signal distrust in the 
supplier and that the relationship is not supposed to build on trust (Davis et al. 1997; Coletti et al. 
2005). According to Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999), control systems invoke business frames rather 
than ethical frames in buyer-supplier relationships, which means that the contracting parties focus 
on rational evaluation on benefits and costs with the cooperation rather than on social norms of 
behavior. This implies that the use of inter-organizational controls that signal lack of trust in suppliers 
will simultaneously lower suppliers’ trust in buyers. In other words, the design and use of the control 
system sends relational signals to the suppliers that affect their trust in buyers (Lindenberg 2000).  
In previous research it has been common to focus on buyers’ trust in suppliers, which is natural and 
logical if the research task is, for instance, to explain how the buyer designs the control system. High 
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trust in the supplier leads to less extensive and intensive control. But since an ambition in this paper 
is to explain the effect of control on trust, it is natural to focus on supplier’s trust in buyers.  
A clue to the general riddle about the relationship between control and trust is that individual control 
mechanisms affect trust in dissimilar ways. From research on intra-organizational management 
control it is evident that results control, behavior control and social control have different impact on 
the controlled (Ouchi 1979; Merchant & Van der Stede 2012). Even though it is common to separate 
results control, behavioral control and social control in inter-organizational research, to our 
knowledge no one has investigated these mechanisms’ individual impact on trust. It remains to be 
investigated when a control mechanism builds trust and when it impairs trust. 
When theorizing about effects of different control mechanisms on trust in low contractibility settings 
the natural starting point is general intra-organizational management control studies (Ouchi 1979; 
Merchant & Van der Stede 2012) , private sector inter-organizational control research (Langfield-
Smith & Smith 2003; Dekker 2004; Emsley 2008; Kraus & Lind 2007; Cäker 2008; Anderson & Dekker 
2010) and public sector inter-organizational control studies (Johansson & Siverbo 2011; Cäker & 
Siverbo 2011). A general agreement in these literatures is that results control is an unobtrusive 
control mechanism which implies that suppliers are controlled from arm’s length distance. The buyer 
does not interfere in the way results are obtained but the supplier is allowed freedom of action and 
is potentially empowered. In most business relations, suppliers accept that buyers mistrust them to 
some extent but not more than up to a threshold, i.e., legitimate mistrust (Lindenberg 2000). The 
relatively unobtrusive character of results control means it is not likely to exceed what is considered 
legitimate by the supplier. On the contrary, in low contractibility settings all involved actors would 
probably agree that results control is a rather relaxed control mechanism. Therefore, it signals 
capability and goodwill trust in the suppliers.  
“By giving relational signals, parties deliberately show their inclination to behave co-
operatively and, thus, their trustworthiness” (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 
2009, p. 273).  
The signaling effect of results control is that the buyer trusts the supplier and that an ethical frame 
rather than a business frame is invoked (Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). Accordingly the supplier is 
inclined to trust the buyer. 
Similarly, social controls may be expected to build trust between buyers and suppliers. Their informal 
and educational character, directed towards affecting values, norms and culture makes them even 
more unobtrusive than result controls. Also, a standard assumption in management control theory is 
that social controls are more effective than any form of formal control in low contractibility settings. 
Besides that this is explained by the difficulties involved in using formal controls in these settings, it is 
also a consequence of a good match between control and control expectations. Managers and 
employees in low contractibility settings commonly perceive themselves as “stewards”, that is, 
collectivistic and trustworthy co-workers struggling for common goals. If controlled by social 
controls, this attitude is likely sustained, but if extensive surveillance systems are implemented, they 
will instead feel “betrayed” (Davis et al. 1997; Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). 
Behavioral controls are less likely to signal ethical cooperation frames and build trust. This control 
mechanism is more intruding, direct and bureaucratic. Suppliers are directed to follow rules, 
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regulations and instructions that contrary to results and social controls signal lack of both 
competence and goodwill trust in the suppliers. This increases the likelihood that the amount of 
control exceeds what is perceived as legitimate by the suppliers. The signaling effect of behavioral 
controls is that the buyer wants a business frame and does not fully trust the supplier. The supplier 
adapts to this frame and accordingly sees no reason to trust the buyer. The reasoning leads to the 
following hypotheses about the links between control and suppliers’ trust in buyers (see Figure 1). 
H1: Results control is positively associated with supplier’s trust in buyer. 
H2: Behavioral control is negatively associated with supplier’s trust in buyer. 
H3: Social control is positively associated with supplier’s trust in buyer. 
 
 
Control and information sharing 
 
Similar to the issue of trust, interacting parties’ inclination to share information has been put forward 
as a prerequisite for successful cooperation (Jones 1999; Selnes & Sallis 2003; Cooper & Slagmulder 
2004; Dyer & Hatch 2006; Mahama 2006; Cäker 2008; Brown et al. 2010; Dekker et al. 2013). In a 
similar way as trust, information sharing is connected to the system of inter-organizational controls 
(Mahama 2006). Previous research has illustrated that bureaucratic (formal) controls lead to 
substantial demands on information systems (Jones 1999) and that the formal controls that buyers 
use to control supplier behavior means “high demands on information sharing and information 
processing capability” (Cäker 2008, p. 249). Mahama (2006) shows that performance measurement 
systems (akin to results control) and socialization (equivalent with social control) substantially 
influence information sharing. In this article we do not only focus on the sharing of information as an 
integral part of the MAS, but se information sharing as a behavior. Information sharing means the 
sharing (or intention to share) of information and experiences that is not necessarily explicit or 
agreed upon in contracts, but that is of strategic and relationship-building character. This voluntary 
behavior (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra 2009) is important for handling information impact 
problems (Speklé, 2001) and creating value within relationships.  
Contrary to Mahama (2006) we do not see why results control (performance measurement) should 
be directly and positively associated with the sharing of strategic and sensitive information. As results 
control is an arm´s length control where the supplier is given ample freedom of action and is 
evaluated on specified performance criteria, there are no incentives for buyers or suppliers to 
disclose and share additional information; at least as long as the supplier performs well. If something 
the incentive for the buyers and the suppliers to share information beyond what is agreed in the 
contract is negative. Producing and providing information comes to a cost and it cannot be ruled out 
that the information would be used opportunistically by the other party. Therefore, results controls 
do not directly stimulate information sharing beyond what is implied by measuring and monitoring 
the result in itself. 
However, results control may have an indirect effect on information sharing. Results control is 
hypothesized to positively affect trust and previous research has proposed that trust is influential on 
the readiness to share information (Caglio & Ditillo 2008; Anderson & Dekker 2010). The rationale is 
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 that trust makes parties willing to disclose information that they would otherwise consider too 
sensitive to share. Trust makes suppliers engage in constructive and creative dialogues (Selnes & 
Sallis 2003) and creates a belief that the increased value of providing information will be fairly 
distributed between the parties and not used opportunistically. Since buyers in established public 
sector outsourcing relationships have few or no reasons to withhold information from suppliers 
(after the competitive tendering), information sharing is mostly a matter of suppliers’ trust in buyers. 
In the presence of trust, the suppliers calculate that sharing information is more beneficial than 
withholding it (Selnes & Sallis 2003; Cäker 2008). Both Cooper and Slagmulder (2004) and Dekker et 
al. (2013) show that trust between parties makes them more inclined to develop inter-organizational 
management techniques, which among other things means more open information flows (Van Slyke 
2007). Therefore we pose the following hypothesis: 
H4: Results control has a positive indirect effect on information sharing between buyers and 
suppliers through suppliers’ trust in buyers. 
Accordingly, since we hypothesize that social control is positively associated with suppliers’ trust in 
buyers we expect social control to have an indirect effect on information sharing. However, there are 
also reasons to assume a direct effect of social control on information sharing. Social controls enlarge 
the arena for cooperation and give opportunities for giving information (Mahama 2006). They are 
appreciated by suppliers since they are less threatening and can make it possible to bypass rigidities 
in the formal control system (Cäker 2008). In situations when suppliers experience that the 
performance measurement system is incomplete they use the enlarged arena to share more 
information (Cäker 2008). Furthermore, most types of social controls are weak rather than strong 
forms of sanctions which mean that they invoke normative frames of behavior that has been shown 
to be positively related to cooperative behavior (Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). This means we 
hypothesize both a direct and an indirect effect of social control on information sharing.  
H5a: Social control is positively associated with information sharing. 
H5b: Social control has a positive indirect effect on information sharing through suppliers’ trust in 
buyers. 
The relationship between behavioral control and information sharing is not much discussed in 
previous accounting research, although the behavior control mechanism is included in the wider 
formal control construct used by some researchers (Jones 1999; Cäker 2008). While behavior control 
is argued to reduce suppliers’ trust in buyers experimental research has shown that tight controls 
(strong sanctions) produces cooperative behavior (sharing strategic and potentially sensitive 
information being such an example) directly (Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). When a calculative 
business frame is invoked by behavior controls (see H2) the tightness of such controls has a positive 
effect on cooperative behavior since the increased risk of ‘getting caught’ by the supervised pushes 
his/her incentive function (a cost-benefit calculus) towards cooperation rather than defection 
(Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). This holds regardless of the level of trust in the buyer. From these 
arguments we expect that the intensity in use of behavior control is directly related to the level of 
information sharing in buyer-supplier relationships. We pose the following hypothesis about the 
association between behavior control and information sharing. 
H6: Behavioral control is positively associated with information sharing. 
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Controls 
The model includes two theoretically relevant control variables: the degree of supplier dependence 
on the buyer and goal congruence between buyer and supplier. Supplier dependence in the buyer is 
included since it may be a reason why suppliers decide to share information (Donada & 
Nogatchewsky 2006; Kraus & Lind 2007; Cäker 2008). Goal congruence between the parties, which is 
often proxied by supplier profit motive (Fernandez 2009), is included as it may be an explanation for 
trust. When the supplier is a non-profit organization, the contracting parties are more likely to share 
mission and values and therefore trust each other (Van Slyke 2007).  
 
Method 
Sample and data collection procedure 
Our data consists of information about control and relationship characteristics in contracted elderly 
care in Swedish municipalities. More precisely it concerns elderly care housing with somatic care. In 
Sweden the care of elderly is the responsibility of local government. Sweden has 290 local 
governments (municipalities). The municipalities can choose to deliver these services in-house or to 
contract for them. The setting is inter-organizational, meaning that the responsible organization (the 
municipality) is formally and legally separated from the providing organization. The choosing of 
supplier is established by a competitive tendering process as laid down in the national procurement 
act (Swedish Code of Statutes 2007:1091). As discussed and explained in the theoretical part we are 
interested in the suppliers’ experiences and therefore data were collected among them. 
Our first examination of public statistics from The National Board of Health and Welfare showed that 
118 out of 290 municipalities in Sweden had contracted at least one elderly care establishment. The 
number of outsourced suppliers varied from one up to more than eighty. In total there are 395 
elderly care facilities that provide elderly care to Swedish local governments. Some of the facilities 
have the same manager and since we did not want to ask any manager to complete more than one 
questionnaire we only contacted 350 unit managers; mostly via information posted on company 
webpages. 
The questionnaire was distributed in late 2012 and early 2013 and sent by e-mail with links to a web-
based survey instrument. The response rate after sorting out unusable responses was 36 per cent 
which is higher than normally generated in studies of local government contractual relationships 
(Girth et al. 2012) and in studies of inter-organizational accounting and control in the private sector 
(Dekker et al. 2013). 
Before dispatch, the questionnaires were scrutinized by several research colleagues and pre-tested 
by three elderly care managers. They suggested some improvements in content and wording. We 
included a cover letter where we explained the purpose of the study and offered the respondents 
access to our research results. We did not offer any financial incentives to the respondents, as we 
thought this could affect the quality of the respondents’ answers. The third reminder contained a 
new cover letter with a more extensive explanation of our research project and the importance of a 
high response rate. A selection of non-respondents and respondents who had left many questions 
unanswered was contacted by phone. During these conversations we learned that some did not want 
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to participate due to time constraints and others because they had changed their position or were 
new to their position. Despite our efforts some respondents did not answer all questions.  
An analysis of missing values showed that the proportion of cases with missing data was 25.6 per 
cent and the overall proportion of missing values was 7.5 per cent. Little’s MCAR test showed that 
missing data were not randomly distributed (Chi-Square = 558.863, DF = 469, Sig. =.003), which 
means that case wise deletion is not advisable since it may induce bias (Schafer 1999; Afifi et al. 
2003). Instead, and assuming MAR, missing values were handled with the Expected Maximization 
(EM) method for imputation (Hair et al. 2010) to make the data set less biased and to ensure 
sufficient statistical power. A Comparison between a case-wise deletion and model-based 
replacement is conducted in the analyses. To assess the potential influence of common method 
variance, we employed the Harman one-factor test (Podsakoff & Organ 1986). The one-factor 
solution accounted for 34 per cent explained variance indicating that common method variance is 
not an obvious concern.  
 
Measures 
Our measure of result control is adapted from Dekker and Abbeele (2010) and Jaworski and McInnis 
(1989) and reflects how the measurement and evaluation of output is designed. We use four items 
that focus on the performance measurement and prevalence of goal and targets in the relationship. 
A sample item is: the municipality measures and evaluates goal achievement. 
Our measure of behavior control is also adapted from Dekker and Abbeele (2010) and Jaworski and 
McInnis (1989) and reflects how the municipality uses and monitors behavioral constraints. We use 
six items that focus on the use of rules, routines and regulations and the monitoring of the 
compliance to them. A sample item is: the municipality requires frequent reports from us on 
compliance with rules and regulations.  
Social control is captured by asking questions about to what degree the municipality tries to socialize 
with suppliers and impose values on them. We use two items that capture the extent to which the 
municipality tries to socialize with suppliers by training and educating them (Chatman 1991) and 
three items that capture the extent to which the municipality tries to impose (inform about) values 
and visions on the suppliers (Simons 1995). A sample item is (to what extent): does the municipality 
inform you about what the municipality considers acceptable behavior and acceptable values for this 
service? 
To measure the supplier’s trust in buyer, we used the scale adapted by Selnes and Sallis (2003), 
previously used in several studies on inter-organizational relationships. The five items capture several 
dimensions in trust, including goodwill, capability, organizational and interpersonal trust. Two 
examples of items are: I believe the municipality will respond with understanding in the event of 
problems and there is a general agreement in my organization that the contact people in the 
municipality are trustworthy. 
We used seven items to assess the degree of relationship information sharing (see appendix). The 
measurement scale was developed by Selnes and Sallis (2003), who used it to measure one sub-
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dimension of their relationship learning construct. One example of item is: we exchange information 
on successful and unsuccessful experiences. 
The control variable goal congruence is a dichotomous variable coded 0 if the supplier is a for-profit 
organization and 1 if it is non-profit. The information was gathered from official statistics and the 
suppliers’ webpages. Dependence is measured by a two item measurement scale developed by 
Johansson and Siverbo (2011). We used a seven point Likert scale for all survey items. Descriptive 
statistics for the measures is presented in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
Results 
In this section we describe the technique of partial least squares (PLS) used to test the model, 
disclose relevant information about the measurement model and presents the results of the 
empirical test of the structural model. 
 
Structural equation modelling: PLS 
To analyze data we used a Partial least squares (PLS) method (Lohmöller 1989; Wold 1982) and the 
software SmartPLS 2.0 developed by Ringle et al. (2005). Contrary to variance-covariance based SEM, 
PLS estimates the measurement model and the structural model simultaneously by using an iterative 
OLS regression-like procedure where the aim is to minimize the residual variance of both observed 
and latent variables (Hartmann & Slapnicar 2009). PLS structural modelling overcomes some of the 
theoretical and estimation problems in traditional covariance structural models and is appropriate 
when samples are small, stringent assumption of the distributional characteristics of raw data cannot 
be made and research is exploratory (Wold 1982; Chenhall 2005). 
 
Measurement model 
The correlations between the variables is presented in Table 2 as well as the square root of the 
average variance explained (AVE). 
[Table 2 about here.] 
The table shows that the control mechanisms are inter-correlated at levels between 0.41 and 0.62. 
They are also fairly highly correlated with information-sharing, and results and behavior control are 
correlated with trust. The control variables (not the control mechanisms) are not very correlated with 
any of the other variables in the table. 
Discriminant validity is achieved when no correlation between the focal variable and any other 
variable is higher than the square root of the AVE for each variable (Fornell & Larcker 1981). The 
words in bold diagonally in Table 2 show that all variables meet this criterion. 
Discriminant validity also requires that each item loads higher on the variable it is supposed to 
measure than on any other variable. Items of a variable should not overlap with other variables (Chin 
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1998). Table 3 displays the cross-loading of all items. All items load the highest on their own variable 
indicating good discriminant validity.  
[Table 3 about here.] 
The table also shows that all variables have acceptable levels of convergent validity since all items 
have high or moderate factor loadings on their own construct. This is further confirmed by 
Cronbach’s alphas above 0.6, AVE statistics above 0.5 and composite reliability well above 0.7 for all 
constructs (Chin 1998; Hair et al. 2010). See Table 1 for details. 
 
Structural model 
The structural model is evaluated by the explained variance in the endogenous variables, reported as 
R2 values, and the significance of standardized beta-coefficients, which are equivalent with path 
coefficients (Chin 2010). Bootstrapping is used to evaluate significance levels. We applied the 
procedure of using 5 000 samples with replacement. In Figure 2 and Table 4 the results of PLS related 
to the structural model are presented.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 shows the R2 values for the endogenous variables and thus the predictive power of the 
structural model (Chin 2010). For both trust and information sharing the PLS model explains a 
considerable degree of the variance (29% and 52% respectively). 
As expected, results control is positively related to supplier trust in buyer, giving strong support for 
H1 (B=0.407, p<0.001). However, neither behavior control nor social control is related to supplier 
trust as predicted. This means that we cannot confirm H2 and H3. The hypothesized relationship 
between social control and information sharing is significant (B=0.255, p<0.001) as well as the 
association between behavior control and information sharing (B=0.160, p<0.05). This means H5a 
and H6 are confirmed. Furthermore, in the table and the figure, a strong and significant effect of 
suppliers’ trust in buyers on information sharing is reported (B=0.403, p<0.001).  
To test the indirect effects we conduct a bootstrap test which is more powerful and rigorous than the 
commonly used Sobel test (Zhao et al. 2010). For this we used the Preacher and Hayes SPSS Macro 
for multiple mediation (Preacher & Hayes 2008). In the test, latent variable scores from PLS were 
used. The bootstrap results for the indirect effect tests (covariates as in figure 1 included) show that 
suppliers’ trust in buyers fully mediates the relationship between results control and information 
sharing. The indirect effect is positive (B=0.173) and statistical significant (95% confidence interval). 
Since the direct effect of results control on information sharing is insignificant when the mediator is 
included the theorized mediating effect is confirmed and there is low risk of omitted variables in the 
theoretical framework (Zhao et al. 2010). The same test shows that the hypothesized indirect effect 
of social control on information sharing is not confirmed. The indirect effect is weakly positive 
(B=0.0219) put not statistical significant (95% confidence interval). Consequently, H4 is supported but 
not H5b.  
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Finally, from Table 4 it is clear that neither dependence nor goal congruence has any significant 
impact on its dependent variables. 
To assess the EM-imputation made to the data set we run the same analyses with case-wise deletion 
(N = 93). The results were basically the same regarding path coefficients and statistical significance. 
Generally, case-wise deletion leads to somewhat stronger (std. betas) structural relations, indicating 
that the model-based (in this case the more appropriate) imputation technique leads to more 
conservative conclusions.  
Discussion and conclusions 
 
The outsourcing of non-technical core public sector activities such as education, healthcare, social 
care and elderly care and other “soft” operations has increased in many countries. This is interesting 
since many scholars question if these (low contractibility) activities can be contracted out without 
causing substantial transaction or agency costs (Gulati & Singh 1998; Brown & Potoski 2003b; Brown 
et al. 2006; Padovani & Young 2006; Kraus & Lind 2007; Dekker 2008; Johansson & Siverbo 2011). An 
alternative would be to develop trust-based control patterns (Van der Meer-Koistra & Vosselman 
2000) but also within this pattern some degree of formal inter-organizational control would exist, not 
least as a consequence of demands in the institutional environment, and this could harm a trust-
based pattern (Johansson and Siverbo, 2011). The main thrust of this article is to contribute to the 
literature on the ‘accounting-control-trust nexus’ of inter-firm relationships (e.g. Vosselman and van 
der Meer-Kooistra, 2000, 2009; Dekker et al., 2013) by focusing on the effects of different types of 
control, rather than control (or accounting) in general terms, and by posing supplier trust in buyer as 
an important mediator between control and information sharing..  
Our study confirms that there is a positive association between results control and suppliers’ trust in 
buyers. In this respect, results controls in low contractibility settings stand out as a control device 
with a positively signaling effect on suppliers. The unobtrusive character of result controls means 
that suppliers experience capability and goodwill trust, which is returned (Davis et al. 1997; Coletti et 
al. 2005; Lindenberg 2000) and that the relationship is within an ethical frame rather than a business 
frame (Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). Contrary to our expectation, however, social controls have no 
positive effect on suppliers’ trust. A speculation is that social controls are less visible for the suppliers 
and therefore not as effective for relationship signaling. Neither have behavior controls the 
hypothesized negative association with suppliers’ trust. It is possible that the (negative) relationship 
signaling of behavior control is over-emphasized in our theory. Other studies have indicated that 
behavior controls may be appreciated by the controlled since it reduces uncertainties and 
ambiguities (Oliver & Anderson 1994; Cäker & Siverbo 2014). These findings come from studies of 
salespersons and it remains to be investigated if the same effects occur among staff in low 
contractibility settings where the controlled often belong to occupation groups that treasure 
professional autonomy. It could also be problematized how to view upon the difference between 
trust, lack of trust and distrust (Luhman, 1979). Anyhow, the existence of one positive association 
and the non-existence of negative connections between inter-organizational controls and suppliers’ 
trust means our study is more consistent with the positive view of inter-organizational control 
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presented in Coletti et al. (2005) and less with the more negative stance taken by Tenbrunsel and 
Messick (1999).  
As expected, behavior controls and social controls are positively and directly related to information 
sharing. However, the underlying explanation for their respective effect is most likely fundamentally 
different. Social controls create possibilities for suppliers to provide a more qualified representation 
of their activities and outcomes through personal contacts and an enlarged arena (Cäker 2008) and 
are often constructed as soft sanctions (Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999), while information sharing 
through behavior controls is more forced in its character (Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). In this respect 
they seem to be two equifinal paths to information sharing. Future research could benefit from 
studying under which circumstances (moderators) they may not be and if or how they differ in 
effects on other outcome variables. 
Turning to the indirect effects of control we first note the positive association between supplier trust 
and information sharing, which is in accordance with our theoretical expectation and means that 
when suppliers trust their buyers, their readiness to share information increases (Zaheer et al. 1998; 
Selnes & Sallis 2003; Fernandez 2007; Dekker & van den Abbeele 2010; Dekker et al. 2013). This has 
beneficial consequences for the relationship such as facilitated coordination, mutual adaptation, 
more innovation and better understanding of each other (Selnes & Sallis 2003; Cooper & Slagmulder 
2004; Dyer & Hatch 2006; Mahama 2006; Brown et al. 2010; Dekker et al. 2013). The established 
indirect effect of results control on information sharing through suppliers’ trust in buyers clearly 
speaks in the favor of result controls in this context. It also means that all three control mechanisms 
drive information sharing, although one of them indirectly. Consequently, we have increased our 
understanding of through which mechanisms information sharing is increased in contractual 
relations. 
To sum up, we confirm some theoretical expectations about the relationships between different 
control mechanisms and variables theorized to be important antecedents to contractual 
performance. Our study of inter-organizational control in low contractibility settings gives three main 
contributions to the general literature on accounting and control in inter-organizational 
relationships. First, we theorize and show that different inter-organizational control mechanisms 
have dissimilar effects on trust and information sharing; variables expected to be important 
performance antecedents in contractual relationships. More specific, we confirm our initial 
expectation that different control mechanisms affect suppliers’ trust in buyers in different ways. This 
is a contribution to the literature on the relationship between control and trust. It has been proposed 
in previous research that outsourcing of low contractibility activities requires trust-based control 
patterns (Van der Meer-Koistra & Vosselman 2000). According to this study, result controls appear to 
be most suitable for building contractual trust. Second, contrary to what sometimes is cautioned in 
previous research (Davis et al. 1997; Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999; Vosselman & Van der Meer-
Kooistra 2009) , inter-organizational controls do not seem to impair suppliers’ trust in buyers or their 
willingness to share information. On the contrary, control based on setting goals for the activity and 
using financial and non-financial accounting information for evaluating goal fulfillment (results 
control) is highly associated with suppliers’ trust in buyers, which in turn increases contracting 
parties’ inclination to share important information. The one control mechanism assumed to be 
harmful in our context of low contractibility activities (behavioral control) showed to be no threat to 
suppliers’ trust in buyers and directly and positively related to information sharing. Third, contrary to 
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most previous studies we theorize about and measure suppliers’ trust in buyers and show that this 
form of trust is highly influential on the inclination to share important strategic and operational 
information.  
Our study is not without limitations. First, the cross-sectional research design inhibits us from 
drawing causal inference. However, our results are supported by theorizing that is in line with what 
has been argued in the inter-organizational literature. Our contribution is to combine theorizing on 
the relationship between control, suppliers’ trust and information sharing. We rely on self-reported 
measures from single respondents, which makes the influence of common method variance a 
potential concern (Podsakoff et al. 2003). We have taken several steps to reduce such influence 
including ensuring confidentiality, pre-testing on practitioners, careful design of wordings in the 
questionnaire and testing for lack of substantial uni-dimensionality by the Harman’s one-factor test. 
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Appendix: The constructs. 
Results control (RC1-4)(degree of concurrence, 1-7):  
The municipality has established specific performance goals for the service that you provide.  
The municipality monitors the extent to which your organization meets the performance goals.  
If you do not meet the performance goals, you are required to explain yourselves to the municipality.  
The municipality provides feedback about the extent to which we achieve our goals. 
Behavior control (BC1-7) (degree of concurrence, 1-7):  
We are monitored based on the extent to which we follow established rules and procedures (for 
example routines and work instructions) (excluded in construct).  
The municipality evaluates rules and procedures that we use for a given task.  
The municipality revises (modify) rules and procedures when desired results are not obtained. 
The municipality gives us feedback on the manner in which we accomplish our performance goals.  
The municipality demands periodically reports on compliance to rules and procedures. 
To evaluate our working methods the municipality demands us to report periodically. 
There are sanctions if we do not comply with agreed rules and routines. 
 
Social control (SC1-5)(to what extent; 1-7):  
Do supplier personnel participate in the municipality’s educational programs (which aim to inform 
about the municipality’s objectives, expectations and norms)?  
Do supplier personnel attend gatherings and meetings that the municipality organizes to create and 
develop relational bonds?  
Does the municipality inform you on what the municipality deems acceptable behavior and norms for 
your service?  
Has the municipality described values, aims and objectives for the service that you should follow (for 
example, vision and mission documents, general policies, value documents)?  
Does the municipality communicate values to influence you as a provider? 
 
Supplier’s trust in buyer (concur to what degree, 1-7): 
In our organization we believe the municipality will respond with understanding in the event of 
problems. 
In our organization we trust that the other organization is able to fulfill contractual agreements. 
In our organization we trust that the municipality is competent at what they are doing. 
There is general agreement in my organization that the municipality is trustworthy. 
There is general agreement in my organization that the contact people in the municipality are 
trustworthy. 
 
Information sharing (‘We’ refer to the supplier and buyer. Concur to what degree, 1-7): 
We exchange information on successful and unsuccessful experiences. 
We exchange information related to changes in end-user needs, preferences, and behavior. 
We exchange information related to changes in the technology and work methods of the focal 
service. 
We exchange information as soon as possible of any unexpected problems. 
We exchange information on changes related to our two organization's strategies and policies. 
We exchange information that is sensitive for both parties, such as financial performance and 
company know-how. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.  
 Theoretical 
range 
Actual 
range 
Me
an 
Medi
an 
S.D Cronb
ach @ 
AVE Composite 
reliability 
Results control 1-7 1-7 5.7 6.5 1.63 0.93 0.82 0.95 
Behavior control 1-7 1-7 5.2 5.6 1.64 0.92 0.67 0.93 
Social control 1-7 1-7 4.8 5.3 1.79 0.90 0.71 0.93 
Trust 1-7 1-7 5.4 5.8 1.46 0.92 0.71 0.93 
Information 
sharing 
1-7 1-7 4.6 4.5 1.69 0.91 0.65 0.93 
Dependence 1-7 1-7 4.6 4.5 1.69 0.62 0.73 0.84 
Goal congruence 0-1 0-1 0.2 0 0.36    
n = 125         
 
Table 2. PLS correlations. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Results control 0.91       
Behavior control 0.62 0.82      
Social control 0.41 0.48 0.85     
Trust 0.52 0.42 0.30 0.87    
Information sharing 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.60 0.81   
Dependence 0.16 0.09 0.06 -0.06 0.04 0.84  
Goal congruence -0.03 -0.14 -0.11 -0.01 -0.09 0.02 1 
Notes: Diagonal elements represent the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE). 
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Table 3. Cross-loadings. 
 Results control Behavioral control Social control Trust Information sharing Dependence Goal congruence 
Results control_1 
0.8517 0.5216 0.4483 0.4849 0.4788 0.1925 0.0892 
Results control_2 
0.9332 0.5803 0.313 0.4191 0.4278 0.1247 -0.0557 
Results control_3 
0.9179 0.5582 0.3399 0.47 0.4879 0.1467 -0.0992 
Results control_4 
0.921 0.5695 0.3919 0.4984 0.5281 0.0984 -0.057 
Behavioral control_1 
0.6037 0.8533 0.4651 0.3755 0.4394 0.0715 -0.1377 
Behavioral control_2 
0.5261 0.8612 0.3599 0.3673 0.4265 0.0739 -0.1524 
Behavioral control_3 
0.3977 0.7766 0.4223 0.3184 0.3408 -0.1044 -0.0523 
Behavioral control_4 
0.632 0.8701 0.4335 0.5111 0.4837 0.1106 -0.091 
Behavioral control_5 
0.4907 0.867 0.3583 0.3621 0.5118 0.147 -0.1392 
Behavioral control_6 
0.3965 0.8086 0.3529 0.2346 0.4501 0.1162 -0.1723 
Behavioral control_7 
0.444 0.7078 0.3544 0.1616 0.3493 0.0811 -0.0728 
Social control_1 
0.3359 0.3761 0.8197 0.1551 0.4136 0.0516 -0.0626 
Social control_2 
0.3662 0.2754 0.8098 0.2182 0.4409 0.0559 -0.0056 
Social control_3 
0.3034 0.41 0.8729 0.2618 0.401 -0.0166 -0.1426 
Social control_4 
0.3624 0.4855 0.8529 0.317 0.4244 0.0976 -0.109 
Social control_5 
0.3867 0.4615 0.8862 0.2833 0.4534 0.062 -0.14 
Trust_1 
0.2455 0.2345 0.1934 0.7125 0.4453 -0.16 -0.0454 
Trust_2 
0.4745 0.4029 0.2751 0.8672 0.4979 -0.0667 0.0055 
Trust_3 
0.5024 0.4489 0.2656 0.9053 0.5253 -0.0163 -0.0374 
Trust_4 
0.4554 0.3551 0.2807 0.9409 0.5782 -0.0721 0.0112 
Trust_5 
0.5345 0.3746 0.2627 0.9189 0.5891 0.0196 -0.0076 
Information sharing_1 
0.411 0.3633 0.3349 0.4766 0.8154 0.1099 -0.0823 
Information sharing_2 
0.4129 0.2814 0.1492 0.4869 0.6878 -0.0042 -0.1296 
Information sharing_3 
0.4338 0.4566 0.4072 0.56 0.8757 -0.0522 -0.1071 
Information sharing_4 
0.4591 0.4063 0.5354 0.4104 0.8394 -0.0911 -0.0528 
Information sharing_5 
0.4583 0.4353 0.3989 0.5347 0.8426 0.0696 -0.0865 
Information sharing_6 
0.5095 0.6056 0.5025 0.5617 0.8569 0.0805 -0.0439 
Information sharing_7 
0.3271 0.3857 0.4675 0.401 0.739 0.1124 -0.0232 
Dependence_1 
0.2224 0.1249 0.0736 -0.0262 0.0384 0.9144 0.0185 
Dependence_2 
-0.0109 0.0057 0.0166 -0.0868 0.024 0.7616 0.0239 
Goal congruence 
-0.0334 -0.1436 -0.11 -0.0139 -0.0902 0.0241 1 
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 Table 4. 
Paths from Paths to  R2 
 Trust Information  
sharing 
 
Results control 0.407 (3.784)*** 0.117 (1.091)  
Behavior control 0.142 (1.181) 0.162 (1.715)*  
Social control 0.063 (0.661) 0.255 (3.222)***  
Suppliers’ trust  0.403 (4.395)*** 0.29 
Information sharing  0.52 
Dependence  0.013 (0.167)  
Goal congruence 0.026 (0.394)   
n = 125. * p < 0.05 (one-tailed). **p < 0.01 (one-tailed). *** p < 0.001 (one-tailed). 
 
 
Figure 1: Hypotheses of direct and indirect effects. 
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Figure 2. Structural model results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n = 125. *p < 0.05 (one-tailed). **p < 0.01 (one-tailed). *** p < 0.001 (one-tailed). a within a 95% 
confidence interval. 
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PERCEPTION OF FAIRNESS OF 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM 
Evidence of differences in attitudinal 
patterns among lending officers 
99
THE LOAN OFFICER 
 The unusually complex boundary role of the loan officer 
 The “face” of the bank in the eyes of customers in need of a loan 
 Advisor to customer on suitability of financial products 
 Responsible for loan risk exposure 
 Part of a team 
 Financial products “salesman”? 
 
 Previous research has focused on the credit approval aspect 
 Capacity for rational evaluations of the risk 
 Risk appetite and sense of responsibility 
 
 Little research on the motivation of loan officers to perform 
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RESEARCH ON INCENTIVE-BASED 
COMPENSATION PLANS 
 Support for incentive-based compensation motivated by popular agency 
theory (see review by Baiman 1990). Financial incentives needed to 
motivate cooperative behavior in situations with high information 
dissymmetry.  
 Basu et. al. (1985) emphasize that salespeople tend to work in a context 
of inherent unpredictability.  The assumptions of agency-theory are 
suggested to be particularly applicable to salesman behavior as a result. 
 To deal with salesforce heterogeneity, research on sales quotas (Lal & Staelin 1986; 
Rao 1990) and relative incentives, i.e. sales contests (e.g. Kalra & Shi 2001; Murthy & 
Mantrala 2005) 
 However, in non-sales environments there is little empirical support that 
incentive-based compensation improves performance. Indeed, some 
studies show decline in performance 
 E.g. Arkes et al. (1986);  Ashton (1990); Bonner et al. (2000) 
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ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT 
 Organizational commitment 
 Mowday et al. (1979): “An 
employee’s identification with and 
involvement in the organisation” 
 Affective commitment 
 Porter et al. (1974);  Angel and 
Perry (1981) saw two dimensions: 
 Values: Strong belief in and 
acceptance of organizational goals 
and values 
 Effort: Willingness to exert 
considerable effort on behalf of the 
organization. 
 Meyer et al. (1990) argued  for a 
second type of commitment 
 Continuance commitment 
 Perceived cost of leaving the 
organization 
 I.e. the opposite of the intention to 
quit 
102
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT VS. 
AGENCY THEORY 
 Chong & Eggleton (2007) 
 Relationship between incentive-
based compensation and 
performance: 
 Managers with low organizational 
commitment: positive correlation 
 Managers with high organizational 
commitment: no relationship 
 “when the assumptions of standard 
agency theory are relaxed, the role 
of an incentive-based 
compensation scheme is not 
important“ 
Low 
Asymmetry  
High 
Assymetry 
Low value OC n.s. p = 0.006 
High value OC n.s. n.s. 
Low effort OC n.s. p = 0.039 
High effort 
OC 
n.s. n.s. 
Evidence of positive correlation between 
high incentives and performance  
- in high and low information asymmetry situations 
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PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT &  
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
 Procedural Justice  
(Leventhal et al. 1980):  
 Are applied consistently across 
people and time,  
 Are free from bias,  
 Ensure that accurate 
information is collected and 
used in making decisions, 
 Involve some grievance system, 
 Conform to personal or prevailing 
standards of ethics, and  
 Ensure that the opinions of various 
groups affected by the decision 
have been taken into account.  
 Lau and Buckland (2001): 
 Financial metrics results in higher 
justice perceptions; ‘objective’ and 
‘truthful’ 
 Nonfinancial metrics are perceived 
as relatively ‘subjective’ and ‘biased’  
 Lau and Moser (2008)  
 Nonfinancial metrics result in 
higher justice perceptions, ; 
‘complete’ and ‘accurate’ 
 Financial metrics regarded as 
‘narrow’ and ‘rigid’  
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PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT & 
OUTCOME JUSTICE 
 Outcome Justice 
 Based on Equity Theory (Adams 
1963, 1965) 
 “inequity distress”: ratio of one’s 
outcome (reward) compared to 
one’s input (contribution) is 
unequal to the corresponding ratio 
of a comparison other 
 “Fair process” effect 
(McFarlin and Sweeney 1992): 
 Employees’ perceptions of 
procedural justice are positively 
related to their perceptions of 
distributive justice 
 
 
 Tyagi (1982): 
 need to achieve equity might have 
a greater impact on salesperson 
motivation to perform than the 
desire to maximize economic gains 
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PERFORMANCE EVALUATION JUSTICE & 
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT 
 Sholihin, Pike (2009): 
 Confirming and refining 
conclusions from Lau et. al (2008) 
study 
 Perception of the procedural 
justice of performance evaluation 
is indirectly related to 
performance via organizational 
commitment 
 Procedural justice 
 Direct relation with organizational 
commitment 
 Also indirectly via trust in 
superior, and via outcome justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Outcome 
Justice 
Trust In 
Supervisor 
Organizational 
Commitment 
Performance 
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PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT &  
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
 Procedural Justice  
(Leventhal et al. 1980):  
 Are applied consistently across 
people and time,  
 Are free from bias,  
 Ensure that accurate 
information is collected and 
used in making decisions, 
 Involve some grievance system, 
 Conform to personal or prevailing 
standards of ethics, and  
 Ensure that the opinions of various 
groups affected by the decision 
have been taken into account.  
 Lau and Buckland (2001): 
 Financial metrics results in higher 
justice perceptions; ‘objective’ and 
‘truthful’ 
 Nonfinancial metrics are perceived 
as relatively ‘subjective’ and ‘biased’  
 Lau and Moser (2008)  
 Nonfinancial metrics result in 
higher justice perceptions, ; 
‘complete’ and ‘accurate’ 
 Financial metrics regarded as 
‘narrow’ and ‘rigid’  
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PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT & 
OUTCOME JUSTICE 
 Outcome Justice 
 Based on Equity Theory (Adams 
1963, 1965) 
 “inequity distress”: ratio of one’s 
outcome (reward) compared to 
one’s input (contribution) is 
unequal to the corresponding ratio 
of a comparison other 
 “Fair process” effect 
(McFarlin and Sweeney 1992): 
 Employees’ perceptions of 
procedural justice are positively 
related to their perceptions of 
distributive justice 
 
 
 Tyagi (1982): 
 need to achieve equity might have 
a greater impact on salesperson 
motivation to perform than the 
desire to maximize economic gains 
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PROPOSITION I: 
TWO ATTITUDINAL PATTERNS 
 Financially-driven pattern 
 Outcome fairness is more 
important than procedural fairness 
 Incentive-based compensation 
motivates better performance 
 Financial indicators are considered 
more fair than non-financial 
indicators 
 Organizational commitment 
limited to economic alignment 
 
 Socially-driven pattern 
 Procedural fairness is more 
important than outcome fairness 
 Incentive-based compensation 
reduces motivation to perform 
 Non-financial indicators 
considered more fair than financial 
indicators 
 Organization commitment has 
potential to encompass 
organizational values 
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PROPOSITION II:  THE PMS CAN BE USED TO 
STRATEGICALLY ALTER MIX OF EMPLOYEES 
 Performance management system impacts team dynamics and ultimately 
team composition 
 Organizational focus on financial indicators gives greater influence to employees with 
financially driven pattern 
 Incentive-based compensation and sales contests are introduced, partly due to 
pressure from employees with financially driven pattern 
 Socially driven pattern employees perceive management system as unfair, resulting in 
low organizational commitment, trust issues, poor performance and ultimately 
intentions to quit. 
 Reintroduction of non-financial indicators for performance evaluation and de-
emphasis of incentive-based compensation and sales contests produces trust issues 
and poor performance among financially driven employees, who perceive the new 
performance management system as unfair 
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THE BANK 
 Established early 1800 
 One of the larger commercial banks in 
Norway, with 1200 staff members 
 Customer base 65/35, retail and 
corporate market respectively 
 Return on equity has shrunk from 
approximately 24% in 2006 to 13% in 
2013 
 New vision 2013 
 “We intend to be the recommended 
bank. This vision entails a weighty 
commitment to our customers, 
partners, staff and EC holders. To fulfil 
this vision we must strive continuously 
to improve ourselves and to stay 
abreast of market and customer needs.” 
 
 The loan officer is the banks face  
 Their job should be based on the 
banks vision 
 The banks financial goals are 
increased RoE and market share 
through increased customer 
satisfaction 
 The performance evaluation system 
should facilitate the loan officers’ 
ability to achieve these goals 
 Team-work is emphasised as a key 
factor to achieve the goals of the 
bank and increase business results 
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METHOD 
 Eight interviews 
 Initial categorisation 
 4 “high performers” (Group 1) 
 2 “middle performers” (Group 2) 
 2 “low performers” (Group 2) 
 Second categorisations 
 Financially-driven pattern 
 Socially driven pattern  
 
 Themes explored in the 
interviews 
 Sales 
 Motivation 
 Team vs. individual rewards/efforts 
 Evaluation/measurements 
 Performance 
 Second categorisation 
 Performance management system 
impact on team dynamics  
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CHANGES IN THE PERFORMANCE 
EVALUTATION SYSTEM 
 The change was (partly) a 
reaction to the financial crisis 
 The bank reflected a desire of 
changing the prevalent sales 
culture, i.e. less focus on 
individual performance than 
previously 
 Individual vs. team based 
performance 
 From “Bonus Card” to Balanced 
Scorecard 
 
 From departmental (only) to 
individual scorecards (in 
addition) 
 Pre-change, basis for 
performance pay mainly based 
on individual sale 
 Post-change, basis for 
performance pay was extended 
to include more team based 
effort 
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PERFORMANCE BASED PAY  
Before the change 
Individual 
performance 
75% 
Team 
performance 
25% 
Max payout 
per year 
60.000 
After the change 
Individual 
performance 
50% 
Team 
performance 
50% 
Max payout 
per year 
80.000 
• Allocation of performance pay 
due to team performance done by 
manager 
• Individual performance not linked 
to team performance 
• Allocation of  performance pay 
due to team performance split 
evenly between employees 
• Team performance goals need to 
be gained for before individual 
performance based pay falls out 
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RESULTS OF THE CHANGE 
 Loan officers with medium and lower sales performance 
 Positive effect on sales 
 Loan officers with very low sales performance 
 Weak positive effect on sales 
 Loan officers with the highest sales performance 
 No systematic effect on sales 
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PERCEPTION OF THE CHANGE – GROUP 1 
 Preferance for the original performance system 
 Focus on individual performance is motivating and representing performance 
more fairly 
 Team performance is seen de-motivating 
 Free riding is mentioned several times 
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PERCEPTION OF THE CHANGE – GROUP 2 
 
 Preferance for the changed performance system 
 Team performance is seen as motivating and representing the performance 
more fairly 
 Free riding never mentioned  
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TWO BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS: 
 1a) Financially driven pattern 
 Outcome fairness is more 
important than procedural fairness 
 Incentive-based compensation 
motivates better performance 
 Financial indicators are considered 
more fair than non-financial 
indicators 
 Organizational commitment 
limited to economic alignment 
 
 I need the extraordinary rewards, like 
the trip to New York for the top 
performers. I get excited about it. I 
need the carrot. But now, when they’ve 
taken it away, what carrot should I 
attach myself to now? (1) 
 If I don’t have the success I deserve, I’ll 
leave. Some people are unable to 
perform, in a business like this? If I had 
not been successful, I would have 
changed job. Never would I have sat 
here. But we are different. (1) 
 When the focus on team rewards were 
increased there were some who 
cheered: “yes, now we will get a bonus”, 
the ones who performed poorly. And I 
said: “yes, you can thank me for that”. 
So I’m a bit crossed about that. (1) 
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TWO BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS: 
 1b) Socially driven pattern 
 Procedural fairness is more 
important than outcome fairness 
 Incentive-based compensation 
reduces motivation to perform 
 Non-financial indicators 
considered more fair than financial 
indicators 
 Organization commitment has 
potential to encompass 
organizational values 
 
 Our performance is measured in 
relation to increase in sales volume, not 
on how we carry out our working 
tasks. It is a lot that isn’t cached in in 
this type of performance evaluation, and 
it doesn’t really say much about how 
you perform in your job. (2) 
 I want to succeed anyway. I’m not saying 
the bonuses are irrelevant. Of course it 
matters, reward matters. But at the 
same time, my performance would have 
developed positively whether the 
reward had been there or not. Because 
I want to prosper, I want to become 
better. But it is clear that if you get a 
pretty nice little reward for it as well 
one is motivated by it. (2) 
 
119
TWO BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS: 
 2) Performance management system 
impacts team dynamics and ultimately 
team composition 
 Organizational focus on financial indicators 
gives greater influence to employees with 
financially-driven pattern 
 Incentive-based compensation and sales 
contests are introduced, partly due to pressure 
from employees with financially-driven pattern 
 Socially-driven pattern employees perceive 
management system as unfair, resulting in low 
organizational commitment, trust issues, poor 
performance and ultimately intentions to quit. 
 Reintroduction of non-financial indicators for 
performance evaluation and de-emphasis of 
incentive-based compensation and sales 
contests produces trust issues and poor 
performance among financially-driven pattern 
employees, who perceive the new performance 
management system as unfair 
 
 My selling performance is because of my activity level. Its 
twice as big as many others. I put the hours in. (1)  
 We look after customers that are looking for services 
other than sales, we take care of customers that are 
dissatisfied for some reasons, and it is not always the 
wrongdoings of one self we take care of. So it is tiring 
when all focus is on sales, and new sales. (2) 
 I think, most people are motivated by sales. Now, I can’t 
speak for those who perform badly, well it’s hard to say. 
We have a sales culture, so we, we are the motivated 
ones. But certainly there are many who are negative to 
the sales culture. (1) 
 The individual sales focus creates solo riders. They are 
more concerned about reaching their own rewards than 
helping other to reach their goals, to relieve a pressure 
others may be experiencing, or sharing when you have 
more than enough. New employees may have lesser to 
do, and others may have far too much on their plate. And 
they don’t share because they want to make sure they can 
reach their individual goals.  
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Introduction 
Coordination between organizations and the challenges of control across organizational 
boundaries have been problematized both among researchers (Cäker and Siverbo, 2011; van 
der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens, 2008; Dekker, 2004; Håkansson and Lind; 2004), and among 
policymakers the last decades.  There is an increasing and general concern about the inter-
organizational control problems facing the reforming public sector.  Cooperation between 
public sector organizations has become increasingly more important as different forms of inter-
organizational relationships have emerged from the international reform initiatives in this 
sector. New control problems arise when services are to be coordinated between autonomous 
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units. Especially in the welfare sectors we observe that health care services are produced in 
collaboration between two or more public and/or private units.   
In order to face such coordination problems, mergers of hospitals into large units have 
been observed as emerging tools in US and in most European countries. However, there is great 
uncertainty among researchers and healthcare officials as to the effects of increased hospital 
consolidation. Proponents of hospital mergers emphasize that such reorganization will result in 
lower costs and greater efficiency, while skeptics of hospital mergers believe that, due to the 
complexity of these services will actually increase patient costs, mainly because of increased 
administrative staffs and management control challenges (Gaynor, Laudicella and Propper, 
2012).     
Our study does not deal with the effects of public hospital mergers, as our focus is on 
the internal management aspects of mergers. Our assumption is that a study of internal elements 
may increase our understanding of why many mergers often fail to produce the expected 
positive effects.  Mergers between hospitals will often imply management accounting and 
control at distance. This means that the administrative top managers are located at one of the 
hospitals involved in the merger, whereas the other merging entities are located somewhere else 
and often far from the “mother hospital”. Consequently, management control will be performed 
at distance for some of the entities while top managers will be close to the departments in the 
“mother hospital”.  Distance is one important contextual element which affects the relationship 
between managers and their employees (Chenhall, 2003). Consequently, distance is also a 
contextual determinant when managerial tasks such as coordination and control are to be 
performed. Further, when the context such as distance changes, we might expect that this 
change also may change elements in the relations between managers and employees in merging 
hospitals. On this background, our research question is how do clinical managers and 
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professionals in hospitals perceive their relations with top managers at a distance when contexts 
are changing?  
Distance between top managers and the professional staff may affect these actors in the 
merged hospitals when it comes to their perception on how management is performed, what are 
legitimate management practices and what should be emphasized in such practices.  One 
important frame of the reforms which have driven the mergers is the rationalist logic based on 
managerial and businesslike principles. This managerial logic is often in contrast to the 
professional working life in the hospital, and may therefore be in conflict with both the identity 
and values of the professional employees in hospitals. In professional service organizations like 
hospitals, we know that the decisions are legitimized through professional implementation and 
influence. When analyzing the views expressed by professional staff in hospitals, we have to 
be aware of the differences between the administrative logics and the professional norms 
guiding the actions of doctors and nurses in the hospitals.  
The setting for the case studies presented here is quite unique. The two hospitals studied 
(hospital 1 and hospital 2), were merged into one independent unit in 2002 together with another 
small hospital. One of the hospitals in our study had at that time the role as the “main” actor 
and housing the top management group (hospital enterprise 1). The merged hospital 
experienced fundamental intra-organizational conflicts, especially vertically between the top 
and the operational levels in the three merging units. Consequently, the board of the regional 
health authorities decided to split up the merged hospital in 2007 due to these internal conflicts, 
internal unrest and escalating budget deficits (Regional Health Authority, 2006). At the same 
time, a new merger was constructed based on political decisions, and the two hospitals were 
merged with the largest university hospital in the region, while the third hospital was included 
into a central hospital in another geographical unit.  
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In order to follow the two case hospitals and analyze the perceived changes in the 
managerial practices, we made a follow up survey study in 2013 to compare a survey from 2005 
in the two case hospitals.  We also conducted interviews among respondents in the merged 
hospitals during spring 2014 in order to compare the 2005 interviews. The empirical data 
therefore consists of a longitudinal study in the case hospitals with the possibility to compare 
perceived experiences among the staffs working in the hospitals both in 2005 and 2013/14. 
   
Previous research has questioned how management reforms in hospitals have affected 
the operation of clinical practice (Jacobs, 2004; Lapsley, 2007), while other studies refer to 
different practices of clinicians in hospitals (Llewellyn, 2001; Model et.al. 2001; 2007; 
Kurunmäki, 2004, Jacobs, 2005; Lehtonen , 2007; Martiniussen and Magnussen, 2011). Our 
main findings are that horizontal/lateral coordination is perceived as functioning well, whereas 
vertical control is perceived as more or less ill-functioning independent of distance. We base 
our study mainly on a theoretical framework focusing on inter-organizational controls. This 
study contributes to existing knowledge and research in this field as we highlight the 
longitudinal perspective in changes of the vertical and horizontal management control at 
distance in mergers. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we describe the theoretical framework. 
Thereafter the research setting and research methods are presented. The empirical findings are 
discussed and finally, the main findings are analyzed and discussed.  
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Theoretical framework 
Introduction 
A merger may according to our view be defined as a transaction in which two or more hospitals 
combine most or all of  their assets and competences to create a third entity, the merged unit, 
and thus,  resulting in a change of control for all hospitals.  Such merger introduces new lines 
of authority, which in principle may induce longer lines of command between the top 
management and the professional staffs. These mergers follow the traditionally management 
control practices, which have been designed for line organizations to allocate accountability 
between managers at different levels. In such contexts we may talk about action at distance 
(Robson, 1992: 691); “While distance in this formulation is the fundamental problem for action 
and control, it is also a source of “power” that those who act upon a setting through 
power/knowledge are distanced from that setting”. 
This traditional view is challenged by the introduction of the horizontal dimensions, 
which focus on the support of decisions and control between units in lateral relations, such as 
hospitals.  Here the main task is to manage activities in a non-hierarchical and lateral sense, 
introducing aspects of process orientation, which is related to inter-organizational management 
control.  In this context, the clinical department is central. Consequently, mergers based on 
vertical and formal lines of authority, may in principle conflict with the lateral management 
view to perform process activities between administrative units in hospitals in order to manage 
patient throughputs.  
Since the late 1990s there are some signs of new organizational forms emerging within 
health management based on lateral or horizontal rather than vertical modes of organizing 
(Grafton et al. 2011). There is talk of a “governance” model of organizing (Newman, 2001) 
based on lateral rather than vertical relations. These models all challenge the vertical control 
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lines, stressing lateral and process-based forms of organizing rather than vertical or functional 
principles. These arguments are highly relevant for hospitals as professional service 
organizations. On the other hand, the trends towards formal mergers point to a direction of more 
vertical lines of control which may conflict with the professional governance in hospitals, which 
are mainly based on social or norm based control in the hands of the professionals themselves.  
 
Horizontal and vertical management control 
According to the focus on professional norm controls which is fundamentally tied with 
horizontal/lateral practices, literature in the field points at the observation that horizontally 
oriented MACS (Management Accounting and Control System) are often used for coordinative 
purposes in inter-organizational settings (Håkansson and Lind 2004; Dekker, 2004; Cäker and 
Siverbo, 2011). It is noted that the horizontal MACS do not substitute the existing vertical 
functionally oriented MACS, but complement it (Kastberg and Siverbo, 2011). However, what 
they see is that the use of horizontal and vertical MACS are kept separate and used in different 
situations. Other studies show that traditionally designed (vertical) MACS obstruct the 
realization of process orientation, since such MACS (horizontal coordination) reinforce a 
vertical perspective on the organization, which makes inter-departmental cooperation and inter-
organizational collaboration more difficult.  
Accordingly, hospital mergers which motivate to more formal management at a distance 
may hamper the development of lateral management practices. Laterally based principles of 
organizing are now being promoted as a potential successor to highly integrated forms. But the 
success or failure in inter-organizational contexts depends on the coordination between the 
partner institutions (Smith et al., 1995; Dekker, 2004; Caglio and Ditillo, 2008). A lateral 
management control system is more similar to the interactive control system defined by Simons 
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(2000:216) as “…the formal information system that managers use to personally involve 
themselves in the decision activities of subordinates.” Interactive management control systems 
appear in interaction between managers and their subordinates (van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Scapens, 2008). According to Batec and Carassus (2006) and Kominins and Dudau (2012: 144) 
the interactive management control systems are characterized by: “a strong level of involvement 
from all organization members, and a focus on dialogue and knowledge exchange for the 
examination of the assumption underlying both current strategies and new strategies.” These 
processes are characteristics of lateral relations built on involvement, dialogues and 
communication. The vertical control approach does not include the lateral processes across 
functional lines of authority.  Management at a distance may accordingly hamper these lateral 
relations. 
According to Kastberg and Siverbo (2011) the horizontal MACS are at a more general 
level used for coordination, for interactive control and for attention direction. Simon (2000) and 
Kominis and Dudau (2012) conclude that the measure of success of an organization’s 
management control package is its ability to manage the tension between predictable goal 
achievement (monitored by diagnostic systems) and creative innovation (fostered by interactive 
systems). Further, we may expect that interactive management control have to be practiced with 
the “hands on” in close relations with the actors; and not at a distance. 
 
Interorganizational controls and framing of interaction 
Increased attention has been paid to see cooperation as means to increase efficient public sector 
services (Miller et al, 2008). In an overview, Carlsson-Wall et al (2011) conclude that existing 
literature mostly relating to the private sector, has primarily focused on inter-organizational 
administrative control, and with much less attention to social and self-controls. On the other 
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hand, long ago Hopwood (1974) pointed to the need to pay attention to social controls and self-
controls as parts of managers’ tool boxes and the potential influences with behavior in 
organizations. Administrative controls are the traditional, formal tools managers use for 
potential influencing behavior. Then comes social controls derived from colleagues, education 
and group norms, and last, self-control based on personal values which motivate action.  
Solstad and Pettersen (2010) show that in a hospital merger the hospitals were forced to 
change, but the new organization – the merged hospital – followed different pathways to handle 
the externally imposed stress. The top management changed the administrative control and the 
structures, while the professional parts of the hospitals did not adjust to these changes. The 
formal organizational structures and flow charts were changed, whereas the routines and 
clinical practices based on the key actors’ evaluation of activities; their interpretive schemes – 
their framing remained unchanged (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). Based on these arguments, 
we need to go beyond the formal, vertical lines of coordination and control when studying 
mergers and the perception of control by the professional staff. These arguments are also 
according to van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens (2008), who point at the comprehensive view 
of management control which include these lateral relations which cannot be observed merely 
from the hierarchical management viewpoint. 
In our case where performance is heavily dependent on professional actors, we assume 
that  social control and self-control are most important incentives for high quality service 
provision. These control mechanisms cannot be administered from distance, but have to be 
implemented in direct face-to-face contact with and between the professional staff as they are 
performing their tasks. Administrative controls, on the other hand, might be performed at a 
distance by indirect media (e-mail, telephone, documents).  
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Inter-organizational social controls develop by informal and direct interaction. This is 
especially relevant in professional organizations such as hospitals, where performance is in the 
hands of these professional employees and guided by social/norm controls. In such 
organizations, researchers have noticed that there is a potential clash between the goals set by 
management and those of the   health care professionals. Management by distance as 
organizations become larger due to mergers may, accordingly, challenge social and self control 
if administrative controls replace the other control bases.   
How then can we understand the differences in perceived controls such as those 
discussed here? Actors may interpret signals and actions differently, which directly refer to the 
concept of framing (Goffman, 1974). Frames are organizing principles that govern actions and 
performances, and are expressed in discourse and subject to collective construction. The actors 
compare experiences and actions, and use framing to give meaning and common understanding 
or definition of the situation. Framing is, according to Goffman (1974), a way to explain the 
background different actors or group need to interpret the ongoing conversation and interaction. 
In this sense, framing refers to how something is contextualized, interpreted, and essentially 
given meaning (Sundstöm, 2011).  As social and self-controls are directly tied with social 
interaction (face-to-face), social interaction presupposes established social frames. Social 
frames do not only provide a “schemata of interpretation” but also guide the interactions 
between these individuals, and they are continuous negotiated between different parties. 
According to Goffman (1974), actions are always interpreted in a context that makes certain 
performances legitimate, while others will face resistance. The context will therefore be part of 
the individual's understanding of what’s happening. These frames enable and regulate the way 
actors establish meaning of what is going on around them (Bay, 2011).  
Consequently, we may understand differences in perceived control relationships 
between management and professionals by noticing that actors/professionals construct their 
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interpretation and understanding of control differently due to many reasons, among other 
explanations difference as to context (distance) and professional background. This different 
understanding of control may also include managing of identification and tension in the 
organization (Seal and Mattimoe, 2014). Tension in this sense may not only include different 
goals, but also different concepts and perspectives on reality (Seal and Mattimoe, 2014; 
Cinquini et al., 2013; Nørreklit, 2011). According to Nørreklit (2011:17) is reality not at static 
phenomenon, but a well-functioning actor-world relationship’ and is the “integration of the four 
dimensions of facts, possibility, value and communication.” Facts may thus be defined by their 
possibilities or logics (Seal and Mattiemoe, 2014. 
In this paper, we argue that the tensions are socially constructed by actors  framing the 
ongoing conversation and interaction. Management control at distance may create special  
managerial challenges ( especially in hospitals), and consequently, distance may influence 
framing. Facts could then be understood as framing of physical distances. Values and logic 
could be understood as framing of emotional distance, while communication could be seen as 
framing of cognitive distance. Normally individuals feel more socially connected to others who 
are located nearby (Stafford, 2005; Henderson and Lount, 2011). Increased physical distance 
between individuals may lead to disconnection, and individual may react less positively towards 
one another. Physical distance may also have a negatively effect on the quality of the interaction 
between leaders and employees (Howell et al., 2005). The physical distance may also affect the 
perceived distance – the cognitive and emotional distance. In such a context, framing is 
essential. 
The research setting 
Like most other countries in Europe, the hospital sector in Norway has been continuously 
reorganized since 2002, and the reforms have created organizations that are 
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functionally/vertically controlled by managers, whereas the production lines are coordinated on 
a process- or a lateral basis (Pettersen et. al., 2012). The new organizational form is basically 
built on Regional Health Authorities which include several independent local hospital 
enterprises. Each level is managed by a general manager who reports to the board at regional 
or local level.  These units are legal entities regulated in the Hospital Enterprise Act (2001).  
This model is in many ways similar to the business enterprise model, consisting of several 
independent business units called daughters which are governed by the parent organization. In 
this paper we focus on the respondents’ perceived intra – and inter-organizational vertical and 
horizontal coordination practices  between the “mother unit” and the other hospital units  as the 
hospitals are merged.    
The four Regional Health Authorities in Norway coordinate the hospital enterprises.  
This coordination model is complicated, as we find vertical coordination between the State (the 
owner), the Regional Health Authorities and the local hospital enterprises. There are also 
horizontal coordination tasks between the local hospital enterprises within their region, and also 
internal horizontal coordination challenges within hospital units, as these are large 
organizations.  In order to develop more efficient governance forms, the Government 
introduced hospital mergers as one of several reform initiatives. The politically lead pressure 
towards larger hospital entities motivated a comprehensive reorganization and large number of 
mergers took place within few years after the reform. Between 2002 and 2013 the number of 
self-governing hospital entities was reduced from 54 before the reform to 25 years after. 
 
Research methods 
The purpose of this study is to analyze mergers between hospitals as a part of a managerial 
reform. We have made a longitudinal study to gain a deep insight (Lee et al., 2007) and followed 
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merger processes affecting our two case hospitals during 11 years. We began the study as the 
Norwegian Hospital Enterprise Reform was implemented in 2002, and during these years two 
merger initiatives were implemented in this region. When studying organizational change, Ryan 
et al, (2002) and Scapens (2004) highlights the necessity to study the changes in their historical, 
economic and organizational context to gain a comprehensive understanding what’s happen 
during the change process. According to Pettigrew, Woodman and Cameron (2001) time is also 
an essential part of investigations of change if processes are to be uncovered. We have included 
these suggestions into our study.  
We began with a fieldwork in the first merged hospital enterprise consisting of three 
previously independent hospitals. These three hospitals were geographically located in two 
different counties. The hospital ad a total of approx. 1,500 employees. Each hospital unit offered 
most hospital services, but with varying degrees of specialization. It was a long distance 
between the hospitals; nearly 225 km between the two hospitals with the longest distance range. 
The three hospitals were earlier managed by their own top management and administration. 
Because of geographical and historical reasons, there had been little cooperation between the 
hospitals before the merger in 2002. The general manager and the top management team were 
recruited from outside and localized to one of the former independent hospitals. During the 
field work we interviewed key informants in 2005, such as the clinical   department managers 
situated in each of the three merging hospital units. A total of six   clinical  managers were 
interviewed. The data collection was based on semi-structured interviews. In order to obtain 
valid information, each construct was explained and discussed with the respondent during the 
interviews. The researcher participated in the interviews, and these were taped and recorded. 
The interviews took from 1,5 – 3 hours and were carried out in the offices of the clinical 
managers. . The notes were sent to the interviewees for validation.  
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In spring 2014 new interviews were made with clinical managers in the same two case 
hospitals. Six managers participated in the study. They were not identical with the key 
informants in the earlier field study (2005), but they have the same positions.  The interviews 
were made similar with the former data collection. The quotes used in this paper are all 
translated from Norwegian to English by the authors.       
 A survey among all the professional employees was also carried out in 2005. That 
survey was sent out three years after the merger had been implemented. The respondents were 
nurses, doctors and the clinical managers in the departments in the three merging hospital 
entities. The questions in the survey were developed according to operationalized constructs to 
describe relevant theoretical dimensions derived from the theoretical framework.  The 
questionnaire was distributed by the internal mail system. The questions were formulated as 
assertions, and they were based on closed alternatives with options from either strongly agree 
to strongly disagree. The assertions have been translated from Norwegian to English in this 
paper. 759 questionnaires were distributed in the hospital in June 2005 with a  total response 
rate at about 38 %.    
During the spring 2013 we conducted a new survey to the reorganized merged hospital 
enterprise. The same questions were used as in the former survey, and we used the same 
practical methods. We received responses from 837 employees, which indicate a response rate 
of approximately 15%, which according to the hospital’s administration is considered a normal 
response rate. Many of the employees were on leave, holidays and may have resigned, and the 
actual response rate may then be 25-30%. Consequently, our interpretation of the data should 
therefore only indicate trends.   
In this paper we present data from the two case hospitals (hospital 1 and 2) that were 
involved in both mergers. The data is analyzed by using SPSS. We use descriptive statistics to 
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calculate the average in per cent. The data is presented in appendix 1 and 2. In the presentation 
we combine the alternatives agree/partly agree, and disagree/partly disagree. 
Empirical findings 
 The implementation of the Hospital Enterprise Reform (2002) was top- down driven. The 
general managers who at that time were responsible for the implementation of the new 
management control systems, were considered as the “Ministry’s prolongations of the reform”.  
The management control was based on vertical lines, where the general managers were the 
representative for theses modes of organizing. These modes are in contrast with a more lateral 
(horizontal) control practice, which are mostly observed in the clinical departments. In the 
mergers between the hospitals the real distance and the perceived distance between the general 
managers and the professional staff in the units may affect the local discourses and the collective 
constructions of norms and culture in the clinical departments. 
The geographical location of the general manager and his staff is a main contextual 
condition for managing the merged hospital units. In 2005 the general manager was located in 
hospital 1, while in 2013, after the second mergers, the general manager was placed in the 
largest hospital, located far away from hospital 1. Hospital 2 did not host the general managers 
neither in 2005 nor in 2013.  
In the interviews and in the surveys the professional staffs were asked about their 
perceptions on decision-making, information, communication, cooperation and distance.  The 
focus was both on the relationship between the general manager (and his staff) and the 
professional staff  in the departments (vertical control line), and between the clinical managers  
and the professional staff (a more horizontal control line).The clinical managers  were during 
this time period all placed  in the same location as the professional staff. Thus, the vertical and 
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horizontal lines of management control have had different conditions as to physical distance in 
these two mergers.     
 
Vertical lines of management control 
The vertical lines of management control are studied by the relation between the general 
managers and the professional staffs. It is striking to notice the differences between the 
respondents’ views between 2005 and 2013.  Although the professional staffs in hospital 1 in 
2005 were housed in the same buildings as the general managers, they were much more hostile 
in their views on this management in 2005, compared with the 2013 view - where the top 
management team is placed far away.  
In 2005 when the top management was in the same building, the professionals disagreed 
with the top managers’ decisions, they felt they were not well informed about key decisions, 
and they felt they were in general not well informed. Further, they did not think that the top 
managers were visible in the organization, and they thought that the top manager did not have 
a good dialogue with the professional employees. Strikingly, they think that the communication 
between the top and the professionals was bad (95 % disagree with the statement that the 
communication is good).  The empirical findings from the survey in 2005 are confirmed by 
interviews with key informants in hospital 1: As one informant said: 
 “There has been communication, but it has not been two-ways communication.” 
This citation illuminates a top-down communication. Further, another informant stated that the 
general manager did not focus on managing the merged hospital, but was concentrating on 
serving the regional administration, upwards:   
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“In my opinion, the administrative top leaders work for the Regional Health Authority 
- they do not carry out discussions with us.” 
We also find signs that professionals perceive the administrative managers to have low 
legitimate standing:  
“I do not trust the administrative top leaders.” 
The same picture is painted by the 2005 respondents in the second case hospital (hospital 2). 
Respondents were highly critical to the top management (although slightly less than in hospital 
1), indicating bad dialogue and communication. This hospital was situated far away from the 
“mother unit”. The 2013 data indicate that the perceived distance between the general manager 
and the professional employees in hospital 2 has decreased, as respondents are neutral as to the 
quality (difficulty) of the relations.  The key decision makers in hospital 2 expressed in 2005 a 
perceived long distance to the general managers.   One informant said: 
“The general managers work by their own agenda. This result that changes we like to 
do in the clinical world don’t get sympathy within the general manager team.” 
 
Another informant stated that the general manager did not have tacit knowledge relevant from 
the hospital world:  
 “The general managers is not rooted in the clinical world” 
The informants in both case hospitals perceive that there are unbalanced power bases in the 
merged units, as respondents think that geographical distance poses a problem related to the 
fact that the general manager is housed in one of the units.   
In 2013 respondents in both case hospitals are of the same opinion, however, in 2005 
respondents in case hospital 1 did not think that relations were unbalanced. In 2013 these 
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respondents changed their opinion and think that the physical distance has increased and favour 
the hospital unit housing the general manager. Informants in hospital 1 said: 
“I experience that there are problems with understanding how we are operating in 
relation to the distance ... they do not understand what we are concerned about” 
“They have the role as the big brother, while we have the feeling of being the little 
brother…” 
  The perception of unbalanced decision-making and problems attached with physical, cognitive 
and emotional distance may be framed by the relative close or long physical distance to the 
general manager and his staff. On the other hand, as seen above, distance does not (seemingly) 
produce negative opinions towards the top management in 2013 
In 2013 the professional staff is still negative to the vertical lines of management control 
represented by the general managers, but the resistance has decreased to some extent. The 
informant from hospital 1 and hospital 2 express in interviews that they do have “any 
experience” with the general manager. The general manager and the staff  were quite distanced 
from the professionals’ daily:   
“We do what we always have been done.” (Informant, hospital 1) 
“I’m not dependent on the general managers in my daily work.” (Informant, hospital 1) 
“We feel very independent in how we operate the clinic.” (Informant, hospital 2) 
“We do not have anything to do with the general managers...I do not know who the 
other person in the general management team are rather than the person who is the 
general managers for this clinic.”(Informant, hospital 2) 
 
The framing of distance as a significant role in management control after mergers is expressed 
by the informants in 2005 (hospital 1), as having to do with traditions:  
 “It has something to do with traditions.” 
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Further, framing of unbalanced power is also shaped by the feeling of closeness/association 
with the unit:  
 “I think the lack of affiliation to the enterprise is the worst. I feel no affiliation.”  
In hospital 2, which did not host the general manager, the respondents agree that the hospital 
1 (housing the general manager) is favoured when decisions are made, and that the distance is 
perceived as a problem: 
 “I’m sceptical to the situation that the general managers are located in hospital 1…” 
The physical distance is felt as a problem as the respondent did not see the top managers: 
“Since the merger I have had little contact with the general managers and the 
administration. I have no relation to the general managers – they are located in 
hospital 1, and the distance is quite large and we never see them.” 
One informant in hospital 2 perceives that the hospital housing the top management is 
favoured when being benchmarked;  
“The general managers always measure the hospitals in the enterprise against each 
other. And it always ends with that hospital 1 is favoured.” 
This feeling of distance is underlined by a professional stating that the top manager does not 
know what happens in the other hospitals:   
“I don’t think the general managers know that we exist in the system. They live their 
lives, and we live our lives. I don’t know what happens up there” 
 
In sum, these statements indicate that the vertical lines of control in 2005 were interpreted as 
bad- irrespectively of the professional were close physical or at distance. The perceived 
opinions on the general manager  in 2013, geographically far away, were totally different and 
much more positive among the respondents in both hospitals. The vertical lines of control in 
2005 could be characterised as “break down”, and as a result the merger was split up in 2006. 
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While in 2013 the data indicate a more positive relation, although the general management is 
far away.  This may indicate that the physical distance is not a main element when evaluating 
vertical coordination between general managers and the professionals in a merger. In 2005 the 
general manager was a person with business background, while in 2013 the general manager 
has background as a doctor. It appears that the cognitive and emotional distance matters more 
than physical distance in this case. This assumption is supported by quotes from the interviews 
in 2014: 
“I have to say that it feels reassuring to know that the decisions are not only taken with 
a focus on the bottom line, but also on the patient securities - that the patient is in the 
centre. The general manager is good in talking about patients and that the patient is the 
most important part of health care, and he talks about the care and quality ... so this 
general manager has many of the qualities that perhaps was lacking in previous 
regimes.” (Informant, hospital 1) 
“I think it must be easier to explain and defence changes in a language that that the 
employees understand.” (Informant, hospital 2) 
“Maybe, the general managers have more legitimacy because he is a doctor, and in such 
a way understand what is going on.”(Informant, hospital 1) 
 
These citations illustrate that the professionals’ feeling that the “general manager is one of 
them” is important in their framing of vertical coordination. 
Intra-organizational control in the clinics and framing 
The empirical findings (appendix 1 and 2) show different picture as to the perceived relations 
between the professional staff and the general management at on hand and their clinical 
managers at the other hand, both in 2005 and 2013. The two case hospitals show almost the 
same trends:  The professionals think that their clinical managers appreciate comments from 
them, and that they always get feedback from their managers if they have questions. This is 
mostly (in the clinics) face-to-face communication which indicates direct interaction – 
underpinning social control and lateral relations based on discourses. 
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 We also notice that the respondents think that it is easy to discuss with their managers 
when conflicts arise and that the dialogue is perceived to be good. Further, the sharing of 
information is good between the parties.  These findings indicate horizontal cooperation, as 
professionals in hospitals are highly educated people who appreciate management by 
involvement and lateral relations, managers who motivate to self-control based on professional 
norms and values. There are also indications that administrative control seems to be established, 
thus creating comprehensive management tools on the clinical levels.  These findings 
above are supported by the interviews in 2005 and we notice the same trands in 2014, as 
informants are positive towards their clinical managers:  
“We have a very good dialogue with our clinical department leader.” (Informant, 
hospital 1) 
“I think the cooperation internal in the clinic and between my managers and my, 
function well.” (Informant, hospital 2) 
“We have a good working environment in my clinical department.” (Informant, hospital 
1) 
 
In the 2014 interviews informants state:  
“We have a good working environment and cooperation in our department.” 
(Informant, hospital 1) 
“We have no replacement of staff. It is a sign that employees enjoy working with each 
other and with the leaders of the department.” (Informant, hospital 2) 
 
Appendix 1 and 2 show that a majority of the respondents in 2005 think that there has been 
little investments in improving the working environment after the first merger. In 2013 most of 
the respondents are neutral to this question, which indicates that the respondents perceived that 
the working environment has been improved from 2005 to 2013. This could be explained by 
the fact that the first merger was perceived as more dramatic than the second merger, and that 
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the professional staffs over time have accepted the merger, as they do not experience dramatic 
changes in the work environment.    
The studies both in 2005 and in 2013 indicate that the respondents perceive the working 
environment in their own department as functioning well, implying that the horizontal 
management control at department levels was not negatively affected by the merger. The 
relationships between the professionals and their clinical managers were judged as positive by 
the respondents both in 2005 and 2013, and the dialogues and information were judged as good. 
The decisions and the general manager’s activities were not affecting the day-to-day clinical 
activities, indicating a split between clinics and administration.  
 
Preliminary discussion 
This paper focuses on distance as one important contextual element which affects the 
relationship between managers and their employees in merging hospitals, as we posed the  
question how managers and professionals in hospitals perceive their relations with top managers 
at a distance when contexts are changing Distance is a contextual determinant when managerial 
task such as coordination and control are to be performed, and when the context such as distance 
changes, we might expect that this change also affect the relations between managers and 
employees, and the management control practices. Distance can here be split into physical 
distance, cognitive distance and emotional distance. 
The empirical setting presented is quite unique. The two hospitals studied were merged 
into one unit in 2002 together with another small hospital. One of the hospitals had at that time 
the role as the “main” actor and housing the top management group. This merged hospital 
experienced fundamental intra-organizational conflicts, and it was split up in 2007 due to these 
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internal conflicts, internal unrest and escalating budget deficits.  At the same time, a new merger 
was constructed based on political decisions.  
We made in 2013 a follow up survey study from 2005 in the two case hospitals to follow 
them during major changes in in managerial control practices over time.  Interviews were done 
among clinical managers in the merged hospitals during early spring 2014, to follow up 
interviews done in 2005. The longitudinal data opens for comparing perceived experiences 
among the staffs working in the hospitals 2005 and 2013. 
 
Physical and cognitive distance  
The existence of professional norm controls in hospitals is fundamentally tied with 
horizontal/lateral practices. Literature points at the horizontally oriented MACS (Management 
Accounting and Control System) used for coordinative purposes in inter-organizational 
settings, as contrasting to the vertical oriented and formal control lines in mergers.  We have 
found that vertical and horizontal controls are separated in our cases. Horizontal control in the 
clinical practices is perceived as functioning well, whereas vertical control is separated from 
the clinical, horizontal control. Administrative control (at distance)  is associated with vertical 
control, and perceived as functioning quite bad. Social/professional control is associated with 
horizontal control, and these controls are judged as adequately practiced, close to the 
professionals who frame these controls as good.  
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Management controls- and framing 
Management control can be seen as tool kits with many elements; including administrative, 
social and personal controls. We have observed in our empirical data that administrative 
controls at distance were perceived as inadequate, whereas social control as professional 
coordination which is performed face to face are judged to be good and independent of top 
managers at distance. In sum, the ill-functioning top management did not interfere with the 
social and professional controls close to employees in the clinics. We may understand 
differences in perceived control relationships between management and professionals by 
noticing that actors/professionals construct their interpretation and understanding (Goffman, 
1974) of control differently due to among other explanations differences as to context (physical 
distance) and professional background (cognitive and emotional distance).  
 In our case where performance is heavily dependent on professional actors, we assume 
that social control and self-control are most important incentives for high quality service 
provision. These control mechanisms cannot be administered from distance, but have to be 
implemented in direct face-to-face contact with and between the professional staff as they are 
performing their tasks. Administrative controls, on the other hand, might be performed at a 
distance by indirect media (e-mail, telephone, documents). The framing of physical distance 
(facts) is here found to be different (due to distance). Further, differences in values and logics 
between professionals and administrative staffs may motivate to emotional distances. We also 
observe that professionals in the clinics have direct communication and are separated from the 
general manager’s staff which leads to cognitive distance (Seal and Mattimoe, 2014).  
In sum, these diverse perspectives on reality challenge the management control practices 
in merging organizations such as hospitals.   
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Appendix 1: 
Hospital 1  
 2005 2013 
 Strongly 
agree/ 
partly 
agree (%) 
Neither 
agree nor 
Disagree 
(%) 
Strongly 
disagree/ 
partly 
disagree (%) 
 (N) Strongly 
agree/ 
partly 
agree (%) 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree (%) 
Strongly 
disagree/ 
partly 
disagree (%) 
 (N) 
I think no local hospitals in the enterprise is favored when the decision is 
made 
25,7 34,6 39,7 136 2,4 20,2 77,4 124 
I mostly agree with the decisions that the administrative top leaders takes 3,0 18,2 78,8 137 10,5 38,7 50,8 124 
I am well informed about key decisions made by the administrative top 
leaders and the board 
17,5 12,4 70,1 137 24,8 32,2 43,0 121 
I think the information from the administrative top leaders is good 4,4 10,2 85,4 137 18,5 35,5 46,0 124 
The information from the administrative top leaders have increased the 
confidence in the organizational processes that are initiated 
4,4 17,0 78,6 135 13,0 47,2 39,8 123 
The representatives are heard in the process 8,8 18,4 72,8 136 23,4 49,2 27,4 124 
The administrative top leaders are “visible” in their positions 3,7 11,1 85,2 135 13,7 46,0 40,3 124 
The administrative top leaders have a good dialogue with the professional 
employees in the hospital enterprise 
1,5 4,4 94,1 137 4,9 46,3 48,8 123 
The communication between  the administrative top leaders and us as 
professional employees are good 
2,2 2,9 94,9 137 4,9 46,3 48,8 123 
The hospital enterprise is running in an efficient way 4,4 22,1 73,5 136 16,3 35,0 48,7 123 
I think the leader of my department appreciate comments from me 70,8 13,1 16,1 137 62,6 26,8 10,6 123 
When I have comments on operational issues relating to the department I 
been heard 
51,4 24,3 24,3 136 56,9 23,6 19,5 123 
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I always get feedback from the leader of  my department if I have a question 57,8 14,8 27,4 135 59,8 12,3 27,9 122 
If conflicts arise, it is easy to take this up with the manager of the department 60,3 8,1 31,6 136 69,1 10,6 20,3 123 
The dialog between the leader of the department and me is good 76,5 10,3 13,2 136 77,7 10,7 11,6 121 
I think the information from the department leader is good 56,5 10,9 32,6 138 65,3 9,7 25,0 124 
My department is taken care on in an effective way 52,1 23,1 24,8 138 67,7 12,1 202 124 
The cooperation between the administrative top leaders  and clinical 
departments are good 
2,2 33,3 64,5 138 4,9 59,9 35,2 122 
Geographical distance poses a problem for working entity 52,2 34,8 13,0 138 75,0 13,7 11,3 124 
It has been investing heavily in the work environment after the merger 1,4 18,8 79,8 138 24,4 41,5 34,1 123 
 
 
Appendix 2: 
Hospital 2  
 2005 2013 
 Strongly 
agree/partly 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree/ 
partly 
disagree 
 (N) Strongly 
agree/ 
partly 
agree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree/ 
partly 
disagree 
 (N) 
I think no local hospitals in the enterprise is favored when the decision is 
made 
5,0 13,1 81,9 61 10,0 27,1 62,9 70 
I mostly agree with the decisions that the administrative top leaders takes 8,2 19,7 72,1 61 14,1 49,3 36,6 71 
149
I am well informed about key decisions made by the administrative top 
leaders and the board 
24,2 17,7 58,1 62 28,2 29,5 42,3 71 
I think the information from the administrative top leaders is good 9,7 14,5 75,8 62 34,3 42,9 32,8 70 
The information from the administrative top leaders have increased the 
confidence in the organizational processes that are initiated 
11,5 23,0 65,5 61 23,9 45,1 31,0 71 
The representatives are heard in the process 9,8 36,1 54,1 5 14,1 47,9 38,0 31 
The administrative top leaders are “visible” in their positions 14,5 16,1 69,4 62 15,5 55,0 29,5 71 
The administrative top leaders have a good dialogue with the professional 
employees in the hospital enterprise 
3,2 14,8 82,0 61 14,1 53,5 32,4 71 
The communication between  the administrative top leaders and us as 
professional employees are good2 
1,6 16,4 82,0 61 12,9 50,0 37,1 70 
The hospital enterprise is running in an efficient way 3,2 22,6 74,2 62 20,3 46,4 33,3 69 
I think the leader of my department appreciate comments from me 72,6 11,3 16,1 62 56,6 24,6 18,8 69 
When I have comments on operational issues relating to the department I 
been heard 
60,6 19,7 19,7 61 47,9 27,5 24,6 69 
I always get feedback from the leader of  my department if I have a 
question 
53,2 17,7 29,1 62 54,9 18,3 26,8 71 
If conflicts arise, it is easy to take this up with the manager of the 
department 
59,7 11,3 29,0 62 56,3 15,5 28,2 71 
The dialog between the leader of the department and me is good 74,2 12,9 12,9 62 64,8 15,5 19,7 71 
I think the information from the department leader is good 51,6 14,5 33,9 62 51,5 22,1 26,4 68 
My department is taken care on in an effective way 47,6 26,2 26,2 61 51,5 27,9 20,6 68 
The cooperation between the administrative top leaders  and clinical 
departments are good 
6,7 43,3 50,0 60 5,6 66,2 28,2 71 
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Geographical distance poses a problem for working entity 64,5 19,4 16,1 62 66,2 25,0 8,8 68 
It has been investing heavily in the work environment after the merger 11,3 21,0 67,7 62 18,6 41,4 40,0 70 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This archival research study unravels critique and unintended consequences arising from 
increased parliamentary oversight controls and multiple accountability pressures in Norway. 
Intensified oversight and accountability pressures are supposed to boost transparency and 
performance, as well as clarifying roles and performance expectations. This study depicts how 
more controls yielded diametrical repercussions. Two other overall findings include the 
necessity of paying more attention to quality over control quantity as well as the 
communicative aspect of the controls. To achieve (more) effective controls, including 
strengthening their legitimacy, the findings in this study point to the need to better understand 
the accountability perceptions of those held accountable—the other side of parliamentary 
oversight. 
Key words: parliamentary oversight, the Office of the Auditor General, accountability, 
unintended consequences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Parliamentary oversight (henceforth PO) has in recent decades received increased attention in 
many countries. The need for PO arises from the eventuality that the executive party of the 
public sector (i.e. the central government, ministries and subordinated agencies) in some way 
fails, thereby endangering the role and decisions of parliament. PO is said to hold different 
functions and to bring about various benefits. E.g. the mere anticipation of parliamentary 
oversight has become a powerful ex-ante influence in determining the content of bills drafted 
by ministers, buffering against coalitional partners’ temptation to use ministerial positions to 
pursue their political agendas (Martin and Vanberg, 2004). Ogul and Rockman (1990) view 
PO as formal and informal endeavours to “bring agencies into compliance with Congressional 
demand” (Ogul and Rockman, 1990, p. 6). Furthermore, oversight enhances accountability 
and ensures executive responsiveness to statutory guidelines (Rockman, 1984). Moreover, as 
defined by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984, p. 165), “...oversight policy concerns whether, to 
what extent, and in what ways Congress attempts to detect and remedy executive-branch 
violations of legislative goals”. This definition has been articulated by viewing parliamentary 
scrutiny as a post-investigation. Therefore, the intention of oversight is to assure that the 
executive remains answerable, i.e. accountable, something which is sought to be achieved via 
various forms of controls. Nevertheless, this is considered to be a political undertaking in a 
system of government and it can deal with various issues ranging from administrative matters 
to policy aspects of governments in different contexts. 
In such settings, the intended functions of parliamentary oversight may not always be 
fulfilled. Indeed, by inaugurating oversight committees, governments may seek to gain 
legitimacy rather than prompting changes (Degeling et al., 1996; Jacobs and Jones, 2009). As 
discussed by Evans (1999), the executive governments that occupied a clear majority in 
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Australia have almost destroyed the ability of Parliament to enforce accountability. 
Furthermore, Holland (2004) argued that one of the crystal clear intentions of parliamentary 
oversight is to prevent the Executive’s negative encroachment over the elected 
representatives. He found that the Parliament’s ability to scrutinize the government’s actions 
had eroded because ministers cannot be asked to testify before oversight committees. 
Consequently, the public sector has become less open to the scrutiny performed by 
representatives of citizens. Holland (2004) therefore proposed to remove the existing barriers 
that hinder oversight committees having complete access to ministers and their administrative 
actions.  
In essence, the referred literature above depicts a controversy between intended functions 
of parliamentary oversight and various settings in which they are severely challenged. 
Nevertheless, the general consensus seems to be that more control and intervention are 
warranted to strengthen or facilitate PO, either by removing existing control hurdles or by 
launching new control initiatives. However, at some point increased controls may transmute 
into dysfunctional parliamentary oversight—as least when judging by organizational literature 
on the consequences of increased control (e.g. Perrow, 1986). An emerging puzzle is therefore 
what happens in parliamentary oversight states characterised by increasing levels of control. 
This is not much addressed by parliamentary oversight literature and therefore led to the 
formulation of the following research question: What kinds of unintended consequences do 
arise from increased parliamentary oversight controls?  
By exploring unintended consequences stemming from increased parliamentary oversight 
controls we learn more about the other side of parliamentary oversight—thereby illuminating 
how the normative instrumental foundation of parliamentary oversight controls is not always 
achieved. This furthermore elucidates factors that ask for more critical accountability studies.   
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This paper makes three contributions. Firstly, it takes a stance against the mainstream 
view in the literature of there being advantageous to intensify PO controls. The evidence in 
this study rather suggests that intensified controls could bring about diametrical repercussions. 
Secondly, this study adds to the literature by underscoring the importance of quality over 
quantity in PO controls—not only to achieve effective controls, but also to avoid jeopardizing 
the legitimacy of the institutionally important role of PO controls. Third, the findings in this 
study point to the importance of the communicative aspect of PO controls—encompassing the 
ways in which they are planned and carried out. This includes the ways in which media have 
seized a core position in PO questions.  
We apply an accountability perspective to guide our discussion. Following the frame of 
reference, the method section is outlined before presenting the two cases. Similarities and 
differences between the two countries are highlighted in the discussion, followed by the 
conclusions.   
 
LINKING ACCOUNTABILITY TO PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT 
 
No country possesses unlimited resources to satisfy the public’s needs. Parliamentarians 
must therefore oversee and control ways of deploying public resources by the political 
executive (herein the central government and public servants), making sure they take their 
obligations seriously (Funnell, 2003). Conversely, parliaments in Westminster are accused 
for being a servant of the executive in financial matters and for legitimizing rather than 
controlling (Hume, 1963). Funnell (2011) supplemented by stating that—although it has 
been argued in the literature that public sector auditors do not always tell the truth—it is 
perhaps more detrimental that they are not always allowed to comment on matters under the 
domain of the government. Furthermore, a minister should not chair oversight committees in 
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parliament as this can impair the ability of parliament to hold the executive accountable to 
the public since parliamentarians of the ruling political party often hesitate to express views 
that may annoy their superiors (Aggarwala, 1966). Thus, the legislature forms (independent) 
scrutiny committees to hold the executive accountable to parliament (Aldons, 1985; Thomas, 
2009). Correspondingly, it is a function of the parliament to scrutinize (important) issues 
stated in the reports of the Auditor General, calling the executive to account for misuse of 
public funds and authority. 
Hence, accountability is an important concept under the auspice of democratic 
governance. Nobody would oppose the requirement of being accountable (Bovens, 2007a; 
Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010). It is, however, a multifaceted (Scarparo, 2008) and a contestable 
phenomenon (Bovens, 2007b). Accordingly, terms like chameleon are used in accountability 
discussions (Sinclair, 1995). Particularly, Sinclair (1995) discussed five accountability 
forms: Managerial, political, public, professional and personal: Managerial accountability 
emphasizes inputs and outputs, meaning that results and the amount of resources used are in 
focus. A related accountability form is administrative accountability, focusing more on 
processes, and thereby how organizational tasks should or could be encountered. 
Accountability in terms of professionalism (i.e. professional accountability) means that one 
feels a belongingness and association with a certain professional community that shares the 
same views as oneself. Public accountability refers to being responsible to the wider 
community, by having or wanting to answer to concerns and questions that may arise, 
through different channels. Political accountability means that one is accountability due to 
the organization of the public sector in different hierarchical levels of authority. In this 
respect, there is a direct line of accountability relations starting with the electors as the 
overall principals, followed by Parliament, central government and ministries, before the 
subordinated agencies comprise the bottom level of the authority chain. Personal 
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accountability resembles an adherence to inner beliefs and conscience, e.g. regarding what is 
perceived to be right and wrong. Moreover, Sinclair (1995) noted that these accountability 
forms might be present simultaneously, making accountability a context dependent 
phenomenon.  
Accountability has therefore been extended far beyond its original intention of—in a 
narrow sense—providing accounts for one’s conduct (Mulgan, 2000). Corollary, 
accountability, within the context of parliamentary oversight, is considered as the obligation 
of furnishing accounts and acceptable explanations to parliament or its oversight committees, 
via the Office of the Auditor General (henceforth abbreviated OAG), to assure that resources 
and authority have been used for legitimate activities and purposes. Similarly, the executive 
and public administrators are obliged to execute recommendations of parliament. In this 
way, accountability—in the context of parliamentary oversight—is supposed to augment 
performance, transparency as well as clarifying roles and performance expectations. 
Hence, the way this term is frequently defined envisages the perception of the ideal 
relationship between parties involved. The bureaucracy testifies before oversight committees 
while discharging accountability (Thomas, 1979; 2009). Accordingly, administrators provide 
justifications and accept responsibility for administrative decisions and actions associated 
with the implementation of governmental programmes. Furthermore, as quoted by Carnegie 
and West (2005: 915), Public Sector Accounting Standard Board refers accountability as “the 
responsibility to provide information to enable users to make informed judgement about the 
performance, financial position, financing and investing and compliance of the reporting 
entity”. The rationally articulated accountability outcome seems to be unquestioned goals 
(Uddin and Choudhury, 2008), thereby ignoring how parliamentary oversight may not unfold 
as expected. Messner (2009), taking a basis in the ethical dimension of accountability, 
cautioned about the limits of accountability, something that appears more pressing when 
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individuals face multiple accountability pressures simultaneously (as explicated by Sinclair, 
1995). Messner (2009, p. 925) applied the term “opaque selves” to spell out limitations of 
accountability, defining the term as follows:  
 
The first constraint upon every account of oneself is grounded in those areas of the self and its 
conduct that remain foreign to the self. This foreignness marks a limit to every effort to know 
oneself and therefore restricts one’s ability to a full story of oneself… Therefore, I cannot 
explain everything that I have done, and I cannot tell a coherent story of who I am and what I 
have experienced because my experience and conduct have not been motivated exclusively by 
my conscious efforts and deliberations and because the minutiae and complexity of what 
happens will often exceed my recognition and memory. 
 
This reasoning provides understanding as to why individuals held accountable sometimes 
become frustrated when asked to explain their conduct in the backdrop of full rationality. 
Messner (2009, p. 934) furthermore informed us what we then might have to expect from 
individuals held accountable: “The idea that there are limits to accountability suggests that 
escaping or resisting accountability is not necessarily an unethical act. It may be an 
understandable reaction to a situation in which demands for accountability have become an 
ethical burden for the accountable self. One may even argue that that resistance to 
accountability is, to some extent, a normal feature of everyday organizational life. Indeed, 
from time to time, discussions or debates have to be avoided and critical questions have to 
be ignored in order to move forward and to ‘get things done’.” In this way, Messner (2009) 
shed light on sources of conflicts in organizations and experienced frustration amongst those 
held accountable. 
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METHOD 
 
This study explores unintended consequences arising from intensified parliamentary 
oversight. It was therefore natural to select a case with a clear history of increased controls. 
Norway met that criterion (see the empirical section). Another reason for choosing Norway 
was the country’s democratic and egalitarian tradition, making it e.g. more likely that public 
servants or politicians would voice concerns with dysfunctional controls. The point of 
departure in this study is the control activities exercised by the Office of the Auditor General 
in Norway as they have attracted more and more debate and appraisal in recent years. 
Archical research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2000) has been conducted, focusing 
on newspaper articles, government reports and reports by stakeholders. The referred 
government reports are authored by the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional 
Affairs. The OAG prepared the case material for several of these reports. Newspaper articles 
and reports by stakeholders (e.g. Civita—an independent think tank) were retrieved through 
searches in printed newspapers and by online searches. One stance of the newspaper articles 
present the voices of experienced (domestically) well-known former public servants, telling 
about their experiences with the OAG in Norway. Since the respondents no longer were 
working in the organization in question they  then could speak more freely as they were no 
longer under the OAG’s “traditional” scrutiny, nor did they risk sanctions from their (former) 
employer. Government reports were identified via a separate search engine available at the 
home page of the Norwegian Parliament. A couple of references were found via the 
newspaper articles, spurring a search for the original documents. 
Advantages of secondary data is the possibility of collecting and analyzing far larger data 
sets and the increased likelihood of collecting higher-quality data than what is often possible 
to collect singlehandedly (Saunders et al., 2000, p. 199). Archival data in this case was a 
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suitable data collection method because the nature of the data could easily have made it 
difficult to obtain them via primary data collection methods, such as e.g. interviews. One 
reason for this is the number of high profile individuals (politicians and top-level public 
servants) that have sheared their views on the matter. Such persons are often difficult to 
interview due to their busy time schedules. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT IN NORWAY 
 
The government system in Norway is a ceremonial monarchy. The king is formally in charge 
of different tasks, but that is mostly ceremonial. The central government is de facto taking 
care of the various duties and tasks performed at central government level. The Norwegian 
Parliament (i.e. the Storting) holds the highest decision making authority and is supported by 
different oversight mechanisms.  
The Parliament holds the central government accountable, ensuring decisions are 
effectuated and that preconditions remain viable. Consequently, carrying out controls has 
become a key task. Nevertheless, the Parliament has initiated different changes, entailing to 
reinforce parliamentary oversight, leading to more formalized control mechanisms. Many new 
controls were introduced during the 1990s, of which some are described below. One was the 
establishment of a separate Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs 
(henceforth abbreviated SCSCA) in 1993 (extending the prior committee from 1981). Another 
change initiative came from putting more transparent, frequent and broader use of the OAG. 
In 1996, two new initiatives were launched, open-hearings in the Parliament and regular 
meetings with one hour of oral questioning, without written documents in advance. During the 
same period the Parliament also increasingly formed new “scrutiny-commissions” to 
investigate specific matters. From 1997, the Ombudsman started reporting on individual 
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cases. In 1999 a procedure was developed for controlling how the central government 
followed up on the Parliament’s instructions. These reforms represented a step-by-step 
approach, resulting in more comprehensive parliamentary controls over the central 
government’s activities, representing ex-post monitoring. Albeit reactive in nature, the various 
control mechanisms have an intended preventive function, namely to stimulate the central 
government to act within the boundaries of their action space, yet in accordance with existing 
rules, professional conduct and as a reflection of the parliament’s intent and formal decisions. 
A review of the parliamentary control system in 2002 lead to some minor suggestive changes 
(as summarized in the report by the Commission evaluating the Parliament's control function, 
2002; the SCSCA, 2003). 
Today’s parliamentary control system can be divided into two main types: the kind of 
controls the Parliament itself carries out and controls performed by external parliamentary 
control units. The first type takes place when the Parliament meets in plenary sessions, 
(whereby parliamentarians ask questions to clarify uncertainties or as controls conducted by 
one of Parliament’s fixed committees (e.g. health, foreign affairs, scrutiny and constitutional 
affairs). Controls performed by external parliamentary control units include e.g. those done by 
the OAG, the Ombudsman and special purpose “scrutiny-commissions”. Particularly the 
OAG and the SCSCA have steadily conducted more controls over the years. 
The OAG is independent of the central government and carries out its audit according to 
predefined auditing standards (corresponding to international auditing standards). Frequently, 
the auditor general presents critical remarks about various practices at central government 
level, many of which relate to inappropriate and flawed steering systems or practices. The 
SCSCA deals predominantly with the Storting’s supervisory authority, and constitutional 
matters. The SCSCA is responsible for reviewing and submitting recommendations to the 
Parliament in various areas (§ 12, paragraph 9 of the Rules of Procedure, see 
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www.stortinget.no). Control areas include the central government’s annual report, documents 
from the OAG, and other matters concerning the OAG’s activities, as well as reports prepared 
by a number of the aforementioned control mechanisms (e.g. the Ombudsman, and various 
commissions of inquiry appointed by the Storting). If deemed necessary, the committee may 
also instigate additional inquiries within the public administration. One particular penalty or 
sanction in the hands of the Parliament is to dismiss the central government. In Norway this 
“threat” has been very much “alive” due to its history of minority governments and multi-
party system. The latter frequently implies the need to form coalitions in order to obtain 
majority in Parliament.  
 
Unintended consequences and criticism arising from increased PO controls 
 
The OAG’s controls and evaluations of agencies over the years have led to frequent incidents 
of harsh criticism, generating frustration and counter-criticism amongst Norwegian 
bureaucrats and (former) ministers. A Norwegian newspaper expressed the frustration 
experienced by the bureaucrats as follows: “It is well known that the bureaucrats perceive 
particularly the OAG as troublesome, more or less as hear in the soup”(Ystad, 2009). As a 
result there is a tendency amongst ministries to instigate a form of protective response to the 
increased level of control. E.g., in 2001 the minister of local government and regional 
development rebuffed the OAG’s request for additional information. This resulted in: “the 
auditor generally being unable to carry out the control tasks he is asked to undertake by the 
Storting, whenever public servants are to decide what documents that the auditor general are 
granted access to” (The SCSCA, 2002, p. 1). When responding to the OAG’s request for 
more information, the ministry responded: “ The ministry of local government and regional 
development reaffirms that, according to today’s regulation, it is doubtful how far the auditor 
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general’s privileges reach concerning the possibility of retrieving notes containing the public 
servants internal considerations and discussions” (The SCSCA, 2002, pp. 3-4).  
Furthermore, in 2008 the same ministry did not accommodate the OAG’s request for 
access into its archives—when investigating a series of bad investments made by Norwegian 
municipalities and the extent to which the proper procedure had been followed. The ministry 
justified its decision, claiming it was necessary to avoid the OAG getting access to central 
government notes—so called R-notes. The OAG complained that this made it impossible to 
conduct the investigation (the SCSCA, 2008). In 2009 the OAG requested documentation 
relating to risk management from the Ministry of environment, but this was not furnished (the 
SCSCA, 2009). The Ombudsman had a similar experience when the minister of petroleum 
and energy for several months refused to grant the Ombudsman access to some of its internal 
documents (Ystad, 2009).  
The OAG’s intensified controls over the years amalgamated into a series of reports and 
newspaper articles in 2012, suggesting the OAG had gone too far in its controls, thereby 
introducing unintended consequences at central government level. Kinander (2012a, p. 1) 
studied the OAG’s work methods, and stated: “The OAG is a powerful institution in 
Norwegian politics and public administration. The question is nevertheless whether it has 
become excessively powerful, and has seized roles and tasks—as a critical voice—that are not 
pursuant with its judicial basis.” Continuing the criticism, the former minister of 
development, Erik Solheim, stated: “The OAG is preoccupied with minor errors, creating 
politicians terrified of initiating big and hairy reforms (Gjerde, 2012a)”. He illuminated the 
symbiosis between the OAG and journalists in the following way: “the OAG criticises minor 
details and with the media’s tendency to enlarge minor issues it constructs an impression of 
the (overall) goal as being a society free of error (Gjerde, 2012a)”. Furthermore, a former 
central government agency director, Ida Børresen, stated that although controls carried out by 
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the OAG in principle can be a valuable lesson, they did not necessarily turn out that way. 
Børresen explained: “I have experienced that the OAG’s mandate is wide and not sufficiently 
aware of what the starting point of the audit ought to be, or mirroring the Storting’s premises 
and decisions (Gjerde 2012b)”. A former Chief of Defence, Sverre Diesen, criticized the 
OAG stating that it “lacks competence and proficiency knowledge in numerous areas, 
hindering them in conducting a proper audit [i.e. a comprehensive area assessment] (Gjerde, 
2012c)”. Diesen was particularly concerned with the wider consequences of such audits: “It is 
unfortunate that the audit provides a skewed impression of actual events, but worse that 
organizations made subject to the measurement deliberately or unknowingly adjusts their 
operations accordingly to avoid criticism. Measurable factors are therefore prioritised over 
the more interesting and neglected qualitative measures of effectiveness. Such unqualified 
audits therefore yield adverse results (Gjerde, 2012c)”. Also, another experienced bureaucrat, 
Tore Eriksen, previously holding the highest administrative position within the Ministry of 
Finance for several years, and currently being Norway’s OECD-ambassador, asserted: 
“During my time in the ministry we felt it as problematic that we did not know the criteria on 
which we were audited… the OAG’s interference with internal planning in the ministries 
leads to poorer agency plans… If it is known that the OAG assesses internal processes, e.g. 
based on internal plans, there is an inherent danger that these plans will become less detailed 
and more deficient (Gjerde, 2012d)”.  
Concomitantly, such tendencies were reported as bureaucrats during the last few years 
have produced more of their internal correspondence in the form of R-notes (Erlandsen and 
Johansen, 2012). These R-notes is a type of government internal notes that can be withheld 
from the OAG. Under the former central government (in office during 2005–2013) the 
number of R-notes more than doubled, which alongside increased use of e-mails and phone 
calls signifies that: “we have got a completely new form of case preparations during recent 
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coalition governments—particularly with the current government. The case preparations are 
almost going underground” (Erlandsen and Johansen, 2012, p. 4). A politician from the 
opposition commented: “The opposition lacks proper grounds for challenging the central 
government’s decisions when ministries prepare cases inadequately [or without proper 
disclosure]. We do not get access to the alternatives being considered or receive explanations 
as to why certain alternatives are discarded. This challenges the Storting’s role as the real 
decision maker and therefore represents a significant error in political conduct” (Erlandsen 
and Johansen, 2012, p. 4). 
One of the larger newspapers in Norway (i.e. Dagbladet) commented the study by 
Kinander (2012a) in an editorial. Kinander (2012b) referred the key notion in the editorial and 
comments as follows: ”Albeit Dagbladet acknowledges the importance of the key findings in 
Kinander’s study (2012a), it is (apparently considered) more important to avoid gagging the 
freely spoken auditor general. This creates an impression of people having grown so found of 
the OAG’s criticism for its own sake that one is not willing to question the criticism no matter 
how weak and poorly founded it is from a professional viewpoint.” 
Kinander (2012b) ends his commentary with the following summary: “The OAG 
frequently grounds its work in the public administration’s own goals, ambitions and visions, 
and treat these as realistic objectives, whereby deviation from 100 % goal achievement 
instigates criticism (by the auditor general). This naturally leads to softening in the public 
administration’s objectives, with associated implications for Norway. This is at the core of the 
criticism targeting the OAG, namely that it does not necessary lead to improvements in the 
public administration. The OAG may end up weakening the public administration.” 
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DISCUSSION 
  
Having described parliamentary oversight control mechanisms and associated unintended 
consequences in the empirical section, the attention now turns to discuss the data from the 
accountability perspective. 
Norway has incorporated various elements of parliamentary oversight control 
mechanisms. A concrete example is found in the organizing of parliamentary committees, 
given the task to oversee the central government. Over time, Norway has also paid more 
attention to goals and results, and sought ways to strengthen parliamentary oversight. This has 
been a steady development, yet with an upswing in the last 10-15 years, reminiscent of its 
control endeavour leading to wider and intensified controls and control mechanisms. A 
difference is found in the way Norway mostly relies on ex-post controls.  
The Parliament of a democratic State is anticipated to exercise control over 
governments and remain as an institution of exercising checks and balances over the 
executive and government (Degeling et al., 1996).  
Even if Norway is said to struggle with performance problems or unsatisfactory results, 
the obvious solution is not necessarily the appropriate path if seeking to strengthen 
parliamentary oversight in the country. The traditional approach and apparent solution would 
be to reinforce control or remove oversight barriers. If the control culture or personal 
accountability elements are not tuned in with traditional democratic views regarding 
accountability, most likely, more controls will not be an effective solution. McMillan (2004) 
discussed accounting manipulations and proposed trust and virtues as a better alternative than 
more control, as the latter option will not solve the problem, but rather exacerbate the 
problem. In the end it is always possible to avoid or sabotage controls and oversight. 
Therefore, introducing more of the same will not necessarily help. For instance, both Iyoha 
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and Oyerinde (2010); McMillan (2004) suggests that strengthening the profession is more 
rewarding than launching more controls. 
At face value, Norway seems to have managed to incorporate preventive functions into 
the parliamentary oversight system. For instance, the Norwegian case shows the increased 
reliance on the OAG to perform controls. The OAG has a reputation as delivering tough 
assessments and scrutiny reports, and speaking freely in its criticism when discovering 
irregularities. This has led to various changes, which show that scrutiny is taken seriously in 
Norway and fierce criticism awaits underperformers. However, the empirical material spells 
out how the public servants increasingly feel monitored, criticised—also on unfair grounds—
and sometimes also without a just basis for the scrutiny and control. Increasingly this has led 
public servants to change the way they do their job. According to the informants, this has 
reached a point at which the public servants perceive the OAG as intruding too much in their 
daily affairs. Actually, there are signs that of Norwegian public servants shunning 
accountability.. In the case of the Norwegian public servants they apparently seek to keep 
more of their internal or strategic assessments away from the public eye. This is materializing 
by means of the increased use of R-notes, the type of notes that the OAG cannot request to 
see. The argument that is found in the data material is that this takes place because it is 
necessary for them to have some action space in which they do not always have to be held 
accountable. This corresponds to the reasoning of Messner (2009): “One may even argue that 
that resistance to accountability is, to some extent, a normal feature of everyday 
organizational life”. Messner (2009) argues that this is sometimes necessary in order to get 
things done. It therefore seems that the public servants in Norway are fed up with being 
scrutinized according to administrative accountability (Sinclair, 1995). Another feature in the 
Norwegian case is the way the public servants feel that minor details are getting a lot of 
attention, whereas various achievements are not much praised. It is not easy or indeed 
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possible for the public servants to always do the right thing or to be in a position, 
retrospectively, where they have to account for everything that has been done or 
contemplated. In this way the public servants encounter their “opaque selves”. As a 
consequence of the fierce criticism, there is an incentive to soften the goals and ambitions to 
ensure they will be met and thereby avoid criticism, also in cases where such actions are not 
necessarily believed to be the best way forward to reach ones ambitions and objectives. For 
instance, some of the experienced public servants commented that the OAG often emphasised 
details and a vision of an error-free world, which was not seen as being compatible with 
establishing ambitious and important, yet potentially hard-to-reach goals.  
 The end result, according to the informants, is that less will be accomplished and still 
less criticism will be presented. This furthermore points to the weaknesses of accountability 
and thereby also parliamentary oversight. 
Paradoxically, rather than achieving more transparency via increased oversight and 
controls, the opposite has turned out to be the case. The data contains a statement by a 
politician that explicated this as being a threat to democratic governance. This therefore 
shows, as also argued by Messner (2009), that there are limitations to accountability, and in 
the context of this paper, also to the extent of parliamentary oversight. When it is pushed 
(too) far, unintended, if not diametrical effects emerge. This represents the other side of 
parliamentary oversight, namely the unfortunate side effects deriving from control, akin to a 
behavioural reaction to control systems found in organization life and studies (see, Perrow, 
1986).  
However, it would be unfair to solely blame the OAG in Norway for the perceived 
difficult accountability pressures faced by the public servants. In Norway it is clear that the 
media has played an important tandem role with the OAG. It has become a tradition in 
Norway that the OAG conducts its assessments and report about them, whereby the press 
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picks up certain elements from the OAG’s report and constructs very critical headings and 
story lines. This may be perceived as the OAG’s viewpoint, but should more correctly be seen 
as the media’s interpretation of the OAG’s reports and announcements. Anyway, the end 
effect, in accountability terms, is that the public servants are exposed to a strong public 
accountability pressure (see Sinclair, 1995), stirred up by the media. 
Nonetheless, a critique launched by the public servants towards the OAG in Norway is 
the way in which the OAG sometimes sets its own agenda. This may be attributed to what 
Sinclair (1995) coined personal accountability. Sinclair (1995, p. 230) stated that personal 
accountability “…rests on the belief that ultimately accountability is driven by adherence to 
internalised moral and ethical values”. Thus, the informants’ references to instigated audits 
without the apparent proper anchoring in the Storting can reflect the auditor general’s 
tendency of acting out under the influence of his personal accountability. In this way it was 
stated that the auditor seizes the role as a political supreme judge (Kinander, 2012a; 2012c). 
This reflects how the auditor general, according to the informants, over time increasingly have 
initiated audits or made inferences about certain findings from audits even when the 
Parliament did not launch or problematize the subject matter. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper on parliamentary oversight has addressed the following research question: What 
kinds of unintended consequences do arise from increased parliamentary oversight controls? 
The evidence points to an increase of controls over time in Norway, escalating 
particularly during the last 10-15 years. The increased parliamentary oversight (controls) 
functions (in the intended way) only up to a certain level of control increase. Beyond that 
level, public servants made subject to controls will become more protective and find ways to 
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escape or hide from accountability. This brings us to the conclusion that although certain 
controls must be in place, it seems pivotal to consider other approaches to improving 
parliamentary oversight. For instance, Iyoha and Oyerinde (2010); McMillan (2004) suggest 
that strengthening the profession is more rewarding than launching more controls. Data from 
the Norwegian case shows for instance how some of the informants question the competence 
of the OAG in carrying out area-specific evaluations and scrutiny. Although it might be 
valuable lessons to be learned from interacting with the OAG, as acknowledged by one of the 
informants, it rests upon the (perceived) robustness of the scrutiny undertaken. 
Furthermore, the increased and intensified controls have amalgamated into growing 
frustration and unintended behavioral responses. According to the data material this has led 
public servants to alter the way they do their job. Three main unintended consequences are 
depicted from the data material.  
Firstly, critique over details and failure to succeed 100 % in everything they do give 
impetus to lowering the ambitions and goals amongst public servants. The end result is 
therefore that increased controls and parliamentary oversight might decrease rather than 
increase performance. Secondly, the data material shows how the use of public servants’ 
internal documents has changed along the way. Particularly the so called R-notes—
representing an off-limits area to the OAG—have grown in popularity amongst public 
servants. In this way, steadily intensified parliamentary oversight controls and scrutiny have 
led to increased opaqueness of public servants’ work processes, rather than to increased 
transparency. Iincompatible accountability pressures challenged the public servants, making it 
difficult for them to account for their conduct. As a result they sought ways to escape from 
parliamentary oversight scrutiny, rendering it difficult or impossible to comprehend what is 
undertaken by the public servants—making their actions opaque.  
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Thirdly, the OAG sometimes launches investigations—according to the informants—
without having a clear mandate from the parliament. This makes it difficult for public servants 
to know exactly what is expected from them and how to respond to the critique. In this way, 
rather than clarifying roles and performance expectations, parliamentary oversight controls 
and scrutiny contributes to mystify public servants’ roles and performance expectations.  
As a result, the intention with parliamentary oversight is distorted, depicting the 
limitations of accountability. This exacerbates the difficulty of the “opaque self”, and helps to 
explain why some public servants seek to ignore accountability. It furthermore instigates 
questions about the ethics of accountability. In such states, the parliamentary oversight 
therefore ends up being a monologue rather than a constructive dialogue (seeking to find ways 
to improve performance). Consequently, there is a need to readdress the other side of 
parliamentary oversight, both in terms of re-establishing a dialogue with those held 
accountable, but also by paying more attention to the unintended consequences that derive 
from pushing parliamentary oversight controls and scrutiny too far. 
One limitation with this study includes the lack of in depth interviews. Future studies 
could therefore benefit from a different data collection design. In particular, upcoming studies 
are advised to explore how “quantitatively” driven PO controls impact on control subjects’ 
willingness to cooperate with those carrying out the controls. Similarly, how fragile are 
control subjects’ willingness to cooperate (with those carrying out the controls) with respect 
to the way they perceive the handling of the communicative aspect of the PO controls? 
Finally, which of the two—number of PO controls or the quality of the PO controls—are 
more likely to bring about diametrical repercussions? 
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Introduction 
Academics are living through significant change, embroiled in its complexity 
and sense of cumulative becoming. The higher education (H.E.) sector is evolving 
into something that it was not, making our day-to-day working patterns different in 
considerable ways. Several once taken-for-granted assumptions, unquestioned beliefs 
underpinning the very fabric of H.E., have not only been challenged in recent times 
but actually been ruptured and to some extent displaced by new emerging ways. 
For instance, a long-standing given in H.E., that ‘students are not customers of 
academics’, no longer seems to hold to the level it did say just 10 years ago; nor 
would ‘research is everything’, nor would the assumption that ‘academia is a safe job, 
underwritten by government’. These assumptions, amongst probably many more, will 
be familiar to many readers, in particular to those colleagues who have worked in 
research-focused universities for more than two decades. But equally, the same reader 
is likely to have questioned the continuation of such phenomenon in more recent 
times. 
The main aim of this paper is to unpack and understand the nature of such 
significant changes in the H.E. landscape in recent times. Much of this change is 
driven by outside, broader factors (e.g., government policy) on the other hand, yet a 
great deal of the unfolding journey is also shaped by agency within H.E. (e.g., 
management styles). In particular, I aim to highlight how new emergent practices 
which collectively I call financialization have become prevalent across the sector and, 
as such, constitutes a key driver, as well as an important outcome, of the institutional 
change that we are living. 
                                                 
1 John Burns is also a Visiting Professor at University College Dublin (Ireland), WHU Otto Beisheim 
Management School (Germany), and Trondheim Business School (Norway) 
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Financialization describes a multitude of things which, in general terms, relate 
to how the H.E. sector is nowadays more than ever managed by, and judged, on its 
financial performance. Broken down, it essentially consists of keen attention towards 
costs and other financially-oriented metrics, cost-revenue analysis management, key 
performance indicators, forecasting, and strategizing around financial numbers. In 
some respects, there is nothing necessarily so new about this, in the case of the H.E. 
sector. Universities have always been very costly organizations, but traditionally they 
have also been heavily subsidised by the Government. They have always had some 
degree of accountability; however, the difference today is in terms of the sheer 
magnitude and pace at which financialization is sweeping through this landscape. 
My personal interest in this subject is twofold. First, I have an interest in what 
is happening as an employee within the H.E. sector; and, second, as a researcher, my 
curiosity is particularly honed towards why and how the change processes evolve as 
they do over time. I shall endeavour to focus predominantly on the latter of these two 
interests and, from this, also consider some of the potential consequences and 
implications of this unfolding story.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: next, I shall briefly outline 
the processual methodology adopted in the research. The case study then follows - i.e., 
a study of key temporal aspects of the H.E. sector over the last two decades. So, I 
begin by describing the H.E. sector in the early 1990s, when I personally entered the 
academic profession as a research assistant, and for which I highlight important 
guardians of continuity. Next, the case description focuses on the nature of more 
recent and present-day changes within the H.E. sector, including an emphasis on some 
of the key drivers of change. Finally, there is a discussion of some of the 
consequences and implications which I draw from the case, including some 
questioning of how financialization has seemingly and widely been assumed to 
represent the ‘best’ way forward in managing tomorrow’s universities and the H.E. 
sector more generally.   
 
A processual approach 
This paper adopts a processual methodological approach (Langley et al., 2013) 
in attempting to unravel and make sense of the dynamics of H.E. during the last two 
decades. Temporality is key in a processual approach – i.e., a predominant interest in 
how and why phenomena evolve over time as they do, as opposed to a predominant 
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emphasis on outcomes or a journey’s end. More specifically, the present process-
oriented research will focus attention on how and why H.E./organizational 
phenomena emerge, settle and change through time.  
Temporality is highly relevant to understanding cumulative organizational 
phenomena, because tomorrow’s organizations are embroiled in ongoing, complex 
challenges over time – not least due to their fast-moving, inter-connected and 
globalised nature. Yet, the social sciences tend to be dominated by ‘static’ research 
approaches which prioritise abstract correlations between dependent and independent 
variables, and espouse to know-what modelling of ‘best’ organizational practice.  
There is an opportunity to push the boundaries of organizational analyses, and 
social science more generally, by developing the processual alternative. Processual 
research incorporates notions of causality which are constituted in sequences of 
interconnected events, and a fundamental aim is the development of know-how and 
pattern-seeking theorization.  
Organizations are immersed in continuous and cumulative uncertainty and 
change, and it would seem an opportune time to pursue new conceptualizations of the 
organization field which are sensitized to all things that flow. In the social sciences, 
more specifically, this will involve the development of perspectives that depart from 
timeless concepts, which review embedded taxonomies, and that substitute 
complexity for linear causality.  
Our case setting is the H.E. sector, particularly that part which involves 
English universities2, which represents an organizational landscape that has recently 
gone through radical change and where further change seems inevitable. The HE 
sector thus provides an empirical setting where complex organizational processes can 
be researched. And, while there is a plethora of prescriptive and policy-grounded 
research which promotes the practices that HE institutions ‘need’ to follow in order to 
prosper in their new time and space, the vast majority of this research is grounded in 
static methodological approaches. In contrast, the present approach aims to balance 
such contributions with research that critically unpacks the cumulative processes of 
change in this vitally important sector.   
 
                                                 
2 The main reason for focusing primarily on English universities is twofold: (1) I have been working 
for an English university for the previous 5 years, and (2) there is a particular difference between 
English and, say, Scottish universities as far as recent significant changes in student fees structures are 
concerned.  
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 UK academia in 1993 
My first taste of the academic field was as an economics undergraduate 
student, enduring three years of ‘rational economic man’ and ‘equilibrium’. Armed 
with the various models and tools of neoclassicism, I then entered the auditing field 
with one of the Big 4 accountancy firms, although I soon discovered that there was a 
greater need for a green-inked pen than for tools of rational behaviour and equilibrium 
forces to fulfil my duties in this vocation. 
I didn’t last too long as a trainee auditor, just over a couple of years, and I 
went back to (higher) education. I returned to my old stomping ground of economics, 
self-funding a Masters in economics at the University of Manchester. It was pretty 
much more of the same – i.e., rational, optimizing models of economic outcomes, the 
major difference was stretching my only-adequate mathematical skills to their limit. 
During my Masters I began to develop a particular interest in the ‘theory of the 
firm’, and it was then that I had my first exposure to more heterodox economists like 
Veblen (1898), Galbraith (1958) and Hodgson (1988). These (and other non-
mainstream) writers began to help me to make more sense of the organizational field 
(i.e., the accountancy firm, and its clients) that I just spent two years breathing-in. 
As a trainee auditor, you normally experience different client-organizations at 
least every other week. I personally felt that, in a reasonably short space of time, I had 
learned a lot about the organizational world, including some degree of recognition of 
the many subtle and often tacit differences from one organization to another, e.g., 
differences in terms of structures, procedures, personalities, perceived identity, 
ambition, and much more. I also think that it was during my auditing days that I 
became more intrigued and curious as to what made an organization tick (or not) over 
time?; what, how, and why do some things change – sometimes expectedly, 
sometimes not?; who were the key, influential players inside an organization, and 
why? These sorts of questions have stayed with me to the present day. 
I began working in academia for proper in 1993. A research assistantship 
came up, literally across the road from where I was doing my masters in economics, 
in the Manchester School of Accounting and Finance. The research project was an 
investigation of whether management decisions were dominated by the statutory 
requirements of external financial requirements (cf. Johnson and Kaplan, 1987), a 
quite convenient marriage of my own (limited) works experience in auditing and my 
keen interest in the economists’ theory of the firm, respectively. 
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Engaging also in a PhD, I immersed myself into reading huge amounts of 
literature in the heterodox economics field, and supplemented this also with social 
theorists whom I sensed might help to extend (though I probably didn’t realise it so 
much at the time!) the sort of methodological and theoretical framework that I was 
rather unknowingly aiming for, e.g., the works of Giddens (1984) and the ‘new’ 
institutional sociologists (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
In no time, I approached a university in the same way that I had acquired a 
habit of doing in my auditing days; that is, I continuously and consciously took stock 
to try to appreciate what ‘makes’ this particular organization – not just the people and 
their oft-habitual behaviours but also the various rules, practices, processes, etc, who 
are the people who ‘get things done’, which practices are generally quite stable and 
rather predictable, and why do some things change, plus lots more. 
The first, most striking observations that I made were of three ‘in stone’, 
unquestioned and seemingly taken-for-granted assumptions throughout the circles that 
I was now engaging in. The first was an assumption that ‘students are not customers’, 
the second was that ‘research is everything, and nothing else matters so much’, and 
the third was that ‘we’re a safe sector, we’re Government-funded’. These three things 
were continuously reiterated to me by my peers, they seemed to be common ground 
for colleagues throughout my 5* research-focused academic department, but I would 
argue that they also resonated for the most part with all research-focused academic 
units at the time. Drawing from my own PhD and early publications, I would argue 
that such assumptions had become institutionalised (Burns and Scapens, 2000).3 
There were numerous and reinforcing drivers for such unquestioned ways in 
English universities at the time. For instance, and first, although maintenance grants 
for students had steadily declined in previous decades and student loans to fund 
‘university living’ were becoming more common, all domestic students still had their 
tuition fees covered by government funds. Second, research achievement – 
particularly the quality of articles written by scholars in highly-regarded peer-review 
academic journals – had become ever more important since the launch of the 
inaugural ‘research assessment exercise’ in 1986. Moreover, importantly, such 
assessment exercises were aligned to significant financial rewards for universities. 
                                                 
3 Burns and Scapens defined ‘institutions’ as “shared taken for granted assumptions” within 
organizations, which are embedded in the rules and routines that shape actions (2000, p.8). Institutional 
change, though infrequent, would reference to the displacement of existing institutions with new ones, 
although total displacement (of the ‘trace’ and memory) is unlikely.  
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Third, while the previous few decades had witnessed a steadily decline in the total 
amount of funds allocated to universities by the UK government, it was still a 
generally well-subsidised sector, and there was still significant amounts allocated to 
research councils – the State funding mechanism was historic and generally reliable. 
Fourth, in 1993, the academic field was probably more national than international, 
email was only just beginning to surface as a common tool within academia, and the 
Internet was still a few years away before it started to have an impact in the sector. So, 
the university market was fairly localised, and there was only probably as much 
competitive pressure in such locale as had previously existed over several decades. By 
1993, then, the H. E. sector in England was under little pressure to change, there was 
an absence of noticeable clamouring for fundamental change from any particular 
groups or key individuals – students at that time were relatively powerless. And, 
commonly-held assumptions such as those mentioned above were continuously 
reinforced through time, taking its people (in particular research-oriented scholars) 
with them, as an embroiled element of such reinforcement processes – they never 
seemed to be questioned or challenged in any meaningful way. 
 
UK academia in 2014 
Fast-forward 21 years and the situation for England’s universities has now 
become extremely different. The three aforementioned institutions have all been more 
or less blitzed and no longer have given status, and there are many other important, 
new features in the sector that just didn’t represent a 1990’s English university. In this 
section, I try to capture some of the more significant features of today’s H.E. sector, 
highlighting amongst other things some of the main drivers underpinning how the 
changes have unfolded as they did through the last two decades. I also include a short 
anecdote of a recent experience I had which was really the catalyst for my intrigue 
into (what I regard as constituting) fundamental and far-reaching institutional change, 
still happening now, in the field in which we work. 
 
Change drivers 
Since the 1990s, global H.E. has been under considerable pressure from 
respective governments, English universities being no exception, to become more 
accountable and to generally convey more value for taxpayers’ money. There have 
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been multiple reviews and reports which have fuelled and furthered such moves 
toward more commercially-oriented organizations, e.g., Dearing Report (1997).   
In 2012, the UK government implemented recommendations of two White 
Papers from the previous year, (1) ‘Students at the heart of the system’, and (2) a new 
regulatory framework for the H.E. sector. These had far-reaching impact(s) on the 
entire academic landscape, including and probably most significantly, within the 
English H.E. sector. First, the UK government has slashed, practically wiped out its 
contribution towards university teaching costs, and replaced this with a new system 
whereby (English) universities elect the tuition fees they wish to charge prospective 
students, up to a maximum of £9k per annum. This of course has a fundamental affect 
on the student-university relationship. Second, academic research has also taken a 
massive hit in that: (1) the government funding that directly flows to universities from 
the research assessment exercises has shrunk significantly compared to just a decade 
ago, and (2) the allocation of government funds to research councils has also been 
dealt a huge hammer blow. Third, the UK government has opened up the market-
place, in allowing the formation of new private (i.e., non-funded) universities. 
     These represent, as I see it, some of the main (though not necessarily the 
only) drivers of recent change in England’s universities. Such changes to the H.E. 
landscape have, through both external requirement and internal agency, catalyzed the 
emergence and creation of new forms of practice in the sector. I shall discuss some of 
these new and emerging practices below. But, first, I shall briefly offer a personal 
anecdote, which brought home to me recently the significance of the changes that we 
(academics) are living through.  
 
An uncomfortable moment 
In March (2014), I was keynote speaker for a conference organised by the 
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA), in London. The 200+ 
audience comprised mostly qualified accountants who worked in the H.E. sector 
across the UK, and also a handful of very senior university managers including Vice-
Chancellors. I opened the conference in the morning session with a talk that was 
angled at some of the behavioural issues when implementing organizational change, 
although I sensed this was not entirely what the audience had expected from me. The 
broader aim of the conference was about how make H.E. institutions more ‘efficient’ 
and ‘cost effective’. My task was specifically to discuss how management accounting 
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might possibly augment these ambitions in the sector, and I did say some things 
(though not too much) on what ‘might’ be gained from such tools as the balanced 
scorecard, benchmarking and more. I did, however, caveat my discussion of such 
tools with a ‘health warning’ and then spent proportionately more of my time trying to 
convince the audience (but likely failing) about how unpredictable and challenging 
the implementation of such tools can become in practice.  
I guess that I was generally well-received – at least, the audience were 
incredibly polite and relatively appreciative; I had got away with it. The next speaker, 
a consultant from one of the Big 4 accountancy firms, seemed to attract more 
attention, at least judging by the number and type of questions he was given, when he 
discussed the university ‘TRAC’ system which is effectively an activity-based costing 
system that tries to better calculate where academics’ costs are incurred.  
But it was the third presentation which really set the conference room alight; 
namely, a presentation given by the finance director of a new private university, BPP. 
His university is of course not accountable to government, and receives no public 
funds, it is a commercial outfit. And, the significance of just how different his 
workplace is to mine, and really epitomising the magnitude of change in the H.E. 
sector in recent times, came to me when this speaker said: “We sell our degrees to 
both home/EU and overseas students”.  
It was his use of the word “sell” which, in particular, drew my attention to (the 
confirmation of) just how different the H.E. sector had become, or at least will likely 
become, now infused with practices and assumptions that had not previously existed. 
The same finance director captured his audience with his commercial astuteness and a 
language that oozed of an accountant whose main task was unashamedly to earn 
profits for his university. He outpoured a whole array of commercially-oriented 
(though fairly traditional MA) tools which he was using; and his whole remit came 
across as being in the field for cutting and managing costs, targeting margins, 
achieving pre-determined ratios, and satisfying the customer. 
The whole audience embraced him, certainly more than they had appeared to 
take to me, and everyone seemed to want a slice of his cake. At the same time, I 
began to sink in my chair, as I felt everyone’s stare onto my back, because following 
the last two presentations (if not even before this day!) I was clearly viewed as an 
expensive resource and, even more significantly, it seemed that the accountants were 
more than ever determined to ensure that they had the means to say so. 
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This got me thinking; in particular, I was curious about the extent to which, in 
the context of their considerably changed and changing landscape, public sector 
universities were also engaged in greater commercial savvy and more business-
orientation than had previously not been the case. Were universities in general 
becoming more financialized, steered both operationally and strategically with 
positive economic returns in mind, and where accountants are likely to assume more 
elevated and powerful roles than they once did in that sector? 
 
Towards the present-day 
The CIMA conference experience was a real eye-opener for me, and ever 
since I have been particularly intrigued to try to see and understand how the journey 
continues to unravel in the H.E. landscape. As I have intimated already, I strongly 
believe that we are living through a milestone period when once unquestioned and 
long-standing assumptions underpinning the sector, particularly amongst its research-
oriented academics, are changing.  More to the point, I would argue that the H.E. 
sector is currently in the throes of institutional change. 
There is much to be observed and seen, concerning the unfolding nature of 
these developments in a very important sector. For instance, there is a plethora of 
prescriptive and policy-grounded research and commentary which generally promotes 
the new management practices that H.E. institutions ‘must’ follow in order to prosper 
in their new time and space. Much of this literature, and much of what we also see in 
practice, represents the promotion of financialization, whereby universities now 
increasingly measure, control and evaluate achievement through financially-oriented 
performance indicators. There is plenty of advice on offer from professional training 
firms who have recently swamped the H.E. market with courses on basically ‘how to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of a university’ or to ‘make your university 
leaner’. Equally there are many more courses on offer, and publications at hand, for 
learning, say, about cost management in universities, ratio analysis, KPI targeting, 
pricing, benchmarking, and much more. 
As a professorial researcher in a Russell Group university, I have never felt so 
subject to measurement than I have (increasingly) over the last year, both individually 
and collectively (i.e., as a member of the Accounting group, or the Business School). 
Particularly at management level there has been a noticeable push on measuring and 
managing costs and other financial metrics, set against (hard-to-predict) revenues, and 
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much of this activity filters down, directly and indirectly, into the individual 
academic’s field. Accounting per se has become more prominent in day-to-day 
university life – e.g., seen in the manner by which faculty research support, for 
conferences, etc., has become a far more closely monitored exercise which requires 
significantly more bureaucratic steps to attend to before an academic boards any plane 
to share ideas with like-minded thinkers.  
Accounting ‘tools’ are entering, and becoming more common, in the day-to-
day life of universities, especially at management level. There are plentiful cost and 
value-for-money exercises, not just cost-cutting but more of generally all-round cost 
management. Revenue management has risen in terms of its priority and importance, 
although managers still struggle in this respect to the extent that much revenue 
information in the H.E. sector is not available until probably after it remains useful. 
Key performance indicators are nowadays more commonplace, often integrated 
within some kind of ‘balanced scorecard’ model, and reporting and review cycles 
would appear to be getting shorter. Also there is strong evidence that benchmarking is 
happening more and more, compared to previous years – e.g., comparisons across 
individual faculty, departments, Schools and Colleges, and Universities; but also 
benchmarking over time, focusing on trends, etc. 
The same kind of thing is also more noticeably and increasingly changing the 
nature of strategy within universities. First, university strategy has on the whole been 
reconfigured into shorter windows (i.e., a 3 year strategy is more common and taken 
as being more useful than any 10-year plan), explicitly stated as being ‘living’ or 
‘rolling’ plans such that they are probably best described as strategizing rather than 
strategy documents. Such strategizing, particularly at management levels, is very 
much geared towards long-run financial health, and university accountants (and their 
‘accounts’) appear to be assuming positions of considerably elevated status than they 
had previously in the H.E. sector. 
 
Discussion 
Institutional change? 
I began this paper by suggesting that academics were living through, and in 
the throes of, significant institutional change in their sector, whereby once 
unquestioned assumptions underpinning their work environment had not only been 
challenged in recent times but were also in serious doubt as to their longevity or even 
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their existence today. As illustration, I questioned whether academics in research-
focused universities today could confidently claim, the following three things, 
namely: (1) that students are not customers of academics, (2) that research is 
everything, and nothing else matters so much, and (3) that academics work in a safe 
sector, with the safety net that is called ‘Government’.   
First, can we really still contest the notion of ‘students as our customers’? The 
growing evidence is: clearly not! For instance, the new fees structure has completely 
altered the university-student relationship; universities are now trading products as 
opposed to funded services. Also, in the last few years the ‘National Student Survey’ 
has elevated into being one of the key metrics and rankings within the H.E. sector, 
and university managers rally their troops at ‘survey time’ to encourage strong (and 
hopefully positive) student input. 
I was also told an interesting story a few months back by a teaching colleague 
of mine at Exeter, which I found very interesting. His son is studying at university and 
he was telling his dad how he and some friends had sat down one day to estimate 
what they thought one lecture for a particular module was costing them (the students). 
Moreover, when a lecturer failed to turn up to class one day, he and his friends began 
to question whether they should be entitled to a refund. This suggests that for the 
students at least there are fundamental changes underway, already happened, in terms 
of their assumptions concerning student-university ‘trading’. This way of thinking, I 
suggest, is bound to deepen given the nature of students’ fees structures now, and it 
will be interesting to see just how these dynamics unfold and the further implications 
that emerge. But it will also be interesting to see what develops from a university, and 
particularly an academic, standpoint. It seems that the pace of institutional change 
amongst students would on the most part be much quicker than the average research-
academic. Indeed, there are probably still a sizeable number of research-academics 
who refuse to shift from their age-old assumption that ‘students are not customers’; 
and, this being the case, there is likely to be resistance and challenges ahead. Possibly, 
who knows, at least some academics will (e.g., through surrounding themselves with 
research income, maybe?) be able to avoid forced entry into the new surroundings 
where student is customer? 
Second, can we still hold that ‘research is everything, and nothing else 
matters’? Again, this would seem unlikely in the long-run. To begin with, universities 
are under immensely greater stress to bring in revenues, they have lost the bulk of 
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government hand-outs and research alone will not reach anywhere near the necessary 
revenue levels needed to ensure the sustainability of a university. This is why the days 
of ‘free research’, e.g., 40% of research active faculty’s workload devoted to research, 
are probably numbered, if not altogether dead. In short, research cannot ‘be 
everything’ because ‘it will not pay’ by itself and more and probably different 
revenue streams will likely need to be given greater priority. Teaching is the obvious 
income stream, but we can probably expect greater competitive behaviours, product 
differentiation, marketing ‘wars’, and more, in the not-too-distant future. Other 
income streams will probably emerge, if they are attainable – e.g., business 
partnerships, sponsorship, and more. 
But also, even if our research can still maintain high and subsidized status in 
some research-oriented universities, the nature of our research is also likely to come 
under greater pressure (to change), thus the ‘research’ in ‘research is everything’ is 
redefining over time. For instance, changes in the mechanics of external research 
funds will probably re-shape the nature of our research. Aside of the fact that there is 
generally considerably less funds available to research councils, there are new and 
very clear boxes to tick in tomorrow’s grant-getting. The overall drivers, as I see it, 
and all intertwined with an undercurrent of getting the most out of scarce funding, are: 
value-for-money, cross-disciplinary and multi-institutional (‘pooled’) input, and 
impact. If academics can get these things right in their applications for external 
research income then, for a select few maybe, research may remain ‘everything’, but 
for most it is more likely that ‘expensive’ research can no longer be afforded as free 
by universities, and that academic curiosity will be under serious threat. 
Third, as academics, can we still claim to be working in a ‘safe’ environment? 
Again, I would suggest that the answer to this also has to be ‘No’; while the H.E. 
sector as a whole claims to be in a generally healthy state, questions can still be made 
surely about the longevity of the configuration that makes up that sector today. 
Notwithstanding the problems underpinning university pension schemes (though our 
sector is not unique in this), universities are scrambling for new positions in a new 
environment to which most are alien. In fact it is the likes of BPP and other private 
universities which are probably finding this journey the ‘easiest’ at the present time, 
because they are basically engaging in more of the same, but probably more 
aggressively.  
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Quite simply, government funds have been swept from under H.E.’s platform, 
so this is bound to be having, and will continue to have, a profound impact on the 
nature of its environment. What matters, what is targeted, what is prioritized, what 
will become assumed to be ‘given ways’, and much more are evolving into situations 
different; and the main certainty is that these phenomena will not resonate with ten 
years ago. Will we see mergers, acquisitions, closures even? Probably, but who knows, 
we will know with the unfolding of tomorrow’s journey. But the ‘safe’, plodding, 
independent but highly-subsidized university of old has most certainly gone, and new 
alternatives are emerging. This process will be an interesting dimension particularly in 
terms of the identity of universities, and how they might (not) choose to manage and 
manipulate that identity.  
 
Financialization 
In attempting to unpack and understand the nature of the institutional change 
in the H.E. sector over recent years, I have stressed the significance of undercurrent 
and new emerging practices which collectively I have termed financialization. 
Financialization, I argue, has recently and quite rapidly become prevalent across the 
sector, constituting both an important driver and outcome of the institutional change. 
The unfolding story of institutional change is rich with interesting dynamics, 
the study of which should be increased and continued in the future. There’s more to 
be learned, for sure, about the institutional contestation that occurs as new directions 
(mis)align differently with the various taken-for-granted assumptions in a university 
locale. For instance, we have already discussed different reactions to changes in the 
relationship between student (as customer) and academic faculty; more specifically, 
students appear to have less-engrained institutional ‘stock’ and personal incentive to 
support the notion of ‘students as customers’, whereas the longevity and 
embeddedness of ‘students are not customers’ appears to be the principal reason for 
sluggishness in change at faculty level. 
The dynamics as conveyed relate both to structure (cf. institutions) and agency 
(cf. action), and therefore do not over-emphasize one or the other, thus avoiding 
primary allegiance to either ‘tall’ or ‘flat’ ontology (Seidl and Whittington, 2014). At 
several junctures in the paper I have tried to highlight both institutional mechanisms, 
within and outside of a university, and also the reactive and proactive actions of 
groups and individuals within a university. Academic managers in particular have 
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driven the recent changes that we are now embroiled in; much of what we now face in 
terms of financialization is of their making. 
The mobilization of power and politics was also apparent in the process of 
change – for instance, it is pretty clear that senior management can press their plans 
and wants on their faculty, but some faculty for their part also have some plans for 
avoiding the perceived pitfalls of new ways (e.g., strategies of attaining external 
research income, leaving the research family, etc.).  
 
Critiquing the underpinnings of change 
I have already highlighted that there is much to be observed and seen 
concerning the change taking place in the H.E. sector. There is, for instance, a 
plethora of prescriptive and policy-grounded research and commentary which 
generally promotes the new management practices that H.E. institutions ‘must’ follow 
in order to prosper in their new time and space. Much of this literature, and much of 
what we also see in practice, represents the rhetorical promotion of financialization.  
However, there is presently a dearth of more critically-grounded research into 
the rolling-out of financialization. And, with this in mind, I would encourage greater 
exploration of how financialization is (or, maybe is not?) taking root in the HE sector. 
But, as important, I would encourage more critical attention towards the philosophical 
foundations of such HE policies. That is, financialization appears unchallenged as 
‘best way’ to steer the sector into its future, an assumption with little apparent 
questioning.  
Yet, financialization comes loaded with increased adoption of (most 
management accounting) tools which, in turn, are underpinned by ‘optimizing’ 
neoclassical economic theory, and premised on an overriding assumption that 
organizations exist primarily to make financial surpluses. So, grounded in this line of 
inquiry, I would encourage future engagement in more critical consideration of the 
ideological aspects of today’s HE policies. In particular, I would stress a need to focus 
on the potential effects (e.g., broader social impacts) of the narrow, financially-
oriented approach that now seems to underpin the field of academia. 
There would seem to be several paradoxes, both empirical and theoretical, that 
are worthy of further exploration. For instance, whereas the strategizing of most of 
today’s universities appears firmly rooted in financially-oriented outcomes, at least 
some of the institutionalized values, beliefs and wider expectations of H.E. stretch 
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further and into different realms - e.g., social well-being; safe, secure and sustainable 
society; and a ‘happy society’. As such, it would seem that the accounting practices 
which are facilitating the financialization process (e.g., financial metrics, KPIs, etc.) 
are becoming an end (an outcome of confirmation against financially-grounded 
targets) rather than a means for assisting the ongoing achievement of broader, societal 
goals. 
 
Closing remarks 
The primary objective of this paper was to unpack and better understand the 
recent institutional change that continues to unfold in the H.E. sector. I have explored 
the drivers of change, the dynamics of the change process or, alternatively, the source 
of no or little change, with particular reference to universities in England. The 
discussion has highlighted an importance of the so-called notion of financialization, 
which put simply represents an elevation of financial outcomes in the long-run 
management of universities, frequently underpinned by an increase in the use of 
management accounting tools and a more prominent role for university accountants. 
But, as well as contributing new and necessary insight into this very important field of 
institutional change, I also closed the paper with a brief discussion of how more 
critically-grounded future studies might do well to question and interrogate the deeper 
philosophical roots of the unfolding changes in the H.E. sector. 
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ABSTRACT 
Improving quality while reducing costs and expenditures represent a real challenge 
for healthcare organisations. Using Adler and Borys’ (1996) framework this study 
investigates the coercive and enabling control role of accreditation and its effects 
on the behaviour and perception of organisational members. The design of a 
qualitative and interpretive approach based on case studies of two public hospitals 
is used to examine the impact of an acute care hospital accreditation system in one 
regional area of Spain, Catalonia. Semi-structured interviews, observation and 
varied types of documentation are used as a triangulation technique to strengthen 
the credibility of the issues investigated. Findings underline the catalyst and 
ambivalent role of accreditation in achieving a balanced mixture of both control 
dimensions. Coercive and enabling features are related to quality assurance and 
continuous quality improvement principles, respectively. These results point to the 
importance of developing and using control systems that integrate compliance to 
standards with transparent and collaborative mechanisms. 
 
Keywords: accreditation; coercive control; enabling control; healthcare; hospital; 
performance measurement; performance management; quality management; Spain 
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1. Introduction 
Limited economic resources and concerns about the sustainability of modern healthcare 
systems are driving countries around the world to adopt policies and practices aimed at 
reducing inefficiencies. Hospitals are regarded as complex organisations due to their 
multiplicity and ambiguity in terms of stakeholders and objectives (Adler et al., 2003; 
Abernethy et al., 2007; Eldenburg and Krishnan, 2007). For instance, cost control and 
quality improvement are seen as intertwined aspects because of the growing pressure to 
deliver best quality of services at lower costs (Kaplan and Porter, 2011; Cardinaels and 
Soderstrom, 2013; Häkkinen et al., 2014). However, it is unclear whether these two 
strategic objectives are complementary, contradictory or incompatible with one another 
(Fleming, 1991; Morey et al., 1992; Carey and Burgess Jr., 1999; Leatherman et al., 2003; 
Hvenegaard et al., 2011; Hussey et al., 2013). 
The rise of healthcare costs and expenditures over the past three decades has 
stimulated the development of more sophisticated cost control and accounting systems 
(Ellwood, 1996; Preston et al., 1997; Hill, 2000; Lehtonen, 2007; Chapman et al., 2014). 
Cardinaels and Soderstrom (2013) argue that this historical emphasis on cost control has 
shifted to a new emphasis on better quality. Many countries have experienced a move 
from reimbursement schemes focused on cost containment (i.e., the introduction of 
Prospective Payment Systems based on Diagnostic Related Groups and Case-Mix 
accounting1) to the implementation of performance-based systems more focused on 
quality-related issues. Although healthcare organisations have a long tradition of 
measuring performance, most research has concentrated on the design and use of the 
Balanced Scorecard (Aidemark, 2001; Inamdar and Kaplan, 2002; Gurd and Gao, 2008; 
Aidemark and Funck, 2009; Dyball et al., 2011; Kollberg and Elg, 2011) and the 
consequences of implementing benchmarking systems (Llewellyn and Northcott, 2005; 
Eldenburg et al., 2011). The roles and effects of other performance measurement systems 
such as quality management tools in healthcare settings still remain an underexplored and 
challenging topic in the management accounting literature. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the use of an external Management Control 
System (MCS) to manage the trade-offs and tensions between potentially conflicting 
objectives of cost and quality. In particular, the focus is placed on an acute care hospital 
accreditation system based on an adapted version of the European Foundation Quality 
Management (EFQM2) model. While healthcare accreditation has become a widespread 
1 Under Prospective Payment Systems (PPS) hospitals are reimbursed using fixed pre-determined reimbursement rates 
for service packages based on Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) which categorise patients into different classes in 
view of clinical similarities and also consumption of hospital resources. Each DRG is defined on the basis of the 
principal diagnosis, secondary diagnosis, surgical procedures, age, sex, and discharge status of the patient treated. The 
main objectives of Case-Mix accounting are to provide a complete financial picture of the costs of treating individual 
patients, and the costs of treating different patient groups. (Lehtonen, 2007) 
 
2 The EFQM is a Total Quality Management approach created in 1988 by the presidents of 14 major companies in 
Europe. It provides a graphical framework which is used to conduct self-assessment as well as external evaluations. 
Inspired by the Malcom Baldrige award in the U.S. follows the Donabedian principles of structure, processes and 
outcomes stressing the importance of organisational development (Heaton, 2000). At present more than 30,000 
organisations in Europe use the EFQM model (EFQM, 2014) 
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instrument promoted by national governments to assess quality standards3 in terms of 
assurance and continuous improvement (Pomey et al., 2004), a number of issues related 
to its suitability, applicability and impact remain disputed in academia. This dual role 
embracing performativity and accountability to guarantee that public funds are 
appropriately invested is used to investigate how accreditation can assist hospitals in the 
pursuit of cost-effectiveness and better quality of care. 
This study explores the use and impact of a mandatory acute care hospital 
accreditation system in one regional area of Spain, Catalonia. An interpretive and 
qualitative approach based on case studies of two public hospitals examines the 
perceptions of primarily top management teams (TMTs) and secondly middle level 
managers and external participants familiar with the accreditation process (e.g., the 
accreditation team from the Catalan Health Department and some individuals from 
recognised healthcare organisations). This research builds on 49 semi-structured 
interviews, non-participant observation and varied types of internal and external 
documentation over a two year period. The process of re-accreditation and external audit 
during 2013-2014 is perceived by participants as a constructive opportunity to analyse 
significant changes and upcoming challenges. A variety of benefits and disadvantages 
underline the complexity arising from assessing and measuring hospitals performance 
against predetermined quality standards. 
Accreditation is seen as a bureaucratic mechanism used to formalise and control 
organisational behaviour. Following the comparative study examining French and 
Canadian accreditation systems by Touati and Pomey (2009) this study employs the 
‘coercive and enabling’ bureaucracies’ framework (Adler and Borys, 1996) and its four 
key design attributes (repair, flexibility, internal transparency and global transparency) to 
examine the trade-offs and tensions of managing opposing and sometimes conflicting 
roles of MCSs (Mundy, 2010; Tessier and Otley, 2012). Enabling controls are viewed as 
formal mechanisms designed to assist employees to deal more successfully with 
difficulties as opposed to more conventional command-and-control managerial styles 
(coercive systems) often designed to act as infallible and fool-proof instruments that 
restrict employees’ capabilities (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004). Tensions caused by a 
number of constraining design features and the possibility to assist organisations on 
quality improvement activities illustrate the ‘coercive and enabling’ role of accreditation 
in this particular investigation. On the one hand, the compulsory nature of the 
accreditation and some restrictive and rigid design characteristics in terms of flexibility 
and repair exemplify the coercive role of control systems and its negative perception 
amongst employees. On the other hand, higher levels of transparency and new 
opportunities for collaboration and cooperation between organisational members enable 
accreditation to be perceived positively in the two hospitals examined. 
3 Definitions of ‘standards’ differ in terms of meaning and scope (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010). In a broad sense, 
standards are seen as “norms selected as a model by which people, objects or actions (including government itself) can 
be judged and compared, and which provide a common language to evaluators, the evaluated and their audiences” 
(Ponte et al., 2011, p. 1). They are key elements of Total Quality Management (TQM) practices, aiming at developing 
better structures and processes in healthcare provision, particularly in hospitals (Grol, 2000). 
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Taking into consideration the particularities of the accreditation context, the dual 
enabling-coercive role of control systems and the literature on the intended-unintended 
consequences of implementing control systems (i.e., Bevan and Hood, 2006; Kelman and 
Friedman, 2009; Lapsley, 2009), the aim of this study is to address a general inquiry 
(question (i)) and three specific research questions (questions (ii), (iii) and (iv)): 
 (i) How is accreditation used to manage the simultaneous pursuit of cost reduction 
and quality improvement in public hospitals? 
(ii) How do differences between the government intentions (i.e. enabling/coercive) 
and management perceptions (positive/negative/neutral) towards the use of accreditation 
impact on performance management? 
(iii) How is a regulatory and prescriptive accreditation system used as control 
mechanism to promote higher levels of transparency? 
(iv) What are the intended/unintended consequences associated with the use of this 
specific hospital accreditation system? 
Despite the fact that healthcare accreditation is a long-established and well 
documented evaluation method, research in the management accounting literature is 
scarce (Agrizzi and Agyemang, 2014). The majority of accreditation studies have been 
published in healthcare and policy oriented journals examining the positive and negative 
impacts of its implementation. Limited attention has been placed on the perception of 
those individuals involved in the process. Therefore, this study aims to expand the 
reduced number of studies investigating the interaction and dynamics between the 
coercive and enabling role of controls (Free, 2007; Cools et al., 2008; Jordan and 
Messner, 2012) and its consequences on the perceptions of organisational members. 
Theoretically, the accreditation illustrates an external control system where coercive (i.e., 
rigid system with obligatory standards) and enabling features (i.e., promoting quality 
improvement through higher cooperation and transparency across departments) exist side 
by side (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004), they are part of the same control continuum 
(Stansbury and Barry, 2007) and they are not mutually exclusive (Free, 2007). 
Furthermore, this study contributes to recent calls made by Cardinaels and Soderstrom 
(2013) to investigate how hospitals manage simultaneously cost and quality objectives 
and how quality incentives and practices affect accounting and control practices. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. First, it outlines some key 
characteristics related to contemporary Performance Management & Measurement 
Systems (PMSs). Then, an overview of accreditation examines the impact and 
consequences on healthcare organisations. Third, Adler and Borys’ (1996) framework is 
introduced as a theoretical lens to analyse the coercive and enabling features of control 
systems. Fourth, the research design and methods selected to conduct a case study 
approach are described to give coherence and rationale to this investigation. Fifth, initial 
findings and results based on a partially completed data analysis are depicted. Finally, a 
concluding section discusses some of these preliminary findings. 
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2. Contemporary Performance Management & Measurement Systems 
“Standard Costing and Budgeting, Return on Investment, Discounted Cash Flow, 
Breakeven Analysis, Activity Based Costing, the Balanced Scorecard and much 
more all share this aspiration to create and shape the capacity of individuals to 
calculate and to measure the performance of themselves and others” (Kurunmäki 
and Miller, 2006, p. 87). 
In a broad sense, Management Control is concerned with the accomplishment of goals 
and objectives (Anthony, 1965; Otley and Berry, 1980; Merchant and Van der Stede, 
2007). Management Control Systems (MCSs) symbolise attempts made by organisations 
to design effective mechanisms to implement intended strategies and accomplish these 
desired goals and objectives (Langfield-Smith, 2007; Merchant and Otley, 2007; Ferreira 
and Otley, 2009). MCSs are then regarded as fundamental to the strategy process and 
useful instruments for strategy implementation (Simons, 1995). Although the interplay 
between MCSs and strategies has long been discussed by academics, researchers and 
practitioners (Nixon and Burns, 2012), there is still limited knowledge about this dual 
relationship, particularly at middle and lower management levels (Simons, 1995) and on 
the effect of MCSs on strategy or vice versa (Kober et al., 2007). 
A key component and subset of MCSs is ‘performance management’ & 
‘performance measurement’ systems. Although both terms describe similar processes 
(Lebas, 1995; Otley, 1999; Smith, 2005) and are often used interchangeably in the 
literature, performance management denotes a more general approach including those 
instruments used by managers to improve organisational performance (Ferreira and 
Otley, 2009) whereas performance measurement is considered as a subcategory of 
performance management focused more closely on indicators, metrics or measures to 
evaluate performance issues (Otley, 1999; Goh, 2012). Nonetheless, both practices 
embody a managerial activity concerned with the accomplishment of specific outcomes 
or results where managers influence people behaviours to put into practice the 
organisational strategy and goals (Stringer, 2007; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009; Adler, 
2011). 
Over the past two decades, a whole array of ideas, initiatives and managerial styles 
developed in private organisations have been introduced in the public sector (Lapsley, 
2008). This influential change, frequently labelled under the term ‘New Public 
Management’ (NPM) (Hood, 1991) has stimulated the proliferation and popularity of 
performance measurement instruments attempting to improve the effectiveness, 
efficiency and accountability amongst public services (Hood, 1995; Modell, 2004; 
Jansen, 2008). As part of this transformation, the healthcare environment has undergone 
significant changes and reforms (Aidemark and Lindkvist, 2004; Nyland and Pettersen, 
2004; Pettersen, 2004; Kurunmäki and Miller, 2006; Kober et al., 2007; Chang, 2009; 
Ellwood, 2009) and governments have been progressively placing higher demands for 
improving efficiency and delivering ‘value for money’ (Chang, 2006) by means of 
containing costs and increasing quality (Kelly, 2008; Boyne and Walker, 2010). 
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Furthermore, this NPM reform has caused a noticeable change in focus from a 
reliance on traditional input-oriented processes to strategic performance measurement 
systems (PMSs) based on more balanced and comprehensive approaches (Ballantine et 
al., 1998; Kloot and Martin, 2000; Aidemark, 2001; Pettersen, 2004; Lehtonen, 2007). 
Thus, these ‘contemporary PMSs’ (Franco-Santos et al., 2012) which include financial 
and non-financial measures linked to the organisation’s strategy (in the case of the 
Balanced Scorecard, for instance) have intensified the importance of examining the 
relationship between strategy, control and performance. Although these innovative 
methods and measurement tools have become critical to evaluate quality improvement or 
overall organisational performance (Llewellyn, 1998; Adolfsson and Wikström, 2007; 
Aidemark and Funck, 2009), there are still a number of obstacles hindering the 
accomplishment of desired goals and enhanced performance (Bowerman et al., 2001; 
Nørreklit, 2001, 2003; Malina et al., 2007) and causing to some extent negative, 
unintended or dysfunctional consequences (Llewellyn and Northcott, 2005; Bevan and 
Hood, 2006; Kelman and Friedman, 2009; Lapsley, 2009; Mannion and Braithwaite, 
2012). 
A common concern in the literature is that although more balanced and multifaceted 
approaches tend to assist and facilitate decision-making activities, financial and 
quantitative assessments still disregard the quality facet of services since qualitative 
performance measurement is more difficult to evaluate (Vaivio, 1999; Kloot and Martin, 
2000; Pollit, 2006). This complexity arising from the measurement of qualitative 
performance (for example, innovation success or failure) has tended to increase the focus 
of many organisations on measuring simpler and more controllable quantitative financial 
indicators (Jenkins et al., 1998; Newberry and Pallot, 2004). Correspondingly, Verbeeten 
(2008) argues that the trade-off between quantitative information represented by short-
term performance targets (i.e., quantity produced and level of efficiency achieved) and 
qualitative information characterised by long-term or strategic performance objectives 
(i.e., quality and innovation) still remains a key challenge for public organisations. 
In the healthcare context, performance measurement is even more complicated 
because ‘quality’ is not a straightforward concept. Measuring quality in industrial 
activities is somehow much easier because organisations manufacture relatively simple 
and specific products. Processes and practices are entirely oriented to these products 
making performance measurement more uniform, homogeneous and predictable. In 
contrast, healthcare systems operate in organisational settings with multiple objectives 
and stakeholders, a broad variety of products/services and sometimes its intertwined 
nature poses challenges to understand the value, causalities and relationships between 
such products/services and their processes (de Bruijin, 2002). Another complexity of 
examining quality in healthcare constitutes the numerous interpretations and perspectives 
followed in the literature (Donabedian, 1980; McGlynn, 1997; Jun et al., 1998; Shaw, 
2004; Arah et al., 2006). These multiple viewpoints have been frequently categorised into 
measurable indicators such as mortality, intermediate outcome indicators (i.e., medical 
errors, infections and complications), or process indicators (i.e., unexpected readmissions 
and average length of stay) (de Pouvourville and Minvielle, 2002) and labels including 
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dimensions such as safety, equity, accessibility, appropriateness, acceptability, 
comprehensiveness, efficacy, effectiveness, efficiency or patient centeredness (Institute 
of Medicine, 1990; Woodward, 2000; Fletcher, 2001). For this reason, governments and 
regulatory bodies use comprehensive strategic programs to evaluate the quality of care 
and overall performance delivered by healthcare organisations (Øvretveit and Klazinga, 
2012). Accreditation policies, benchmarking systems, clinical practice guidelines, 
national quality strategies or financial rewards/penalties schemes are examples of such 
large-scale quality systems (Øvretveit and Gustafson, 2002; Groene, 2011). 
 
3. Overview of healthcare accreditation systems 
“(…) Prior research has focused heavily on accounting systems that hospitals 
implement in response to pressure from regulators and insurers to reduce costs. 
This focus has been driven by the historical emphasis on cost containment by 
regulators and insurers. (…) More studies are needed to understand how 
hospitals balance cost reduction with care quality and how quality incentives 
impact hospital accounting, control, and governance systems” (Cardinaels and 
Soderstrom, 2013, p. 677). 
Two of the most common approaches to address quality evaluations are quality assurance 
and quality improvement (Adler et al., 2003; Øvretveit, 2003). On the one hand, quality 
assurance refers to the mechanisms applied to certify compliance with a minimum set of 
pre-established quality standards. On the other hand, quality improvement denotes a 
continuous process of enhancing quality levels by identifying and implementing varied 
strategies, measuring performance, and evaluating results and outcomes (Woodward, 
2000; Donabedian, 2003). Quality improvement also entails an evolving process that 
influences personnel, organisational and cultural structures due to the ongoing 
development of practices and attitudes that promote transparency and corporate 
responsibility among managerial and medical staff (Shaw, 2004). This dual role relates, 
in particular, to hospital accreditation because it has been frequently used as a quality 
assessment method that recognises both assurance and improvement (Arce, 1998; 
Woodward, 2000; Øvretveit 2003; Pomey et al., 2010). Its combination of assessment 
against predefined standards and supervisory function encouraging cultural changes 
encapsulates some of the key purposes of accreditations as, for example, the pursuit of 
measurable and sustainable improvements over time (Scrivens, 1997; Arah et al., 2006). 
Adler et al. (2003) argue that a noticeable aspect of quality management systems in 
hospitals is the shift from ‘assurance’ of minimum acceptable levels of quality to 
‘continuous improvement’ in order to guarantee that over the years average quality levels 
increase and discrepancies in results and outcomes are reduced. They sustain that: “(…) 
The focus thus broadens to include a whole host of processes contributing to the quality 
and cost of care, and it shifts from post-factum assessments to pro-active improvement 
initiatives, from a focus on people as the source of errors to a focus on systems and 
processes, and from a focus on outliers to a focus on common variance. Whereas 
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credentialing sought to screen out the incompetent few, the focus now shifts to 
continuously upgrading everyone’s knowledge and skills” (Adler et al., 2003, p. 17). 
Similarly, Pomey et al. (2004) support the viewpoint that current accreditation processes 
are evolving from quality assurance to quality improvement. This transformation in 
quality management and accreditation systems denotes as a result a move from external 
reviews and yes/no standard checklists to a new measurement approach centred on 
internal reviews and self-assessments, active role and participation of personnel, 
quantifiable improvement over time, and focus on activities linked to patient satisfaction, 
patient safety or prevention of medical errors. 
Healthcare performance assessments using standards and guidelines have 
proliferated since the 1990s. One of the main rationales underlining the evaluation of 
healthcare activities against quality standards is the identification and recognition of 
successful organisations. This formal recognition by means of an organised and 
methodical process is commonly referred to as accreditation. In a broad sense, 
accreditation is a formal, rigorous and well-established assessment process used to 
evaluate and promote effective and efficient ways of delivering specific standards (Pomey 
et al., 2010). In the healthcare context, accreditation is a widespread tool used by 
governments to regulate and guarantee a selection of quality specifications linked to 
patient care and safety (Shaw, 2006; El-Jardali et al., 2008). In order to attain public 
recognition, accreditation programmes follow a sequence of stages comprising self-
assessment, on-site survey, peer review interviews, an official report (with or without 
recommendation), an award or refusal, and follow-up evaluations to guarantee that 
organisations maintain certified quality levels (Shaw, 2004; Touati and Pomey, 2009; 
Braithwaite et al., 2010; Pomey et al., 2010). Participation is voluntary or obligatory 
depending on the particular characteristics of regional or national legislations (Shaw, 
2003). However, current regulation and legislation trends in the healthcare industry 
indicate a growing expansion of mandatory accreditation (Touati and Pomey, 2009). 
The literature on the role and consequences of healthcare accreditation has 
predominantly focused on changes in professional, managerial and organisational 
practices, impact on healthcare outcomes, and patient satisfaction. Despite the fact that a 
large number of investigations recognise the positive impact of accreditation on quality 
and organisational processes, research to date reveals a complex picture with a mixture 
of unclear, conflicting and inconsistent findings with regard to quantifiable improvements 
delivered by hospitals (Øvretveit and Gustafson, 2002; Shaw, 2006; Greenfield et al., 
2007; Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2008; El-Jardali et al., 2008; Nicklin and Dickson, 
2009; Pomey et al., 2010; Braithwaite et al., 2011; Greenfield et al., 2012; Hinchcliff et 
al., 2012; Mumford et al., 2013; Ng et al., 2013; Nicklin, 2013). For instance, 
accreditation systems are seen as quality improvement processes that stimulate 
professional development, encourage organisational and clinical practice changes, 
provide better information for decision-making to numerous stakeholders, promote 
accountability, reinforce local and regional communities’ confidence in their healthcare 
organisations, and operate as an effective mechanism to reduce unnecessary costs and 
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increase efficiency. In contrast, concerns related to work overload, increase of 
administrative tasks, resistance to change, opportunistic behaviour and maintenance costs 
undermine a positive implementation of accreditation programmes (See Table 1 in the 
Appendix for an overview of the advantages/disadvantages of healthcare accreditation). 
The Catalan Accreditation System 
The Spanish healthcare system is tax-based and integrates an extensive variety of services 
combining aspects of public and private care (Acerete et al., 2011). It is based on a 
decentralised model where the provision of healthcare services is managed by the 
different regional autonomies (Lopez-Casasnovas et al., 2005; Álvarez and Durán, 2013). 
The Central Government holds authority over specific areas such as basic legislation and 
coordination, financing, pharmaceutical and international health policies. In contrast, 
regions or Autonomous Communities (AC) are responsible for its own organisational 
structure, purchasing and service provision, planning and accreditation (Sánchez-
Martínez et al., 2006). Typically, the structure of regional healthcare systems comprises 
a ministry in charge of regulation, planning and policy activities, and a regional healthcare 
service acting as a provider (García-Arnesto et al., 2010). 
Regional authorities hold as a result full responsibility for authorisation and 
accreditation of healthcare organisations in their territory. Catalonia, one of the seventeen 
regions in Spain, has a long tradition in hospital accreditation (Fortes et al., 2011). In the 
early 1980s and after the transference of healthcare responsibilities from Spain to 
Catalonia, the Catalan Department of Health & Social Services introduced an external 
quality accreditation system for acute care hospitals (Healy, 2011). This pioneer 
experience standardising healthcare quality provision offered by public and private 
hospitals became the first accreditation model established in Spain and Europe (Heaton, 
2000; WHO, 2003). Although accreditation is theoretically voluntary, in practice 
hospitals that wish to secure a contractual agreement with the Catalonian Health Service 
(CatSalut4) must be accredited (See Table 2 in the Appendix section for a brief summary 
of the key historical accreditation developments in Catalonia). 
The accreditation in Catalonia follows a four-stage process including self-
assessment, external assessment, commitment to quality through the implementation of 
an improvement plan, and certificate attainment. The current acute care hospital 
accreditation system was developed by the Catalan Health Ministry and is based on the 
Excellence Model of the European Foundation Quality Management (EFQM) combining 
standards from the International Joint Commission (IJC) and the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO). Besides, a review examining the experiences 
with accreditation in Canada, France and the U.K. was used to design the current Catalan 
model. During the first version of this model in 2007-2008, 83 hospitals were accredited 
4 CatSalut is a government institution that operates as a public insurer, recognises health requirements and 
needs, purchases services into an internal market to public and private providers (i.e., hospitals) and 
evaluates healthcare issues (Gené Badia et al., 2008) 
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achieving an average compliance to required standards of 82.6% (López-Viñas et al., 
2014). In the second process of accreditation in 2013-2014 a total number of 69 hospitals 
went through the process of “re-accreditation”. Hospitals are audited by an independent 
external institution through the visits to the different hospital’s departments or units and 
numerous interviews with organisational members. Accreditation is awarded for a period 
of three years5 and hospitals must achieve at least 65% of the total standards to be 
qualified. An on-going improvement quality plan related to those standards not 
accomplished is carried out during this three-year period. 
Management control systems aim to achieve organisational strategies by controlling 
resource inputs, influencing the transformation process, and monitoring results or outputs 
(Daft and Macintosh, 1984; Parker et al., 1989). Therefore, hospital accreditation is seen 
as an external MCS where standards describe how different ‘structures’ (i.e., personnel, 
equipment), ‘processes’ (i.e., medical protocols, clinical flows) and ‘results’ (i.e., 
outcomes related to mortality or readmissions) are used to assess the activities and 
processes carried out in the different departments. The actual model includes 1,300 
standards (696 essentials and 604 non-essentials) and hospitals are evaluated on the 
essential standards which are classified under nine dimensions: Leadership, Strategy, 
People, Partnerships & Resources, Processes, Customer results, People Results, Society 
Results, and Key Performance Results (see Figure 1). Although this model provides a 
comprehensive organisational picture, emphasis is primarily placed on Processes and 
secondly on Partnership & Resources and Key Performance Results (see table 3 in the 
Appendix for an overall view of essential standards). A number of those 604 non-essential 
standards have the potential to be incorporated in the next re-accreditations and represent 
a self-assessment incentive to engage in continuous quality management practices. 
 
Figure 1. Acute care hospital accreditation in Catalonia 
 
5 The delay in more than three years in the second accreditation process came after two postponements made by the 
Catalan Health Ministry. 
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4. Theoretical framework 
“It is well established in the literature that accounting information usually does 
not capture all the dimensions of performance considered relevant for an 
organisation or manager. If for example, a hospital is managed exclusively on 
the basis of cost and revenue information, then it is likely that some arguably 
important dimensions of its performance, such as the quality of patient care, will 
receive insufficient attention. In such a case, accounting information can be 
considered an incomplete representation of organisational performance and thus 
also an incomplete guide for appropriate action (Hopwood, 1972). Does such 
incompleteness pose a challenge for the realisation of an enabling form of 
control?” (Jordan and Messner, 2012, p. 546-547). 
Accounting research has increasingly adopted a comprehensive and multidimensional 
theoretical approach to examine how organisations can accomplish their desired goals 
and objectives (Berry et al., 2009). Even though a mixture of various concepts related to 
strategic management, public administration, institutional, organisational and 
behavioural theories will be used in this research, the primary tool will be based on the 
‘coercive and enabling’ bureaucracies framework developed by Adler and Borys (1996) 
and introduced in the management control field by Ahrens and Chapman (2004). 
MCSs are commonly viewed as organisational processes and practices with two 
complementary functions (Mundy, 2010; Ylinen and Gullkvist, 2014). They are used to 
control the achievement of organisational strategic objectives and to assist as well the 
tasks of employees which involve new opportunities and ways of doing things (Simons, 
1995; Ahrens and Chapman, 2004; Davila et al., 2009; Adler and Chen, 2011). These 
opposing and sometimes conflicting interests require managing organisational goals 
while providing employees with some degree of autonomy and flexibility in decision-
making and problem-solving situations (Speklé, 2001; Sprinkle, 2003; Tessier and Otley, 
2012). This type of balance comprising trade-offs or tensions between twofold roles has 
generally been categorised in the literature in terms of ‘mechanistic-organic’ (Chenhall 
and Morris, 1995), ‘tight-loose’ (Merchant, 1985), ‘diagnostic-interactive’ (Simons, 
1995) or ‘coercive-enabling’ (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004) controls. 
Adler and Borys (1996) suggest that depending on the type of formalisation 
managers are confronted with (coercive vs. enabling), their attitudes to control will differ. 
‘Coercive’ systems are characterised by formal detailed rules to enforce compliance and 
control employee behaviour (sometimes by means of sanctions/punishments) whereas 
‘enabling’ systems refer to rules and guidelines encouraging employees to develop their 
own capabilities, respond effectively to uncertainties and facilitate decision-making 
activities (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004). Furthermore, Adler and Borys (1996) recognise 
three types of attributes to classify coercive-enabling systems: (i) the features or 
characteristics of the system, (ii) the design process of the system, (iii) and the different 
uses of the system. They argue that the design and objectives of control systems are 
determined depending on how they are employed. Thus, a system designed with coercive 
elements should be used in a coercive manner, while a system conceived with enabling 
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characteristics will be better managed in an enabling way. When features and uses are 
aligned (e.g., coercive attributes with coercive uses or enabling attributes with enabling 
uses) the system will lead to its planned or intended purposes. In contrast, a mismatch 
between attributes and uses will cause unintended or even dysfunctional outcomes6. 
In order to establish whether a control system is enabling or coercive, the purpose 
of Adler and Borys (1996) is to identify why and how MCSs might be used to assist rather 
than constrain operational management (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004). Adler and Borys 
(1996) also suggest the examination of four general and integrated characteristics (repair, 
flexibility, internal transparency and global transparency) to achieve a better 
understanding of the formal control mechanisms. First, ‘repair’ refers to the 
characteristics within the system that permit employees to improve or change work 
processes. It relates to the extent to which employees are allowed to fix and repair 
breakdowns and continue working without further interruptions. It also represents the 
degree of autonomy that individuals have to use their own judgements to make 
appropriate adjustments to prescribed rules and protocols. For example, repair involves 
managers’ consent and ability to modify the definition and measurement of performance 
indicators (Wouters and Wilderom, 2008) or the encouragement of knowledge creation 
by using prototypes and experimenting with contextualised data (Wouters and Roijmans, 
2011). Second, ‘flexibility’ denotes the extent to which formal systems provide employees 
with different choices and alternatives to proceed in completing their tasks. It refers to 
the level of discretion that employees have over the use of a determined systems. 
Illustrations are provided by Free (2007) in one of the two case studies when the ‘category 
management’ relationship between retailers and suppliers led to a process of adaptation 
to individual needs and greater focus on customer’s knowledge or Jørgensen and Messner 
(2009) in their study about process control system for product development where 
specific guidelines were modified or adjusted to suit the individual development product 
characteristics. Third, ‘internal transparency’ represents the degree of available 
information for employees to understand and recognise the quality of the system and its 
status. It relates to the extent to which users are able to see through and understand the 
logic of the system. This transparency indicates situations where employees develop a 
better understanding of their local processes (i.e., own department or business unit). For 
instance, in order for an output control system to be transparent, target values for 
performance need to be communicated to managers (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004). 
Chapman and Kihn (2009) see enabling budgeting practices as mechanisms that clarify 
activities, increase the operational knowledge and guide to a better understanding of 
revenue/cost levels carried out in the business units. Finally, ‘global transparency’ 
symbolises how employees perceive the overall system in which they operate. This type 
of transparency is associated to the extent to which users understand the upstream and 
downstream inferences of their work. In the health environment, global transparency will 
allow employees to see how their departmental or unit work contributes to the overall 
6 An example of these unintentional consequences is the concept of ‘mock bureaucracy’ (Gouldner, 1954) which 
reflects how managers and employees are aware of certain organisational rules but they intentionally decide to ignore 
them because neither party wishes to enforce these rules (i.e., rules are promoted due to its symbolic attributes but 
ignored in real practices) 
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hospital objectives. Chapman and Kihn (2009), for instance, argue that in the context of 
budgeting practices, global transparency is accomplish when it increases managers’ 
understanding of the organisational strategy. Similarly, Free (2007) shows that global 
transparency is enhanced when information sharing between retailers and international 
suppliers involves proactive supplier participation, joint forecasting and cost sharing. 
Previous research examining the ‘coercive-enabling’ framework in the 
management control literature is relatively limited. Features related to the design, 
implementation and use of several management systems such as budgets, costing systems, 
PMSs and IT systems have been investigated to evaluate their coercive or enabling nature. 
The traditional viewpoint of Adler and Borys (1996) suggest that organisations should 
select either a coercive or enabling strategy to determine their governance procedures. 
However, Ahrens and Chapman (2004) in their UK restaurant chain’s study argue that 
managing organisations using a unique management system may not be feasible and it 
could be possible to use both systems simultaneously. Enabling systems are viewed as 
control instruments that supports twofold roles: ‘flexibility and efficiency’ (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2004; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2006; Jørgensen and Messner, 2009) and 
‘business partner and corporate policeman’ (Hartmann and Maas, 2011). 
While different lines of reasoning support the two types control systems, previous 
research has primarily focused on enabling features due to their positive results in terms 
of design and use of MCSs and organisational performance (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004; 
Wouters and Wilderom, 2008; Chapman and Kihn, 2009; Jørgensen and Messner, 2009; 
Wouters, 2009; Wouters and Roijmans, 2011; Groen et al., 2012; Jordan and Messner, 
2012; Mahama and Cheng, 2013). Examples of successful enabling mechanisms include 
employee engagement, experience-based development, time and autonomy to 
experiment, higher transparency, organisational professionalism, support and clear 
communication from top management, availability of modern IT systems (e.g., SAP), 
strategy alignment, and new opportunities to develop personal skills and capabilities. 
Despite the fact that coercive and enabling systems exist side by side (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2004), they are part of the same control continuum (Stansbury and Barry, 
2007) and they are not mutually exclusive (Free, 2007), research has tended to separate 
them using positive or negative connotations or perceptions. If employees recognise that 
formal systems support them to better master their jobs, then control systems are received 
positively. In contrast, if employees feel that top management use enforcement and 
compliance, formal systems are perceived in a negative sense. However, coercive systems 
are necessary for control purposes and they should not always be linked to negative and 
undesirable outcomes. Taking into account the accreditation and coercive-enabling 
literatures, it can be argued that hospital accreditation systems have simultaneously 
coercive (i.e. quality assurance) and enabling (i.e., quality improvement) attributes. 
Besides, healthcare settings appear to be a suitable and underexplored approach to 
investigate how performance management captures the relationship between cost 
containment and quality enhancement.  
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5. Methodological approach and research methods 
This study follows a qualitative and interpretive approach based on case studies of two 
public hospitals in one regional area of Spain, Catalonia. The selection of the case sites 
was based on similarities in terms of public ownership, willingness to participate and 
geographical proximity. Furthermore, the nature of the research emphasises the role of 
management accounting practices in everyday life, in its commonplace setting. Data 
collection consist of face-to-face semi-structured interviews, different forms of archival 
records and documentation, and observational information arising from interviewees’ 
attitudes, awareness of events and personal perceptions. Interviews were conducted using 
the principles and guidelines for qualitative research. A meticulous and rigorous approach 
comprising informed consent and protection of confidentiality was strictly followed 
during the entire process (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). Ethical approval was given by the 
NUI Galway Research Ethics Committee. As a result, triangulation of data (Flick, 2002; 
Ahrens and Chapman, 2006) is used to reinforce the credibility and reliability of the issues 
investigated (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). The use of multiple research sources enables to 
address a broad variety of issues and explore how internal and external attributes 
influence healthcare accreditation processes.  
In order to understand current challenges faced in the healthcare environment, 
several pilot interviews were completed during April – May 2012 and January 2013 with 
top managers and a hospital director in three hospitals. The topics discussed during the 
interviews were derived from the control and performance management literatures. Those 
interviews enabled discussion of some of the issues associated with control systems (i.e., 
budgeting systems, funding mechanisms and costing systems), different managerial 
instruments used for performance management and measurement (i.e., benchmarking 
tools, scorecards, dashboards and total quality management techniques) and main 
strategic objectives and goals.  One of the main purposes during this initial stage was also 
to confirm and secure access and plan further interviews with key informants over the 
following months. Therefore, a professional and honest relationship with the gatekeepers 
in each organisation assisted the researcher in the selection process for potential 
interviewees in the following stages. As previously used in numerous accreditation 
qualitative studies (Jaafaripooyan et al., 2011), purposive sampling method (Patton, 2002) 
was employed to select key organisational members familiar with the process. 
Good practice in the data collection process and analysis of the preliminary findings 
has been rigorously followed and adhered to (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ahrens and Dent, 1998; 
Adams et al., 2006; Yin, 2009). The data collection process includes two stages based on 
the agreed interviews for 2013 and 2014. The first phase of data comprises eighteen 
interviews with top managers/directors from the healthcare service departments (medical 
and nursing units) and supporting activities (accounting and finance, human resources, 
general services, maintenance, and information systems) in the selected hospitals during 
June – August 2013. This exploratory stage was indispensable to validate the suitability 
and appropriateness of the ‘coercive and enabling’ framework in the healthcare context 
and recognise the critical role played by the accreditation process. The second phase was 
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carried out during January – May 2014 and consists of twenty-seven interviews with Top 
Management Teams (TMTs), middle managers and several individuals belonging to 
recognised institutions familiar with the accreditation system (see Table 4 in the 
Appendix section for a summary of the interviews carried out to date). A key objective 
was to examine the four dimensions of the coercive & enabling framework: repair, 
flexibility, internal transparency and global transparency. The role of accreditation as a 
catalyst for cost control and quality improvement and other issues related to the 
effectiveness, changes and effects of the re-accreditation were also investigated. Although 
the original research plan was to examine three hospitals, factors beyond the control of 
the researcher (i.e., the possible privatisation of one of the organisations and numerous 
impediments to facilitate and arrange interviews with key informants) made possible to 
investigate only two organisations. 
Most interviews were digitally recorded and when this procedure was not feasible, 
extensive notes were taken during each session. Shortly after interviews, more detailed 
notes were written to capture valuable perceptions and personal reflexions. Each 
interview has been transcribed (either in Spanish or Catalan languages) by the researcher 
to identify and classify data into similar topics and common themes. Transcriptions were 
followed by a manual coding process to facilitate the identification of relevant issues prior 
to further interpretation. This coding approach facilitated the creation of deductive codes 
related to the enabling-coercive framework as well as inductive codes derived from the 
participants’ interviews (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Interviews were also 
supplemented by document analysis of internal information (i.e., hospital reports, 
protocols, clinical processes, improvement plans, accreditation reports) and external 
documents (related to the Catalan Health Department) to gain in-depth insight of the 
accreditation process. The researcher is currently using NVivo qualitative data analysis 
software (Bazeley, 2007) to undertake a more detailed and rich analysis by themes and 
sub-themes as well as searching for differences on participants’ perceptions (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Arranging information chronologically and recognising emerging 
patterns, common topics and key constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989) has been consistently used 
as a research strategy to examine ‘coercive and enabling’ control studies (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2004; Free, 2007; Cools et al., 2008). The purpose is to identify expressions 
and quotes about participants’ perceptions to classify whether accreditation is perceived 
as a coercive or enabling system. 
The design of this field study research includes two healthcare organisations being 
referred to as ‘Hospital L’ and ‘Hospital S’. The name of the hospitals has been modified 
to preserve the anonymity and confidentiality of the sources investigated. On one hand, 
‘Hospital L’ is a large high-technology hospital with almost 1,000 beds covering an area 
of two million population. It is owned by the Catalonian government and has a ‘traditional 
public model’ of governance. The majority of the staff are statutory employees (i.e. civil 
servants) and the administration of the hospital is under the supervision and organisation 
of professional managers. This hospital is one of the top performers in Spain and since 
2000 has been frequently awarded with prestigious prizes due to its extraordinary levels 
of quality excellence. On the other hand, ‘Hospital S’ is a small basic general hospital 
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with less than 100 beds covering an area of reference of 50,000 people. Its ‘foundation’ 
legal status indicates that it is a public not-for-profit hospital that work as an autonomous 
accountable organisation (López-Casasnovas et al., 2009) and is regulated by private law 
with a certain level of autonomy regarding healthcare services. The hospital has non-
statutory healthcare professional staff and it is a self-governed organisation where top 
management has certain degree of freedom to manage its own cash flows, decide where 
to invest and whether to buy or lease assets. 
 
6. Initial findings and results 
In this section, a summary of the initial findings based on observations and comments 
from the two data collection phases is presented. In order to understand the course of re-
accreditation is important to underline several significant changes perceived by 
participants between the two most recent accreditation processes. First of all, the 
economic context has changed. The first accreditation (2007-2008) using the actual model 
(a modified version of the EFQM) was evaluated at the end of a booming and prosperous 
period whereas the second accreditation or re-accreditation (2013-2014) has been 
examined on a period of recession and austerity. This second accreditation was deeply 
influenced by the NPM rationale of ‘more with less’ emphasising the achievement of 
similar levels of activity with less workforce and resources. Second, higher demands and 
expectations from the Government and changes in the auditing process (‘more action, less 
documents’) have pushed organisations to attain better results. Third, a transition era in 
terms of technological developments (‘from paper to digital’) has created a large increase 
of medical and clinical information sharing. Finally, organisational structures have 
evolved to new managerial styles involving higher participation from top management 
level, greater delegation and engagement with lower-level staff, multidisciplinary 
cooperation between departments and units, and higher collaboration between healthcare 
organisations. In this context, a shared concern by a number of participants regarding the 
next re-accreditation process is clearly articulated by Klazinga (2010, p. 26): “Apart from 
the challenge of measurement, the management challenge remains of how to link outcome 
measures to policy initiatives, such as financing (associating resource allocation to 
performance) or national quality improvement programmes”. 
Interviewees acknowledged the crucial role of accreditation as a lever of change 
(Cooper et al., 2014). Recommendations made by the accreditation surveyors in previous 
visits helped hospitals to promote and develop changes. Particular examples include 
better use of indicators for decision-making, better clarification and interpretation of rules 
and processes by creating new protocols or improving existing ones, the creation of 
organisational structures and functions dedicated exclusively to quality and safety issues, 
multidisciplinary collaboration at clinical levels, and significant improvements on 
information management practices (i.e., digital imaging processes, integration of patient 
information, confidentiality issues) and patient safety procedures. A combination of good 
leadership, clear definition of strategies and processes, appropriate personnel 
management and efficient use of resource seems critical to achieve better results. On the 
205
contrary, several negative effects are noticeable at professional levels, too. Work overload 
and administration burden due to an excess of paperwork leading to spending less time 
with patients are frequently mentioned. Some medical and nursing staff also perceive 
accreditation as a controlling and intrusive mechanism designed to scrutinise their 
activities rather than a quality management instrument promoting the development of 
collaborative healthcare practices. 
According to Touati and Pomey (2009), the theoretical framework developed by 
Adler and Borys (1996) points out a number of contextual factors, which in the case of 
the accreditation context can encourage or restrain the development of an enabling 
system: (i) the legitimacy rationale: participating and collaborative cultures support 
enabling mechanisms; (ii) the power distribution: asymmetrical power causes managers 
blaming employees for poor results, this hindering learning activities; (iii) external 
incentives: organisations facing higher competition or demanding customers are expected 
to encourage a learning approach; and (iv) institutional actors: the viewpoint of an 
institution (i.e., the government accreditation body) affects the kind of bureaucracy that 
sets in a particular environment. The analysis of the interviews conducted during the 
second phase reveal a mixture a positive and negative factors related to the contextual 
factors affecting the design of the accreditation. The overall perception of participants on 
these contextual aspects shows to a certain extent that although the accreditation’s design 
contains multiple constraining elements (i.e., rigidity and inflexibility) its use is fairly 
enabling. See Table 5 below for a summary of the main positive/negative contextual 
factors. 
Table 5. Positive and negative impacts of contextual factors 
Contextual factors Positive impact Negative impact 
Legitimacy of the 
process 
- Equal treatment for public and private 
organisations 
- Standards are seen as norms of 
excellence 
- Valuable opportunity to take stock of 
actual practices and conduct inventory 
- Indicators developed for the 
accreditation process help decision-
makers 
- Standards of excellence are seen as 
requirement and inspection 
- Standards are seen as rigid, inflexible 
and prescriptive 
- Additional time spent on paperwork 
and administrative duties 
 
Power distribution - More delegation at lower levels and 
greater support from top management 
- Increases the power of some groups: 
quality coordinator, nursing staff, 
middle-level managers  
- Increases the power of the Health 
Department 
- Still limited participation of users 
during the accreditation process 
- Accreditation is seen as a top 
management tool 
External incentives - Accreditation’s award 
- Reputation 
- Absence of economic/no economic 
rewards (i.e., more activity, extra 
formation) 
- Limited feedback from the Health 
Department (i.e., benchmarking) 
Institutional actors - Participation of professional 
associations and other healthcare 
institutions in the design and 
development 
- Compulsory status of accreditation 
enforced by the Health Department 
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The current and unfinished iterative analysis of this study recognises the coercive 
and enabling role of accreditation and its four fundamental characteristics (repair, 
flexibility, internal transparency and global transparency). The overall viewpoint of 
participants is that the accreditation system integrates relatively well both approaches. 
However, the enabling features of the control system are more noticeable and to some 
extent perceived more positively than the coercive features (see Table 6 in the Appendix 
section for some quotes of key informants during the first phase in Jun – Aug 2013). 
The following summary underlines some preliminary findings related to the 
enabling and coercive framework: 
Characteristics ‘Coercive’ features ‘Enabling’ features 
Repair - ‘Inspection’ and ‘scrutiny’ process: 
compulsory requirements for standards, 
users have limited opportunities to 
express their opinions 
- Users are able to revise and modify 
indicators and protocols 
- Users can employ and integrate 
information systems technologies (i.e., 
different software programs) to required 
circumstances 
Flexibility - Strict rules and protocols reduce 
flexibility 
- Limited latitude and freedom to affect 
decisions 
- Possibility of contesting the 
recommendations and conclusions made 
external audits 
 
Internal 
transparency 
- Uniform standards poorly adapted to 
different departments/units and some 
activities 
- Rules are communicated to users 
without explanations and rationale 
- Better understanding of departmental 
processes because rules are explained (i.e., 
accreditation meetings) and users are able 
to make sound decision-making 
- Information sharing within department 
Global 
transparency 
- Viewed as a top management tool 
- Restricted access and limited 
information available to employees 
- Some issues with the Health 
Department: limited support and 
feedback, poor communication 
- Better understanding of the strategic 
objectives and mission followed by the 
hospital 
- Support from top management 
- Multidisciplinary collaboration 
- Information sharing across departments 
and with other healthcare organisations 
  
Furthermore, the accreditation model is seen as an effective management tool which 
recognises organisational efforts towards excellence on quality. The role of accreditation 
as a facilitator for quality assurance and continuous quality improvement is widely 
recognised as well in the two hospitals (Pomey et al., 2010). Even though the accreditation 
system is based on a managerial approach more focused on quality than costs, participants 
underline that both organisational objectives are not mutually exclusive. However, the 
function of accreditation as a catalyst to simultaneously improve quality and reduce or 
contain costs is not fully recognised due to the lack of evidence to corroborate it and the 
difficulties to capture and calculate the direct effects and relationships among them. 
Despite the fact that performance measurement systems can contribute to the 
improvement of healthcare systems, measurement in the public sector can inadvertently 
stimulate a whole array of unintended consequences (Smith, 1995; Hood, 2007; Dahler-
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Larsen, 2014). Following Mannion and Braithwaite’s (2012)7 classification of 
dysfunctional effects in four categories (poor measurement, misplaced incentives and 
sanctions, breach of trust, and politicisation of performance systems) this study did not 
find hard evidence of such unintended and dysfunctional behavioural consequences. 
However, preliminary findings reveal to a certain degree some signs of ‘poor 
measurement’ in terms of ‘tunnel vision’ (i.e., emphasis on those measures included in 
the essential standards disregarding other relevant but unmeasured elements of ‘quality’), 
‘quantification privileging’ (i.e., concerns about how numbers capture complex social 
phenomena and the measurement of softer and qualitative facets of healthcare such as 
staff morale or culture) and ‘misplaced incentives and sanctions’ through 
‘undercompensation’ (i.e., lack of economic and non-economic incentives by means of 
rewarding organisations with new ways of financing or extra training when they achieve 
high accreditation scores). 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
A variety of aspects such as worsening economic conditions, growing and ageing 
population, dependence on expensive technological equipment, and higher expectations 
by patients and citizens (Spurgeon et al., 2014) are accentuating developments towards 
more responsive and sustainable healthcare systems. The provision of high quality 
services at reasonable costs is a common challenge faced by worldwide health systems. 
A central concern is that policies that aim to reduce costs, increase efficiency or promote 
higher competition may cause a reduction in healthcare quality (Or and Häkkinen, 2011). 
In such a context, professional groups (e.g. physicians, surgeons and nurses), market 
forces and regulation are key drivers that help organisations to improve quality and safety 
issues (Berwick et al., 2003). Similar to other powerful and leading sectors such as 
telecommunications or banking services, the healthcare industry is extremely influenced 
and regulated by governments. Compliance and regulation are used together to guarantee 
certain minimum quality levels, assist the government’s function as the main healthcare 
purchaser, and respond to providers’ efforts (e.g., hospitals and primary care centres) to 
increase the demand for services (Chang et al., 2014). 
In order to overcome some of these challenges, the introduction of new managerial 
practices, accounting techniques and organisational incentives have changed to some 
extent the healthcare sector (Pettersen, 2004; Kurunmäki, 2004; Lehtonen, 2007; Dyball 
et al., 2011; Kaplan and Witkowski, 2014). In the public sector, concerns about improving 
control, facilitating decision-making and promoting performance measurement activities 
(Kurunmäki and Miller, 2006; Conrad and Guven Uslu, 2011) have popularised 
7 They classified twenty different types of dysfunctional effects in the U.K. National Health Service in four 
groups: poor measurement (measurement fixation, tunnel vision, myopia, ossification, anachronism and 
quantification privileging), misplaced incentives and sanctions (complacency, silo-creation, 
overcompensation, undercompensation, insensitivity and increased inequality), breach of trust 
(misrepresentation, gaming, misinterpretation, bullying, erosion of trust and reduced staff morale), and 
politicisation of performance systems (political grandstanding and creating a diversion). 
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expressions such as ‘value for money’ and ‘more with less’ (Chang, 2006; Yang and 
Modell, 2013) to denote this emphasis for achieving greater efficiency within restricted 
resources. However, transformations and changes in healthcare are rather slow compared 
to other sectors and industries (Bohmer, 2010) and these innovative instruments not 
always have been able to assist organisations in achieving their desired objectives leading 
sometimes to negative, unintended or dysfunctional consequences (Smith, 1995; 
Llewellyn and Northcott, 2005; Mannion and Braithwaite, 2012) 
A number of scholars argue that a close relationship between strategic objectives 
and management accounting systems is needed to face growing competitive pressures and 
promote long-term viability and clear strategic objectives (Kober et al., 2007; Franco-
Santos el al., 2012). Contemporary PMSs (Franco-Santos et al., 2012) or Strategic 
Management Accounting (SMA) (Cadez and Guilding, 2008) are seen as helpful 
mechanisms to manage some of the problems related to the effectiveness of traditional 
control systems. Although healthcare organisations are adopting new management 
methodologies to reduce inefficiencies and enhance quality and patient safety, research 
is limited. As Lachmann et al. (2013, p. 337) point out: “…, empirical evidence on the 
use of SMA practices in hospitals is scarce. In the hospital setting, the literature mainly 
analyzes conventional management accounting and control systems used in the context 
of environmental change (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 
2006). However, it remains unexplored whether particular SMA techniques are 
implemented”. Consequently, the study of a hospital accreditation system based on the 
EFQM model will expand the literature related to the impact and consequences of 
contemporary PMSs. Besides, the mixture of inconsistent and contradictory positive and 
negative organisational impacts in the healthcare accreditation literature reinforces the 
need for investigating this underexplored topic in the management accounting field. 
Adler and Borys (1996) recognise that the design, implementation and use of formal 
systems can be assessed by examining four key characteristics: repair, flexibility, internal 
transparency, and global transparency. Depending on the features of this 
multidimensional approach, the role of control systems can be categorised as enabling or 
coercive. However, modern organisations frequently follow a mixture of both systems 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2004) and is difficult sometimes to understand the implications 
and relationships between coercive and enabling mechanisms. Although enabling systems 
offer managers ways to deal with unanticipated or emergent contingencies, there is still a 
need to integrate or combine them with rigid and specific rules to achieve the desired 
organisational objectives. The limited attention in the literature to the association and 
interaction between coercive and enabling characteristics (Jordan and Messner, 2012) 
represents an excellent opportunity to examine performance measurement in healthcare 
settings. 
Overall, this study is critical for several reasons. First, it aims to achieve a better 
understanding of how organisations manage the simultaneous pursuit of two challenging 
and sometimes conflicting objectives: cost reduction and quality improvement 
(Cardinaels and Soderstrom, 2013). Second, this study examines how Adler and Borys’ 
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(1996) theoretical framework can be used to understand control differences in the 
healthcare context. Research using this particular framework is limited within public 
management and accounting literatures and almost non-existent in hospital settings apart 
from the quantitative study conducted by Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2006) and the 
accreditation’s research carried out by Touati and Pomey (2009). This study investigates 
how the enabling and coercive features of an acute care hospital accreditation system 
impact on the integration of cost and quality objectives. Coercive controls are seen as 
restrictive mechanisms that hinder decision-making activities whereas enabling styles 
encourage higher flexibility, transparency and collaboration amongst departments. 
Accreditation systems encapsulate both lines of reasoning and recognise the coexistence 
of both approaches to successfully implement rules and processes. Quality assurance 
denotes compliance to predetermined quality standards whereas quality improvement 
promotes changes by incorporating new ways of doings. However, prior studies have 
primarily focused on the positive enabling features ignoring deliberately the coercive 
mechanisms related to the use of control systems. Therefore, this study aims to achieve a 
better understanding of situations where controls are perceived by employees as 
ambivalent, i.e., simultaneously coercive and enabling (Adler, 2012). Finally, it is crucial 
to examine how the current economic climate and austerity measures have affected 
performance management in the public sector. Although research on contemporary PMSs 
such as the Balanced Scorecard emphasise its capacity to enhance hospital performance 
(Gurd and Gao, 2008; Aidemark and Funck, 2009) it is also expected that various 
unintended or dysfunctional behavioural effects in healthcare organisations could emerge 
(Llewellyn and Northcott, 2005; Bevan and Hood, 2006; Kelman and Friedman, 2009; 
Lapsley, 2009; Mannion and Braithwaite, 2012). For these reasons, investigating 
management and accounting practices in the public sector is needed more than ever, 
particularly at a time when the ‘language of cuts and costs’ dictates any debate or 
discussion (Yang and Modell, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
210
APPENDIX 
Table 1. Advantages and disadvantages of healthcare accreditation programmes 
Advantages Disadvantages 
- Promotes change: improves staff engagement and 
communication, promotes collaboration with external 
stakeholders, promotes organisational learning, 
decreases variance in practice among providers and 
decision-makers, promotes the use of ethical protocols, 
provides a clear vision for sustainable initiatives, better 
integration and utilisation of information (i.e. 
codification of policies, procedures and protocols), 
promotes a quality and safety ‘culture’ 
- Encourages professional development: reinforces 
interdisciplinary team effectiveness, builds team-
working and collaboration opportunities, increased job 
satisfaction, sharing of best practice 
- Increases compliance with quality and safety standards 
- Stimulates healthcare improvement efforts: mitigates 
the effect of adverse effects, reduction of medical errors, 
enhances the reliability of laboratory testing, involve 
patients and families in quality management 
- Increases efficiency: reduces unnecessary costs, 
adoption of new processes and systems improving 
operational effectiveness, consciousness on the use of 
resources (i.e. medication), improvement of internal 
practices 
- Improves public recognition and reputation 
- Provides opportunities for additional funding 
- Deterioration of working conditions: work overload, 
administrative burden 
- Organisational culture of resistance to change 
- Insufficient training and support: doctors participation 
is weak 
- Lack of applicable standards for local use 
- Funding cuts and decrease on resources 
- Potential for opportunistic behaviour (i.e. gaming) 
- Lack of participative incentives 
- A regulatory approach focused on mandatory 
participation 
- High costs for sustaining accreditation programmes 
- After some years, organisations find accreditations are 
no longer challenging 
(Own source: based on the studies conducted by Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2008; Pomey et al., 2010; Nicklin and 
Dickson, 2009; Ng et al., 2013, Mumford et al., 2013; Nicklin, 2013) 
 
Table 2. Historical approach to the Catalan accreditation (Catalan Health Department, 2014) 
Timeline 1979-2013 
2013: Start of the second accreditation period (2013-2016) for acute hospital care centres 
2009: Ceremony of hospital accreditation certificates 
2006: Celebration of 25 years of Catalonian accreditation 
2006: Start of the new accreditation model, regulated by Decree 5/2006 of 17 January 
2005: Presentation of the new Catalonian accreditation model for acute care hospitals 
2000: Creation of the Quality Assistance Advisory Council of the Health Care Department 
1992: Amendment of the 16 August 1988 Order, adapting the composition of the Advisory Committee for 
the Accreditation of acute care hospitals 
1991: Third accreditation process for acute care hospitals in Catalonia (10 July 1991 Order) 
1988: Creation of the Advisory Commission for the Accreditation of acute care hospitals (16 August 1988 
Order) 
1983: Second accreditation process for acute care hospitals in Catalonia (25 April 1983 Order) 
1981: First accreditation process for acute care hospitals in Catalonia (21 November 1981 Order) 
1979: Transfer of healthcare competences to Catalonia 
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Table 3. Distribution of essential standards in the second Catalan Accreditation Process 
 
SECOND ACCREDITATION PROCESS (2013-2014) - Essential Standards (n=696) 
 
1. Leadership (n=71, 10.20%) 
a) Leaders develop the mission, vision, values and ethical principles and act as a role model (n=4) 
b) Personal involvement of leaders to ensure the development, implementation, continuous improvement and 
performance management of the organisation’s systems (n=50) 
c) Organisational leaders know their external stakeholders and create planning tools to understand, anticipate and 
respond to the diverse needs and expectations of these groups (n=14) 
d) Organisational leaders motivate people and give them support and recognition (n=3) 
e) Flexibility and change management. Leaders reinforce a culture of excellence within organisational members 
(n=0) 
 
2. Strategy (n=23, 3.30%) 
a) The strategy is based on understanding the needs and expectations of stakeholders and the environment (n=8) 
b) The strategy is based on understanding the performance of the organisation and its capabilities (n=7) 
c) The strategy and its supporting policies are developed, reviewed and updated (included in Criteria 1 and 2a, 2b 
and 2d) 
d) The strategy and supporting policies are communicated, implemented and monitored (n=8) 
 
3. People (n=59, 8.48%) 
a) Planning, management and improvement of human resources (n=20) 
b) Identification, development and maintenance of knowledge and people’s abilities in the organisation (n=16) 
c) People involvement and responsibilities in the organisation (n=9) 
d) Existence of a dialogue between people and the organisation (n=7) 
e) People recognition in the organisation (n=7) 
 
4. Partnerships & Resources (n=106, 15.23%) 
a) External partnerships management (n=22) 
b) Economic and financial resources management (n=6) 
c) Buildings, equipment, materials and natural resources sustainable management (n=49) 
d) Technology management (n=13) 
e) Information and knowledge management (n=16) 
 
5. Processes (n=295, 42.39%) 
a) Design, management and improvement of processes (n=12) 
b) Products and services are produced, distributed and managed in the following categories: outpatient; urgent care; 
care hospitalisation; surgical care; laboratories; blood use and blood components; medication use; radiology, 
nuclear medicine and radiotherapy; rehabilitation; nutrition; files and clinical documentation; client management; 
infection prevention and control; clinical research; hospitality; warehouse; social care; client education; and ethics 
and client rights (n=275) 
c) Relations with clients (n=8) 
 
6. Clients Results (n=19, 2.73%) 
a) Perception (n=14) 
b) Performance indicators (n=5) 
 
7. People Results (n=13, 1.87%) 
a) Perception (n=3) 
b) Performance indicators (n=10) 
 
8. Society Results (n=17, 2.44%) 
a/b) Perception and performance indicators (n=17) 
 
9. Key Results (n=93, 13.36%) 
a) Results and key organisational indicators (n=7) 
b) Results and key economic indicators (n=5) 
c) Results and key operational indicators: key processes and support processes (n=81) 
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Table 4. Number of interviews carried out in the two hospitals and other healthcare organisations 
 
Date 
 
Job description - HOSPITAL ‘L’ 
 
Job description - HOSPITAL ‘S’ 
Time (min) 
Recorded / Non-
recorded 
 -Preliminary interviews-   
03/05/2012 Administration & Finance Director  60 
03/01/2013  Hospital Director 60 
08/01/2013 Administration & Finance Director  45 
 -1st phase of data collection (Jun-Aug 2013)-   
19/06/2013 Assistant Director of Human Resources   76 + 15 
20/06/2013 Maintenance Manager  28 + 15 
20/06/2013 Information Systems Director  13 + 5 
21/06/2013 Nursing Head of Quality & Safety + 2 nurses  37 +15 
26/06/2013 Assistant Director of Human Resources   58 + 15 
01/07/2013 Technical Office Manager + Technical Office 
Assistant 
 42 + 60 
04/07/2013 Medical Director  62 + 15 
05/07/2013  Hospital Director 60 
09/07/2013 Assistant Director of Information Systems   54 + 15 
10/07/2013  Hospital Director 39 + 10 
15/07/2013  Medical Director 34 + 15 
15/07/2013  Nursing Director 38 + 15 
15/07/2013  Human Resources Director 60 + 15 
18/07/2013  Technical Services Director 45 + 25 
18/07/2013  Costumer Services Director 29 + 15 
18/07/2013 
01/08/2013 
 
Administration & Finance Director 
Economic & General Services Director 45 + 15 
40 
 -2nd phase of data collection (Jan-May 2014)-   
04/02/2014  Quality Coordinator 49 + 15 
19/02/2014  Human Resources Director 43 + 20 
21/02/2014  Costumer Services Director 25 + 15 
21/02/2014  Economic & General Services Director 36 + 15 
24/02/2014  Nursing Director 37 + 30 
24/02/2014  Technical Services Director 30 + 30 
24/02/2014  Medical Director 22 + 5 
25/02/2014 Billing Manager  10 + 45 
25/02/2014 Accounting Manager  26 + 120 
26/02/2014 Economic Management Manager  94 + 50 
27/02/2014 Logistics & Purchases Manager  123 + 30 
28/02/2014 Administrative Contracts Manager  10 + 30 
17/03/2014 Quality Manager  63 + 120 
27/03/2014 Hospital Deputy Director  13 + 30 
07/04/2014 Medical Director  43 + 20 
09/04/2014 Nursing Director  20 + 10 
24/04/2014 Administration & Finance Director  90 
25/04/2014  Quality Coordinator 13 + 45 
25/04/2014  Hospital Director 13 + 30 
 Total interviews HOSPITAL ‘L’ = 21 Total interviews HOSPITAL ‘S’ = 18  
 -Other related interviews related to this study-   
27/04/2012 Executive Director (Hospital M) Preliminary interviews 70 
05/08/2013 Executive Director (Hospital M) First phase 45 
03/01/2014 Applications Systems Manager (Hospital M) Second phase 60 
08/01/2014 Quality & Accreditation Director (Catalan Health 
Department) 
 
 
20 
27/01/2014 Institute Director (‘Health’ Institute)  60 
30/01/2014 Quality & Accreditation Director + 2 committee 
members (Catalan Health Department) 
 120 
05/02/2014 Foundation Director (‘Health’ Foundation)  120 
17/02/2014 Health Sector Manager (Auditing Firm)  30 + 15 
08/04/2014 Quality & Accreditation Director + 2 committee 
members (Catalan Health Department) 
 180 
12/05/2014 Quality & Accreditation Director (Catalan Health 
Department) 
Second phase 45 
Total Interviews = 49 
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Table 6. Quotes and perceptions related to accreditation during Phase 1 (June – August 2013) 
(Hospital L and Hospital S) 
Job position Quote Type of 
feature 
Effect 
HR Deputy 
Director 
Hospital L 
“For example, next week we have the hospital accreditation (…). Everything is 
protocolised (both healthcare and non-healthcare activities). Here at the Human 
Resources department we have… many protocols. Why? Because it is critical. And can 
we say that is it a coercive situation? Well, there are a protocols to be followed and it 
is clear that it is the only way to be organised and to do things properly (…)” 
Flexibility, 
Repair 
- 
Nursing Head 
of Quality & 
Safety, 
Hospital L 
“It is important to follow protocols and work procedures, and we need to continuously 
revise, review and measure them to ensure healthcare quality” 
Repair + 
Nurse, 
Hospital L 
“This year we have worked very hard on the whole subject of procedures and protocols: 
updating procedures, latest versions available on the intranet, classification by 
categories (general, respiratory, etc.) (…) It was a personal project in our department 
and people were highly committed… even a few times nurses reviewed more protocols 
than originally planned because they thought they were obsolete” 
Repair, 
internal 
transparency 
+ 
    
Nursing 
Director, 
Hospital S 
“We have many protocols… more than three hundred and we are always changing and 
revising them every two or three years (...) Despite having many protocols you always 
find something that it has not been protocolised (...) In fact, we are continuously 
creating new protocols and procedures (...) sometimes we use protocols from larger 
hospitals or we adapt them to our specific characteristics (...) For example, a few days 
ago we finished the protocol ‘Actions delegation: Endoscopy sedation 
multidisciplinary team’ created by the anaesthesia nurse and the endoscopist. This was 
the version 2 and it was originally created in 2012 but now we had to renew and change 
some aspects” 
Repair + 
Technical 
Services 
Director, 
Hospital S 
“During the accreditation self-assessment process we detected the need to create a 
single record document summarising all the protocols and procedures in place (...) 
Basically it is an Excel document with all the institutional documents classified 
according to the type of document (e.g. medical reports, protocols, informed consent 
forms, etc.) indicating the date of creation, updating and reviewing (...) To do this, we 
had to create ‘the protocol of the protocols’ and includes who is responsible for the 
documents, how were created, how to update them, revision date, whether to go or not 
to the intranet, etc.  This protocol has its own importance because it has helped to clean 
up a bit our previous mess (...) some protocols were in local computers while others 
were in common repositories, different updating procedures, same document had 
several versions, etc. Everything now is placed in a common repository, it is available 
online, backup copies are constantly created, etc. This really has helped us to clean up 
and create some order!” 
Repair, 
Global 
transparency 
+ 
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Abstract 
Purpose – the purpose of this paper is to contribute to knowledge about Russian public 
sector budgeting in times of change by exploring the emergence of new norms for the 
Russian central government. 
Design/methodology/approach – in this paper budgeting is viewed as a social institution. A 
frame of reference consists of classical neo-institutional theory and its recent incarnation, 
known as institutional logics approach. Document search, supplemented with in-depth 
qualitative interviews, represents the main method of gathering data for this paper.  
Findings – An assiduous endeavor to provide an understanding of an emergence of new 
Russian government budgeting system is undertaken in this paper. As our evidence 
indicates, it now represents a kind of hybrid model influenced by the ideas of New Public 
Management, those ideas stemming from the Russian past, as well as a strong rhetoric of 
Russian officials aimed at boosting the image of the Russian state as a modern sovereign and 
independent player. 
Research limitations/implications – this paper focuses on budgeting provisions issued over 
the last decade at macro-level and does, therefore have limitations with regard to scope. 
The findings of the paper may inspire further research on the implementation of described 
changes at micro-level, including regional and local governments as well as public sector 
organizations. 
Originality/value – In line with the existing research on Russian governmental accounting 
(see e.g. Bourmistrov and Mellemvik, 1999, 2002; Bourmistrov, 2001, 2006; Timoshenko, 
2008; Timoshenko and Adhikari, 2009a, 2009b, 2010; Adhikari et al., 2012; Bourmistrov and 
Antipova, 2013), this paper strives to introduce rather unexplored phenomenon of Russian 
governmental budgeting to international research community.  A theoretical contribution is 
linked to the literature on accounting/budgeting hybrids as a recently emerged way of 
seeing the outcomes of public sector reforms. The study ensues from viewing national 
traditions as one of competing logics triggering the reforms along with New Public 
Management logics. 
Key words: Russian public sector, budgeting reforms, New Public Management, New Public 
Governance, Neo-Weberian State, Institutional Logics, hybridization and hybrid models.  
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1. Introduction 
Public sector is a significant part of global and national economies. It contributes with 
around 30 per cent to the world’s gross domestic product in terms of expenditures, ranging 
from 11 to 51 per cent in national economies (Bandy, 2011). Until the end of 1970’s the 
ideas of Weber’s (1922) rational bureaucracy had constituted the theoretical foundation for 
managing public expenditures and the provision of public services (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2011). Among other things, these ideas included, but were not limited to, detaching public 
administration from political agenda but seeking for a good or right behavior of public sector 
administrators in performing their tasks (Wilson, 1887). Over the last three decades we have 
witnessed substantial efforts to reinvent public sector worldwide. “New Public 
Management” as a comprehensive package of ideas (Hood, 1991), variations of a theme 
(Hood, 1995), or as a label for the clusters of reforms, has been on the top of the agenda in 
public administration in the West (Hood, 1991; OECD, 1995). Having become increasingly 
known as a more or less global trend (see e.g. Sahlin-Andersson, 2001), this development 
has envisaged the manifestation of a paradigmatic shift, i.e. a change from the traditional 
bureaucratic model invented by Max Weber towards the management model. While the 
idea under the former was the efficient execution of legal authority and power, the idea of 
“New Public Management” (NPM) has been the efficient management of public resources in 
a more businesslike way as a result of a new economically defined role of state operations 
and functions (Budäus and Buchholtz, 1996; Naschold, 1995; Eliassen and Kooimann, 1993). 
Among the claimed arguments for NPM reforms, there has been more efficient and effective 
use of resources, augmented accountability, greater focus on outputs, and better 
performance (Hood, 1991, 1995; Boston et al., 1996; Olsen et al., 2001; Mellet, 2002).  
Along with many accomplishments, NPM has received a lot of criticism from academia and 
professional community (see e.g. Lapsley, 2008, Drechsler and Kattel, 2008). As documented 
by e.g. Brunsson and Olsen (1993) more than two decades ago, this criticism has partially 
stemmed from a general notice that public sector reforms rarely go as expected or designed 
by policymakers. It is worth noting here that the existing patterns examples of successful 
implementation of public sector reforms have been often described by those authors 
affiliated with international financial institutions such as International Monetary Fund 
(Dabla-Norris et al., 2010) and Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
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(Ruffner, Sevilla, 2004, Webber, 2004). At the same time, academic researchers have 
unveiled a huge gap between the ideal reform concepts and the application of new financial 
instruments (Bogt and Van Helden, 2000). The resilience of traditional public sector financial 
instruments in some of the leading Western economies has been claimed as an important 
implication for the reform process (Jones et al., 2013). Among those vivid examples of NPM-
like reforms with national “flavor” are e.g. the “New Zealand model”, the Canadian and the 
Belgian models, as well as the German one, just to name a few (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). 
Furthermore, new trends have been recently emerged in the literature, threatening to 
challenge the ideological leadership of NPM in the field of public sector reforms and even to 
dismiss it. As Pollitt (2009) has pointed out, traditional bureaucracy excels post-bureaucratic 
forms of organization in terms of organizational memory and capability of learning from 
experience. In turn, Drechsler (2013) has introduced three potential paradigms of 
governance and administration: Chinese, Western and Islamic, thus accentuating the 
significance of national (regional) contexts in public sector developments. Furthermore, as 
documented by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), many national or regional models have been 
established by distinguishing themselves from Anglo-Saxon model (e.g. Nordic model in 
Veggeland, 2007), implying that the most far going changes on the NPM track have been 
achieved in Anglophone countries.  
However, despite criticism of many aspects of NPM for its declared merits, there is still a 
wide consensus in the literature (see e.g. Lapsley, 2008) that NPM will continually stay 
attractive for policymakers in the foreseeable future and challenge public sector managers 
while facing resistance and opposition from profession. As a matter of fact, the recent 
literature on NPM may be channeled into two streams. One strengthens the trend of 
government reduction while concentrating wider on inter-organizational settings known as 
New Public Governance (Osborne, 2010). The other brings evidence of different model, 
partially re-inventing the merits of historical ancestor of NPM – Public Administration. This is 
what has come to be known as Neo-Weberian state (Drechsler and Kattel, 2008; Lynn, 2008; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Interestingly enough, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) insist on the 
existence of three recently emerged big models of public sector reforms: New Public 
Management, Neo-Weberian State and New Public Governance. At the same time, as Wiesel 
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and Modell (2014) have reported, the governance logics assigned to these three models may 
all coexist together through the process of hybridization.  
Hybridization and hybrids are deemed not only promising in terms of their scientific value, 
but also seem to be more realistic approach for practitioners, especially policymakers and 
reform designers. The research on hybrid models has gained in significance in recent years 
and streams roughly into two major directions (Wiesel and Modell, 2014). One examines the 
process of hybridization (Kurunmaki, 2004; Kurunmaki and Miller, 2006, 2011; Wiesel and 
Modell, 2014), while the other investigates hybrid forms of organizations (Brown et al., 
2003; Jacobs, 2005). The contexts taken for the research on hybridization and hybrids have 
first and foremost covered OECD nations such as Australia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden 
and UK (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), while there is still a paucity of systematic research 
efforts on public sector reforms in developing countries and those in transition, including 
former Soviet bloc and its core – the Russian Federation.  
Throughout the history, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and then the Russian 
Federation represent an example of a society modernizing itself through rapid changes 
affecting social sphere and being affected by leading ideologies (Bourmistrov, 2001). The 
role of the state in production of public goods and commodities has been changing, albeit it 
has always stayed remarkably significant. Some researchers have claimed that changes in 
Russia’s nascent public sector have served not for enhancing instrumentality, but rather for 
supporting the legitimacy of the Russian state on the international arena (Timoshenko, 2008; 
Timoshenko and Adhikari, 2010). Although on-going changes fit seemingly well with Russian 
top political agenda, they have come into a contradiction with the existing accounting 
tradition, as evidenced by Antipova & Bourmistrov (2013). Such a behavior may pursue to 
provide a good image of the Russian state for foreign investors and state leaders, as well as 
for supra-national institutions like the International Monetary Fund. Neo-institutional 
theorists could argue that this is quite anticipated situation providing that such changes are 
viewed as going from the top and seen as an adaptation to the environment (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). However, bearing in mind the presence of strong 
Russian accounting traditions (Bourmistrov, 2001; Antipova & Bourmistrov, 2013), there 
could also be enough space for competing institutional logics fostering the hybridization 
process and giving rise to hybrid models. For instance, it may be assumed that New Public 
229
 Management could be one logic in place, competing with the Russian tradition (e.g. Public 
Administration tradition) as the other logic. Changes in Russian public sector thus may be 
comprehended as part of an interactive process of institutional development rather than 
solely the outcome of legitimization or isomorphism.  
With some minor exceptions, a current body of research on recent developments in Russian 
public sector is meager. While developments in Russian central and local government 
accounting are already studied by Western researchers, there is conscious absence of 
rigorous research efforts on the Russian government budgeting system in Western English-
language literature. Indeed, there is virtually nothing about Russian central government 
budgeting in CIGAR’s publications and in most of international accounting and budgeting 
research networks, workshops, and groups. Such a paucity of knowledge can be considered a 
valuable source of motivation to augment our knowledge in the field of Russian central 
government budgeting, both in terms of theoretical development and empirical knowledge. 
That is why the present research is intended to contribute to the literature by enhancing our 
knowledge about an “unknown” budgeting system. 
Based on the mentioned above, the purpose of this paper is to contribute to knowledge 
about Russian public sector in times of change by exploring the emergence of new norms of 
budgeting for the Russian central government. A time span for the research covers a period 
commencing from the outset of a new millennium and continuing until recently, with the 
most significant government initiatives discussed. Noteworthy, the paper focuses on 
budgeting provisions issued over the last decade or so at macro-level and does, therefore 
have limitations with regard to scope. Document search, supplemented with in-depth 
qualitative interviews, represents the main method of gathering data for this paper. A 
theoretical contribution is linked to the literature on accounting/budgeting hybrids as a 
recently emerged way of seeing the development and the outcomes of public sector 
reforms. The findings of the paper may inspire further research on the implementation of 
described changes at micro-level, including regional and local governments, as well as public 
sector organizations. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section offers an overview of 
the previous research on governmental budget where budget is understood as social 
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construction. A theoretical framework is then introduced, consisting of classical neo-
institutional theory and its recent incarnation, known as institutional logics approach. 
Section 4 deals with methodological issues pertinent to the present study. Section 5 gives a 
more contextual understanding of broader public sector reforms in Russia and recent 
alterations in Russian governmental budgeting brought about by the federal government. In 
the penultimate section, the viewing of budgeting as a social institution is utilized in 
attempts to gain a clearer understanding of what eventually affected the thinking round 
Russian government budgeting to change the reform path.  Section 6 presents some 
concluding remarks and proposals for further research. 
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 2. Budget as a social institution 
Budget can represent different meanings for different purposes. It may be a calculative 
practice. It may be a technology to predict and describe a future. It may be used to set 
purposes and put price labels on them thus providing a possibility for making choices or, in 
other words, serve as a decision-making tool. It may be seen as a contract, as a law or a rule 
to follow and a precedent to reproduce (Wildavsky, 1974). In a democratic governance 
model budgeting in a public sector is considered as an organizational practice assisting local 
actors to manage local economy and welfare production, meaning that budget provides 
finances and an important element in democratic governance where the wishes of 
individuals (e.g. electorate) as well as resources are meant to be converted into collective 
action by discovering and implementing policy coalitions (March & Olsen, 1995). Budget may 
be treated as a management accounting tool thus performing the main functions that are 
assigned to accounting: support of legitimation and the exercise of power (Mellemvik et al., 
1988; Gårseth-Nesbakk and Timoshenko, 2014). Accounting is viewed as socially constituted 
or socially constructed (Grønhaug et al., 1997; Garrod and McLeay, 1986; Laughlin, 1988; 
Dillard, 1991), meaning that the computational practices and techniques of accounting are 
“intrinsically and irredeemably social” (Miller, 1994: 4). Having originated from institutional 
theory in general and the concept of legitimation in particular, this view tends to define the 
phenomenon being researched as:  
“… a set of practices that affects the type of world we live in, the type of social 
reality we inhabit, the way in which we understand the choices open to business 
undertakings and individuals, the way in which we manage and organize activities 
and processes of diverse types, and the way in which we administer the lives of 
others and ourselves” (Miller, 1994: 1);  
Using a similar vein of thought, Miller (1994: 4) spoke of the power of accounting to create 
“… a particular realm of economic calculation of which judgments can be made, 
actions taken or justified, policies devised, and disputes generated and 
adjudicated”.  
In this article an understanding of budget as of a social institution is being developed. Thus 
232
 by institution authors mean:  
“an (observable) pattern of collective action (social practice), justified by a corresponding 
norm”   
Czarniawska, 1997 in Czarniawska, 2009, p. 423 
Our aim is to construct the view of budget as of a social institution in the context of society 
in transition.    
To be developed…  
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3. Institutional theory on organizational changes and reforms 
Institutional theory has been a dominating approach in describing organizational changes in 
European and American social sciences for last 50 years. It focuses attention on the 
relationships within and among organizations. Some of the most well-known understanding 
of these relationships brings us to the categories of organizational structure as a myth and 
ceremony (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and isomorphism of three types – normative, coercive 
and mimetic (DiMaggion and Powell, 1983).  
As Czarniawska (2008) takes it:  
“institutional theory is not a theory at all, but a framework, a vocabulary, a way of thinking 
about social life, which may take many paths” 
Czarniawska, 2008: p. 770  
Institutional logics authors see themselves as successors of new institutionalists sharing with 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) a concern with how cultural rules 
and cognitive structures shape organizational structures. However their main focus is not on 
the isomorphism,  
“but on the effects of differentiated institutional logics on individuals and organizations in a 
larger variety of contexts, including markets, industries, and populations of organizational 
forms” Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, p. 100  
Moreover, the approach of institutional logics 
“provides a bridge between the macro, structural perspectives of Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Zucker’s more micro, process approaches” 
 Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, p. 100 
Institutions are known to constrain actions. However, institutional logic trend-setters state 
that institutions also provide sources for agency and change. This is associated with the 
contradictions between or among different logics. In these contradictions individuals and 
groups can find sources for transforming individual identities, organizations, and society 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
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Institutional logics are defined as  
“the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, 
beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, 
organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality”  
Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, p. 804 
To be developed..  
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 4. Research method  
This study focuses on the normative aspects of changes in budgeting for the Russian central 
government. Thus, the main interest here is to identify and describe those reform ideas as 
they are first and foremost reflected in official documents. Through analyzing documents 
themselves and conducting non-structured interviews with experts and public sector 
practitioners, we are intended to construct an analytical overview of budget reform 
sequences that have taken place in Russia’s public sector since the beginning of a new 
millennium until recently. The relevant articles on the topic, authored by top-level 
government executives, are also considered the primary data. Following terminology, 
suggested by Pollitt and Boukaert (2011) official documents represent decisions, while 
interviews and papers are “talks”.    
Table 1. Researching public management reforms 
Stage Description                                                          Research? 
Talk           More and more people are 
talking and writing about a 
particular idea (e.g. contracting 
out) 
Quick and cheap. Monitoring what people are 
talking and writing about is fairly 
straightforward 
 
Decision    The authorities (governments, 
public boards, etc.) publicly 
decide to adopt a particular 
reform 
Again, quick and cheap. The public decisions of 
the authorities can usually be located quite 
quickly (on the Net, often without leaving one’s 
desk) 
Practice     Public sector organizations 
incorporate the reform into 
their daily operational 
practices 
Probably requires expensive and time-
consuming ﬁeldwork. This needs both funding 
and access 
 
Results      The results (outcomes) of the 
activities of public agencies 
change as a result of the  
reform 
 
Final outcomes are frequently difﬁcult (and 
expensive) to measure. Even more frequently 
there is an attribution problem, i.e. one cannot 
be sure how much of the measured change in 
outcomes can be attributed to the reform 
itself, as opposed to other factors 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, p.13 
Budgeting norms are easily accessible and publicly available on the Internet (see e.g. the 
Federal Ministry’s of Finance website www.minfin.ru and …) and in libraries. In searching for 
them, snowballing sampling is largely utilized, giving rise to a rich collection of normative 
documents. These includes various laws, presidential decrees, cabinet resolutions, concept 
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 papers, and ministerial orders, which all contributed to a better understanding of the 
process of budgetary development and changes in the Russian public sector. A full list of 
norms employed for studying budgeting at the macro-level is contained in Appendix 1. While 
collecting and assessing these norms, it is essential to assemble them with respect to a 
particular transition period, their institutional source, and the degree of accounting 
regulations laid down in them.  
The search for official documents is supplemented by informal face-to-face interviews with 
public officials embedded in the budgetary changes. These are undertaken with the aim of 
boosting the level of detail and care. The primary aim of these interviews is to get 
acquainted with outgoing and emerging budgeting norms in order to reveal differences and 
commonalities in their content, to make sense out of them, and to enhance confidence in 
our own comprehension and interpretation of them being correct.   
Besides this, a multitude of other independent and additional “texts” available throughout 
the study (i.e. those from Russian and international budgeting textbooks, articles, press 
clippings, …) were utilized. A large portion of these texts was derived from the Internet (see 
Appendix 2).  
As observed throughout the data gathering process, a number of publications tackling the 
topic of public sector budgeting have considerably grown over the last few years. Indeed, 
while Russian government budgeting was drawn little academic and official attention in the 
1990’s, the situation varies dramatically now. To illuminate this, the launch of the Budget 
Process Reform Paper for 2004-2006 made a shift from … towards … an urgent task. In 
response, Russian accounting and budgeting journals such as “Finansy” [Finance] and 
“Budget”[Budget], just to name a few, advocate the move towards an up-to-date … 
budgeting system in their pages. 
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 5. Empirical section  
Throughout the history, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and then the Russian 
Federation represent an example of a society modernizing itself through rapid changes 
affecting social sphere and being affected by leading ideologies (Bourmistrov, 2001). The 
role of the state in production of public goods and commodities has been changing, albeit it 
has always stayed remarkably significant. After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
Russia went through many turbulent times on its way towards a full-fledged market 
economy and democracy. Despite a severe and devastating economic recession throughout 
the nineties, a myriad of different ideas and policy measures aimed at reforming and 
modernizing Russian society had been put into an agenda. This enabled formation of the 
basic institutes of the market economy and democracy in the country. As a consequence, the 
relationship between the Russian state and the rest of the economy, as well as the rules of 
the game, had dramatically been altered. A totalitarian economy had gradually been 
superseded by a competitive market economy, giving rise to a nascent Russian private 
sector. The latter was considered a key factor for laying down the foundation for subsequent 
economic growth.  
While the country had made some important strides towards establishing a robust private 
sector under Yeltsin’s reign, the development of the government sector appeared to lag far 
behind. Albeit the economic conditions had undergone significant alterations, those public 
organizations rendering social services in such areas as education and health care remained 
virtually unchanged since the Soviet era (see e.g. Tokarev, 2000; Beliakov et al., 1998; 
Tragakes and Lessoff, 2003). Additionally, corruption became a serious problem (EBRD, 
2004). According to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2004, 
Russia's score of 2.8 out of 10 (where 10 is "clean") suggested that corruption was 
"rampant" and endemic (Transparency International, 2004). The Russian score was better 
than most CIS countries, but well below that of the advanced transition economies, placing 
the Russian Federation amongst the most corrupt countries in the survey. The 2002 Human 
Development Report provided similar evidence by ranking the RF below the average in terms 
of government effectiveness and an aggregate index for democracy titled “Voice and 
Accountability” (Saghal and Chakrapani, 2002).   
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 Since President Putin came into the Kremlin in 2000, questions of how to modernize Russian 
public administration came to the fore, heralding the launch of a more or less 
comprehensive policy pattern. During his first four-year term in office, Putin had shown 
himself determined to build a strong state and use it to tackle all Russia’s problems. As he 
elucidated this himself: 
“For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly… Quite the contrary, [Russians] 
see it as a source and guarantor of order… and the main driving force of any 
change” (Business Week, 2000) 
So, during the recent decade Russian state has significantly increased its presence in the 
national economy (IMF, 2013). First, this was done through state-owned companies, state 
corporations and enterprises that produce around 50% of Russian GDP (OECD, 2013). Second 
- through the growth of public expenditure from federal and regional budgets that in total 
represent around 37.5% of country GDP (data from Russian Ministry of Finance and Ministry 
of Economic Development web-pages, calculation made by authors for 2012).  
Since Putin’s easy re-election in the first round in 2004, reform energies were intensified 
with rapid velocity. In this context, appeals for boosting efficiency, effectiveness, and 
accountability began to be widely heard in the country, serving as truths, in the name of 
which, the Russian state was to be revitalized. Driven by a motto to double Russia’s GDP by 
2010, a series of initiatives were put forward by government officials, signalizing a clear-cut 
shift in the ideology in Russian public administration (Russia Journal, 2004b). In fact, the 
decision to radically transform the Russian state was based on the recognition that a public 
sector modeled on the needs of central planning was ill suited to the demands of a market 
economy (World Bank, 2003). This initiated the need for important institutional reforms to 
be introduced. According to EBRD (2004), such reforms were necessary in order to “increase 
confidence in the state institutions, to strengthen their policy and reform implementation 
capacity, to effectively rein in corruption, and to raise efficiency and quality of public 
services” (p. 20). 
Amongst those reform efforts, the modernization of the whole budget process was 
announced to be at the core of the Russia’s program of economic transformation and 
development with the primary goal of “boosting accountability in government 
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 expenditures”. Advocates of the reform stressed that granting managers more autonomy in 
place of asking them for more accountability for the consequences of their decisions would 
enhance the quality and efficiency of provided services (Avdasheva et al., 2005, Tambovtsev, 
2004). Referring to former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, “the budget policy’s 
restrictive impact on [business] opportunities, its inability to maximally make use of federal 
finances, and the necessity to create conditions that correspond to government priorities” 
were claimed as the main drivers for the change (Russia Journal, 2004a). 
The importance of these efforts could hardly be emphasized enough as they were laid down 
in the Concept of the Budget Process Reform for 2004 – 2006 endorsed by Cabinet 
Resolution # 249 on May 22nd, 2004 (hereafter, the concept). This was followed by an April 
30th Russian Cabinet’s of Ministers Resolution # 225 creating a commission for augmenting 
the efficiency of government expenditures under the chairmanship of the Deputy Prime 
Minister Alexander Zhukov, empowered to guide this reform effort (Finansovya Gazeta, 
2004; Diamond, 2005). Deputy Prime Minister Zhukov stressed that implementing the 
Concept of the Budget Process Reform would be a step of vital social significance as it would 
make government expenditures clear and transparent to each Russian citizen.    
The launch of the Budget Process Reform in effect caused quite a stir in Russian mass media. 
Colorful headings like “A Reform for the People”, “A Real Breakthrough in Boosting the 
Efficiency”, or “A Budgetary Revolution” abounded in Russian newspapers (see e.g. 
Kommersant; Finansovye Izvestia) and Internet sites. Indeed, the search for its title in 
www.yahoo.ru and www.google.ru resulted in more than 400 different references (links) in 
each data-base. According to NEI-Moscow News (2004), the reason for this was pretty 
obvious, namely to make government officials work for the citizens, and to hold them 
accountable to the latter. All this could be traced back to the 2001 Budget Message of the 
Russian President to the Federal Assembly explicitly addressing the need for “furnishing a 
real openness and transparency of budgets and budgetary procedures at all levels of the 
budget system”. Although in diverse ways, this message was increasingly reiterated by the 
Russian President in the subsequent years. For example, in his 2002 Budget Message 
President Putin spoke of public information that would transparently disclose those financial 
flows released to various budget recipients in order to support their activities. Last, but not 
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least, in his 2005 state-of-the-nation address, Putin underscored the right of all Russian 
citizens to having equal access to public information.   
The main objective of the reform process, as stated in the concept, was “to lay down 
preconditions and prerequisites for the most effective allocation and management of 
government finances by appropriate prioritization of various governmental activities 
considered to have critical bearing on a country’s development” (p. 2). In essence, the 
reform process was meant to move away from the costs and inputs [administration of 
resources] towards goals and outputs [management by results] by “strengthening the 
accountability and widening the managerial autonomy within a medium-term financial 
planning framework” (p. 2). The adoption of a modern budget management model, directly 
translated from Russian as “results-oriented budgeting”, was said to be “the nucleus of the 
up-to-date organization of the budget process” (p. 3), aimed at forging a more direct link 
between allocating resources through the budget and performance in reaching stated 
government objectives.   
As derived from above, the main idea behind the concept was to make administrators of 
budget funds (line ministries and agencies) more accountable and to better monitor their 
performance. In this model, the budget is to be formulated on the basis of a clear-cut ex-
ante specification of the performance expected of each budget administrator. As a 
repercussion of the transformation process, budget appropriations are to be directly linked 
to the various government functions and divided into distinctly individual programs. To be 
meaningful, they are to be set in a medium-term budget framework, in the sense of a rolling 
forecast of fiscal aggregates for the budget year plus two forward years (see more in Petrov, 
2005; Lavrov, 2004).  
The resources allocated to the programs are to be determined and grouped under 
responsibility of administrators of budget funds (so-called “Subjects of Budget Planning”). 
The latter are to be given the degree of managerial autonomy and freedom in decision-
making they need to achieve the tasks assigned to them. For instance, the concept allowed 
allocations to be freely redistributed by administrators within each program. At the same 
time, as was clearly emphasized in the text of the concept, line ministries and agencies are to 
be held directly accountable for meeting a contracted level of outputs by carrying out 
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 monitoring and subsequent external audit of finances and results of activities, so that good 
budgetary performance would be rewarded while poor performance would be penalized.  
Perhaps most importantly, a new reform agenda embarked on in Russian general 
government sector was announced to encompass the following five policy headings: 
1. Modernizing the budget classification and government accounting. 
2. Distinguishing between the present (“deystvuushikh”) and new 
proposed/assumed policy (“prinimaemykh”) commitments when preparing the 
budget. 
3. Enhancing medium-term financial planning. 
4. Developing and expanding program- and performance-oriented methods of 
budget planning. 
5. Improving and streamlining those procedures for budget preparation and budget 
approval.  
To begin with, none of the aforementioned budgeting goals in support of boosting 
accountability, transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency in government expenditures was 
expected to be achieved without related changes in the accounting system. This was also 
quite evident from the 2004 Budget Message of the President to the Federal Assembly which 
stressed “the need for a system of government accounting that was capable of not merely 
controlling the use of budgetary expenditures, but assessing the effectiveness of their use as 
well”. That is why reinventing Russian public accounts occupied the leading place among 
those policy directions laid down in The Concept of the Budget Process Reform. Along with 
the budget classification, the reforming of Russia’s public sector accounting system, as 
stated in the concept, was  
“… a necessary and indispensable precondition in modernizing a country’s budget 
process. Both the budget classification and accounting system should become a 
reliable tool that ensures transparency of those activities of the state bodies and 
administrators of budget resources, and provides with a wealth of financial 
information required throughout all the phases of the budget process, emanating 
from the analysis of the previous period’s financial results, to the preparation and 
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presentation of the draft budget, and its execution throughout the fiscal year up 
to the generation of final accounts” (p. 4).  
Under this rubric, the objective of the transformation process was declared twofold. One 
was to make the budget classification closer to international best practice by incorporating 
the IMF GFS classification methodology. Another objective was to introduce a Chart of 
Accounts, integrated with the budget classification, so that all spending units would be 
brought under a single budget classification and a single Chart of Accounts. The purpose of 
so doing was to enable the effect of decisions made in the fiscal and budgetary sphere on 
the stock of assets and liabilities to be judged upon, as well as for the assessment and 
preparation of reports on budget execution.  
The second policy measure was intended to cut significantly down the time devoted to the 
process of budget formulation and approval. To make things clearer, present commitments 
are those obligations which are predetermined by varying compulsory provisions and 
regulations endorsed earlier and liable to be included in the budget automatically. On the 
other hand, the new assumed/proposed policy commitments envisage those expenditures, 
the insertion of which into the budget is dependent upon decisions being made directly in 
the course of budget preparation for the next fiscal year. To be included in the budget, the 
latter are to be subjected to thorough scrutiny. As were recognized, nearly 90-95 per cent of 
commitments were already “locked-in” so the truly new programs occupied 5-10 per cent of 
the budget (Diamond, 2005).  
The third element of the reform package aimed at ensuring the augmented reliability of 
medium-term forecasting for those resources available to budget managers. Specifically, the 
budget for the forthcoming fiscal year is to become a constituent part of an annually 
updated rolling multi-year (normally three-year) fiscal document. In analogy with Soviet five-
year plans, some Russian mass media nicknamed these as three-year plans (Finansovye 
Izvestia, 2004a, 2004b).  
The fourth direction was declared to be the keystone of the reform package, directed at 
establishing a procedure for assessing the effectiveness of budget expenditures. Viewed in 
this way, it presupposed a step-by-step move away from the view of budget as primarily 
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 focused on resource allocation and input control (so-called smeta financing or resource 
management) towards program and performance-oriented budgeting.  
Finally, the fifth area of the transformation process envisaged the streamlining of procedures 
for budget preparation and budget approval to also meet the requirements of medium-term 
performance-oriented budgeting. In particular, the concept proposed the draft law on the 
federal budget for the next fiscal year to be approved in three readings as compared to the 
previous four. Above all, the concept substantially extended the power of the executive 
bodies in the course of budget execution.  
Since the concept was put into force, fast and rapid changes may be witnessed on both 
federal and regional levels of state. Some practitioners see these changes as constant 
ongoing process: 
“Doing reforms is like riding a bicycle: if you stop turning pedals – you fall”. 
Informant 1, 2013 
However, government executives, officially responsible for policy-making in governmental 
budgeting claim that there are clear stages and milestones that may be traced in this sphere 
after 2000:  
Table 2. Milestones from Lavrov, 2005: 
Milestone Period Corresponding document 
(if applicable) 
Stage 1 – management of expenditures 
- Balance of budget 
- Cash-based accounting 
- Treasury 
- Targeting expenditures according to 
plans 
- Methodology of financial support 
redistribution 
Before 2000 Budget Code -1998;  
 
Stage 2 – transition period 
- Performance oriented budgeting 
- Medium-term expenditure framework 
2001-2008 The Concept of reforming 
budget process in Russian 
Federation in 2004-2006;  
Budget Code - 2004  
Stage 3 – management of results 
- Separation of budget system levels 
- Mid-term planning 
After 2008  
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 - Target and Result oriented budgeting 
- Reorganizing of budget entities 
- Accounting and reporting according to 
international standards 
 
Table 3. Milestones from Nesterenko, 2008: 
Milestone Period Corresponding document 
(if applicable) 
Stage 1  
- strengthening the budget execution 
system;  
- reporting, based on cash accounting; 
- providing external control of budget 
execution 
Before 2004 Budget Code -1998;  
 
Stage 2  
- balancing expenditures of public 
entities with their resources 
2004-2008 The Concept of reforming 
budget process in Russian 
Federation in 2004-2006;  
Budget Code - 2004  
Stage 3  
- implementing mid-term result-
oriented budgeting;  
- reporting on financial condition of 
public entities, based on accrual 
accounting;  
- implementing internal control and 
audit 
After 2008 Budget Code - 2007  
 
So, since 2000 until 2014 there have been several stages and milestones in the change of the 
normative framework regulating how the budgets are done. Although previous changes have 
also been significant, in this article 2004 is taken as a starting point. The reform of the 
governmental budgeting in Russia was announced in 2004 by approving “The Concept of 
reforming budget process in Russian Federation in 2004-2006” (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2004). 
In their rhetoric Ministry of Finance officials address to foreign experience and use the term 
“performance-oriented budgeting” (Lavrov, 2005). The 10-year period ends with the address 
of Russian President to Russian Federal Assembly in 2013 (Annual Address of President of 
the Russian Federation to Federal Assembly, 2013).  
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 The performed analysis resembles the sequencing approach – “should do” and “must do” for 
donor community, promoted by authors or editions, close to IMF or other international 
financial institutions (Allen, 2009; Bietenhader and Bergman, 2010).   
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Table 4. Summary of empirical findings 
Evidences of NPM-like approach Evidences of non-NPM approach(-es) 
- Appeals to NPM rhetoric 
(performance, efficiency) 
- Move towards accrual-based 
accounting and budgeting 
- Sequencing methodology 
- Treasury, Accounts Chamber, … 
- Mid-term expenditure framework 
- Performance measurement 
- Program-Based Budgeting 
- Creation of special-purpose-vehicles 
for provision of public services 
- Education for government: 
“manager” qualification 
- Hiring managers and top executives 
with business background 
-  
- Appeals to sovereignty and 
modernization of the state 
- Resilience of cash accounting,  
parallel and hybrid systems 
- Federal law on strategic planning: 
- 6-year plans for the country, 
agencies, regions and industries 
- budget is subordinate to plans 
- New public service entities are 
created as multi-functional centers 
- Academy of Public Administration as 
the main education institution 
- A special legislation for public 
servants that puts them outside from 
“normal” labour relationships  
-  
 
To be developed..  
 
6. Discussion 
To be developed..  
 
7. Conclusions 
In the last few decades we have witnessed substantial efforts to reinvent public sector 
worldwide. Since early 1970-s significant attempts to modernize public sector has been 
made worldwide under New Public Management (NPM) paradigm as a response to 
government growth and several other challenges (Hood, 1991, 1995) implying rationality in a 
line with neo-classical shift in economics, seeking to make public sector more effective and 
efficient through applying business practices.  
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 Although the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia and other OECD countries were the 
earliest adopters of NPM, we see today to some extent controversial trends. On the one 
hand Anglo-Saxon community has been intensively promoting NPM reforms through 
international organizations such as International Monetary Fund and World Bank to 
developing countries with sometimes fruitful examples (see IMF, 2006 for Malaysia case; 
Timoshenko & Adhikari, 2010 for Nepal; Kuruppu, 2010 for Sri Lanka and many others). But 
on the other hand the reforms within NPM ideology seem to have not been implemented in 
its pure sense in some European continental countries, resulting to decoupling between 
intended and achieved results and sometimes giving birth to hybrid models (see Luder, 2002 
for Germany and Van Helden, 2000 for Netherlands).  
Although the Russian context with the developments in Russian society is distinct from 
Western and Central Europe, we may witness the similar processes of hybridization and 
“nationalization” of NPM-like reforms. An assiduous endeavor to provide an understanding 
of an emergence of new Russian government budgeting system is undertaken in this paper. 
As our evidence indicates, it now represents a kind of hybrid model influenced by the ideas 
of New Public Management, those ideas stemming from the Russian past, as well as a strong 
rhetoric of Russian officials aimed at boosting the image of the Russian state as a modern 
sovereign and independent player. 
To be developed..  
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2. Программа развития бюджетного федерализма в Российской Федерации до 2005 г. 
3. Концепция реформирования бюджетного процесса в Российской Федерации в 2004-
2006 гг.  
4. О мерах по повшению результативности бюджетных расходов: Постановление 
Правительства РФ от 22.05.2004 №249 (в редакциях: от ... №...; от ... № ...) 
5. Постановление Правительства Российско Федерации от 06.03.2005 №118 
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Success and fail of participatory budgeting: comparative study 
of two experiments in Russian local governments 
Abstract: 
This paper is aimed to add new knowledge about participatory budgeting practices in less 
developed countries, mainly the case of Russian Federation is investigated. During the period of 
2000s Russia has integrated (or has been integrated) to NPM and NPFM trends of public 
changes. As a result a huge package of reforms (“reform bombing”) was initiated by central 
authorities affecting various budgeting, accounting and managerial practices all over the country. 
Responses for reforms are not clear in Russia and worth to investigate. In this paper we focused 
on quite unusual Russian practice internationally known as “participatory budgeting” (PB) which 
emerged in several Russian local governments as response to “increasing efficiency and 
transparency of public sector”.  Mainly comparative study was done as a study of two practices 
of “participatory budgeting” experiment in Russian local governments. Based on interviews, 
observations, secondary and primary data we try to understand why participatory budgeting 
experiment (as innovation) fail in one case and “success” in another one. 
Key words:  
Participatory budgeting, reforms, Russia, local government, transparency, communication, 
innovation 
 
3 bullets (the Craft of Research):  
1. Topic: I’m studying participatory budgeting practice in Russian local governments in a 
period of extensive public sector reforms  
2. Question: because I want to find out how such innovations as participatory budgeting emerge 
and survive  
3. Significance: in order to help my readers understand   the nature of innovations in public 
sector.  
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INTRODUCTION 
New Public Management (NPM) has been vilely discussed by the scholars more than twenty 
years (Denhardt, 2004; Gualmini, 2008; Hood, 1991, 1995; Špaček & Malý, 2010; Weimer, 
1994) as important part of developing efficient government practice, mainly such elements as 
performance measures, result control, decentralization and market-orientation choice flexibility, 
and transparency (Timoshenko & Adhikari, 2009a, 2009b). Last decade some authors claim that 
NPM “lost ground” (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006; Lynn Jr, 1998). At the same time Drechsler 
(2005) talked much about “Adieu NPM”, but still adding that it’s “very much alive and kicking” 
yet. According to De Vries & Nemec (2013, p. 13) NPM is still used to support process 
improvements and “it is far from certain which way the public sector is heading in the so-called 
post-NPM era”.  
Nowadays some countries are still implementing NPM related reforms and other countries have 
chosen alternative paths as a “more or less complex mixture of public management reforms” (De 
Vries & Nemec, 2013, p. 10). 
Lots of studies were focused on NPM related reforms in developed countries. But fewer studies 
were devoted to investigating public sector reforms in less developed countries and countries 
with transitional economy. Russia is one of such countries to focus as a country with long history 
of changes from the “Tsar autocracy” through “Soviet times” and transition to market reforms 
economy. At the outset of the new century New Public Management trends came (or were “let 
in”) to Russia to modernize and render more efficient to the public sector and give greater cost-
efficiency for governments. This trend gave a starting point for dynamic extensive public sector 
reforms in Russia, which affected various aspects of public sector, mainly the budgeting and 
accounting practice throughout the country at federal, regional and local levels.  
The ideas of reforms were “to ensure transparency of the movement of budget funds and increase 
efficiency of public funds spending” (Tatyana Antipova & Bourmistrov, 2011, p. 1) and to give 
more autonomy for local governments. The core changes for public sector as a part of “A 
budgetary revolution” was introduction of management for results and a shift from traditional 
cash accounting towards businesslike accrual accounting (Timoshenko, 2008).   
Lots of studies were done related to the issues of budgeting reforms in Russia by Russian 
authors.  Most of these studies were conducted by Russian authors and mainly focused on issues 
related to problems of budgeting reforms in Russia (Lavrov, 2005; Ovchinceva, 2009; Serplin, 
2005; Starodubrovskaya, 2008) that there are a lot of challenges for local and regional 
governments. The same point was continued by foreign authors, mainly the representatives of 
Norwegian research school. Antipova and Bourmistrov (2011; 2013) describe Russian accrual 
accounting reforms (starting from 2004) and analyze its adoption, mainly using  “travel of ideas” 
they found contradiction between the international legitimization of Russia and Russian public 
sector accounting traditions. According to their study   reforms have “never gained a proper 
momentum and stack in technicalities” and “…new system of accounting and reports in Russian 
government is a kind of “hybrid” system which combines historical “sediments” of the past and 
only some “innovations” of today”. Konstantin Timoshenko has several own and joint articles 
(Adhikari, Timoshenko, & Gårseth–Nesbakk, 2012; Timoshenko, 2006, 2008; Timoshenko & 
Adhikari, 2009a, 2009b) focused on investigation of public sector reforms in Russia on central 
and local contexts. He found out that implementation of budget reform was better comprehended 
in terms of legitimacy rather than in terms of instrumentality for central authorities in Russia.  
To sum up, according to existing literature Russian public sector reforms represent  “top-down” 
push process (Tatiana Antipova & Bourmistrov, 2013) initiated by central authorities. Gaining 
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more international legitimization for central authorities than instrumentality (Timoshenko & 
Adhikari, 2009a), reforms spread from the top to down levels (regional and local governments) 
as modernization process which actually  contradict with the Russian public sector tradition 
(Tatiana Antipova & Bourmistrov, 2013).  
At the same time these studies focus on implementation of reforms in federal and regional level 
(and state entities), but a lack of knowledge appears in the field of local (municipal) level, 
mainly how reforms were reflected by municipalities.  
According to De Vries & Nemec (2013, p. 13) there is no uniform adaptation of public 
management reforms and each country makes its own translation combining old and new 
traditions. At the same time it worth to mention the importance of local context in studying 
financial aspects of changes in a public sector (Timoshenko, 2008). And the significance of local 
contexts in reinventing the reform templates should not be underestimated (Czarniawska & 
Joerges, 1996). 
The municipal level as a local context has even greater specifics than the regional level 
(Ovchinceva, 2009): according to Russian legislation local governments are forced to take 
responsibility for the development prospects of the municipality and therefore adequately assess 
their capabilities and resources;   municipality is the closest level of government to the people, 
which has ample opportunities for attracting people to the evaluation of its performance;  in the 
municipal level the majority of public services are provided and the municipality is responsible 
for providing them. Thus, closeness to people, performance evidence exactly at the municipal 
level indicates the applicability and possibly greater clarity, transparency, effectiveness of public 
sector reforms, thereby this reasons stress the importance of studying local governments.  
According to legislation Russia as federal state has three levels of management: the federal level, 
regional level and local (municipal) level. And there are more than 22 000 local governments in 
Russia (Belenchuk, 2013).  Municipalities took the existence in 1995 with a new federal law "On 
General Principles of Local government in the Russian Federation" August 28, 1995 N 154-FZ 
with subsequent amendments of articles.  After that in 2009 regulation of municipalities was 
introduced as a new federal law "On General Principles of Local government in the Russian 
Federation" October 6, 2003 N 131-FZ with subsequent amendments of articles. According to 
Bourmistrov (2001) “municipalities have not formed their identities yet”, but after more than ten 
(almost twenty) years of forming and reforming, we claim that municipalities as units in Russia 
are institutionalized and as type of local governance municipalities have a great interest for 
investigation. 
Thus, Russian local governments represent a huge gap of unknown practices. These practices can 
tell a lot about how centrally-driven reforms are perceived and settled down in local settings, for 
example budgeting reform adoption, but   
“Public sector reforms are not only budgeting reform… We face a lot of reforms and it 
looks like a constant bombing: new statues, degrees come very often to different 
departments and you should always be ready for siren”  
(the Deputy Head of Administration of North-West Municipality) 
So how do municipalities respond to this “bombing”? Do they “defend”, move to the “shelter” or 
pretend that they “give up” or really “give up”? So how do they manage with this “constant 
bombing”? In this paper we don’t watch to this battlefield and don’t try to understand the rules. 
Instead we see this “reforms’ bombing” environment as a context.  It looks like the constant 
“bombing” process don’t give any chances for municipalities to develop their own practices and 
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just give some time to react for new “bomb”. But reality shows that own practices are possible.    
It’s extremely interesting to see that except centrally-driven changes some new local practices 
emerge in Russian municipalities, such as participatory budgeting. We don’t know how and why 
they emerge and mainly how they survive, spread or die. 
Thus, the focus of this article is investigation of “participatory budgeting” experiment in Russian 
local governments as a local practice which emerged in “reforms’ bombing” environment. In this 
paper we try to find out how participatory budgeting emerged and developed in Russia in 
order to understand the nature of innovation’s adoption. 
Mainly comparative study was done as a study of the same experiment of “participatory 
budgeting” in two different Russian local governments. Based on interviews, observations, 
secondary and primary data we try to understand why participatory budgeting experiment (as 
innovation) fail in one case and success in another one. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: first, theoretical framework of paper will be 
introduced as glasses with budget, transparency and ?institutional? lenses; the next section gives 
methodological considerations for the article; further the participatory budgeting concept is 
introduced as giving a short history,  main ideas and development of this concept around the 
globe;  after that two Russian local governments  are examined as successful and  failed cases; 
the last two sections give discussion and conclusion of the article. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK (open for suggestions) 
Budgeting 
“It’s clearly a budget. It’s got a lot of numbers in it” 
(George W. Bush) 
Budgeting is a significant mechanism of economic management and planning, it transforms 
financial resources into people’s needs and goals as allocating resources (Wildavsky, 1986, 
2001). Budgeting has a lot of different but on the same time interconnected functions. Budgeting 
can be seen as management control system. At the same time budgeting is translating financial 
resources into human purposes. Budget represent a record of the past and at the same time is a 
statement about the future. Budgets are plans as they try to determine future states of affairs 
through a number of current actions. Moreover, budgets are predictions because they specify 
links between words and numbers on the budget documentation and future human behavior 
(Wildavsky, 1986). Wildavsky& Swedlow (2001) defines the following functions of budgeting: 
control function, efficiency measurement and instrument of management and planning.  
Budgeting has a direct link with accounting (Høgheim, Monsen, Olsen, & Olson, 1989). The 
budgeting is a basis for the government actions.  The results of transactions and actions are 
reordered in accounts that are used for the next year budget in turn. Therefore, the fundamental 
purpose of governmental accounting use is monitoring of budget execution and the using for the 
new budget creation (Timoshenko, 2006; Timoshenko & Adhikari, 2009b).  
Despite the long time of existing, the budget system continues to change and be developed 
around the whole word. Nowadays the transition from traditional incremental budgeting 
discussion (Fölscher, 2007; Good, 2011; Jones, Baumgartner, & True, 2002; Weimer, 1994; 
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Wildavsky, 1964, 2001) to results-based budgeting  (Rose, 2003; Schiavo-Campo, 2007; Schick, 
2003) took place as response to NPM agenda. Results-based budgeting gives opportunity to link 
the results obtained and the budget, giving more transparency and efficiency. 
The transparency of the budget presentation in linking expenditures to activities is essential 
(Wildavsky, 2001). It was already discussed that governmental budget has broad range of 
functions. One of the goals of governmental financial reporting is state’s accountability. Budget 
can function as massage and a mean of communication between government and society, 
forming relations based on trust (Wildavsky, 1986).  Communication theory (Madigan, 1985) 
can be used for understanding this function of budget. Talking about budget as a communication, 
transparency issues can be defined (Benito & Bastida, 2009; Kaufmann & Bellver, 2005; 
Robinson, 2006). 
Using Kasozi-Mulindwa (2013) theoretical framework: 
 
 
METHODS 
The goal of this paper is to give additional knowledge how such experiments as participatory 
budgeting  emerge, develop or die in constant changing public sector environment in Russia. As 
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an instrument for achieving this goal the comparative study of two municipalities will be 
presented.  Multiple methods of data collection technique are used, mainly documentary 
analysis, observations, interviews (semi-structured and in-depth) with representatives of different 
departments at municipalities (using existing contacts as “to be more successful” (Buchanan, 
Boddy, & McCalman, 1988)).   
First, the documentary analysis of official documents of Russian Federation and previous 
publications is done, giving ability to understand Russian “reforms’ bombing” context.  
Then the local practices were examined: 
1) the case of participatory budgeting in north-west municipality was observed as analysis 
of online video and text chronology and two interviews were conducted (it’s planned to 
be more): with coordinator of participatory budgeting (50 minutes, tape recording) and 
the Deputy Head of Administration, Chairman of the Finance Committee of Sosnoviy 
Bor Municipality (35 minutes, without tape recording).  
2) the case of participatory budgeting in high north municipality will be introduced.   
3) Kasozi-Mulindwa  (2013) framework for comperison: 
 
 
 
PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING  
The term “participatory budgeting” (PB)  first appeared in Brazil in 1989 and became a “symbol 
of democracy” and successful model of budget participation around the world (Sintomer, 
Herzberg, & RÖCke, 2008). For more than 20 years history the term has a huge amount of 
definitions which generally connected with such slogans as “good strategy for poverty 
reduction” (Kasozi-Mulindwa, 2013), “new concept of citizen participation” (Miller & Evers, 
2002) and just a good budgeting method where all stakeholders can participate in budgeting 
process (Shah, 2007). 
In general, the participatory budgeting is an approach to budgeting where all not elected citizens 
are allowed to participate in public finance allocation (Sintomer et al., 2008) and contribute to 
decision–making of public budget (Goldfrank, 2007), i. e. “participation” of citizens in public 
finance budget is expected. 
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Staring from Porto Alegre in Brazil (Pinnington, Lerner, & Schugurensky, 2009) more than 20 
years ago, the concept of PB began to spread internationally all over the world and adopted in 
different contexts. Moving from hundreds cities in Latin America, participatory budgeting spread 
to North America, Europe, Asia and Africa.  In Europe PB become a highly dynamic process 
where a number of experiments has increased rapidly from 6 to more than 100 in 2000-2005s 
(Sintomer et al., 2008). Such countries as England, Germany, Italy, France and Spain initiate 
such experiments all over the country (Allegretti & Herzberg, 2004). According to Worldwatch 
Institute (2007) there were more than 1200 experiments of PB around the world in 2007.  
Developing in space and time the goals and principles of PB practices were different from one 
country to another one. According to Sintomer et al. (2008) importation of successful Brasilian 
case of Porto Alegre has been “highly differentiated process”, relying not on one procedure but 
rather on a multitude of devices. In developing countries, PB was used as political and social tool 
(Kasozi-Mulindwa, 2013). Some countries adopt PB as instruments of legitimacy to get funds, 
other countries as NPM trend or strategy for poverty reduction.  This points the importance of 
local context because each country (and local) context is different. Thus, practices are different 
and what was called participatory budgeting in Brazil can be different thing in other countries. 
Indeed, many researches prove that, showing the various PB adoptions all over the world (see 
foe example Abers, 2001; Allegretti & Herzberg, 2004; Kasozi-Mulindwa, 2013; Sintomer et al., 
2008) . But on the same time there are some legitimate formal and established principles and 
processes which in some extent represent the general picture of PB. 
A common ways of PB stages can be seen as follows: diagnosis, deliberation, collective 
decision-making, execution and monitoring (Pinnington et al., 2009). Or alternatively PB 
represents a process that involves formation, approval, implementation, control, monitoring and 
evaluation of public recourses (Kasozi-Mulindwa, 2013).  
Traveling around the world, PB concept deeply rooted in the principles of democracy, social 
justice, citizen control, education, transparency and accountability (Goldfrank, 2007; Kasozi-
Mulindwa, 2013; Pinnington et al., 2009; Sintomer et al., 2008). These principles as part of PB 
were widely discussed by the scholars testing on different countries’ settings. Some of them 
showed that PB has a “success story” of these principles (Abers, 2001; Allegretti & Herzberg, 
2004; Avritzer, 2006) , but the others gave evidence that PB could be a “shield”, “show” and 
“ritual” to gain legitimacy (Kasozi-Mulindwa, 2013) and real PB could fail and give 
contradictory results. Folowing this logic, the research community around the world focused on 
such directions as preconditions of PB practices, the desiegn, process and outputs of PB in 
different countries, mainly focused on municipalities and cities in developed and developing 
countries (for example Ebdon, 2002; Ebdon & Franklin, 2004). At the same time comparatative 
research was increased last decades giving ability to see different intepretations of PB  and 
showing the complexity of global panorama. 
Talking about link between NPM and PB it worth to say that participation by all stakeholders in 
the budgeting process is at the centre of NPM reforms in public sector financial managment 
(Kasozi-Mulindwa, 2013).  Thus, PB adoption can be a trend or ritual exercice driven by NPM 
reforms. According to Kasozi-Mulindwa  (2013) PB can be a good symbole of legitimacy both 
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for NPM and ordinary sitizens, but not always gain real instrumentality such citizens’ 
participation in dicision-making and increasing trancparency & accountability. In most cases in 
developing countries adoption of PB is centrally driven and seen as additional “window“ to get 
funds from donor countries with NPM reform package. But what happens when country adopts 
NPM reforms without need of funds?  When centraly driven package of reforms doesn’t say 
directly about particicipartory budgeting, but PB practices emerge on their own merit? 
As it’s written earlier, last decade Russia has integrated (or has been integrated) to NPM and 
NPFM trends of public changes rainforcing a huge package of reforms (“reform bombing”) by 
central authorities. Moving down from central level to regianal outhorities and local 
governments reforms got different responses. It looks like there is no time an d funds for local 
governments to take some intiative, but  the data shows quit interrestng results, mainly PB 
emerged in several Russian municipalities with different ways of development. In this paper we 
try to understand how PB emergerded in Russian local governments in context of reform 
bombing and why it sevive and fail? 
Using Kasozi-Mulindwa  (2013) framework for comperison, the following section represent the 
description of Russian “reform bombing“ context and comparison of two PB experiments in 
Russian municipalities.  
 
RUSSIAN “REFORMS’ BOMBING” CONTEXT 
As it was mentioned before, the period of 2000s was covered by extensive public sector reforms 
which was called one of the respondents from municipality as “reforms’ bombing”. The key task 
was to create maximum opportunities for both federal and municipal authorities to deal with 
development of local areas effectively and free from conflict. And of course Russian regional 
authorities were also involved into reforming process.   
In 2004 the Concept of the Budget Process Reform for 2004-2006 was introduced as “A reform 
for the people,” “A real breakthrough in boosting the efficiency,” or “A budgetary revolution” 
(Timoshenko & Adhikari, 2009a). In 2006 the Concept of increasing the efficiency of 
intergovernmental relations and the quality of management of state and municipal finance in 
Russia took place. 2003-2009 the reform of local government took place as Federal Law № 131 
"On General Principles of Local government in the Russian Federation".  In 2006 Concept of the 
Administrative Reforms for 2006-2008 was approved. And finally the concept of program-based 
budgeting took place in 2013. That’s quite difficult to analyze the whole legislation connected 
with public sector reforms, there are hundreds of pages of material (laws, statutes, reports, 
degrees) about reform process on official web-site of Russian Ministry of Finance. Several 
studies tried to analyze this huge package of budgeting reforms (Tatyana Antipova & 
Bourmistrov, 2011; Tatiana Antipova & Bourmistrov, 2013; Timoshenko, 2006, 2008; 
Timoshenko & Adhikari, 2009a, 2009b). 
Talking about the budget reform in particular, the main features were:  
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• moving to the results-based budgeting at all levels of government. This process of 
transition was declared on step by step amendments to the budget process (three years 
planning and orientation towards results). At the same time, a number of new norms, 
laws, decrees have been issued by the government and municipalities are to follow them, 
because these norms and decrees have the force of law; 
• within the reform boundaries the activity of the Federal Treasury has been changes as it 
has become the only state cashier, and the most important task of it is to ensure the safety 
of funds of budget managers and accumulate it in the single treasury account; 
• the status of the Chamber of Accounts as a permanent body of the state financial control 
has been consolidated. The Departments of Chamber of Accounts and Federal Treasury 
execute the power at regions, districts, and cities; 
• within the reform boundaries the system of accounting and reporting, treasury and 
banking has been changed. In particular, it has been decided to use accounting on an 
accrual basis, a new procedure was introduced for treasury execution of the federal 
budget. The payment order includes specific details (budget classification codes), which 
provided an opportunity for their automated processing. According to the reform 
changes, the system of accounting and budget classification should ensure transparency 
of public bodies and provide precise information at all levels. 
• within reform process the inter-budgetary relations have been changed, mainly funds are 
allocated not by almost equal parts among all institutions, but in accordance with 
programmes supposed by these institutions. By doing so, competition among institutions 
is intended to be increased and they have got more initiative as prescribed by two NPM 
dimensions: managerialism and marketisation (Schick, 2003).  
During all years of municipal reform in the Russian Federation all transformations of municipal 
level of government were oriented on creation of conditions for independent realization of 
municipal functions and also on for further independent social and economic development of 
municipalities. Despite more than decade of reforms, which have led to some positive (what is 
quete urgable) developments, unresolved problems still continue. This is a problem of excessive 
(and for some municipalities - insufficient) competencies and their underfunding (due to 
contrasts with the tax base and economic opportunities of the territories), and many others.  
It became clear that one can not apply the same approaches to the formation of the content and 
scope of competencies to all municipalities. It is necessary to consider the diversity of local 
conditions. Useful in one town, a particular model may not work in another. This is especially 
true with the question of the scope of competencies. Some municipalities have sufficient 
economic base and can perform not only their own, but also additional competencies delegated 
by the regional authorities. Other municipalities cannot perform even the minimum function, for 
example, due to small population and remoteness of the area. As president Putin said "The main 
goal is to find a balance between the amount of competencies and resources of municipalities, 
but this balance should be looked for a long time". 
Thus, the problem of sufficient base for financial and economic autonomy is the key problem of 
municipal level of government. At the same time a system of evaluation of the effectiveness of 
local government is introduced in the Russian Federation. The list of indicators of the efficiency 
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of local governments of city districts and municipal areas is approved by the Decree of the 
Russian President of 28.04.2008 No. 607 "About an assessment of efficiency of local 
governments of city districts and municipal areas". The main attention is paid to indicators which 
generally depend on activity of local authorities and characterize quality of life of the population, 
extent of introduction of new methods and the principles of management. Therefore even in 
rather difficult conditions municipalities are compelled to introduce the new principles of 
management and interaction with the population. 
Now the special attention is paid to openness and transparency of activity of municipalities, and 
also creation of effective communications with inhabitants. Carrying out reforms of municipal 
management, the federal authorities demand increase of these parameters and introduction of the 
participatory budgeting is the answer to these requirements. The system of citizen participation is 
declared in many municipalities, but the quality of introduction of this system and the final result 
differ strongly. Some municipalities seek to reach real participation of the population in 
distribution of the budgetary resources, it is enough to another to report about increase of 
transparency of the budget and improvement of communications with the population. 
Summing up, municipal reform in Russia, including the budget reform, became a respond to the 
changing world trends (under NPM umbrella) and has been represented by huge package of 
legislation documents, which were developed on the “top” and began to penetrate to the regional 
and local settings as “bombs” which should hit the target. Watching to this “reforms’ bombing” 
as a context and trying to understand the content of this “bombing”, we investigate several 
municipalities’ practices of PB experiment. The emergence of PB experiments in several Russian 
municipalities may be indirectly connected (should be proved) with federal law #8 adoption as 
one of the “bomb” which was thrown by Russian central authorities in 2009 “to ensure 
transparency and openness of the budget and the budget process to the public” (Annual Budget 
Message of the President of the Russian Federation to Federal Assembly on the 28th of June, 
2012). In the year 2014 the President declared: “Russia now is among the top ten countries 
according to the International Budget Partnership index of budget transparency... Information 
published in the public domain enables citizens to get an idea about the scope of budget spending 
and realize the effectiveness of costs and intended use of funds”. 
 
 
COPMPARETIVE DATA (in process) 
 
Municipality “Sosnoviy Bor” Municipality “Murmansk” 
Short description of municipality: 
Sosnoviy Bor is a town with population of 68 thousands 
people. Location is North-West Russia (Leningrad 
region). Past, present and future of Sosnovy Bor 
inextricably linked to the Leningrad Nuclear Power 
Plant-branch "Rosenergoatom". More than 500 large, 
medium and small organizations operate in Sosnoviy 
Bor. These are companies of different directions and 
forms of ownership, including the use of high 
technology. Major industries are manufacturing, 
construction, science, transport and communications. 
Sosnoviy Bor has 29 institutions of the education. There 
are 120 different kinds of sports facilities. About 10,000 
Short description of municipality: 
Murmansk is a city with population of 300 thousand 
people. It is the world's largest city located beyond 
Arctic Circle. Murmansk is the largest port on the 
shores of the Arctic Ocean and the only port to remain 
ice-free all year round. The Arctic seaway stretching 
along the northern and eastern coast of Russia up to the 
Pacific Ocean takes its start from the port of Murmansk. 
As Murmansk is a maritime town, all large enterprises 
are connected with the sea. Major industries are: fishery 
and fish processing, sea transport, ship repair, sea, rail 
and automobile transportation, metal working, the food 
industry, sea geology. Murmansk has 227 institutions of 
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residents are engaged in sports clubs (www.sbor.ru). the education. There are 304 different kinds of sports 
facilities. 
(http://mun.gov-murman.ru/). 
PB roots: 
The project didn’t appear in municipality originally, but 
was initiated by initiative research group of European 
University in St.-Petersburg jointly with Kudrin’s Fund 
in 2013. The main focus of the project is participatory 
budgeting. The research group of 3 people made 
presentation of the project for municipal administration 
and asked to arrange PB experiment in municipality. 
The research group used Brazilian model of PB as 
frame for experiment. The main source of data was 
literature from internet in English. PB goal is 
“development of access to budgetary financial data, 
federal, state, local, etc. and learning how to use these 
data”, “citizens become familiar with how the process 
of the formation and execution of the budget is going” 
 
Goal for European University: test “whether PB is 
applicable in Russian local governments”.  
 
The PB experiment was called “I plan Budget” 
 
The source of finance: minipality funds 20 mlns roubles 
from the 1 535 billions budget (1,3 % of total municipal 
budget).  
Goal of the experiment: “Our task now is not to reform 
the budget process, not to reform governments, our task 
is to add a channel of communication between officials 
and citizens, which would effectively solve the 
problems that are pushed participants in our project”. 
Preconditions: 1) balanced budget 2) the desire of local 
authorities to co-operate 3) sufficient activity of the 
population 4) and the fact that major infrastructure 
problems are solved. “Municipality should be without 
serious problems that may call into question the very 
existence of the municipality. Of course, there are own 
problems, but at the same time, the municipality is rich 
enough to afford some of the budget for the distribution 
of the citizens. This municipality has no such problems 
as fixing hot-water pipes... and it’s developed enough to 
maintain good living conditions” 
First Expectation: “we were not expecting anything 
really specific and the project could finish at any stage”.  
PB roots: 
The “3D Budget” project was initiated by the head of 
municipality Alexey Veller. He was supported by the 
head of administration of Murmansk Andrey Sysoyev 
and the Council of deputies. 
Idea of the project: the residents of Murmansk don't 
show any activity in public hearings, therefore it is 
necessary to find such form of work with the population 
which allows considering opinion of citizens at the 
discussion of distribution of the budgetary funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The PB experiment was called “3D Budget”. The name 
comes from the three Russian words beginning with the 
letter ‘D’ (the direct translation - let's divide money). 
 
The source of finance: minipality funds 
Goal of the experiment: “This project aims to bring to 
the budget process hundreds and thousands of people. In 
addition, the outcome of the project should be to 
identify the most significant social problems from the 
standpoint of Murmansk citizens. All this contributes to 
a socially-oriented budget”. 
 
First Expectation: Many organizers of the project had 
doubts, even scepticism. 
 
PB design and mechanisms for participation: 
citizens form special commission of 15 people. 
Credentials of Commission are extremely limited. 
Commission members must choose a theme for budget 
application for 2014, to form this application and hold it 
through the appropriate committee of administration 
and budget committee. Application must be included to 
the total municipal budget for 2014 and this budget 
should be accepted by deputies. The commission deals 
with the distribution of funds, it operates a couple of 
months and going to a couple of times a week for the 
exchange of information for dealing with officials.  The 
main task is to agree on the projects to be realizable, 
PB design and mechanisms for participation: 
The first stage (September 2013): A questionnaire is 
designed for the citizens. It can be filled in on paper or 
on the Internet. The questionnaire consists of two parts. 
First of all citizens are asked what expenses they 
consider priorities for the city of Murmansk in 2014. 
Secondly people are asked about whether they support 
the social projects of administration of Murmansk. 
The second stage (4th of November 2014): “Sawing” the 
budget in the central square of the city. In Russia it is a 
non-working day. A lot of people come with their 
families to the central square of the city. This time they 
can find there a beam that symbolizes budget. The beam 
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contain certain funds. After that, the work begins with 
the working group and the implementation of selected 
initiatives begins. They are implemented 3-4 months. 
is divided into 9 sectors (the same as in the 
questionnaire). 12 500 small holes are made in the beam 
and 12 500 sticks are prepared for voting. Everyone can 
get one stick and put it in a hole in the selected sector. A 
few hours later the beam looks like a big hedgehog. It is 
time to saw a beam on 9 pieces and see what pieces are 
longer.  
Finally part of the budget is to be formed in accordance 
with the wishes of the citizens. 
Government environment for PB: 
Several official documents from administration 
regarding PB experiment 
Funds for budget allocation are 20 mln. rubles for 2014 
FZ №8 2009 "On providing access to information about 
the activities of state bodies and local self-government" 
Government environment for PB: 
Several official documents from administration 
regarding PB experiment. 
Funds for budget allocation are about one billion rubles 
for 2014. 
PB process: 
 
Preparation: 
1) 1st of March 2013 - PR-company took place 
(organised by sity administration)  – news about the 
project in the internet, TV and newspapers. 
2) Registration of potential participant 
3) 12 April 2013 -  Presentation of the PB 30 minutes: 
what is participatory budgeting; how it will be; the 
goals. 
4) 13 April 2013 - 30 minutes : 79 candidates; 15 
people are selected; 15 people reserve. 15 citizens, 
randomly selected by lottery, will be included in a 
special commission and will take part in the formation 
of budget applications for the total sum 20 mln. rubles 
for 2014. Commission members must choose a theme 
for budget application for 2014, to form this application 
and hold it through the appropriate committee of 
administration and budget committee. Application must 
be included to the total municipal budget for 2014 and 
this budget should be accepted by deputies. 
5) 17 April 2013 – 1st meeting of the Commission - 1 
hour in the evening: introduction of moderator; 
introduction of participants, observers and rules; 
presentations of proposals for municipal funds 
spending. 
6) 19 April 2013 – 2nd meeting of the Commission:1 
hour in the evening: lecture “How urban space is 
organized” 
7) 24 April 2013 – 3rd meeting of the Commission: 1,5 
hour in the evening: reviewing proposals, questions and 
answers; voting for proposals; sports block applications 
got the most votes; mainly proposals for creation and 
renovation of sports fields, creation of a bike route and 
cycling infrastructure in the city. 
 
Formation: 
1) 28 April 2013 – 4th meeting of the Commission. 
1,5 hour meeting with representatives of administration: 
Chairman of the Finance Committee; Deputy Chief of 
the Capital Construction Departments; Head of external 
improvements and road infrastructure; Reviewing the 
proposals and giving the comments; Question and 
answers; “Everything is not so simple”.  Lots of thing 
should be discussed. “You don’t know how it’s difficult 
to manage!” 
PB process: 
 
Preparation 
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2) 6 May 2013 – 5th meeting of the Commission - 
1,5 hour meeting: creation of the working group (3 
persons from commission);  the working group is 
responsible for communication with administration; 
discussion of the results of meeting with representatives 
of administration; discussions of proposals and creation 
of detailed application; debates!  
3) 8 May 2013 – 6th meeting of the Commission - 
1,5 hour lecture about budget process: theory and 
practices, tendencies and trends in municipalities. 
4) 17 May 2013 – 7th  and the last meeting of the 
Commission - 1,5 hour meeting: new sport facility will 
be created as the total proposal of the commission;  the 
working group is responsible for realization of this 
proposal trough all circles of the agreement; totally the 
proposal have to become an expenditure item in the 
budget for 2014, in 2014 the working group have to 
track the implementation of this budget item; 
5) At the end of the meetings of the budget 
committee supported the authors of proposals for sports 
fields and landscaping included in the working group in 
the administration, which was engaged in the practical 
implementation of these projects. Both projects were 
accompanied by Department of improvements and road 
facilities and the Department of Capital Construction. 
Work on proposals lasted from June to November of 
2013. The aim of this work - making proposals of the 
Commission in the full budget request. It is important to 
emphasize that the work was carried out jointly by the 
administration and members of the commission. In 
separate meetings held during these few months, the 
working group has tried to maximize the number of 
wishes come from the members of the commission and 
add them to the budget proposals 2014. 
 
Approval:  
1) 18 June 2013 – 1st meeting of the working 
group. 1,5 hour meeting: 3 persons of the working 
group + Deputy Head of Administration in Social 
Affairs + Chairman of Finance Committee +Deputy 
Governor; Discussion of application; Some suggestions 
and corrections.  
2) All calculations, technical documentation and 
other documents are made by the city administration. 
Projects are included in the budget lines of the relevant 
committees. 
3) The idea is to get people involved into the 
process. This is followed by the standard scheme, where 
the municipality allocates funds and ideas of working 
group are considered along with the other projects 
during public hearings about the budget. 
4) While members of the working group engaged 
in organizational issues, citizens collected signatures 
against the construction sport facility in their backyard; 
As a result changing place and project documentation; 
5)  The main risk is approval of ideas by 
Municipal Deputies. 
6) 20 November 2013 –hearings about the budget 
7) As a result, 2 budget proposals of the 
commission members were included in the budget for 
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2014, subsequently approved by the Municipal Council 
for the total sum 1,079 million  rubles (0,09%) for 2014 
and 19 million  rubles for 2015. 
 
Implementation 
1) Two purchase procedures for 1,079 million  
rubles. 
2) 2014 – construction of  sport park + bicycle 
parking 
 
Mornitoring and Evaluation 
Sity administration andworking group 
Outcomes of PB: 
Influence budget decisions – citizens has limited 
influence (only 1,5% of the budget). Public officials 
make decisions – Partial Broad Participation 
(Moynihan, 2003) 
 
Transparency and accountability - “Provide access 
easily, harder to get people interested . What currently 
exists, if you see a budget made-up by the CSC codes , 
it is incomprehensible to most deputies and it dealt only 
those officials who are responsible for it and may be a 
couple of deputies who know something about the 
budget process ... you need to give people the 
opportunity to work with budgets. People have a lot of 
ideas, but they do not know what to do with them, they 
come to administration, and they say that your ideas are 
unrealizable, and they go without anything.” 
 
The social web network was created by citizens. There 
are a lot of discussions about municipal budget in this 
network.  
 
Education, i.e. enhance capacities of citizens – citizens 
who involved to the process began to understand how 
budget process goes and how actions and decisions take 
place. 
Administration gets “two bonuses”. “Firstly, a new form 
of working with people dedicated budget, because now 
there is budget hearings they held in each municipality. 
There come three men brawl at the meetings, and leave 
with nothing. And here is a brand new form of 
discussion on the budget. Second, there are very limited 
resource for municipal deputies in the cities, i.e. mayors 
expect that these programs will involve such people that 
can later be manipulated as a municipal deputy and it 
will be much easier to communicate with them than it is 
now.”  
“Just municipality understands that communication with 
citizens is weak now, people do not hear each other and 
sources of new ideas are not enough”. 
 
“The project affects everyone - citizens, administration, 
deputies, the relations between the people and the 
administration”. 
 
“The administration of the project affected by the fact 
that they are not used to work in such format (from 
comfort zones to the stretch ones?). There are a lot of 
ideas (projects) from the people. And much work should 
Outcomes of PB: 
Influence budget decisions (?) - the result is confirmed 
only by the statements of the administration of 
Murmansk in mass media. 
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be done to evaluate project - the working group is 
created, which includes representatives of the relevant 
departments of the committees, which can give 
comments on each and applications. Administration 
officers are not used to work like that. When we attend 
meetings, we see how hard they talk with each other.” 
 
“These working groups contribute to the improvement 
of contacts within the administration itself. Especially 
when the project involves several departments of the 
administration. 
 
It turns out that there is reduced power distance. “Yes, 
and very strong. I do not know of any other situation 
when the head of municipality can seat at the same table 
with the citizens together and watch over the map and 
decide where best to implement a particular project . 
This is a great step forward”. 
 
“People wean o to see their enemies in officials, 
because when they work together on something, they 
change style of conversation and ideas about the work. 
People begin to offer constructive ideas”. 
 
Legitimacy for central authorities as a good example of 
communication between citizens and administration. 
Actors and roles: 
City administration – facilitator, consultant and 
technical professionals 
University – coordinator, consultant, facilitator 
Municipal council – guardians  
Citizens - spenders 
Working group – representatives of spenders 
Newspapers – PR company 
Social network – communication channel  
Actors and roles: 
City administration 
Council of deputies  
Citizens (about 25 000) 
Public council of the city  
Mass media 
Development of experiment: 
“We would like that people can dispose of large sums, 
that they have experience in similar projects and know 
what projects are feasible, which can be supported. 
They should focus on what is happening now in the 
budget programs. Now this is a contest of ideas and 
work on implementation. The main difference - that we 
involve people in the process.” 
Several municipalities try to adopt the same practice.  
Development of experiment: 
Experiment isn't planned to repeat. The attention 
switched over to the project of the Internet portal of the 
budgetary system of Murmansk region "The budget for 
all". 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
CONCLUSION 
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Preliminary Abstract 
Drawing on a field study of the inter-organizational relationship between a hospital and a municipality this 
paper analyzes how an accounting innovation, in the shape of a financial incentive arrangement, became 
involved with promoting a governmental program involving a redirection in coordination of health care service 
provision across organizational boundaries. Drawing on actor-network theory the paper demonstrates how 
various inscriptions are built and configured in efforts to frame organizational action. Tracing the connections 
between various inscriptions and processes of translation the paper shows that accounting becomes important 
in making patient flows calculable and that the creation of calculability is a powerful means for promoting a 
governmental program of action and reconfiguring organizational behavior. The paper contributes by 
highlighting the role of inscriptions in reconfiguring accountabilities and the importance of investigating the 
interrelatedness of inscriptions when attempting to understand the performative role of accounting. It is 
argued that to understand how accounting is implied in the regulatory and managerial game, accounting 
innovations [inscriptions] need to be investigated as entangled in a larger nexus of efforts to promote a certain 
program of action.   
Originally submitted abstract: 
This paper investigates the role of accounting inscriptions in the cross-boundary relationship between separate, but inter-related, public 
sector organizations. The paper departs from the recent reforms in public sector health-care service provision in Norway, a national 
initiative involving a redirection in horizontal coordination within and across organizational boundaries. Providing a unique empirical 
account of how inscriptions travel through organizations the paper aims at contributing to the understanding of how accounting numbers 
are used and function in the interplay of actors and to the understanding of how inscriptions are negotiated (translated) and mobilized in 
processes of changing interactivity. To achieve this we draw on actor-network theory in the analysis of fieldwork from an in-depth case 
study of the relationship between two separated health authorities over a one-year period. Following ongoing processes of negotiation and 
translation the story shows that accounting numbers become focal in managerial and operative discourse, and come to be important 
mediators for practice both internally and between interactive parties. 
 
Key words: inscriptions, mediators, actor-network theory, translation, framing, quantification. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of inscriptions in framing cross boundary health care 
service provision. Drawing on a field study of the relationship between a hospital and a municipality 
jointly responsible for providing health care services to a large regional public, the paper analyzes 
how accounting inscriptions got involved with promoting a new way of coordinating action across 
organizational entities […]  
In 2008 the Norwegian government introduced “The coordination reform” (HOD 2008a). The reform 
is arguably one of the most fundamental changes in Norwegian health policy during the last decades. 
The reform addresses societal challenges related to both a patient-care perspective and to 
economical perspectives. The reform highlights three major challenges to the Norwegian health care 
system. Firstly patients’ needs for coordinated services are not sufficiently answered and services are 
fragmented. Secondly, service provision is characterized by shortcomings in efforts to limit and 
prevent illness. Finally, the demographical (and epidemiological) development and changes in 
disease patterns presents challenges that will threaten the society’s economical sustainability. The 
Norwegian health care system is divided, largely, into two levels of service provision; specialist health 
care services provided through stately regional health enterprises and hospitals, and generalized (or 
primary) health care provided by the municipal sector. The recent reform is built on the assumption 
that both from a medical and economic perspective better coordination between health authorities 
should be (one of) the most important areas of development. Coordination, as it is defined by the 
Norwegian department of health care, is then “[…] a notion describing the health and social care 
services’ ability to  share tasks among them in order to reach a common, agreed goal, and the ability 
to conduct the tasks in a coordinated and rational manner” (HOD 2008a, p. 13). The reform is 
presented under the vision of “proper treatment – at the right place – at the right time” (HOD 2008b, 
p. 1). The main approaches prescribed in the reform is related to developing a clearer patient role, 
establishing a new role for the municipalities in the provision of health and social care, developing 
the specialist health care services in order for them to make greater use of their specialized 
capabilities, facilitate clearer prioritization of holistic approaches to episodic patient care1 and the 
establishment of economic incentives. In other words, a complex array of goals, strategic intents and 
actions. These approaches are interrelated and multifaceted, the perhaps most intriguing aspect of 
this is however the prescribed general shift in task division and the accompanying/ attempts at 
promoting this through the establishment of various financial incentive arrangements.   
//Payment for dischargeable patients – the incentive arrangement// 
                                                          
1
 Episodic patient care – pasientforløp (patient careers).  
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The coordination reform, as most larger governmental reform programs, entails the introduction of 
multiple financial incentives aimed at promoting the desired outcomes of reorganization. The 
perhaps most visible and arguably most influential change introduced through the coordination 
reform is that of obligatory payment for dischargeable patients in specialist health care, which will 
hereafter be termed PDP, or Payment for Dischargeable Patients. The arrangement involves a 
restructuration of block-funding to the layers of the health sector, where funding is moved from the 
specialist health care to the municipal sector. 600 million NOK is transferred from stately health 
enterprises to municipalities. The PDP, as an incentive arrangement, is built upon the introduction of 
a price mechanism where municipalities are obligated to finance hospital care for dischargeable 
patients. […] 
(In this early version of the paper the PDP as an incentive arrangement is described in larger detail in the empirical section 
of the paper. The current introduction of the PDP in the paragraph above will be extended and reworked to incorporate a 
good illustration of the arrangement as an accounting innovation in the introduction to the paper. The paragraph above is 
included in this draft just to give the reader a short statement on what is being discussed. A further introduction can be 
found later in this version; pp. 15-16.) 
 
//Inscriptions//  
The concept of inscriptions includes many things (Robson 1992) and Latour (1999b, p. 306) defines 
this as any type of materialized sign that is constructed through translations, it could include a single 
sign, an archive, a document or a note on a piece of paper. Put generally the term inscription denotes 
a materialized trace of a translation. These traces are the ones this paper is concerned with 
accounting for, as a reconstruction of a series of translations. According to Latour (1996b) 
inscriptions are, most commonly, two-dimensional, superimposable and combinable. Hence he also 
terms them “immutable mobiles” as they are always mobile, and whilst allowing new translations 
and articulations they keep some relations intact. Inscriptions become important as conversions of 
local events into mobile entities with the potential ability to create, capture, safehouse and contest 
claims about other places and times (Preston 2006 in Qu & Cooper 2011, p. 345). In this sense these 
materializations are potentially important in stabilizing, or destabilizing, organizational practices. 
Inscription devices have the potential to enroll users and to make ideas and actions happen,  
(Quattrone 2009; Qu & Cooper 2011). Qu & Copper (2011) stress that whilst acknowledging the 
potential importance of inscriptions in developing accounting technologies, it is evidently not only 
about inscriptions. Inscriptions do however play a significant role in “selling” these technologies. This 
perspective is also fundamental to this paper. Whilst central inscriptions that introduce the 
technology, in this case the PDP, are important they are only so in terms of their relatedness to other 
((also non-numerical)) inscriptions and the way in which they are used by various 
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((participants/groups of participants)) actors. Thus concern is primarily directed at the role of 
inscriptions as entities in the wider organizational assemblages, and as investments promoting a 
certain program of action.   
We would seldom find inscriptions that are disconnected from other inscriptions, other non-human 
or human actors, which would incase make them irrelevant – we would not be able to trace them 
without their associations (ref). The aim of this approach is to trace the association between various 
inscriptions and their associations through the actions of actors. Latour (1999b) focuses on the role 
of inscriptions, as “immutable mobiles”, in creating references. When inscriptions are “[…] cleverly 
aligned they create the circulating reference” (Latour 1999b, p. 307).  The idea of aligning inscriptions 
with other, and further inscriptions, as well as associating these with other allies, non-human and 
human, is illustrated by Latour (1991) in his example of European hotel keys. To persuade hotel 
guests to leave their key when leaving the hotel the hotels developed inscriptions in the form of 
posters and notes informing the customers to leave their keys at the desk. These efforts were not 
sufficient to persuade customers to do so. To strengthen the reference they added further 
inscriptions in addition to adding metal weights to the keychain. The key was translated into an 
annoyingly heavy object the guests could leave at the desk to avoid having to drag around, a 
transformation from a (moral) obligation to something the guests were happy to do. This sort of 
chain of translation, or creation of circulating reference, is that which this paper seeks to reconstruct.  
//Existing literature and contribution// 
The paper is closely linked to the literature that investigates the role of inscriptions in the making of 
general and localized accounting technologies (Ezzamel et. al 2004; Preston 2006; Robson 1992; Qu 
& Cooper 2011). The paper contributes to this literature by focusing on the interconnectedness of 
numerical inscriptions and other non-quantified inscriptions as a nexus of materialized traces 
reconstructed from various actors’ attempts at promoting a certain way of conduct. Many have 
highlighted the importance of tracing the inscription building process (e.g. Robson 1992, Briers & 
Chua 2001, Qu & Cooper 2009) and the need to focus on how these in their various forms are 
mobilized, how they are produced and distributed and how they stand up to the tests of the 
elements. Such is also the sentiment of this paper, it does however place greater emphasis on the 
consecutive works of translation following an implementation of an accounting innovation aimed at 
fortifying its connected program of action. As Qu & Cooper (2011) who stress that the inscription 
building process is one of continuous character this paper seeks to unravel an ongoing process in 
which yet newer inscriptions are construed to replace the older or to reconfigure their connections 
and use. By focusing on the connection of accounting inscriptions to other non-numerical 
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inscriptions, to an even greater extent, the paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of how 
accounting becomes entangled in organizational practice and becomes crucial to instill a new way of 
performing services.  
//Structure// - the paper is organized as follows. 
The paper is organized as follows. The succeeding section elaborates on and discusses the 
importance of inscriptions in the establishment of organizational practice. The third section of the 
paper outlines the research process and the empirical field work. The fourth section of the paper 
introduces, in greater detail the PDP arrangement and the various actors involved in a theorized 
account of the interrelatedness of various inscriptions and the framing process. The paper is 
concluded by emphasizing the role of inscriptions as important mediators of organizational action 
and the importance of investigating the interrelatedness of various inscriptions in order to 
understand how accounting numbers become entangled in practice. […]  
This needs to be written once it becomes clear how the introduction should incorporate the ideas 
of centers of calculation and the creation of calculable spaces, including the notion of calculability 
and calculative agency.  
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Theoretical points of departure 
//Introduction to theory – inscriptions again// 
Inscriptions, in the form of for instance paperwork, charts or pictures have been argued to hold 
several rhetorical advantages as they are considered as mobile, immutable and re-combinable (Chua 
1995). Robson (1992) defines inscriptions as material translations of the setting that is to be enacted, 
at such they have the ability to transcend between the context of action and actors remote to that 
context. Defining inscriptions largely from their ability to enable ‘action at a distance’, or rather 
mediate problems of distance, Robson (1992, pp. 692) builds on Latour (1987) to elaborate on three 
mutually related qualities of inscriptions; mobility, stability and combinability. Mobility refers to the 
inscriptions ability to move, more specifically to move from the actor to the setting, and back. The 
written word and the use of numbers even more so, considered as easily mobilized and easily 
dominated, thus illustrates the mobility of inscriptions as materialized translations. Stability refers to 
the degree to which the form of the inscription is stable and the degree to which it is recognizable to 
its users. Inscriptions should then be able to withstand deterioration and corruption. The importance 
of stability, or durability, is elegantly illustrated by John Law (1986) in his paper on “the methods of 
long distance control”, see also Latour (1987, pp. 215-220). The third quality, combinability, refers to 
the inscriptions quality in terms of the actors’ ability to accumulate, aggregate and combine them. It 
considers the extent to which they can take the inscriptions to create new orders, new relationships 
or rather associations (Robson 1992).  
//Mediators or intermediaries// 
So how about these inscriptions? We have learnt they are the materialization of translations, and 
they can be said to have certain qualities. But what are they really? The central concern of this paper 
is the role of inscriptions as mediators. Mediators are “actors with the capacity to translate what 
they transport, to redefine it, redeploy it and also betray it” (Latour 1993, pp. 81). In short they 
change the meaning or elements they are supposed to convey (Latour 2005). Latour, and many more 
to follow, separates the notions of mediator and intermediary. Intermediaries, as opposed to 
mediators, transport meaning (or force) without transformation, in practice they are black-boxes. 
What you put in is what you get out, input equals output. In contrast mediators cannot be fully 
defined by their input or output (Latour 1999b; 1993; 2005). Inscriptions, in the form of documents 
as for instance laws, regulations or calculations, are often seen as simple intermediaries. Latour uses 
the example of a properly functioning computer as a good prospective intermediary, but highlights 
how if it breaks down it becomes a “horrendously complex mediator”. As we will see even the 
simplest of document, due to its associations to other entities, may lead to uncertain outcomes. “No 
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matter how apparently simple a mediator might look, it may become complex; it may lead in multiple 
directions which will modify all the contradictory accounts attributed to its role” (Latour 2005, pp. 
39). The account that follows in this paper shows that the “faithful intermediary” is a rare thing, and 
that the stabilization of a practice – a way of conduct – requires investment in, or rather mobilization 
of, further mediators (Latour 2005, Christensen & Skærbæk 2010).       
Framing and overflowing 
In later years several scholars have established that accounting inscriptions (Kirk and Mouritsen 
1996, Christensen and Skærbæk 2010) and particularly accounting numbers, or quantification in 
general (Vollmer 2007) aid in accommodating (social) interaction between humans in various ways. 
The investigation of the role of these inscription devices play have drawn on the theorization 
provided by Erving Goffman (1974) and his “Frame analysis” and the later contributions of actor 
network theory scholars. Goffman’s (1974, pp. 10-11) claim was that social situations are subject to 
ordering by frames that establish sense, or meaning, of what is going on and aids to regulate the 
actions taken by participants. The contribution made by ANT scholars has been to expand this by 
including non-humans into the social interaction (e.g. Callon and Latour 1981, Callon 1986; 1998, 
Latour 1987; 1993; 2005). The notion of framing is here expanded by the acknowledgement that 
“[…] almost all our interactions with other people are mediated through objects of one kind or 
another” (Law 1992, pp. 381-81). Goffman did in fact suggest himself that the production of 
frameworks is a co-production of interdependencies amongst humans as well as objects and things 
(Callon 1998). The concern of this paper is mainly related to the role of inscriptions (in framing) as 
mediators and as objects (or matter) that mediate (inter)action and create interdependencies and as 
such it draws heavily on the contributions of ANT.  
This concept of framing is easily ‘applied’ to the interactions investigated in this paper, we could 
think of it as an extension of economic transactions or contract negotiations, which are the examples 
employed by Callon (1998, pp. 250). Callon suggests it could be seen as a game of chess where there 
cannot be any effective agreement without the players sitting down at the chairs opposite side of the 
chessboard and adhering to the rules of the game. Extending this analogy to inter-organizational 
relationships is arguably not that far a stretch, this however is a story where most of the frame needs 
to be created and the rules are less defined and the investments of creating the frame has yet to be 
made. Drawing on the concept of framing we are thus looking for the role of inscriptions, as the 
materialized signs of translation work, or as investments, in the coproduction of a frame of action.  
//Overflowing// 
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Near complete framing of action requires substantial investments, despite even substantial 
investment framing attempts are highly unlikely to be successful (Christensen and Skærbæk 2007, 
Callon 1998). Callon attempts to deal with issues of identifying, measuring and containing overflows. 
Overflows are analogous to the economical concept of externalities, or rather the sociological 
revision of it (Christensen & Skærbæk 2007). Overflows can then be defined as all negative, or 
positive, externalities that are produced in the processes of framing. These overflows are not viewed 
as accidental; they are rather the norm (Callon 1998, Christensen and Skærbæk 2007). Callon (1998, 
pp. 252) further states that; “[…] framing – when present at all – is a rare and expensive outcome; in 
short it is very costly to set up”. He goes on to claim that framing should be regarded as something 
that does not happen on its own, and that overflows are not accidents which require repair. 
Overflows should be treated as the rule, whilst framing is a fragile artificial result based upon 
substantial investment. This is corresponding to the idea presented in this paper. The concepts of 
framing and overflowing are used to trace the investments in inscriptions/mediators, or framing 
devices, that aid in attempts to produce a sense of order, albeit temporal and artificial. In our case 
we will recognize that substantial investment in works of framing (works of translation) is conducted, 
but we will also see that this is no guarantee that efforts to frame the action taken will provide the 
desired outputs.  
Centers of calculation and calculative agency 
Framing is then, in simple terms, defined as processes of establishing the rules of the game, a frame 
of action. The main concern here is the role of inscriptions as framing devices and the role of 
(accounting) inscriptions in creating a frame of action. The creation of a frame involves the 
combination of a series of investments and a series of interlinked inscriptions. Rose and Miller 1992 
use the term inscription to denote traces of government work to transform phenomena into 
information, as “material conditions which enable thought to work upon an object” (Rose and Miller 
1992, p. 185). The creation of this information is a way of acting, in the same instance it becomes a 
basis of further action. The production of inscriptions enables the establishment of what can be 
termed centers of calculation. Latour (1999 PH, p. 304) defines this as “any site where inscriptions 
are combined and make possible a type of calculation”. Central to the notion is the inter-relatedness 
of inscriptions, and how inscriptions are made up and combined to create calculability. The creation 
of calculability, according to Vollmer et al. (2009, p. 623), can be described as “the (collaborative) 
processes which make possible the assignment of numbers (such as prices) to entities […] an 
assignment which in its turn, endows these entities with relative stability and makes possible their 
circulation through society”.   
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Inscriptions, such as the accounting numbers implied in this case study, are as framing devices 
perceived to be essential in the creation of rules of action. The potential performativity of artefacts 
(inscriptions), such as the PDP, implies that they are endowed with calculative agency. Calculative 
agency is characterized by (I) framing, (II) disentanglement and (III) performativity (Barry and Slater 
2002, Callon 2004, Vollmer et al. 2009). Framing, as the concept developed by Callon (1998), are the 
distinctions used by participants to define what is calculable and not (Vollmer et al. 2009). 
Disentanglement is the process of establishing boundaries about what is relevant and not in 
calculation, unraveling and sorting out the calculable pieces of reality. Performativity here 
designates the use of these ‘technologies’ in enacting (market) transactions. Framing and 
disentanglement is thus the (collaborative) efforts into defining what should be calculated, and 
further establishing how to calculate. Performativity is thus about the actual use, or mobilization, of 
the technologies or artefacts in practice. As Vollmer et al. (2009) indicate framing and 
disentanglement can thus be seen as preconditions for performativity, that is for acting upon what 
has been made calculable.   
A center of calculation, as a combination of inscriptions (enabling calculation), evolves only through 
its relatedness and associations to other entities in a complex of technologies, agents and agencies 
(Rose and Miller 1992). Thus a center of calculation is a fragment of a larger sociotechnical 
arrangement, or agencement. The term agencement denotes a combination of humans and non-
humans entangled in a dynamic configuration emphasizing the distributed character of action and 
the symmetry (non-separability) of humans and non-human (Callon 2004, p. 121). Agencement 
resembles closely the notion of assemblages (as often preferred by Latour) and generally illustrates 
the idea of heterogeneous entities that have been carefully adjusted to each other (Callon 2006, p. 
13). The notion is however less ‘functionalistic’, more fragile and temporal, and emphasizes 
heterogeneous arrangements with the capacity of acting in different ways depending on their 
configuration (Callon 2006, p.13). The co-production of centers of calculation, or calculability per se, 
can thus be described as integral to the configuration of (the) agencements. An ethnography of 
organizational practice, or inter-organizational practice as in this case, can be seen as an effort to 
trace the associations of the agencement(s) of organizational actors, both human and non-human. 
The closer examination of the role of inscriptions in framing the larger cross-boundary interaction is 
an investigation of the work of constructing and combining inscriptions (as/i.e. technologies and 
artefacts) as efforts (or investments) to reconfigure agencements. When attempting to understand, 
more deeply, the role of accounting innovations or inscriptions, such as the PDP, there is a need to 
look (more) closely at how processes of making things calculable helps frame and thus reconfigure 
the larger organizational assemblages.  
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The inscriptions that are meticulously studied in this paper can therefore be seen as a chain of 
interwoven investments or innovations. These innovations represents the materializations of groups 
of participant’s efforts into translating their intentions into devices that aid in framing organizational 
activity. The innovations are thus co-produced, and are in their own sense actively involved in 
shaping, that is mediating, organizational action. They are performative. The (allied) innovator(s), 
which include governmental institutions as well as administrative levels of both organizations, seeks 
to enroll groups of participants and technologies (agencements) into a particular program of action 
(Latour 1991). This is the track, or path, that the managers of health care services wishes that the 
organizations’ members will follow. This much resembles their idea of an intended agencement, 
assembled accordingly to their program of action, a particular configuration of distributed action. 
Mind that this should be considered a mere utopia. To predict this path the innovators make a series 
of successive statements, the starting point can be considered the initial problematization of health 
care services and their presentation of the intention of the “coordination reform”. This first 
statement of intent, or any singular statement, and the force with which it is put forward is never in 
isolation enough to predict a path of successive action. This is one of Latour’s fundamental principles 
of SST studies, “this path depends on what successive listeners do with the statement” (Latour 1991, 
p. 104). The strength of the statement depends on the character of the written sign, the inscription, 
and on how listeners act upon it; “[…] a thousand listeners will follow a thousand different paths 
after reading the order” (Latour 1991, p 104). The managers then have two choices of action in order 
to advance their program of action; incorporation or excorporation. Incorporation involves making 
sure all involved understands their statement and know what to do. The latter is a matter of loading 
the statement of intent in a sense that generates the compliance of many to follow their program of 
action (Latour 1991). This is the very concern of this paper. Inscriptions, the accounting innovations 
and other inscriptions, can be seen as loads attached to the initial intent. This intent being the new 
(particular) way of acting across organizational boundaries in the provision of care services.   Each 
‘load’ a further effort in framing action. The number of loads that need to be attached depends upon 
the actions of the ones to be enrolled, that is the larger agencement. The ‘adversaries’, the ones the 
innovators seek to enroll, are commonly termed anti-programs. As the literature tells us the numbers 
of loads needed are potentially numerous, and presumably hardly likely to be (totally) successful.  
The framing of organizational activity is then dependent upon an (incessant) series of investments in 
inscriptions. These loads need to be carefully constructed and aligned in order to produce something 
resembling a coherent frame of action. In the following it is suggested that to investigate the role of 
these devices in shaping action and their inter-relatedness we should look for their ability to create 
circulatory reference. An accounting innovation, such as the PDP, constructed (around an incentive 
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arrangement) can be seen as a nexus of inter-related inscriptions of various kinds supporting, 
extending, fortifying and even betraying each other. These inscriptions are constructed and 
(attemptedly) combined to create a calculable space that aid in the reconfiguration of the assembly 
of organizational actors and actants.  
//Calculable spaces// 
Calculable spaces is not incorporated in the text. There is a need to FOCUS in on ACTION AT A 
DISTANCE, both in the introduction and to create a transition from the definition of CENTERS OF 
CALCULATION to that of CALCULABLE SPACES – through the notion of long distance control.  
KEY WORDS THAT NEED TO BE SETTLED: 
ACTION AT DISTANCE 
LONG DISTANCE CONROL 
CENTERS OF CALCULATION 
CALCULABLE SPACES 
GOVERNING BY NUMBERS 
The acts of making things calculable through the framing, disentanglement and performing of calculations can thus, through the creation of calculable spaces …    
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Methodology and research design 
This study draws on an ethnographic approach and what is sometimes termed ‘Ethnoaccountancy’ 
(MacKenzie 1996, pp. 59-61, Tryggestad & Skærbæk 2010, pp. 111). This is also in line with the 
ethno-methodological tradition in which actor-network theory has its roots. True to such an 
approach ANT is thus used as a method, a way of accessing the empirical site rather than a theory for 
understanding the actions of actors, not providing a language for the actors’ behavior (Latour 1999 
A-ANT).  In this case this means that the study is concerned with providing a description of how 
accounting is practiced, more specifically what role inscriptions play in local accounting practices and 
how these are negotiated and translated in practice. The research design utilizes a method of tracing 
the actions of relevant actors and tracing the inscriptions as they travel through the organization(s).  
The case study is based on qualitative field work conducted at the organizations during a period of 15 
months from the spring of 2013 to the late summer of 2014 (estimated). The field work was 
conducted at multiple sites in the organizations, both in the separate organizations and their units as 
well as in arenas where both organizations were represented. As part of the field work I was during 
this time for several periods present at the hospital during office hours for entire weeks. Here I was 
provided with a working desk so I could sit amidst the practitioners.  I was granted full access to the 
administrative department, received my personal access card and privileged access to internal 
computer systems, accounting systems, intranet and even selected dimensions of the IT systems 
devoted to patient journals and electronic communication amongst departments and (also) between 
the hospital and the municipality. For most of this period I was affiliated with the “coordination 
department” at the Hospital, a department subsidiary to the hospital administration. The 
department is responsible for handling tasks related to the relationship to the municipalities in the 
region, decentralized health care services provided by the hospital and internal routines for 
coordination and cooperation. During this period I followed a number of meeting arenas, both on 
internal matters as well as meeting arenas were both the hospital and the municipality was 
represented. Being present at the department over time allowed for me to follow also informal 
meeting arenas, such as ad-hoc conversations and unplanned discussions, lunch time talks and 
discussions before and after planned meetings. This allowed for me to engage in asking questions to 
participants, both ahead of meetings and in the hours and days afterwards. During this period I spent 
quite a number of days at my desk in the field, this allowed for me to observe the everyday life at the 
department, but it also allowed for me to spend as much time as I needed to browse internal 
documents and IT-systems, all of those for which I had access. During this work I had every 
opportunity to ask questions about things that needed clarification and discuss elements I came 
across with the people dealing with this, and quite often the people who had authored or shared the 
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information and documents I was grappling with. Inspired by an ethnographic approach these 
periods may be seen as extensive participatory observations. More specifically the notion of 
participation does not mean ‘real participation’, it is not about doing the exact same thing as those 
being observed, such as writing invoices or preparing documents for meetings, but watching these 
things being done (Delamont 2007). Thus ‘participant’ does not suggest “doing what those being 
observed do, but interacting with them while they do it” (Delamont 2007, p. 207). The field work of 
this study, in ethnographic or sociological terms, can be characterized by a ‘partial immersion2’ into 
the research site(s). This implies that the researcher spends a large portion of the time as participant 
at the site, whilst the rest is spent away from the field. This allows for an iterative research process 
where the time spent at the site writing field notes and collecting data is combined with an ongoing 
analytical and theoretical process conducted both on and off site. The fieldwork conducted at the 
hospital, the field-notes, the traces of documents and actions are here presented as a theorized 
account of the role of inscriptions in the organizational life at the hospital and the municipality.  
The fieldwork presented here thus relies on several empirical sources, including open in-depth 
interviews, participatory and non-participatory observations and extensive document studies. 
Interviews were conducted with representatives of both the hospital and the municipality; these 
representatives included top managers, mid-level managers, managers at the operative level, 
accountants and health personnel including doctors and nurses. These interviews were conducted 
mainly as open-ended phenomenological in-depth interviews lasting on average from 1 - 1 ½ hours. I 
also engaged in informal talks with people in their work situation during observations, before or after 
meetings and at the lunch table. Observations mainly consisted of meeting observations where I took 
notes in the form of meeting minutes (dialogues), pre-scripts and post-scripts. Observations also 
included watching as health personnel received training and tutoring in the use of IT-systems (e.g. 
patient journals and messaging systems).  
This papers’ focus on the role of inscriptions affords a particularly great interest to documents as an 
empirical source of evidence, this focus makes them significant non-human matters that become 
important in this account that attempts to reconstruct the translations of local practices. Documents 
that become particularly important in this account include national laws, regulations and bye-laws, 
budgets, white-papers, governmental guidelines, regional guidelines, cooperation agreements, 
locally produced practical guidelines, meeting minutes, consensus protocols, user-manuals and 
various communication forms. The documents investigated include publicly available documents, 
internal documents of each organization and documents produced for the relationship partner and 
also co-produced documents. The focus of this paper is mainly on the latter, and the tracing of the 
                                                          
2
 Sett in note fra samme ref med forklaring «full and partial immersion» 
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translation of inscriptions and the investment in co-producing additional inscriptions that is ongoing 
in the daily operations of these organizations.   
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Empirics: Framing cross boundary health care service provision 
//Introduction// 
The recent reformative trends in the Norwegian health sector, and “the coordination reform”, largely 
represents an initiative to redistribute tasks of health care service provision in the relationship 
between the two layers of public health services in Norway, that of the specialist health care services 
in the regional health enterprises and hospitals, and that of the generalized health and social care 
provided by the municipalities. When the reform was initially presented the focus was put on lack of 
efficiency in the total health care system, and wrongful use of funding. The shift initiated by the 
governmental program can be generally described as a matter of shifting tasks and responsibilities 
from the specialist health care to municipal service providers.  
“Norway is one of the OECD countries that use the most public [health-funding] per 
person, but we don’t get correspondingly much good health in return […]. We must get 
better at governing the money that comes into the health services. My opinion is that a 
lot of money is spent wrongfully in the health service. […] Much, and more, money will 
still be put into the specialist health care. Hospitals shall be a cornerstone of the health 
service. […] This means betting on prevention rather than repair, and providing 
economic incentives that enables the municipalities to provide the health services the 
residents need. The growth in resources must increasingly be put into building services 
in the municipalities. It will pay off for the municipalities to bet on preventive efforts, so 
that people need less specialist health care. And it will pay off for hospitals and 
municipalities to team up. (Health Minister, Bjarne Håkon Hanssen in HOD 2008) 
This is the voice of the Minister of health and care services in office at the time as he introduces the 
reform in the White Paper that presents the foundation of the reform (HOD 2008). The reform places 
particular emphasis on the development of financial incentives that are supposed to effect 
organizational structures and practices of service provision. The then present government felt that 
serious shortcomings of the financing system and incentive effects had for several years hampered 
advances for better coordination and cooperation between various parties of the health care system 
(HOD 2008). Initially the government prescribed several new approaches, so called system measures, 
to mediate ((promote)) a more holistic approach in care services – these promoted a stronger 
integration of the financing system. The three key approaches included (I) implementing municipal 
co-financing of specialist health care, (II) transfer of the financial responsibility for dischargeable 
patients from the hospitals to municipalities and (III) increasing the degree of block funding to the 
specialist health care. All these financial incentive arrangements implied significant changes to 
legislation and prescribed large and smaller changes in local practices. This paper focuses on the 
second device presented; that is the transfer of the financial responsibility for dischargeable patients 
from the hospital to the municipality. This is the PDP, Payment for Dischargeable Patients, presented 
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in the introduction to this paper. The PDP was initiated to provide a financial incentive for 
municipalities to provide care for a larger part of patients, relieving the increasing pressure on the 
hospitals. The intent was that moving part of the funding from the health enterprises and hospitals 
to the municipalities was to allow for more cost effective treatment of patient groups, and allow the 
municipal greater degree of freedom in establishing care services for, to them, new patient groups. 
The arrangement involved a movement of 600 million NOKs from the regional health enterprises to 
the municipalities, money which should cover the estimated cost for dischargeable patients 
occupying hospital beds after being declared ready for discharge. This restructuration of health care 
funding policy was supposed to be 100% funded for the municipalities, meaning that the move of 
funding from the health enterprises should fully cover the municipal expenditures for dischargeable 
patients. In other words the municipalities should be able to keep the same number of dischargeable 
patients in hospital beds without experiencing a deficit. At least from the beginning, with the same 
level of patients in need for care. The municipalities were to pay 4000 NOK for each day a patient 
defined as ready for discharge occupied a bed in specialist health care. The incentive was initiated on 
the assumption that a bed in the municipality, for these types of patients, cost relatively less than a 
hospital bed (per day). The intent was that since municipal care for these patients should be 
relatively cheaper, the municipalities should by supplying care for an increasing number of these 
patients be able to create a surplus which could be re-invested into the establishment of care 
services. In addition to this restructuration in funding, municipalities were able to apply for subsidies 
and investment-funding for the establishment of initially required services in the form of ear-marked 
development projects.  
The PDP, as a financial incentive arrangement, can be seen as an accounting innovation implemented 
to promote the governmental program of the coordination reform. The introduction of the incentive 
arrangement can be seen as a project within the larger program of realigning the responsibility for 
care provision amongst the layers of health authorities ((service providers)). As an accounting ((a 
financial)) innovation the incentive schema represents an effort to promote a certain program of 
action, that of coordinating the provision of health care services in a certain, different, ((NEW)) 
manner between the hospital and the municipality. The incentive arrangement is one effort into 
promoting a different, more efficient, coordination ((and cooperation)) between the service 
providers. To implement the changes suggested by the new arrangement into practice a number of 
investments are required, an endeavor subject to multifaceted challenges including the 
establishment of new practices for book-keeping (accounting), billing, communication between 
organizations and amongst internal units, medical and treatment specific questions, contracting 
issues and  […]. The establishment of the PDP, as an accounting innovation, requires substantial 
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efforts by governing bodies, but also the involved relationship partners providing services. The 
following account seeks to reconstruct the materialized traces of the process of creating the 
incentive arrangement, but seeks to reconstruct this accounting innovation as entangled in a larger 
nexus of inscriptions involved in the coproduction of cross boundary service provision. The focus is 
on how the incentive arrangement, through various inscriptions, aims at reconfiguring organizational 
practice surrounding the handling of patients ready for discharge and the flow of patients between 
the hospital and the municipality. The inscriptions built around the initial incentive arrangement are 
in detail reconstructed to understand how these aid in the framing of organizational action. 
Following the traces of the successive investments in inscription building conducted to promote the 
program of action the account establishes […] 
//The PDP – framing cross boundary health care services across [in] time and space// 
Transfer of the financial responsibility for patients ready for discharge to the municipalities was part 
of the initial government initiated reform and the scheme was put in effect from 2012. In practical 
terms this arrangement invokes a payment obligation onto the municipality for patients deemed no 
longer in need for specialist health care. The arrangement, and the payment obligation, was put into 
effect from the 1st of January 2012 as regulated by the new law on municipal health- and care 
services published in June 2011 (Lovdata 2011a). This replaced the old law on municipal health 
services of 1982 (Lovdata 1982) and the law on social services of 1991 (Lovdata 1991). The law 
regulates a series of dimensions in health and social care within the municipal domain, hereunder its’ 
purpose is amongst other things to ensure the quality and egalitarianism of health services. Of 
particular importance in this case is the law’s purpose of ensuring coordination, user-oriented 
provision of services and optimal use of resources (Lovdata 2011a, §7-4, 5, 6). The law further 
defines the municipal responsibilities in health and social care service provision (Lovdata 2011a, 
chapter 3). The municipalities’ duties to facilitate coordination and cooperating, both internally and 
with other service providers, is also explicitly stated (Lovdata 2011a, §3-4). The cooperation between 
municipalities and regional health enterprises, hospitals and others is further specified (Lovdata 
2011a, chapter 6). This includes their duty to negotiate and enter into collaborative agreements with 
both regional health enterprises and local health enterprises (e.g. hospitals) as well as it designates 
the minimum requirements of thematic content of these agreements (Lovdata 2011a, §6-1,2,5). 
Further it governs the evaluation, re-negotiation and revision of these agreements.  The financing of 
the municipal health and social services are regulated in a single chapter of the law. (Lovdata 2011a, 
chapter 11). The arrangement for municipal payment for patients ready for discharge is specified in 
this part of the legislation (Lovdata 2011a, §11-4). This establishes that the payment obligation is in 
effect from 1st of January 2012 and defines the patient groups to which the arrangement is 
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applicable. The law empowers the Ministry of Health and Social Services to further regulate the 
scope and content of the arrangement in national bye-laws.  
The law on municipal health and care services (Lovdata 2011a) represents the materialization of the 
governmental translation of the arrangement at that time, and contributes to create a foundation for 
the further regulation of local organizational arrangements, and also the successive process(es) of 
inscription building. Miller and Rose (1992) have commented on the importance of legislation in the 
operationalization of governmental programs of action;  
“The enactment of legislation is a powerful resource in the creation of centres [of 
calculation], to the extent that law translates aspects of a governmental program into 
mechanisms that establish, constrain, or empower certain agents or entities and set 
some of the key terms of their deliberations.” (Miller and Rose 1992, pp. 189-190) 
The introduction of the new law on municipal health and care services thus represents (parts of and) 
a basis for the development of financial and economic controls directed at framing service provision. 
The law authorizes the execution of the PDP as a formal system control and in so establishes a 
(figurative) frame in which the groups of participants must calculate. Whilst authorizing the 
implementation of the accounting innovation, the legislation in itself is not enough to ensure the 
change of practice. Embedding the PDP in law does not necessarily determine the decisions of 
managers and health-personnel, but it sets part of the terms in which their actions ((decisions)) must 
be taken (Rose and Miller 1992). More importantly, here, the law becomes important in establishing 
a basis onto which further efforts to frame action can be attached. The law authorizes, and places 
regulatory demands on, the negotiation and establishment of regional and local contracts governing 
the relationship between hospitals and municipalities. By authorizing the establishment of such local 
arrangements, as well as determining legislative maneuverability for the parties, the law establishes 
autonomy to separate authorities and empowers ((enables)) other ((different)) bodies [the 
organizations] to conduct change processes. At the same time the law provides a basic frame to 
which the service providers can be held accountable, both towards state and local government and 
between the organizations.  
The introduction of new legislation thus becomes an important effort into framing service provision. 
The law, and in effect the PDP, appropriates funding throughout the system. If the incentive 
arrangement, and the redistribution of public funding, is to function accordingly to the intended 
program of action this depends upon an alignment of interests and the compliance by allies. Miller 
and Rose (1992) use this point to illustrate how withholding funds can be an important inducement 
to ensure the faithfulness of allies to their program. What becomes interesting in this case is that the 
PDP involves a redistribution of block funding to service providers, and does not allot for the 
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possibility for governmental withholding of funds. However, the construction of the PDP, and the law 
in which it is authorized enables the participant service providers to be accountable to govern the 
funding amongst them, and also responsible for actually holding each other to account. The law thus 
creates a frame in which certain accountability structures are established, the further development 
of localized practice is a matter that requires further (both) governmental and local efforts. 
///Framing – what patients are included///  
The governmental introduction of the new law on health and care services is not the only 
investments made to introduce the incentive arrangement of the PDP. Simultaneously as the new 
law was introduced the government put into effect the ‘regulation of municipal co-financing of the 
specialist health care and municipal payment for patients ready for discharge’ (Lovdata 2011b).  The 
regulation directly extends the law presented above and its purpose is to “ […] contribute to better 
task distribution among service levels […] develop good patient careers and cost-efficient solutions 
that can provide the patients with an equally good or better services in [the municipalities] as in the 
specialist health care” (Lovdata 2011b, §1). The regulation further specifies the scope of the 
arrangement which includes payment obligation for patients who stay admitted in the hospital 
pending the provision of municipal services (Lovdata 2011b, §2). This is fairly straight forward. The 
further scope and content of the regulation is rather more direct towards the actions to be taken on 
by the parties when handling patients with a (expected) need for municipal services. The regulation 
can thus be seen as a procedure designating what actions should be taken by both the hospital and 
the municipality in cases where there are patients included within the frame of the law. The 
following paragraph summarizes central elements of the regulation directed directly at designating 
action to be taken (Lovdata 2011b, chapter 3). This is also illustrated ((represented)) in figure 1 (see 
also appendix 1).  
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The document delineates a quite clear timeframe for actions to be taken in the case of patients 
admitted to the hospital which are in need of municipal care services when discharged. The 
regulations state that any patient admitted to the hospital needs to be evaluated for the need of 
municipal services at the point of admission (Lovdata 2011b, §7). It further regulates the 
communication between the hospital and municipality both concerning the timeframe, content and 
nature of communication. If a patient is deemed likely to be in need of municipal care after being 
discharged the hospital is required to notify the municipality within 24hrs, this notification needs to 
contain details on the patients status, expected patient career ((patient/clinical pathway)) and 
expected time of discharge (Lovdata 2011b, §8). Thus this is denoting a rather tight control. 
However, due to the nature of the task at hand - curing deceases and saving lives - the regulations 
open for the need for making assessment as time passes and opens for exceptions; “[if it is] not 
possible to make the evaluation after [paragraph en andre ledd] within 24hrs after admission the 
evaluations shall be made and the municipality notified as soon as possible” (Lovdata 2011b, §8). The 
regulations further state that there is to be ongoing notifications of changes from the hospital to the 
municipality. As we will soon see this is not always the case, nor is it easy to achieve consensus on 
amongst practitioners of both organizations. The framing of such adverse timelines is illustrated 
below in figure 2.  
 
///Regulative framing – the program of action – utopia///  
The regulations state, in general terms, what action should be taken, at what time and by whom the 
action should be taken. A quite tight procedure directed at framing patient care both across time and 
space. The regulations extend the framing efforts made in the law, as presented above. Whilst the 
law is focused on establishing an outer frame (figuratively speaking) for what patients (meaning what 
services) are to be included into the arrangement, the regulation extends this into a more detailed 
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frame for handling these patients. Framing, as the concept developed by Callon (1998), is thus largely 
a matter of deciding who, or what, is “inside” or “outside”. The law thus aids in the development of a 
frame of reference for the managers and health-personnel to establish “what is calculable and what 
is not” (Vollmer et.al 2009). The regulation represents a further effort into establishing how this 
should be acted upon, in other terms a further investment into framing how action should be 
conducted.  This involves a further detailing of responsibilities and rights, aimed at establishing 
clearer lines of accountability.  The paragraphs of the regulations and the attached notes establish a 
concretized step-wise representation of how patient should be handled in the transition between the 
two organizations, as an idealized code of conduct (or ‘cookbook’). The flow of patients is hardly a 
straight forward task, nor is it likely to always be as predictable.  As Callon (1998) emphasizes 
deviations, or overflows, from the idealized frame (code of conduct) is rather the norm. This is 
certainly the case here, and further efforts to handle irregularities, which are more like the 
regularities, has to be made.  The successive framing attempts, and inscription building processes, as 
efforts to stabilize a certain program of action can be seen as investments in sealing “leaky black 
boxes”3 (REF and FOOTNOTE).  
From the outset a point of much controversy was the question of when a patient is to be defined as 
ready for discharge. According to the regulations a patient is ready for discharge when the treating 
doctor at the hospital considers him or her to be no longer in need of specialist care (Lovdata 2011, 
§9). The regulations do however list a series of criteria to be met and documented in the patients’ 
journal. Problems and the situation at time of admission should be settled, arising problems should 
be settled, unsettled questions must be accounted for, a judgment on diagnosis must be provided 
along with a plan for patient follow-up and the patient’s overall level of functioning must be 
accounted for including changes during the stay and expected progress. These are all demands put 
on the specialists of the hospital. It is not however in many cases easily defined whether or not a 
patient is ready for discharge and also there was, in the beginning, often a question of what, or how 
much, information is needed for this to be adequate and appropriate for the municipality. Whether 
or not a patient is dischargeable is hard to measure in absolute or quantitative terms, both 
organizations thus experience a measuring problem that is fundamentally hard to overcome. The 
practice on the matter becomes dependent upon the quality of information, on a series of more 
qualitative parameters, shared between the groups of participants and the establishment of 
consensus amongst practitioners. To some extent it is a question of power of definition, both when it 
comes to evaluating the patients need for care, but also in terms of what information needs to be 
provided and also how, in what form, and when this should be  provided. The regulations as such do 
                                                          
3
 Black boxing notion & «leaky black boxes» 
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much to establish a frame, both in terms of time and space, but are at the same time rather open for 
interpretation.  
When a patient is defined as ready for discharge (only those in need of municipal services) the 
hospital is to notify the municipality immediately (Lovdata 2011b, §10). If they are in need of care the 
payment obligation is in effect, if not they fall outside the frame of the arrangement and get to go 
home – no payment due. When the municipality receives notification that the patient is ready for 
discharge they are obligated to report back to the hospital department on when they can provide 
needed services – as soon as they are ready notification must be provided (Lovdata 2011b, §11). As 
soon as this is provided the patient is ready for transfer from the hospital to the municipality.  
From the time a patient is defined as ready to be discharged, and the requirements of the paragraphs 
summarized above are met, the obligation of the municipality to pay for the patient’s stay waiting for 
municipal services is in effect. In this sense the arrangement is built upon what can be presented as a 
simple mathematical expression for the cost of a dischargeable patient which ties together several 
central inscriptions ((inscription devices)) aligned to represent this arrangement of “the coordination 
reform”. The law which anchors the obligations and responsibilities of the municipality and 
effectuates the incentive arrangement, the regulation which further specifies the nature of the task 
and the national budget (Regjeringen 2012,2013) which contains a chapter on the incentive 
arrangement at hand, alongside a series of others relating to health and social services. In the 
national budget for 2014 this price is set at 4125 NOK (approx. US$ 670) (Regjeringen 2014). The cost 
of a patient who stays in the hospital after being defined as ready for discharge is thus the number of 
days the patient is occupying a hospital bed whilst awaiting municipal services. 
                                              (                                                                               ) 
                                              (     ) 
The laws and regulations presented above outline the PDP putting forward a frame of reference for 
sorting patients that fall within the categories defined by the legislation, subsequently establishing 
the basic conduct of how the organizations should coordinate patient flows. However, though the 
legislation creates the foundation for defining a frame of reference under which the arrangement 
should be enacted it does not represent, and far from it, a complete framing of all action concerning 
patient flow between organizations. The legislation however provides a basis onto which further 
efforts need to be made in order to gain compliance from involved parties to cooperate in the 
manner intended. The legislation and financial arrangement enables such efforts to be made and acts 
as both an empowering and legitimizing foundation for further investments in promoting the 
program of action. 
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//Cooperation-contracts and service agreements// 
The legislation authorizes and demands the negotiation and establishment of local cooperation 
agreements (contracts) between each hospital and municipality. This includes both the 
establishment of an aggregated contract governing the general relationship, and the negotiation of 
service agreements for each area of service. In total there are eleven service agreements governing 
separate ((but interrelated)) parts of the relationship. One agreement is specifically devoted to 
handling admission and discharge from the hospital and patient flow between the organizations. The 
agreement is specifically constructed to incorporate the PDP and is directly built upon the legislative 
framework presented above. In the case of this region the service agreement on admission and 
discharge has been formulated as a set of practical guidelines for handling admission and discharge. 
The agreement is a result of a negotiation surrounding the parties interpretation of the legislative 
framework and a joint inscription building process. The agreement builds directly upon the 
paragraphs of the ‘regulation of municipal co-financing of the specialist health care and municipal 
payment for patients ready for discharge’ (Lovdata 2011b), and represents a “take-down” version of 
the legislation. As such the agreement can be seen as a translation of the legislation into practical 
guidelines. The process of negotiating these guidelines was explicitly considered by the 
administrative managers of both organizations to be just that, to translate the formal legislation into 
more explicit and practical set of “rules of thumb” for practitioners. This process of inscription 
building can be de described as the making of an extension of the legislation into a new device with 
increased mobility able to circulate with more ease amongst new groups of practitioners in the 
organizations. These practical guidelines, which also form the formal service agreement, are often 
referred to by some hospital managers [coordinators] as “the bible”, which has become the 
encyclopedia to refer to for them.  The practical guidelines also contain a series of details on local 
arrangements which specify the handling of communication flows between the organizations, this 
represents an extension of the general rules of action from the legislation. Especially the agreement 
specifies the timeframe of communication and patient transfers and specifies to a greater extent 
how communication between the organizations should happen. An example of this is adding rules of 
thumb establishing that the parties should stride for discharge during day-time, regular office hours 
for the municipality. The agreement establishes criteria for the content of information and 
documentation of care provided by either party, hereunder it extends the legislative specification of 
when, what and to whom information needs to be provided. In day to day (co)operation it is these 
guidelines that represent the inscription that is acted upon [that is performed]. The service 
agreement also specifies the mutual responsibility for agreeing upon the matter in which information 
is to be shared, that is the infrastructure or technology utilized to communicate.  
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//PAS – EPJ – AND E-MESSAGING “Meldingsløftet”// (PAS/EPJ  GERICA PA/GERICA EPJ) 
The hospital registers all their patients through their Patient Administration System, abbreviated PAS. 
Here all patients are registered with personal identification details, demographics and it provides a 
register of all contact with patients. The PAS also registers the flow of patients including what 
department the patient is admitted to, all movement between units, and codifies patients according 
to the stage of treatment from admission to discharge. This is the internal system of the hospital. The 
clinics and departments also utilize various other technologies in their patient administration; 
especially important is the Electronic Patient Journal system, EPJ. Here all patient journals, including 
treatment information, medicine information and epicrisis are created and stored electronically. The 
EPJ stores all information on care provided by both doctors and nurses. The municipalities on the 
other hand have their own patient administration system, in this case this is called Gerica which has 
separated modules of patient administration [plassadministrasjon] and electronic patient journals 
[Gerica EPJ]. Both organizations need to register all their information in their own system to 
coordinate and ensure quality in their treatment and patient flows. The new program of inter-
organizational coordination puts new demands on information sharing across organizational units. 
The flow of patients from the hospital to the municipality is not new, patients were moved and 
cooperation was handled before the introduction of the coordination reform, a point which cannot 
be left out. Ahead of the reform however most information followed the patients personally. When 
patients were discharged from the hospital they had their papers [epicrisis and medicine lists] with 
them [physically]. Now patients are moved at a much speedier rate and transfers must be smoother, 
thus timelier and more accurate information is needed to coordinate more effective transfers of 
patients. As a part of the governmental program of the reform every region has been responsible for 
implementing electronic messaging between hospitals and municipalities. This was introduced 
through the governmental project “Interaction 2.0: The Messaging lift 2009-2010” initiated by the 
Norwegian Directorate of Health (Helsedirektoratet 2009). The process of adapting and 
implementing e-messaging is beyond the scope and reach of this paper, however these technologies 
are of crucial importance in the coordination of patients and in daily patient care. 
All information about patients requiring municipal care after hospital admission is supposed to be 
conveyed through e-messages, creating a link for electronic sharing of information between the 
hospitals EPJ and the municipal EPJ system. This requires the establishment of a system able to 
translate information from each system into pieces of information which can be processed and 
included in the other party’s system. A module for messaging is incorporated in each organizations 
system created to receive and allow for the processing of forms containing information, this was 
again dependent upon the negotiation and implementation of a mutually understood language and a 
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mutual understanding of the information to be shared. This illustrates the crucial inter-dependencies 
of various technologies and inscription devices. The e-messaging modules created to facilitate the 
translation of information between the systems of each organization are linked to the legislative 
frame of information sharing and the locally negotiated rules of thumb in the service agreement and 
guidelines. The technology is created in order to standardize and facilitate the sharing of the 
information needed and the chain of inscriptions created to guide behavior frames the content and 
use of information sharing. The information shared between the EPJ systems form the 
documentation and the basis of accounting for patient flows between the organizations. The hospital 
is responsible for collecting payment from the municipality according to the PDP arrangement. The 
invoices sent from the hospital to the municipality are based upon the coding in the PAS system. It is 
the responsibility of doctors and nurses to register the information in both the EPJ system and PAS, 
which are separate operations. When the municipality then receives the invoice they need to control 
this against the registered information in their EPJ system, which is the information base upon which 
they can act to hold the hospital to account.  
 //”The supporting cast” – further investment in framing enactment is needed - FURTHER LOADS// 
The account above have established the importance of several legislative and locally co-produced 
inscription devices and their interconnectedness with important technologies created to establish a 
new way of coordinating patient flows between the organizations. All of the inscriptions so far 
discussed are of a legislative or procedural nature, and are of importance in establishing a frame to 
which groups of participants must refer their actions. However, whilst the legislative inscriptions and 
the translation of these into practitioner directed practical guidelines are important, there has been 
made several additional efforts into the production of inscriptions directed at framing organizational 
behavior both on the part of both organizations and mutual efforts. The legislative inscriptions and 
contracts frame to a large extent the responsibilities and rights of each group of participants, 
however there is no guarantee that this ensures the compliance of various actors. Even though they 
might comply, it is not plausible, nor is it the case, that all involved actors are able to enact this in the 
intended manner. To ensure that tasks are conducted according to the intent several successive 
investments in inscriptions are made. This involves the further translation of intentions into even 
more practically relevant, understandable and persuasive devices directed at even more specific 
audiences. To exemplify the hospital management, through the efforts of the coordination 
department, have made substantial investments ((efforts)) into the creation of specific textual and 
visual inscriptions for the health-personell in their registration of patient information and 
information sharing [e-messaging & other comm.forms]. This as a part of regular training programs in 
the use of information technology, but also as textual inscriptions dispersed across the departments 
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in various physical shapes. The hospital has produced a series of user-manuals for practitioners when 
it comes to the use of e-messages. These range from 12-15 page “click-by-click” user manuals, to 
shorter “quick-start” leaflets in the form of picture series showing step-by-step screenshots from the 
graphical user interface of the EPJ system. These inscriptions follow the structure of the regulatives 
for required and recommended information sharing, but take this down to a pragmatic visual 
example. These inscriptions are made available through the hospitals intranet and are incorporated 
as obligatory steps in each patient career through formalized procedures. The user manuals are also 
physically dispersed to each department and available through the computers where the EPJ is used. 
The hospital have also produced so-called “pocket-guides”, laminated single sheet guides, with 
mnemonic lists for each registration task. These are provided for the personnel to carry around on 
their person, or as easily accessible as the keyboard on the computer. These are examples of further 
inscriptions created to be even more mobile than the legislative and regulatory devices. These 
represent a more concrete translation of the hospitals interpretation of the regulatives and 
represent a more stable and more accessible version which opens for less interpretation and more 
pragmatic procedures on the part of practitioners. This is of course not to say that this ensures 
complete framing and “on-the-dot” compliance and execution at all times. The municipalities also 
have check-lists for their information registration and documentation, this follows corresponding 
check-lists for patient treatment. These much resemble in form the ones produced and utilized by 
the hospital. These checklists are directly incorporated in the registration forms of the [GERICA] EPJ 
system. 
The hospital must everyday keep records of the number of dischargeable patients still occupying 
beds in specialist care. This is communicated directly to the department of the municipality 
responsible for coordinating users and patient allocation. This is used to constantly monitor the 
development and to keep record of the state of affairs at a more general level. The collection of 
payment is made periodically when the municipality receives an invoice from the hospital. The 
municipality must then check this against their EPJ system which holds the information to which they 
must hold the hospital to account. The hospital is required to be able to document that the necessary 
information has been provided, according to the legislation. The hospital and municipality have 
reached an agreement on how to handle deviations from the regulatives. Deviations that are in 
direct violation of the regulative (Lovdata 2011b) must be reported and negotiated by the managers 
of the organizations [director of the coordination department and the director of municipal health 
and care services]. Deviations that are not deemed as direct violations of the regulative on 
information sharing is reported between the parties and incorporated in each organizations quality 
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management systems. Both these types of deviations from the intended program of action can be 
seen as overflows, and the results of unintended action.  
 //ASU-FSU and COOPERATION MEETINGS// 
//FURTHER INVESTMENT – USKSTOLAV – USKØHH – QUALITY CONTROL// NB!!!!! 
 Establishment of a hospital ward for dischargeable patients 
o Internal control unit 
 Establishment of a municipal ward for dischargeable patients 
o To clear “the PAS-LIST” – initiative to perform 
Preliminary discussion 
 
// HOW ACCOUNTING GOT INVOLVED WITH PROMOTING THE PROGRAM OF ACTION // 
In this paper I seek to investigate how inscriptions got involved with promoting a governmental 
program of action through the introduction of the PDP, a financial incentive arrangement. The 
account above attempts at reconstructing a chain of inscriptions as investments made to frame 
organizational action. This has been described as a work of translation, more specifically as the work 
of attaching ever new loads to the initial statement of the program of action. The phenomenon that 
is being tackled is thus not the work of inscribing on its own, or the isolated inscription per se, but 
the chain of ever simplified inscriptions made to promote a certain organizational practice (adapted 
from Latour 1987b, p. 16). This chain of investments can perhaps be better seen as the circulation of 
various devices providing reference to the intended program of action. The creation of reference, 
again, is the act of keeping something constant through the series of transformations (Latour 1999, p 
58). In investigating the assemblages of various inscriptions this is a matter of the quality of the chain 
of transformations, and the viability of its circulation (Latour 1999, p. 310).  Empirically this is a 
matter of how inscriptions are aligned and mobilized in order to produce a viable reference to the 
program of action.  
The PDP, as a financial incentive arrangement, can be seen as a construction of a nexus of 
inscriptions including the legislative and (local) contractual inscriptions. The introduction of the 
arrangement can in these terms be viewed as an accounting (based) innovation aimed at promoting 
a new way of coordinating services across organizations. The PDP then contributes by making the 
patient flow between health care service providers calculable. The argument forwarded is thus that 
by combining a series of inscriptions the program aspires to create a calculative center which can be 
acted upon by managers, but which also aids in the framing of operational activity. Making the 
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handling of patient flows between the hospital and municipality calculable thus becomes an 
important means in promoting the program of action. The introduction of PDP, as a (quite crude) 
price mechanism, is a way of standardizing entities which implies a process of stabilization. This task 
requires the efforts of various groups of participants, including financial analysts, economists, and 
medical experts. To the extent that it becomes important again relies upon the enactment of it by 
professionals (operatives). The analysis here focuses less on the process through which these actors 
have produced the price mechanism per se, than the interconnectedness of the various inscriptions 
that are built to promote compliance to the program of action the price mechanism is intended to 
promote.  
Rendering patient flows calculable is largely a matter of visualization. Latour (1987b) focuses on the 
importance of ‘optical consistency’, a matter of creating a common perspective. Optical consistency 
allows for pieces to mix with each other, that is rendering them commensurable and combinable. In 
this sense an important intention in the introduction of the PDP and ‘making cost visible’. It is thus a 
matter of introducing entities that can be viewed in similar terms by both organizations. This is 
connected to the creation of a common ‘visual culture’ (Latour 1987b, p. 9). In such terms the 
definition of dischargeable patients is much a matter of turning complex phenomena into, one 
amongst many, representations to which the eyes of both organizations can focus. The combination 
of various inscriptions is needed to create calculability, in order to understand how this is created we 
can revisit the account above and look at how the inscriptions together form a center of calculation. 
//CALCULATIVE AGENCY – CALCULABILITY// 
Enabling calculability requires as we understand more than the simple invention of a price 
mechanism. To be able to perform according to the program of action and acting upon the newly 
defined entity of dischargeable patients, and changed patient flows, requires the investment in a 
series of inscriptions. Here the numerical inscriptions must be coupled with other more practical 
guidelines. Calculative agency is, as established earlier, characterized by acts of framing, 
disentanglement and performativity (Vollmer et.al 2009). Calculability is thus dependent upon much 
more than the price mechanism per se. Framing involves [all of] the ((a series of)) distinctions used 
by participant to distinguish what is calculable and what is not.  Traces of the translations of all these 
distinctions can be seen dispersed through the building of the various inscriptions described in the 
above account. The legislation defines the patient group, dischargeable patients in somatic DRG’s. 
These are the ones affected by the PDP, at large. Defining patients upon these criteria is a result of an 
active clinical or medical process in which care is provided, this is guided by another set of 
inscriptions built to guide the process of treatment, such as ‘patient careers’. For the arrangement to 
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function, and for the parties to be able to perform, a chain of information must circulate. The process 
of information sharing is again guided by a set of textual procedures, guidelines and manuals. The 
information sharing process, generating the data enabling the parties to calculate, is again a process 
of enacting the schemes developed for translating information. The process of performing 
information sharing again involves the building of inscriptions according to a common language, an 
ongoing process of negotiation and translation. These successive inscriptions both aid in the further 
framing of what can be calculated and what cannot. Furthermore, the successive investment in 
practical guidelines, user manuals, forms and schemas facilitate disentanglement. Taken together it 
is these inscriptions that enable both the producers of information and the users to select and draw 
boundaries around elements that can be calculated. It is thus both a question of how managers and 
accountants can extract numbers for calculating performance measures and keep account of patients 
and relationship partners, but also the ((a)) way in which professionals can untangle elements 
relevant for decision making and execution of tasks. Framing and disentanglement can thus be seen 
as antecedents, or preconditions, of both managerial and operative (professional) action, the 
performance of cross-boundary health care service provision. This is off course not to say that 
calculability is all that frames the action involved, but it shows how accounting innovations through 
inscriptions, as it becomes entangled and involved in a series of transformations becomes involved 
with the ongoing process of promoting the program of action, and in general health care service 
provision.  
//TRACING THE INVESTMENTS IN PROMOTING THE PROGRAM// 
To delineate the traces of efforts made in order to promote the program of action, we can use a 
simple diagram, as suggested by Latour (1991, p.107). In doing so we take the viewpoint of the 
government [HOD] seeking to promote a certain way of coordinating tasks amongst hospitals and 
municipal service providers, what we have called the program of action. This is the track, or path, 
that the authorities would like the service providers to follow. To reconstruct the controversy of 
introducing the program of action we depict this as a ‘battlefield’, in a less warlike manner, between 
the program and anti-program. The anti-program represents the ones that need to be persuaded, 
more than they represent true adversaries, or enemies. They are the performers that should act in a 
different manner. The diagram shows each ‘version’ of the program as it progresses with the efforts 
made to promote it. Each new effort into inscription building is denoted by a number, this represents 
each ‘version’ of the program.  
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At first, as the [HOD] first problematized the need for a new coordination of services and task 
division, they were the only one enrolled to the program of action. This is version one (1). The 
program is represented by the [HOD] and their statement, “the coordination reform” (White Paper, 
HOD 2008). To persuade service providers, and individual managers and professionals, to follow the 
program of action further investment is needed. To extend the program to the right comes at a price 
(Latour 1991, p. 107). The [HOD] then introduced the PDP as a financial incentive arrangement 
through the new law on municipal health services (Lovdata 2011a). This represented a move to 
persuade, and legislatively commit, local governments and hospitals to initiate processes of change. 
Simultaneously the [HOD] introduced the regulative on municipal co-financing of specialist health 
care and payment for dischargeable patients (Lovdata 2011b). This further investment detailed the 
arrangement for the service providers and further aided in gaining commitment from service 
providers. Successively this legislative frame paved the way for the establishment of aggregated 
cooperation agreements and service agreements. Now the parties are increasingly committed to the 
program of action, and committed in joint efforts to cooperate. The controversy is however still not 
settled, and further investment is required in the framing of organizational action. To enable 
organizations to coordinate differently significant investments were made into the development of 
technologies for information sharing, schemes and forms for communications. This provided a basis 
for information gathering to enable calculation, at the same time it provided a platform onto which 
professionals of both organizations could act to communicate and coordinate. The technical platform 
proved insufficient alone to ensure that various actors could cooperate and coordinate according to 
the initial intent. Further efforts are required, and further work of translation conducted. The 
program needed to collaborate in further efforts to enable communication and flow in patient 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
PROGRAM ANTI-PROGRAM
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treatment. Both organizations, both separately and in collaborative efforts, made significant 
investments in producing rules, procedures and other inscriptions dispersed to enable various groups 
of participants in both decision making and perform operative tasks.  
The initial intent of the [HOD] is successively accompanied by a series of efforts into promoting it. 
This has enabled the PDP as a payment arrangement to circulate in the organization. To claim that 
these efforts have fully framed, or ensured total compliance with the initial intention, would be 
foolish, or at least to simple. The ability to coordinate services in a perfect manner is, again, most 
likely an unachievable utopia. Even if it’s not, it is certain that the program of action will be 
continuously transformed and will no longer remain the same as the initial intent. In this case the 
efforts made to frame coordination and establish the PDP in succession ensured more compliance by 
groups of participants to the program. The anti-program gradually surrendered, much as in Latour’s 
(1991) example. The initial program was clearly however also transformed, the wish of the 
coordination reform has become loaded. “In the beginning it was unreal; in the end, it had gained 
some reality” (Latour 1991, p. 108). The abstract accounting innovation of the PDP, through a series 
of reframing and transformation, had through the processes of inscription building, come to provide 
substance to the new program of coordinating services. By transforming unsortable matter into 
calculable entities the PDP, and successive framing attemtps, provided a frame onto which the 
organizations could act.  
//REFRAMING – a contribution from focusing on the alignment-relatedness of inscr.// 
//MAKING THINGS ACCOUNTABLE// 
The introduction of the PDP, along with other accounting innovations introduced as efforts of 
‘making costs visible’ (Kurunmäki & Miller 2008) can also be seen as a way of making the public 
sector, in this case providers of health care services, auditable (Power 1996). The PDP, seen as an 
assemblage of inscriptions, does in many ways contribute to the establishment and reconfiguration 
of accountability structures. The calculative arrangement aids in the construction of a bureaucratic 
surface upon which instances of government can hold service providers to account and a process of 
performance audit can work (Power 1996, p. 309). The PDP, through the establishment of legislative 
devices, enables government and state health authorities to hold service providers accountable 
towards the program of action. The new legislation introduces a different task division between 
layers of service provision, but at the same time it makes possible the calculation of specific (output) 
performance measures to which service providers can be benchmarked and held to account. At the 
same time the legislative devices provide a basic surface facilitating the further building of new 
inscriptions directed at specifying ((purifying)) relational and internal accountability structures of the 
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service providing organizations. Whilst the legislative frame authorizes and enable the government 
to hold providers to account it also authorizes, and demands, the establishment of certain 
accountabilities between relationship partners. Parties are required to create cooperative 
agreements and contracts in which accountabilities are further specified. The aggregated cooperative 
agreements, and successive service agreements, are jointly constructed in order to frame the 
responsibilities and task division between parties, further represents the basis onto which the parties 
can hold each other to account. Relationship partners have then continuously invested significant 
efforts in the processes of building internal inscriptions directed at reconfiguring (mediating) internal 
accountability structures and promoting internal coordination. Efforts into the creation of practical 
guidelines and procedures for documentation (EPJ and information sharing) were constructed 
directly aimed at defining employee tasks and creating a standard to which their activity could be 
held to account. These efforts aid in the framing of internal activity, but also aid in the establishment 
of procedures for engaging in cross-boundary interaction with relationship partners.  
The PDP arrangement rests on a series of inscriptions, all aiding in the creation of calculability 
(calculative agency). Power (1996, p. 309) emphasizes how things are made auditable through the 
proceduralization of networks of trust, where things that were formerly unauditable can become 
auditable at one point due to shifts in the network of trust. This case illustrates how [accounting] 
inscriptions can play an important role in the creation of auditability by making things calculable. 
Auditability is thus closely related to the creation of calculability. Power (1996, p.309) describes 
auditability as a distinctive form of administrative objectivity ((PORTER 1994)) based on the acquired 
acceptance of certain procedures, in a process of fact-building [...].  
Powers (1996) notion of auditability can thus be seen in close relation to Latour’s (1987) notions of 
visualization. […] 
//THE CREATION OF CALCULABLE SPACES// 
“The creation of calculable spaces is the creation of manageable spaces. But calculable spaces are 
not straitjackets into which individuals are inserted” (Miller 1994) 
//RECONFIGURATION OF LARGER ORGANIZATIONAL ASSEMBLAGES// 
This paper has established how the PDP, as an accounting innovation, can be seen as dependent 
upon the building of a chain of inscriptions, both numerical and non-numerical. The various 
operationalizations in the form of these various inscriptions can be seen as the loads which provide 
the arrangement with some reality, in doing so it is also a translation of the governmental program; a 
translation of the initial intention, or wish, of a new way of coordination. Earlier in the paper I have 
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drawn on Callon’s (2004) notion of agencements to denote the larger organizational configurations. 
This implies looking at the organizations and the relationship between them, and the provision of 
health care, as a nexus of human and non-human entities, i.e. people, technologies and inscriptions. 
The [inter-]organizational agencement is a temporal, fragile and heterogeneous association of such 
entities. This is our actor-network. The governmental program [of action] is seen as an attempt to 
reconfigure these associations, an attempt to reassemble and reconfigure entities to perform as 
intended. The introduction of the PDP as a part of a larger program to achieve this shows how 
accounting and the enabling of calculative agency can become involved with reconfiguring such 
organizational assemblages. The construction of the accounting innovation requires the careful 
alignment of a [incessant] series of inscriptions to create an assemblage of inscriptions enabling the 
larger agencement to act upon it in a certain manner. Through a series of translation, those for which 
the inscriptions are the material evidences we can investigate, groups of participants negotiate a 
frame which enables the context to be defined and calculated in a wholly new manner. The enabling 
of such calculative agency can be seen as a result of efforts to induce a [certain] rationality into 
service provision. Thus making patient flows calculable can be denoted as a process of rationalizing 
the performance of care services. Rationalization in this case has little to do with the logical ability of 
the people involved, but more to do with the extension of the network which makes it more stable 
(Latour 1987b, p. 27). All the inscriptions that are loaded onto the program being promoted can be 
seen as the results of efforts to add associations to the assemblages aimed at adding stability and 
putting in place and reinforcing new ties. The PDP is an abstraction, just as ‘dischargeable patient’ is 
an abstraction. It enables the price mechanism to be recombined and merge with a series of other 
inscriptions. This is where the accounting innovations become interesting, and it is through these 
associations it becomes important. The visualization of new entities, such as the dischargeable 
patient, and the ability to calculate upon these entities, shows that the enabling of quantifying these 
terms is significant for how the work of service provision is organized. The numbers per se, i.e. the 
price per patient, ‘bed days’, length of stays and readmissions, become important. The 
“numerification” enables information to circulate in a totally different manner; they enable new and 
different ways of acting upon the context. Latour (1987, p.28) stresses however that the emphasis 
should not so much be put on these numbers in isolation; “[…] what should really be stressed is the 
cascade of mobile inscriptions that end up in an account, which is, literally, the only thing that 
counts”. The PDP, or the price of 4125 NOK per day, are meaningless in isolation, they become 
meaningful through its function within the larger assemblages of inscriptions, and further through its 
performative connection to other entities in the larger organizational assemblage. The PDP through 
the various materializations it is represented by becomes a center of calculation and enables the 
interface between the separated organizations to become a calculable space, thus making it 
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manageable. A abstract space is created in these ongoing translations, this new way of coordinating 
can be seen as a totally new phenomenon. The abstractions, which now in one way or another have 
become real entities, are fragile and minute reductions of what they represent, however it shows 
how accounting numbers can come to dominate, or enable domination.  
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Abstract: This work-in progress illustrates the role of management controls within a festival. The 
festival is cultural-religious event in Norway taking place every summer. This factual statement 
was however challenged in 2008 as the event almost faced bankruptcy. After such affair, the 
festival was ‘re-established’ and nowadays prospers well in economic terms. This descriptive case 
study shows relevance of single management controls and their interconnectivity in the creative 
industry of performing arts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Performing arts, such as theaters, concerts, talks, public lectures and performances, are solidly 
embedded in our society to the extent that their internal organizational life is taken for granted 
and the outcome of these art forms is questioned mainly from the aesthetic point of view. Many 
of us will perhaps not even see the organization behind these events. The name and the identity of 
attended events thus become a synonym for artists or performers who did their best on stage. This 
cultural experience must however be built on solid economic pillars, such a stable foundation 
create a possibility for future cultural and social development. 
This paper aims for a deep understanding of management and control approaches within 
performing arts, especially in one of their branches – festivals. In particular, the active use of 
management controls is investigated and related to the time frame of one year. The research 
question is stated as follows: 
 
How are management controls used in a festival throughout the year? 
 
To reach a close touch to reality, the single-unit analysis rich on empirical data has been 
prioritized over surveys and other instruments of generalized results. The case study paints the 
picture of control within a well-established cultural festival in Norway. As in many other 
countries, competition among festivals is increasing and brings economic difficulties or even 
bankruptcy for some of the actors. In 2008 the festival under study belonged to this group of 
threatened species. However, stronger focus on management and control bear fruit and these days 
the festival operates in black numbers. The empirical part of the paper visualizes these efforts as a 
conceptualized model of management controls as a package. Utilized research method further 
explains, why certain practices, manuals and activities were captured and employed by festival 
managers and how are these interconnected.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 The layout of management controls 
Management controls, management control systems and frameworks have a number of meanings 
as they are influenced by the theoretical development and progress in the empirical field. One of 
the newest approach that also informs this paper, an open perspective of management controls, is 
evident in Malmi and Brown’s (2008) study. The presented framework goes beyond one or two 
theoretical lenses and also counts with time dynamics. Management control (MCS) are defined 
as: 
 
“Systems, rules, practices, values and other activities management put in place in order to direct 
employee behaviour
1.”(Malmi and Brown, 2008, p. 290). 
 
Hence, management controls are not pure decision making systems, but active instruments in 
managers’ hands. The suggested framework of MCS as a package represents interests of different 
actors claimed at different time and merged in one package of management systems. 
Management controls are consisting of: cultural controls, cybernetic controls, reward and 
compensation controls, planning controls and administrative controls. Each of the controls 
consists of components, for instance planning control includes action planning and long-range 
planning, cybernetic controls group budgets, financial measures and non-financial measures, and 
hybrid measurement systems. Malmi and Brown’s model can be therefore understood as a 
theoretical crossroad referring to already well-established concepts on management control 
systems and frameworks. 
Somewhere: Barretta and Busco (2011)? Caglio and Ditillo (2008)? Humphrey et al. (1993)? 
Ouchi (1980)? 
 
In seminal review paper on management controls systems, Chenhall (2003) presents management 
control systems (MCS) as a set of management accounting practices that have been 
systematically utilized by managers. MCS comes from organizational theory and are perceived as 
                                                 
1 Later in the text we can read that employees might be substitute by collaborative parties. 
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managerial means by which can be reached organizational goals and outcomes. Chenhall (2003) 
explains that a final layout of MCS is determined by the context of the organization -
environment, technology, structure and the size of MCS configuration are deemed as the most 
influential contributors to the context. In 1990’s were these contextual signs enriched by strategy 
due to increasing significance of business models such as TQM, Just-in-Time and elements as 
national culture and organizational substructures – teams. Such an explanation of management 
control systems suggests that each organization has unique MCS. 
 
Although that a definition of MCS implies their active role, Chenhall (2003) later signalizes that 
management control systems are usually viewed from the passive standpoint as supportive and 
informative decision-making systems. The outcome of such systems is therefore judged on two 
levels: usefulness of MCS within the organization and usefulness of MCS towards HR potential 
of the organization, both approaches then further reflect performance of the organization.  
 
Chenhall’s point regarding systematic use of management controls seems to be critical and earlier 
recognized by Flamholtz et al. (1985) and later refined by Flamholtz (1996). Flamholtz et al. 
(1985) attempted to integrate knowledge of control of three scientific fields within one integrated 
model. Their general model of controls contains contributions of administrative management 
school, organizational sociologists and psychologists. The challenge of paradigms bear fruit and 
an integrated framework of organizational controls has been defined as a model consisting of the 
core control system (planning mechanism as ex ante control, measurement and feedback 
mechanism, evaluation process and rewards) and the control context (organizational structure, 
culture and external environment). The model was later extended on criterion of effectiveness, 
i.e. goal congruence that can be achieved through behavior relevance, validity and reliability 
(Flamholtz, 1996). A strategic perspective also brings Otley (1999) through his management 
control framework, the focus is on how to reach strategic objectives and how to monitor such 
effort (plans, target-settings, rewards and incentives and information are taken into account). The 
framework is then implemented on control techniques - budgetary control, EVA and balanced 
scorecards and inadequacies of each of the techniques are discussed. Chenhall’s review of 
contingency-based research on management controls highlights the mind of that time (1980’s) – 
an organizational effort to achieve own goals, i.e. behavior of a firm in a closed system. Although 
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Chenhall (2003) made some steps towards today’s business life, particularly by pointing out JIT, 
TQM and other technologies, the open systems, networks of companies which all try to achieve 
the main goal, has been left without attention.  ADD Fereiera and Otley 2009, Langfield-Smith 
1997. 
 
Dekker (2004) explores new vistas of open systems, building on organizational theory and 
transaction cost economics (TCE) to explain the role of controls in inter-organizational relations 
(IOR). TCE deals with three independent mechanisms – market, hierarchy and hybrids 
governance (according to Dekker 2004 in Williamson 1991). It is argued that based on 
comparison of costs related to contractual conditions2, one of the mechanisms will be chosen to 
rule the relationship, typical the one with the lowest transaction costs (Dekker, 2004). Dekker 
(2004) continues in argumentation that hybrid mechanism matches with IOR framework. 
However, TCE is limited3 when it comes to explaining some aspects of IOR and must be 
supplemented with other theories, especially organization theory.  
Thus, Dekker (2004) proposes extended framework of understanding inter-organizational 
relationships, where both formal (stemming from TCE) and social (arising from organization 
theory) controls are introduced as solutions to control problems. The model departs from 
theoretical antecedents – interdependence, task uncertainty, asset specificity, environmental 
uncertainty and frequency. One may easily see these factors as single contextual elements 
described by Chenhall (2003). However, due to the inclusion of the broader view, relations 
among interdependent business entities, Dekker (2004) draws attention to the control of these 
relationships and extends the conventional view on management controls. 
TCE as an explanatory power to management control challenges was suggested already in 2001 
by Speklé and became soon popular among scholars. Speklé’s pioneering taxonomy of general 
control archetypes built on TCE is seminal. From the TCE perspective have been control 
solutions in IOR, joint ventures, i.e. organizations of mixed ownership, discussed by Kamminga 
and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2007). Compared to other control frameworks, Kamminga and Van 
der Meer-Kooistra (2007) introduce a new element within control framework – dynamics. 
                                                 
2 costs relate to writing, monitoring, adapting and enforcing contracts (Dekker 2004, p. 28) 
3 TCE blindly focuses on opportunistic behaviours and therefore neglects a broad array of IOR forms (and goals) also social 
context, so much typical and decisive in IORs is omitted (Dekker 2004). 
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Dynamics facilitate change over control frameworks as relations and transactions are not deemed 
as static and steady.    
 
2.2 Use of management controls 
 
As it was earlier pointed out, management controls are utilized by managers. Thereby, several 
studies inform about use of management controls. For example, Oriot (2005) focuses on 
decentralized adoption of management control systems within the French bank chain. A conflict 
between use of management control system by senior and operational managers of a restaurant 
chain is captured by Ahrens and Chapman (2004) who find that ‘enabling use’ of the systems 
support organizational flexibility and efficiency. ‘Enabling use’ must be underpinned by internal 
and global transparency, flexibility and repair aspect, i.e. updated and useful application of the 
accounting processes on the operational level of the organization. The idea of management 
control systems as a shared source and the notion of situated functionality, i.e. capacity of senior 
managers to cooperate with operational managers regarding the implementation of centralized 
goals in local context, have been developed by Ahrens and Chapman (2007). The study of senior 
not-for-profit managers and use of management controls suggests that prior performance may 
affect control and use of formal controls (i.e. a set of controls implemented by the main funder, 
i.e. government) and informal controls (controls encompassing overall performance of the 
organization) is a matter of fact (Tucker and Thorne, 2013).  
 
The strategic use of management controls is also debated by Simons (1995), so called levers of 
control – belief systems (cultural ideals communicated and reinforced by top managers) are 
balanced with boundary systems (organizational limits) and incorporated with diagnostic systems 
that draw managerial attention to the outcomes (measures)  and at the same time, interactive 
systems are employed to bring some activity towards processes and enable organizational 
adaptation to the new or unforeseen circumstances. Levers of control are understood as never-
ending competing forces that support renewal of strategy (and creative innovation) and 
simultaneously goal accomplishment. Sheehan et al. (2005)? 
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2.3 Management controls in the performing arts 
Performing arts have been subject of rapid development influenced by technological or artistic 
innovations or a combination of both and such changes have brought impact on their attendance 
rate (Hellbrun, 1993). In the context of the United States, an adverse impact has been noticed 
mainly by symphonic orchestras, while theatres, opera, dance performances and arts museums 
had not struggled that much in economic terms. The popularity of performing arts has a strong 
connection to their funding and final realization. The European view in this matter is different as 
many more of these artistic forms are publicly subsidized. However, global developments and 
competition in the arts diminish the differences. Caust (2003) argues that to justify governmental 
funding to the arts, governments started to highlight also other benefits, i.e. economic benefits 
that suppress unique and main benefit of the arts, i.e. gain of personal transformational 
experiences. Economic benefits of cultural events have been studied, for example, by Thrane 
(2002) or Herrero et al. (2006). Caust (2003) warns against a managerial and rationalistic art 
sector driven only by governmental bureaucrats and calls for higher involvement of artists and 
arts workers in this debate.  
 
Rather than radical change of the trends within the industry of popular music, Jacobs and Evans 
(2012) see art naturally accompanied by commerce and in their analysis of artists views on 
accounting and accountants come to the conclusion that the accountant is perceived both as the 
villain and the hero. Such a claim supports the idea that artistic credit and economic gains are in 
an ongoing discord. Partial agreement on Caust’s call against exclusive managerial leading role 
in the arts is also expressed by Rentschler and Potter (1996), however as authors outline, a 
broader notion of accountability should be achieved, i.e. both financial and non-financial aspects 
should be taken into consideration. Performing arts organizations should focus more on effective 
use of resources and efficient operations. These efforts should be unified under the mission 
statement mirroring values important for public (e.g. cultural, educational) and economic values. 
Such modus operandi enhances innovation, particularly diversification and therefore stimulates 
performing arts organizations to approach new visitors. The gained accountability further helps in 
defence of the core product and in justification of public funding. Management control in a 
specific category of the arts - product design is explored by Armstrong and Tomes (1996) who 
have been mostly concerned with managerial control of such mental process that is hard to 
315
Time, Money and Control: Use of Management Controls in a Festival  Eva Lechner 
 
 
predict in advance and difficult to transferred into ‘accountable form’, i.e. translated into numbers 
and words: 
“Ultimately the self-defeating character of accountable design stems from the impossibility of 
planning for an outcome which depends, in its nature on unpredictability.” (Armstrong and 
Tomes, 1996, p. 123). 
 
Festivals have been analyzed from the stakeholder point of view, see Andersson and Getz (2008); 
Getz et al. (2006). From a leadership perspective, the role of newly hired well-experienced 
festival leader and his impact on strategic changes of the festival and final results of such changes 
have been discussed by Caust (2004). Behavioral outcomes related to governmental funding of 
one of the largest festival in Europe, Festspiele in Salzburg have been outlined by Frey (1986). 
Resource-dependence theory has been chosen by Mykletun (2009) to explain the central success 
factor of growth and prosperity of the extreme sports festival. Cultural and business aspects in 
context of Norwegian festivals have been recently elaborated by Næss (2014). 
Nevertheless, the research gap remains regarding practical control and accounting matters, thus 
this pioneering study brings an example of the festival that can be proud of balanced economy 
after the financial reborn.   
 
3. Research design 
The research method used in this paper is a case study method. Yin (2003) describes case studies 
from three standpoints: according to the type of research question, researcher’s influence of 
behavioral events and type of the phenomena (historical/contemporary). So, case study research 
prioritizes research questions starting with “how and why”, a researcher does not control 
behavioral events and contemporary phenomena is under study. 
 
Scapens (2012) reflects upon Yin’s view on case study method and agrees mainly with Yin’s 
conception of “single unit analysis” perspective, the chosen type of method for this paper. This 
means that business and accounting scholars should focus on in-depth case study which uncovers 
contemporary phenomenon in real-life context. Scapens (2012) further suggests paying attention 
to another characteristic of case studies – blurred boundaries between the context and 
phenomenon. His interest in single unit analysis stems from importance of differentiation 
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between business surveys and true case studies, which are far richer in a number of evidence for 
given context and phenomena.  
 
This research project consists of three phases. First, document analysis was conducted in 
winter/spring 2013. Documents – annual reports, operating budgets, newspaper articles, and other 
sources of information (for instance municipality reports etc.) were gathered and analyzed.  
 
Second, observations in field for three festival days (July 2013) were carried along with another 
PhD. candidate. Observations started already at 8 o’clock with the morning meeting of festival 
managers and volunteers. Afterwards, we observed discussions that took place around a coffee 
machine and could be characterized as small talks or chats. There we often identified our research 
subjects which we followed for the rest of the day. We tried to observe holistically, i.e. 
organization of particular events and inside life of the festival. Our participant-observation was 
also extended by an extra dimension –i.e. participation in events as spectators. These two 
dimensions of being: researchers and festival spectators went hand in hand. Moreover, a number 
of interviews on informal basis and off-record were carried out. In such high-paced and often 
noisy environment recording was almost impossible. To capture feelings and important moments, 
the cell phone camera has been utilized. Most of the time we observed festival together, except 
for five or six hours when we split in order to capture two important moments taking place at the 
same time. In order to fully grasped the meaning and achieve some quality in our study, we did 
breaks at coffee shops where we shared our reflections. Our observational days started early and 
ended very late and our bikes helped us to move from one venue to another as fast as possible.  
 
Third, eight semi-structured interviews with selected actors were carried out in spring 2014, see 
Table 1, to clarify situation in field during observations and enrich understanding of management 
control in the festival. Questions asked were open-ended in nature, see Yin (2003, p. 90). 
Interviews were structured according to the interview guides that mirror theoretical approach of 
Malmi and Brown (2008), see an example of the interview guide in Appendix. Each interview 
guide was reshaped according to the interviewee’s position and already (un)known facts. 
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Table 1: Semi-structured interviews  
Interviewees  Date The length of the interview 
Project manager  - volunteers 25.3.2014 1 hour 52 minutes 
Event manager 12.5.2014 1 hour 4 minutes 
Marketing and communication manager 10.4.2014 1 hour 3 minutes 
Program manager 2 8.4.2014 40 minutes 
Project manager 2 28.4.2014, 5.5.2014 1 hour 52 minutes 
Project manager 1 7.5.2014 1 hour 34 minutes 
Venue manager 8.5.2014 1 hour 33 minutes 
Program manager 1 14.5.2014 43 minutes 
 
This research method covers all sources of evidence mentioned by Yin (2003): documents, 
archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation and physical artefacts (in 
form of photos, program flyers, etc.). Validity and reliability of this case study is internally 
managed with the help of a case study database providing a chain of evidence suggested by Yin 
(2003). Middle-range thinking encouraged by Laughlin (1995) is performed within this research 
paper, as back and forth process between theory and methods were capitalized and “middle” 
focus was held, i.e. being open to change and at the same time ready to accept status quo 
regarding theory and methodology. 
 
 
4. Empirical findings 
 
The festival in question situated in Norway is a regular event taking place for eight days every 
summer. Compared other summer festivals, this festival is specific by its program as the focus is 
both on cultural and religious events. The festival offers over 200 events, some of them for free 
and the rest within price range NOK 150 – NOK 450. The annual budget of the festival is about 
NOK 30 mill and more than a half consists of public subisidy. The festival was established in 
1960’s as many other festivals in Europe (e.g. XZ, TT, FF). Despite its maturity and status the 
festival faced a financial crisis in 2008 that almost caused festival bankruptcy. The municipal 
auditing report explains this failure as a consequence of previous top management, particularly 
the CEOs and the Board as the economic part of the game was underestimated – there was not a 
proper communication about the budget and costs, revenues were overestimated, prolonged 
period of the festival (from 9 to 13 days) did not attracted enough spectators, an excessive 
amount of free-tickets was issued at the expenses of standard tickets, festival in-house 
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productions were too expensive. By and large, financial accounting and management control had 
not been a priority for festival management and no one had an overview. Even worse, the festival 
had broken the law regarding selection of suppliers. All these problems had not been known until 
suppliers and creditors started to demand payment. Hence, it was a surprising august morning for 
a very new festival CEO, who was meanwhile appointed, to recognize this fact and witnessed that 
the total loss of the festival in 2008 was enumerated to NOK 6.871 mil. This economic scandal 
gained national attention and threatened festival existence, as discussions about moving the 
festival to another town went on. Eventually, this idea was left, debts were paid and the planning 
of the upcoming festival year could be initiated. However, this accounting event shed light on 
everlasting festival’s dilemma: How to build and control a financial stable organization and at the 
same time offer unique event experience to audience?  
 
This research inquiry on how he festival controlled is these days brings two main findings. First, 
several contextual controls are found as the most influential regarding management control 
within the organization. Second, a strong interactivity between these controls has been 
recognized and therefore they are better understood within a control package. Time dynamics 
together with prior festival performance has a crucial impact on control of the festival and these 
two aspects are considered as the main meta-antecedents of festival control. 
 
4.1 Significant festival controls 
As the most influential controls in the festival have been identified as administrative controls, i.e. 
organizational and governance structure, policies and procedures, along with planning controls 
and cybernetic controls, i.e. budgets, measures and hybrid measures. Reward and incentive 
controls contribute to the total picture of controls together with cultural controls.  
 
4.1.1 Administrative controls 
The organizational structure is sketched in Figure 1. The highest control authority is the Board, 
consisting of two representatives from the state level and three “local” members who act on 
behalf of local municipality, region and the Church. The Board sets the strategy. The strategic 
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objective of the festival is to restore and strengthen the city as a national ecclesiastical and 
cultural power center. Thus, the festival is very much anchored in local environment and church 
traditions. Other responsibility of the Board is managing a selection procedure of a festival 
director (CEO) and once this is done, regular supervisions and communication with him/her is 
established. Operational responsibilities fall on festival director shoulders. In other words, the 
executive power is in festival director’s hands. The CEO can influence the organizational 
structure into large extent as it is his responsibility to choose right people who help him with 
accomplishment of the strategy. Furthermore, the CEO chooses every year’s festival theme and 
decides on the planning process of the festival, including program choice and length of such 
procedure. The second layer of the organizational structure includes all main characters in the 
organization – CFO, a marketing and sponsor manager, a deputy CEO and at the same time a 
program manager and an event manager. Although, the event manager is formally subordinate of 
the program manager, he belongs to the close circle of festival managers as he is responsible for 
building up the organization that runs the festival in practice during festival days. He takes care 
of security, stage, technical equipment, quality check and other practical necessities of more than 
200 events. For that reason, he is also very much involved in HR process as most of the human 
resources in the organization, particularly during the festival, falls to his area of responsibility. 
Third and fourth level of organizational structure covers staff helping the manager in the front 
line and managers of specific projects, for example, a manger of events for youth and families, 
managers of church events, venue managers, a volunteers’ manager and a manager of a special 
program. diversification-literature overview Finally, the fifth level of the organization includes 
essential workforce – volunteers and security workers. 
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Figure 1: Festival’s organizational structure (based on compilation of eight drawings of the interviewees) 
 
The governance structure is partly influenced by the organizational structure, and partly by the 
natural development of the festival as the festival is well-established with tradition dated back to 
1950’s. Particularly, economic crisis of the festival in 2008 threatened festival existence. This 
event was caused by insufficient control and managerial decisions of the Board. Thus, much 
higher involvement of the Board in this matter is obvious these days as one of the interviewees 
confirms:  
 
“PSKI? Stine? Iris?  somewhere” 
 
The organizational and governance means of control were strengthened after the crisis year. The 
festival moved from the collective way of sharing responsibility to a structured governance 
according to the given field of competence and responsibility, see Figure 1. 
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The project manager 2 describes such process as follows: 
 
“This is my seventh year in the festival, I worked here under three CEO’s and there is a huge 
difference in how they have been organizing the festival. The first year I was a part of 
management, we were all quite equal. I felt really inside, I took responsibility and I felt I had a 
chance to say something and be heard. Then, there was the economic crisis and there was a 
change. We had a new leader. She got together with her people who were good at economy. They 
wanted to do some structure in the festival and they made this – this is the board, this is CEO, 
this is management and you are out there (the fourth level, see Figure 4). I felt that everything 
was decided overheads. There was no communication. The leader did not know what I was doing 
at all. It was so clear that this is the management of the festival (the third level) and others, there 
was a fence between all the people in full time and rest. Of course, I see why they wanted to have 
a structure and organizing. That’s part of the economical control, but there is also very much 
psychology in leading and if you do this so drastically (first, second, third level, see Figure 1) to 
people who are out here (fourth level) and it is many of us, we don’t care – that’s a result.” 
 
The project manager of volunteers also expresses her confusion regarding new governance within 
the festival: 
 
“When I came here, it was a mess, the biggest mass I’ve ever experienced. I used probably five 
months to understand my position and positions of others that surrounded me.” 
 
The structure is negatively perceived also by the project manager 2 (the third level of 
organizational structure), however understanding of relationships differs: 
 
“I don't like this hierarchical structure. I want to have a flat structure. That's what I like with this 
organization - my role is no more important than other project manager’s role. I like this, we're 
all on the same page, in a way. Then, it's more like a circle, like disk world. That's how I see 
myself.” 
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The division of labor and tasks across the organization is quite visible also towards the Board as 
many of the interviewees belonging to the middle management confirm that the Board is not that 
much important for their work. However, the situation is different for the close circle of 
managers, as event manager says: 
 
“Yes, of course, all board members are important. I’ve talked to them in informal settings, but 
I’ve also been to at least one board meeting, where we were asked to have some points of view.” 
 
Although that the new hierarchical structure demarked boundaries of responsibility and in some 
cases blocked communication within the organization, it also facilitates enormous amount of 
needed freedom and flexibility to all project managers. This creative aspect of festival managers’ 
work is however possible to control only with limited instruments and in a way can lead to 
dangerous consequences. One of the interviewees explains: 
 
“Since the festival is organized more or less like this, I understood kind of early in my 
engagement, that I can do it in my own way. I am kind of independent, everyone else is in sort of 
way working with program, economy, tickets. That's not the part of my work at all. So, I am kind 
of a lonely bird down here. If I am moving out or getting sick before the festival, I don't think 
anyone could have taken my responsibility. I would say that you are organizing a very big risk 
here, because nobody takes his responsibility and nobody knows his plans or his thoughts. 
Everyone is sitting on their own hills, I would say.”  
 
Another project manager adds: 
“It does not really present a big problem. There are very little sick-leaves. If you are sick for two 
months, then, yes, of course. But if you have a week or several days, then, you can pick up 
afterwards. It's not like ooops - you should have done that! And if you see that you can't manage, 
you ask.” 
 
To overcome this challenge, evaluation reports are made by some of the project managers, 
though on voluntarily basis. These reports serve for the future course of managerial work and are 
incorporated into the overall evaluation report: 
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“In late August or September, we got an evaluation. That's quiet big one, we put out a scheme, a 
paper, we collect it, we have a meeting and we're more detailed also with the closest persons.” 
the event manager  
 
The overall evaluation is therefore based mainly on accounting information: 
“All information on all the concerts, all the events, all the viewers, visitors, audience, how many 
on that and that event, how many sold tickets, how many sponsors tickets, how many volunteers 
are gathered. To sum up the whole festival in numbers. So it's ready for the budget application in 
January. That’s one big report.” the project manager 1 
 
Another procedure that decreases the risk of the creative part of the project work, again employed 
only by some of the interviewees, rests on sharing own competence with others: 
 
“Now I am trying to teach everyone to do the own contracts with artists.” the project manager 1.  
 
 
The venue manager elaborates: 
 
“Last year, and that was a good idea, I had an assistant. We're going to do it again this year 
because there is a lot, even though it's a small venue, it's a lot of things to do back and forth and 
picking up things. This is a volunteer plus - with more responsibility.” 
 
More sophisticated tasks are however difficult to push through, as the project manager of 
volunteers explains on the case of a new app:  
 
“It would have been much easy for me if they [project managers] could import their needs into it, 
but we have a big Excel mania. That’s an issue.” 
  
There are few policies and procedures that control the festival. The highest rank in operational 
terms has perhaps HMS (Health, Environment, Security) procedures. Liabilities stemming from 
HMS are further operationalized by the event manager: 
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“I must not forget what I've been doing all day. It's making sketches to get permits and license to 
do things. You have to have loads of permits to do things. I use some hours to get these from the 
police, from the fire department, from the city management, from all the people and offices we're 
working with. They are good people and we have a good cooperation with them. I really 
appreciate that, but of course, there are some hours to get it done.” 
 
Formal procedures also shape the governance structure as every fifth year a new CEO is hired 
and the direction of the festival can slightly change. 
 
4.1.2 Planning controls 
 
Evaluation procedures within administrative controls support next year’s planning phase of the 
festival as do’s and don’ts of the festival are taken into consideration. 
 
Three planning terms have been identified: long-term (very new as the new CEO decides to plan 
for 18 months instead of 12 months), middle-term (12 months) and short-term (usually 6 
months). The length of planning phase varies according to the position of the project manager in 
the organizational structure and type of the project she is responsible for.  
 
Middle-term planning starts just after the festival is finished as general ideas for next festival year 
that correlate to the theme are developed. Short-term planning starts about 6 month prior the 
festival. Managers who operate on short-term planning must get together their general thoughts, 
plans and ideas for final realization of the project relatively quickly, because the detailed 
planning of the festival must be started within two or three months. Therefore, managers who use 
middle-term planning control have larger room for manoeuvring and adjusting their plans to 
reality. Program manager 1 illustrates: 
 
“For me, it's no stress here. I have a long time... It's not the hardest period. Hardest is a wrong 
word… Before you get everybody on board, we don't sleep so well. We're searching for good 
people, you're getting knows that they are not able to come, we have to change....” 
 
325
Time, Money and Control: Use of Management Controls in a Festival  Eva Lechner 
 
 
On the other hand, even some of those who plan middle-term can’t enjoy such luxury. The event 
manager enlightens the issue: 
 
“I've worked three years with this festival and it's a lot of thing that we cannot control as good 
ourselves, as we should like to do. When we shall book things, it's often hard to book the artist as 
early as we should like as an organization because of the international management, the booking 
agencies in London, in the USA. They want to wait, and wait and wait, they want to see where 
they can get most money... We thought we have an artist, we were quiet sure, the big 
international one and he didn’t come to us at all! They’ve planned different trails and it became 
an Asia tour at the same time… That’s how it works. 
We should have like that our program was finished a lot earlier. Definitely, I would like that, 
because when I know what will come and how they will have it arranged, I can have better time 
to arrange, but if it's very close up to the festival, I am very short… That's not up to us to decide, 
it's up to international and national booking agencies. We have to accept that and have a good 
flow and speed up the tempo, when we're getting closer to the festival.”  
 
The manager responsible for the program for family and children reflects her planning challenges 
as such: 
 
“Many artists see summer as their working period, when they travel from the festival to the 
festival and work and play on tour, while artists who perform for children follow the school year 
and have holidays, when the audience have holidays. So, the biggest challenge is that many of 
them have vacation.” 
 
As the head-hunting planning process is finished, contracting and detailed planning follows. The 
festival contracts all performers, those who are paid even those who are not paid. Contracting the 
biggest projects is a priority, however all project managers try to have been done with contracts 
for own sake about two months prior the festival. Detailed planning covers many activities: 
 
“There are so many small things to do! It starts with writing all these small texts about artists 
and what’s going to happen for festival newspapers and for the webpage. It’s organizing of 
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travelling, hotel, eating, and transport – car from there to there. It’s also getting costumes for the 
projects…” says project manager 2. 
 
Planning and detailed planning are crucial form of ex-ante control and prepare festival managers 
for the festival week. A good planning together with morning meetings are the most utilized 
instruments that secures the management of festival days. 
 
“Everybody starts with the meeting early in the morning. Then, we go to our projects. I always 
have a plan for the day: when are my guests arriving, checking with the hotel, checking with the 
people regarding food and everything, meeting them [artists] early – say hello...  Check out 
everything, that’s important for me, I like to have everything under control, myself. I don’t trust 
that everything is under control.” says program manager 1. 
 
The project manager 2 confirms: 
“I try to have an overview. Everything is planned too detailed, so I know what’s going to happen 
within the next 10 minutes. I know that something is happening there and there, because it’s on 
my schedule.” 
 
4.1.3 Cybernetic controls 
While planning the festival, an awareness of the budget, especially costs is necessary. The 
management control system, maintained by CFO, keeps eye on the costs of the venues and 
projects.  The event manager – PSK who is also involved in budgeting and financial controlling 
elaborates: 
 
 “If you do not focus on accounting and budget numbers, and make good accounts and realistic 
estimates of the budget, then, it’s not right. So it has certainly been important to me. It doesn’t 
mean that you follow the budget constantly, but you can certainly put considerable effort into it. 
A budget is the dynamic, so the change. There's the cost side, which I represent. I am expenditure 
for the festival, me and those who I lead, but that’s what I’ve been hired for, to look after... At the 
same time, there are changes (movements) in accounting, but these can be predicted into some 
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extent. Unexpected things may pop up, so one has to go into the budget and try to adjust it. Then, 
we have to do a massive review of all accounting records.” 
 
As the festival enjoys public funding, one can envisage that the revenue side of the festival is 
perhaps not that relevant. The situation is however different. Both parts of the budgets are under 
control, however control of revenues is not that easy as in case of costs: 
 
“There is a huge risk and it must be. We have to compare revenue numbers with previous years, 
and we are better at that each year. However, there will be some x’s – weather, temperature, 
some x’s we aren’t able to identify, so you will end up with no understanding why more people 
haven’t come… We always have to count that it may be like that, but we have to have these x’s as 
few as possible.” explains the event manager PSK. 
 
Middle managers do operate with cybernetic controls, but the core responsibility rests on the apex 
of the festival. 
 
“I have my own budget, but CFO is managing all the budgets so in practice I am not responsible 
for the budget, but on the paper yes… My budget compare to the other ones is so small. I 
remember that I sent an e-mail to our CFO asking for 3,000. And she just laughs and says: OK, 
do you know that the event manager use 70,000 without asking me? They trust me and that's 
probably because of that type of e-mail. Ok, are 3,000 making your position better? Totally OK 
for me… But I am still asking! I don't think that she has ever said no to me.” says the project 
manager of volunteers. 
 
The venue manager adds: 
 
“I cannot go to the hiring companies - light and sounds and things like that and say: Hi, I need 
equipment. I always have to get it confirmed by the event manager if that’s ok, I will do it. I 
cannot buy things for the festival without getting green light from him. We have a quiet strict 
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budget on the things. When we get the riders
4
 from different performances, concerts then we see 
what we have to hire. Then we have to do that and that… I have to make sure that the backstage 
area always has a coffee, tea, drinks, fruit, chocolate, things like that, just to keep people happy. 
Sugar and soft drinks! I have an account in the shop, where I can send my assistant to buy that. 
Meals and things like that is something that has been organized in advance by the event manager 
and his people and also according to the rider. If a band or an artist has written: "We have to 
have a hot meal during the day". Then, we organize it at the local hotel restaurant, so they got 
there to eat, because my backstage area is a room a little bit smaller than this. We don't have any 
facilities... Of course, you can order pizza... ” 
 
Budgetary controls and their connection to planning are perceived by the project manager 2 as 
follows: 
 
“Well, of course, it's a manual for me and the thing is to plan very well quite simply. You have to 
remember everything, every, every, every small detail. If it's within the budget, there is no 
problem, it's just to follow it. Every year I have the buffer if there is something happening. This 
always has to be. I am quite secured by the budget.” 
 
Cybernetic controls, especially the budget, thus acts as an active management accounting 
instrument, albeit not the only one. The event manager introduces the next significant 
management control: 
 
“To have an overview, we need to be really hands on the all numbers all the time! But of course, 
we want to play, that’s why we are here. Making big events and nice atmosphere with people, you 
have to use common psychology.” 
 
4.1.4 Reward and incentive controls 
For many managers there are certainly important monetary rewards as they are hired and paid. 
However, intrinsic rewards and motivation are perhaps equally important: 
                                                 
4
 Performer’s request regarding equipment of the stage and necessities for running his show. 
329
Time, Money and Control: Use of Management Controls in a Festival  Eva Lechner 
 
 
“I try to have a good atmosphere, to have a lot of fun. It’s important for me to smile and laugh a 
lot with my colleagues. I say every working day without laugh is miserable day! If you have fun, 
while you’re working it’s unbelievable important, getting a lot of energy! I like to walk around 
and make some fun with my colleagues, laughing a little bit, making crazy things…Otherwise, I 
would be really bored. I am not a guy for long processes, that’s not my thing. I like to do 
something.” explains the program manager 1. 
 
Nevertheless, the extent of provided motivation varies, the project manager 1 says: 
 
“I didn't think I really need it to do so, because chorus-singers were eager enough, the conductor 
wanted to do a good job, soloist knew the festival… My colleagues knew this is going to be big 
and they were looking forward to the concert. I needed to motivate only on this first night of the 
concert. It was not enough time to rehearse. The male choir was tired... We tried to make 
everything all right. Go, get some coffee and tea and try to make it as good as possible. So, we 
had to motivate through the surroundings and not so much the content.” 
 
The most numerous festival workforce, 380 volunteers, is however sometimes difficult to 
motivate, the point is made by the project manager of volunteers:  
 
“I think that 300 of them are self-motivating and they're happy with their position and happy with 
the other volunteers and they are organizing themselves. You always have like 50, probably to 
100, who are another group of volunteers. But, I don't think it is my work and it is not possible 
for me to motivate them more. Probably they don't like the volunteer work. I can talk to them and 
probably 20 of them will be a better volunteer than it was the other day. But I can't make a 
revolution here because we don’t have sanctions. If they aren’t coming to work or maybe they are 
rude… If I am giving them a call and they aren’t picking up the phone… What should I do? Run 
after them?” 
 
Project manager 2 has possibilities to motivate volunteers bit more: 
 
“I try to help them to be aware of all the positive sides of being volunteers: remind them - this is 
excellent for you, you're networking now. These small reminders and also it’s very important to 
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ask: How are you today? Is your day ok? Can I help you with anything? What have you 
experienced today? Something new? Something exciting? Have you met any exciting people? I 
think that caring is very important. There are so many things. It's a balance between giving 
volunteers tasks that are challenging and also not so difficult. I think it's very important to show 
people what your volunteers, what your people, are doing and not taking the glory yourself. It's 
so important. I really try to focus on the fantastic work all the volunteers do. I tell people about it 
all the time, I really think they deserve that I do it. After all, they are working voluntarily and 
they are doing a fantastic job, so it's important to tell in media, to audience, to friends. There are 
so many specific things within motivating, these are some of them.”  
The venue manager provides his perspective on motivation: 
 
“I like people around me to be focused on that everything should go as scheduled, to keep the 
artists happy, to keep the audience happy. I try to motivate them. We're there to make their 
evening complete. If any motivation that's that. I also have to be strict once a while as well. I 
don't like people who take over the show. I don't think I am authoritarian, I am not like that. If I 
think that people stepping over the line, then I stop it. I like people to have a good time.” 
 
4.1.5 Cultural controls 
Rather than one sort of strong cultural control, hybrid cultural controls have been identified. 
These decisive cultural controls have been explored in the festival: cultural clan controls, 
professional clan controls and organizational clan controls.  
 
Cultural clan controls convey the passion to culture. The project manager 2 explains: 
 
“I am head over heels in love with culture. The best thing is an opportunity to create something 
that moves people. To be creative, that’s my strong personal need to be creative and when I have 
an opportunity to be that and at the same time I see it moves people - that makes me happy! 
That's fantastic. If I have a job that was the same from nine to four every year, I would be 
completely crazy.” 
 
Another point of view: 
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“The best thing is to be a part of it. I work with a lot of nice people. I meet a lot of nice people. 
I am being appreciated for what I do during the festival by the management. Overall, it's nice 
week, a lot of work. Maybe this year, I should have this step-counter on me, I've been talking 
about it every year now, I seem to forget to count how many kilometers I actually walk during the 
festival. I think it's a lot. It also keeps you fit. You don't have to pay thousands of crowns to go to 
the fitness center. 
I am in this is because I love being a part of the cultural industry. I feel I have a lot in common 
with the people, the artists, with the rest and of course, you can't like all the music, you can't like 
everything. But in general I feel a home around cultural events. I think I would be bored to death 
if I should punch at an office at 8 o'clock and punch out again at 3:30. Every day for the rest of 
my life, I would die.” confirms the venue manager, who has been engaged in many cultural 
projects since 1976. 
 
Project manager 1 also contributes with her point of view: 
 
“The best thing on my job is that I am able to work with such a big festival. It's all the music 
genres, different artists and bands... I am back to where I started with music. I started playing 
when I was four. My father is musician. It always has been a part of my life. I've never got to be a 
musician myself, so organizing and administration is the second best.” 
 
As festival managers enjoy a large deal of creativity and independence, they however also seek 
for professional support. Thus, professional clan controls have been traced. 
 
“I can take my competences from the festival I worked for. I think I can actually do more or less 
the same in other festivals, because every festival has a volunteer manager and we are doing 
almost the same everywhere. Actually now, we established a group on Facebook, that's a group 
with four different volunteer managers. We have the same issues and this is probably a solution 
for this festival…. Everyone is handling different sets of issues, but, we down here (see level 4, 
Figure 1), we have our community and society.” the project manager of volunteers 
 
Explanation of professional clan controls is given by the project manager 2 who is in contact with 
other professionals in the network, while she is looking for the artists. 
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“I choose artists based on experience within the music industry and based on - I know someone, 
who knows someone, who knows someone... I choose them also based on research on the Internet 
and I call other festivals and say - who is your best artist? I want him, tomorrow!  
It's a lot of work to find best people and it's not like.... I also contact some organizations which 
work with crafts and so on to find more interesting things. It's a combination: some luck, some 
networking, some experience, and some research.” 
 
Finally, organizational clan controls have been identified at the top of the organization, among 
close circle of top managers who share the values, experience and motivation among themselves 
and with others within the organization. 
 
“Anybody here, almost anybody, I can turn to… It’s good atmosphere here and people are 
helpful.” the program manager 1 
 
 “Whenever, there is anything, I talk to the event manager” says the venue manager. 
 
The good atmosphere is supported by regular meetings every Tuesday or everyday morning 
meetings during the festival, open office doors and common lunches throughout the year: 
 
“We have common lunch break and that's very popular and it's talk of everything else than the 
festival.” illustrates the event manager 
 
4.2 Festival management controls as a package 
As previous section of this paper indicates, there is a strong connectivity and overlapping among 
the controls. Thus, similarly to Malmi and Brown (2008) theoretical framework, these controls 
are best understood as a package. 
 
As the event manager explains all his activities, plans and manuals throughout the year, he 
pointed out that all these actions are embedded into ‘the Wheel of the Year’: 
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“We call it Wheel of the Year5 with all this… It's much more detailed, it's quite logical. When the 
festival is over, you have evaluation and start planning for the next one. When some plans are 
landed, you go on to contracts, which venues, which people are going to manage the different 
venues... What we need of technical equipment, what we need of room for offices, what we need 
of cars to transport and so on….” 
Thereby, the model of festival controls is mirrored by Figure 2. It reflects continuum - there is no 
end and the beginning within the controls. They are overlapping and equally important, though at 
some points a year, they are more (deep blue colour) or less (white colour) dominant/used.  
 
 
Figure 2: The Wheel of the Year: Management controls as a package 
 
                                                 
5
 I’ve never seen that one, so I cannot compare Figure 2 with the one they have. The presented model is built on interviews and 
observations that have been carried out. 
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Administration controls shape the organization and are extremely used during the festival week, 
marketing and communication manager explains:  
 
“Perhaps the biggest challenge we have is that during the 50 weeks of the year we are 9 people, 
while for one week we are 40 people in the staff and 380 volunteers. It's one thing to have them 
on board and other thing to communicate with them. It is easy to forget to communicate to 
project managers or those who arrive on short projects. Last but not least, it’s challenge to 
involve them, because they are students, working for other organizations, so they are here 
actually for very short time to establish a good marketing strategy and communication strategy. 
We really want to be bigger to have more long-term employees in this festival.” 
 
For project manager of volunteers has the festival two faces within a year:  
 
“Therefore, we have one organizational structure or a chart or a map for the whole year 
organization. We have one organizational structure, during the festival. That was my solution to 
organize my head.”  
 
Planning controls are in close relation to administrative controls, together with cybernetic 
controls. Plans must be done in advance taken into account both external and internal human 
resources, constraints given by the budget and previous festival performance. Planning controls 
are most used before the festival, from January to the beginning of July, though general plans and 
ideas bear managers in mind all the time. Cybernetic controls are less used during the festival, as 
everything and everyone was contracted, there is no room to steer the costs more. Therefore, it’s 
mainly revenue side that the festival tries to influence through marketing and sponsors strategy. 
Reward and incentive controls are mainly used and enjoyed during the festival and just after the 
festival. It’s time when all volunteers and core organizational members can enjoy the festival 
atmosphere and bear fruit of their all-year work. They motivate themselves by morning meetings 
and fabulous newspaper headlines and enjoy positive words of mouth that are spread among 
citizens. 
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“You don't experience it when you sit in your office during the festival. You have to go out, you 
have to meet people, you have to go to the concerts, you have to go to visit lectures and see - 
what have you been planning for 51 weeks, you have to see the results! That's very nice, I am a 
person if I go to the concert I feel little bit guilty that I am not working, but I am working! I just 
have to flip my brain around and say: this is also work, this is experiencing what the festival is 
all about. The cultural bit is the whole in a way.” says the project manager 1 
 
Finally, cultural controls are steadily used throughout the year, as they set the reasons of being on 
festival board both for single festival managers and volunteers. 
 
The main external factor – time, rationalizes intensity within the controls. Through such 
dynamics, we can see how single controls become more utilized than others. Time as a seasonal 
aspect of the industry is also a decisive control instrument for external partners, particularly 
international and national artistic agencies that try to reach most of it and receive as many 
financial benefits as possible. Time also play role towards the audience, the changeful artistic 
taste of the audience keep program managers busy and often sleepless. Finally, time perspective 
also influences the date of the festival, as the festival is traditional and well-established it seems 
to be naïve idea to move it into other week of the year.  
 
Concluding remarks made a project manager of volunteers: 
 
“The festival is organized the given date. That is the main goal for everyone here. Everyone is 
more or less running that direction. Time and money are only shared goals in whole of the 
festival and without that it would just fell apart.” 
 
5. Discussion 
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Appendix 
An example of the interview guide on management controls within the festival 
 
“Those systems, rules, practices, values and other activities management put in place in order to 
direct employee behaviour (collaborative parties) should be called management controls.“ Malmi and 
Brown (2008, p. 290) 
 
The Project Manager 
Structure of the interview Reason of the section  
0. Introduction To inform about research and the research 
question, to establish first “connection” 
between the interviewer and the interviewee  
Part 1 
1. Long-term planning 
controls 
Focus is on crucial planning phase, when 
program is created, long-term => long-term 
planning controls. 
2. Reward/compensation 
controls 
 
Trying to find out who receive motivation of 
project managers within the projects and 
how is this motivation done. 
 
3. Action-planning controls Follows long-term planning controls section 
with the aim to find out how are projects 
‘managed’ during festival days. 
4. Administrative controls Investigates the role of internal processes 
5. Cybernetic controls Overview of management controls and their 
connections, takes into consideration also 
economical controls - budgets 
Part 2 6. Cultural controls (Work as 
a status or fulfillment? ) 
The aim is to find out into which extent play 
personal/organizational/religious/cultural 
values role in project manager’s and 
volunteers’ work. 
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PART ONE 
0. Introduction 
0. Introduction of: 
 myself, 
 
 the research project, 
 
 and the way how the interview will be conducted and treated afterwards.  
 
1. Can you tell me a little bit about your background? 
a)6 What’s your education? 
b) What’s your previous working experience? 
c) For how long are you the project manager in this festival? 
 
2. Can you describe your role in the organization, what are you responsible for?  
a) What such responsibility covers?  
 
3. Can you draw (sketch) organizational structure of the organization and your relationship towards your 
supervisors  and other project and venue managers, group leaders of volunteers? 
a) Who is your nearest manager?  
b) Have you ever talked to Board members? Are they somehow important for your project? 
 
1. Long-term planning controls 
Let’s imagine that it is the beginning of august and festival is just over. 
4. When do you start to work with your project for next festival? 
 
5. How many events are you supposed to prepare for the festival? 
a) Is it a same amount every year? 
 
6. Do you always have to come up with new events or do you have some recurring events which repeat 
often? Or is it a mix? 
 
                                                 
6
 a) b), c) etc. types of questions were asked if the interviewee has not mentioned the topics in the answer. 
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7.  What is fixed in your work and in which aspects are you totally free? (For example, you can choose 
whatever artists you want, but you know that all your events are staged at one venue, e.g. Vår Frue Kirke.) 
a) Are you free to choose artists/speakers?  
b) Are you free to choose the venue, where your events will be staged?  
c) Which venue is your favorite one and why? 
d) Which venue is the “worst one” (if we can say it like that) and why? 
 
8. How do you choose artists/speakers? 
a) (For example, based on their previous performance at other festivals, positive newspapers’ reviews, 
your previous cultural experience at other cultural events, based on recommendation of someone else…) 
 
9. When do you start to communicate with artists (speakers)? 
a) How do you first contact them and how do you communicate later on? 
 
10. When you prepare the project, do you work with some overall theme of the festival so you try to 
match this theme with your project/events? Like last year, there was this xy topic and zy topic….  
a) When do you know this main theme of the festival? 
b) Can you influence the main theme of the festival, if so, how? 
c) If you can’t influence the main theme of the festival – who will tell you what the theme is about? 
 
11.  Once you roughly know what your events are about, what are you going to do next? 
b) and when this moment comes… 
a) Do you often talk with artists/speakers about their performance and their needs for performance after 
you booked them? Or is it more or less settled and you work on something else? 
c) Are  you involved in marketing activities, do you cooperate with the marketing manager regarding 
advertisement of your events? 
 
12. Do you also have to take care of artists’ accommodation, transport, catering…? 
 
13. How many volunteers do you need for your project? 
a) When do you know how many volunteers do you need? 
Volunteers are not a typical workforce. They often seek to establish some connection with other people.  
14. Therefore, do you have some friends among volunteers so you can enjoy being and work together 
during the festival or are they complete strangers? 
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15. Are there any important competencies which volunteers should have? 
 
16. When are you finished with planning phase of your project?  
17. What is on your project specific compare to other projects (events) within the festival program? 
18. What is the goal of your project work? 
19. What are main management difficulties in your work? 
 
2. Reward/compensation controls 
20. Do you try to work with motivation and do you motivate, for example…: 
- Artists 
- Technical crew 
- Volunteers 
- (Colleagues) 
If so, how? 
 
3. Action-planning controls 
21. When the festival is in full swing and you are in charge of several events, how can you manage to have 
an overview?  
a) For example, do you use some IT system, do you try to be at the venue most of the time, or? 
b) What do you actually do during the festival day, how does your typical day look like?  
22. Can you see some possibilities by which you can improve your overview? (For example, by buying 
better IT system, or some changes within the organization…) 
23. Do you evaluate each event, which you are responsible for? 
a) If so, how? 
b) If so, when? Immediately after the event is over? 
c) If not, why not? 
d) What are the consequences of such evaluation? 
24. The last question of this part which is quite general though bit personal: How would you define your 
management style? 
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4. Administrative Controls – organization design/structure, governance structure 
I am wondering, when you came to the organization for very first time…  
25. How did you know how to do your job?  
a) Did you, for instance, follow some instructions or rules provided by the organization? 
 
26. Are there many written rules – procedures or manuals for performing your work? 
 
27. Do you have to make written plans? 
a) If so - are they detailed, can you mention an example? 
28. To whom do you submit these plans? 
 
29. What kind of reports do you have to make to your manager(s)? 
 
30. How do you communicate with this person and other persons in the organization? (daily contact at 
workplace, written communication: e-mail, meeting face to face…) 
a) Do you participate in stabsmøte every Tuesday? 
a) What’s the topic of discussions? 
 
31. When you discuss your project work with other colleagues and you need to solve some issue and 
decide on something - do you often agree immediately or do you need some time to reach the conclusion? 
 
32. Do you have someone in the organization, to whom you can turn to, when you have a problem which 
is difficult to solve? 
 
33. Do you have any example of such situation? 
 
34. With whom, outside of the organization, do you cooperate the most?  
35. And except them? Are you in touch with xy, zy, zz…? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
344
Time, Money and Control: Use of Management Controls in a Festival  Eva Lechner 
 
 
PART TWO 
5. Cybernetic controls 
36. Do you have some financial restriction in your part of festival work? Are you responsible for the 
budget? 
 
37. For what do you use the budget? 
a) Do you use the budget for personal education and training? 
 
38. Are all performers, which you hire, paid for their performance? 
 
39. How would you describe flow of money from you towards paid performers? 
a) For example, first you contact the artist, she agrees and promise to engage in the festival. Then, one 
week before festival she receives the deposit and once she performed all days in the festival, she receives 
rest of the money…. Is this a realistic picture?... Or…? 
 
b) Is this paid artistic engagement secured by written contract? 
 
c) Are there any bonuses for artists who performed extremely well? 
 
c) Similarly, are there any financial sanctions for artists who performed badly? 
 
d) It is perhaps bit more complicated with foreign artists, who don’t have the bank account in Norway, 
because you or CFO then have to report to Skatteetaten and fill out this form…  
Does this tax-duty report complicate your work? 
 
40. Do you decide on ticket price for events? 
a) how? 
 
41. Do you feel very controlled by the budget in your project planning? 
a) Or is the budget a good instrument which gives you some feeling of stability – you know what you have 
and how much you can spend… 
 
42. Do you feel that you are in a position to influence the amount of the budget for your project in a 
dialogue with the management? 
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43. Does your nearest manager have strong expectations that you will keep (stick on) the budget? 
 
44. Do you feel that a lot of the communication in the festival is about the budget? 
 
45. Do you think the budget has too strong (or too weak) voice at certain points during the year in the 
festival (for planning, communication, motivation, strategy formation, evaluation)? 
 
46. Are there any pre-determined goals you must fulfill? (For example, a number of visitors, a number of 
events scheduled, etc.?) 
 
47. We have learned that the festival is managed based on cost of the projects and cost of the venues. At 
any point of time, management of the festival can see what are cost per project, per venue and total costs. 
Are you familiar with this system? Do you have access to this system? 
 
48.  Is your work evaluated once the festival is over? 
a) by whom? 
 
It seems to me that in events, including this festival, is type of work duties and a level of personal 
involvement very specific and vary a lot throughout the year. 
 
49. Therefore, can you place the most important job tasks to this 1-year timeline and comment on how 
much of your personal effort does that require? 
   
 
6. Cultural controls, i.e. work as a status or fulfillment? (I work as vs. I am) 
50. Is your work for the festival influenced by the fact that it is cultural and religious festival?  
 
51. Is it difficult, for you, to differentiate between cultural and religious elements of the festival? Or do 
you think that both characteristics are tightly connected together? 
 
52. Do you think, that statement ‘xyz’ connect both spheres? 
 
54. Do you think that statement: ‘xyz’ helps to your project work?  
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55. Do you use this statement when you cooperate with others?   
 
The festival staged events at different venues. So my following questions reflect this issue.  
 
56. When you plan single events, do you take into account that the venue itself may have some influence 
on audience/performers? 
a) in practical terms:  
- regarding weather 
- regarding time (e.g. some events are better to stage in the morning) 
- regarding other events on program of the festival 
 
57. Do you prefer to stage all events within your project work at one place for the whole festival? So you 
can better expect all possible challenges in next festival days? 
 
58. Did you work in past for a cultural or religious organization? Can you see some similarities with jobs 
you had in past with the job here? 
 
a) Have you worked in past for an organization which agenda is related to “public matters”? Can you see 
some similarities with jobs you had in past with the job here? 
 
59. In which aspect is then the job here, different? 
 
60. Are your hobbies or other jobs somehow related to the scope of the festival program? 
 
61. What is the best thing on the job you have here? 
 
62. Is there something we have touched during the interview and you want to reflect on more? Do you 
want to add something?  
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Strategic management accounting in close inter-organisational relationships 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides a conceptual comparison between the ‘mainstream strategic management 
accounting’ literature, the ‘accounting and strategising’ literature and ‘strategic management 
accounting (SMA) in close inter-organisational relationships’. It concludes that ‘SMA in close 
inter-organisational relationships’ shares some important characteristics with the ‘accounting 
and strategising’ literature. Important differences were found, too, though. These mainly 
concerned the need to understand individuals working for close partners as preparers of 
strategic information; the need for disaggregated accounting information about unique 
connections to close partners and about the role of indirect benefits that follow from close 
connections; and the need for the company to not only collect information but also disperse 
diverse information within close inter-organisational relationships. Through an intensive case 
study of a global robot manufacturer, Robotics, this paper also provides novel empirical 
evidence on ‘SMA in close inter-organisational relationships’. For instance, SMA practices 
included indirect benefits, something mainly neglected in the existing literature on SMA. 
These indirect benefits involved a close customer’s willingness to invest time and effort in 
Robotics’ technological development, thereby contributing to Robotics’ ability to attain 
revenue gains in its interactions with other customers. Our findings also have important 
implications for the ‘inter-organisational accounting’ literature, for instance by highlighting 
the need to link more explicitly strategic decision-making with the current interest in the role 
of accounting in inter-organisational dynamics. 
 
Keywords: Strategic management accounting, close inter-organisational relationships, 
strategy, strategising, inter-organisational accounting   
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1. Introduction 
Strategic management accounting (SMA) entered the accounting literature more than thirty 
years ago (Simmonds 1981), and since then a growing number of papers have been published 
on topics ranging from conceptual to empirical investigations in both private and public sector 
organisations (e.g. Bromwich 1990, Cuganesan et al. 2012, Dixon 1998, Guilding et al. 2000, 
Langfield-Smith 2008, Modell 2012, Simmonds 1982, Tillmann and Goddard 2008). Two 
special issues have been dedicated to SMA, one in the mid-1990s (Management Accounting 
Research 1996), and the other in 2012 (Management Accounting Research 2012). Over time, 
SMA has become an established accounting topic and has been incorporated as an ordinary 
subject into major accounting textbooks (Drury 2005, Hopper et al. 2007, Horngren et al. 
2002), but recent reviews have shown that there is no accepted definition of SMA (Langfield-
Smith 2008, Nixon and Burns 2012). One reason behind the lack of consensus of what SMA 
entails is that there is no agreed definition of strategy (Ghemawat 2001, Nixon and Burns 
2012). For instance, Nixon and Burns (2012) showed that the literature on strategy since the 
1960s has been characterised by a vibrant and eclectic development, and that different views 
of strategy have been proposed. The mainstream literature on SMA has mainly appealed to 
only a subset of this research by focusing on deliberate strategies where strategic processes 
are viewed as formal, structured and linear (Bhimani and Langfield-Smith 2007, Nixon and 
Burns 2012, Nyamori et al. 2001). In this view, the environment is assumed to be relatively 
stable and predictable, and strategy development and implementation are viewed as work 
done mainly by top management, with the help of strategically oriented management 
accounting practices (Langfield-Smith 2008, Nixon and Burns 2012).   
However, as early as the late 1970s Mintzberg (1978) stressed the importance of 
emergent strategies in his seminal paper. In a later paper he viewed deliberate and emergent 
strategies as two ends of a continuum, both of which will influence an organisation’s realised 
strategy (Mintzberg and Waters 1985). Mintzberg and Waters (1985, p 257) defined strategy 
as ‘patterns in stream of actions’ and this definition emphasised that ‘strategy is consistency, 
in behaviour, whether or not intended’ (Mintzberg 1987, p. 12). This need to move away from 
the deliberate view of strategy is also a key ingredient in the growing literature on strategy-as-
practice that emphasises micro-processes and the importance of exploring how actual strategy 
work is conducted (Johnson et al. 2003, Whittington 2003).1 This alternative view of strategy 
is unusual in the SMA literature and only a few papers address the emergent element of 
                                                 
1 In fact, Mintzberg and collaborators’ emergent process of strategy formation constitutes the broader framework 
for the strategy-as-practice approach (Johnson et al. 2003, Whittington 2003).    
350
  
strategy (e.g. Ahrens and Chapman 2005, Jørgensen and Messner 2010, Skærbæk and 
Tryggestad 2010). These papers focus mainly on how accounting information plays a role in 
strategic action on a day-to-day basis. A central message is that strategy is not something that 
exists before accounting is called upon (Chua 2007), but an activity that is developed in 
tandem with accounting when calculations are mobilised by individuals on different levels 
within a company (Ahrens and Chapman 2007). 
However, even though these recent contributions have paved the way for new SMA 
research endeavours, the SMA literature has yet to add an inter-organisational perspective. 
For example, empirical research from UK restaurants (Ahrens and Chapman 2005, 2007), 
Danish instrument manufacturers (Jörgensen and Messner 2010) and French construction 
companies (Fauré and Rouleau 2011) focuses primarily on intra-organisational activities. This 
is not surprising since Whittington himself emphasises that the strategising literature has yet 
to explore the role of external parties such as customers and suppliers (Whittington 2006). 
Thus, the importance of close inter-organisational relationships for a company’s emergent 
strategies has not been picked up within the SMA literature (Langfield-Smith 2008, Nixon 
and Burns 2012, Skærbæk and Tryggestad 2010).2 As noted by Cadez and Guilding (2008, p. 
855): ‘Given the still nascent nature of SMA, it is to be expected that further conceptions of 
what it constitutes may be forthcoming.’ Against this background, the first objective of the 
paper is to develop a conceptual comparison of three streams of SMA research: ‘mainstream 
SMA’, ‘accounting and strategising’ and ‘SMA in close inter-organisational relationships’. 
The latter describes how accounting information is used to support strategic decision-making 
in a setting characterised by close cooperation with important customers and/or suppliers. It 
builds on recent strategy research that focuses on companies operating in industrial markets, 
that is, markets where both the buyers and sellers are companies (Baraldi 2008, Baraldi et al. 
2007, Gadde et al. 2003, Halinen et al. 1999, Harrison and Prenkert 2009). Companies in 
industrial markets are often involved in close inter-organisational relationships that have a 
substantial impact on the companies’ current and future performance (Håkansson and Snehota 
1995, McLoughlin and Horan 2002). In this research, a close relationship is defined as a 
‘mutually oriented interaction between two reciprocally committed parties’ (Håkansson and 
                                                 
2 We acknowledge that there exists a large and growing body of literature on accounting in inter-organisational 
relationships. However, this literature does not explicitly analyse the role of accounting in strategy development 
and strategic decisions (Caglio and Dittilo 2008, Håkansson et al. 2010) and is therefore not perceived to be 
domain literature (Lukka 2005) in this paper and will not, therefore, be reviewed in section 2. As noted by Locke 
and Golden-Biddle (1997), it is difficult to position the intended contributions in the introductory and theory 
sections vis-à-vis too many domain literatures, but researchers can instead reflect on a broader range of domain 
literatures in the discussion of their findings. Following this line of thought, in the discussion section of the 
paper, we will reflect on if, and how, our findings contribute to the literature on inter-organisational accounting.  
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Snehota 1995, p. 25); it is characterised by long-term cooperation and adaptations between the 
firms involved (Gadde et al. 2003). Baraldi (2008), for instance, used a case study to illustrate 
how cooperation with close suppliers played a key role for IKEA´s strategic development. 
This stream of strategy research develops the emergent element of strategy and defines 
strategy as ‘the pattern of a company’s choices that are significant for its economic 
performance over time, and that it becomes committed to’ (Baraldi et al. 2007, p 881). It 
acknowledges the inter-organisational dimension of strategy as many of these significant 
choices are made in a company’s close relationships (Baraldi et al. 2007, Halinen et al. 1999).  
The study’s second objective is to obtain empirical detail of SMA in close inter-
organisational relationships through a case study of ABB Robotics (henceforth referred to as 
Robotics), a global manufacturer of industrial robots. This is a case in point as our analysis 
shows the importance of the close customer relationship with General Motors for Robotics’ 
strategic development. Our empirical study thereby answers calls by Cadez and Guilding 
(2008) and Nixon and Burns (2012) for more empirically based research on SMA. For 
example, Cadez and Guilding noted (2008, p. 856): ‘Despite the considerable discourse on 
strategic management accounting occurring since the early 1980s,… very little has been 
achieved in terms of empirical enquiry designed to further our appreciation of the nature and 
context of SMA application.’  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature on SMA and provides a conceptual comparison of ‘mainstream SMA’, ‘accounting 
and strategising’ and ‘SMA in close inter-organisational relationships’. The following section 
describes the research methods; this is followed by one that describes and analyses the 
Robotics case study, then a discussion. Finally, the conclusions are presented, and the issues 
remaining for further research are outlined. 
 
2. Theoretical development 
As several authors have highlighted, the boundaries of SMA are unclear (Langfield-Smith 
2008, Nixon and Burns 2012, Roslender and Hart 2003). For instance, some authors included 
papers on activity based costing (ABC) as part of SMA (Langfield-Smith 2008), while others 
such as Guilding et al. (2000) did not include ABC in their survey of SMA practices. Cadez 
and Guilding (2008) suggested that the ‘mainstream SMA’ literature has mainly focused on 
two particular areas: a set of strategically oriented accounting techniques and the role of 
management accountants in corporate strategic decision-making processes. In this paper, we 
will not make an a priori classification of accounting techniques as strategic or not. Instead, 
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we employ a definition of SMA, where the starting point is a company’s strategic decision-
making processes. Tillman and Goddard (2008, p 80) also offer such a definition of SMA and 
defined SMA ‘as being the use of management accounting systems in supporting strategic 
decision-making’. A critical issue then becomes when a decision becomes a strategic 
decision. Mintzberg et al. (1976, p 247) defined a strategic decision as ‘important, in terms of 
the actions taken, the resources committed, or the precedents set’. This definition accords well 
with the previously mentioned definition of strategy by Baraldi et al. (2007, p. 881). A 
strategic decision in this paper is therefore defined as a choice that has significant 
consequences for the company’s economic performance over time and that it becomes 
committed to (Baraldi et al. 2007).3  
To structure the literature review, we employ a general model of classic information-
system design. Gordon et al. (1978) proposed such a model defining three relevant design 
features: (1) Recipients, (2) Preparers, and (3) Information characteristics. Recipients are the 
actors who use the information and make the strategic decisions. Preparers are actors who 
support the strategic decision-making process by providing information. The third feature – 
information characteristics – needs to be specified further. We will use the following 
parameters in structuring the literature review: (A) Focus, (B) Orientation. Focus concerns 
whether the information is financial or non-financial and the level of detail given, i.e., 
whether it is in an aggregated or disaggregated form. Orientation concerns the source of the 
information. Does the information derive from internal details or from details outside the 
company? Orientation also concerns the direction of information flow; whether the company 
only collects information about, for instance, competitors and customers (unilateral), or 
whether information is collected, but the company also disperses it to customers and suppliers 
(bilateral).  
 
2.1 Mainstream SMA  
The large majority of papers on SMA, here labelled ‘mainstream SMA’, fall within a 
deliberate strategy framework (Langfield-Smith 2008, Nixon and Burns 2012, Nyamori et al. 
2001). Companies are assumed to make independent decisions so that strategy emerges out of 
a series of coherent strategic choices (Bhimani and Langfield-Smith 2007). In this respect, 
one can quote Nyamori et al. (2001, p.77), who reviewed the literature and concluded that: 
                                                 
3 We acknowledge the often intertwined nature of strategic decision-making and strategy implementation. Thus, 
while a focus on the use of management accounting for strategic decision -making serves the purpose of this 
paper well, it limits the sphere of what could be considered as SMA (see also a discussion on this issue in the 
paragraphs on future research at the end of the paper).     
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‘The bulk of the SMA literature has taken strategy as unproblematic, without questioning 
what various organisations or groups within these organisations understand by it or how it is 
formed’.  
During the 1980s and early 1990s, several conceptual papers were published with 
empirics used mainly as illustrations. Two significant contributions in the ‘mainstream SMA’ 
literature are Shank and Govindarajan (1989, 1993) and Bromwich (1990). Shank and 
Govindarajan (1989, 1993) developed SMA based on Porter’s (1980, 1985) strategy 
framework and showed how accounting information could be used in three different ways: 
positioning analysis, value-chain analysis and cost-driver analysis. Bromwich (1990) 
contributed with a strong voice for moving away from accounting’s internal focus on 
operations to make accounting more externally oriented and strategic. There accounting 
information addressed cost projections on input products, competitors’ cost structures, and 
fluctuations in market prices on output products. Later, surveys and case studies were 
conducted on accounting and management accountants’ relationships with strategy and 
strategic decision-making processes (e.g. Cadez and Guilding 2008, Ma and Tayles 2009). 
In the ‘mainstream SMA’ literature the top management are the recipients of accounting 
information for strategic decision-making processes in all types of studies including 
analytical, surveys and case studies (Bromwich 1990, Lord 1996, Ma and Tayles 2009, 
Tillmann and Goddard 2008). Management accountants are viewed as the main preparers and 
several papers investigate their degree of involvement in the strategic decision-making 
processes (Bhimani and Langfield-Smith 2007, Bromwich 1990, Coad 1996). For instance, 
Tillmann and Goddard (2008) showed in their case study of a German cosmetics and toiletries 
company that the management accountants were proactive and did not limit their involvement 
in the top management’s strategic decision-making to the identification of problems; they also 
worked on counter-measures and solutions and were referred to as the management’s sparring 
partners. When important strategic decisions were to be made by the top managers, the 
management accountants were called upon to help understand the situation and make it more 
transparent (Tillmann and Goddard 2008). Similar results were found by Ma and Tayles 
(2009) in their study of a large UK pharmaceutical company. They showed how the 
management accountants gradually became more involved in the strategic decision-making by 
providing managers with support relevant to decision-making, such as information about 
markets and competitors.  
When it comes to the focus of the information used, the range encompassed extends 
from financial measures to non-financial information about competitors’ positions and 
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technical developments in key areas (Guilding et al. 2000, Lord 1996, Ma and Tayles 2009). 
This extent was shown by Cadez and Guilding (2008) who studied the following SMA 
practices: attribute costing, benchmarking, brand valuation, competitor cost assessment, 
competitive position monitoring, competitor-performance appraisal, customer profitability 
analysis, integrated performance measurement, life-cycle costing, lifetime customer-
profitability analysis, quality costing, strategic cost management, strategic pricing, target 
costing, valuation of customers as assets and value-chain accounting. Furthermore, the 
majority of the papers show that the information used is primarily presented in an aggregated 
form, for instance expressed through the overall position in the market or value chain where 
competitors, customers and suppliers are viewed as generic concepts (Bromwich 1990, 
Bromwich and Bhimani 1994, Hergert and Morris 1989, Shank and Govindarjan 1993). Some 
papers discussing SMA and supply chains give examples of how companies use somewhat 
less aggregated information to engage with specific firms to attain certain advantages 
(Anderson and Dekker 2009a, 2009b, Lord 1996). However, this information rarely consists 
of unique detailed information from customers or suppliers. When companies collect 
information from suppliers, they do so within predefined categories, as illustrated by Dekker 
(2003) in his study of value-chain accounting at Sainsbury. 
The orientation of the information used ranges from internal details to external 
information about competitors, customers or suppliers. Internal information such as costs, 
competences and resources are important for the top management (Tayles et al. 2002), but one 
of the main differences between traditional management accounting and SMA is that the latter 
primarily has an externally oriented perspective (Cadez and Guilding 2008, Shank and 
Govindarajan 1993). An early example of the strong external orientation is Bromwich (1990, 
p. 28), who stated that ‘there is a need to release management accounting from the factory 
floor to allow it also to aid directly in meeting these market challenges’. However, despite the 
external focus, the direction of the information flow is perceived to be unilateral: Top 
management and management accountants collect information from the external environment 
in order to make more informed decisions and improve the competitive position of the 
company (Shank and Govindarajan 1993). 
 
2.2 Accounting and strategising 
Several scholars have urged SMA researchers to extend their view of strategy and focus 
beyond that of deliberate strategies (Bhimani and Langfield-Smith 2007, Chapman 2005, 
Chua 2007, Nyamori et al. 2001). Recently, an emerging body of SMA research, here labelled 
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‘accounting and strategising’, has therefore started to focus on how accounting information 
plays a role in the strategic action on a day-to-day basis (Ahrens and Chapman 2005, Hansen 
and Mouritsen 2005, Jørgensen and Messner 2010, Miller and O’Leary 2005, Skærbæk and 
Tryggestad 2010). These studies show that top management is an important recipient, but one 
recipient alongside others (Ahrens and Chapman 2005, Jørgensen and Messner 2010). For 
example, Skærbæk and Tryggestad (2010) demonstrated how officers, captains and union 
representatives emerged unexpectedly as recipients of accounting information when they 
reacted to top management’s view on strategy. The importance of unexpected recipients is 
supported by other studies (Ahrens and Chapman 2005, Hansen and Mouritsen 2005, 
Jørgensen and Messner 2010). Ahrens and Chapman (2005), for example, illustrated the 
importance of local restaurant managers’ use of financial and non-financial information for 
the company’s strategic development. Within the ‘accounting and strategising’ literature, 
management accountants are still an important preparer group (Jørgensen and Messner 2010, 
Skærbæk and Tryggestad 2010). However, the management accountants are being challenged 
by other groups. In Jørgensen and Messner’s (2010) study, for instance, it is project managers 
who present the accounting numbers for the top management and explain the assumptions 
behind the numbers. Similar findings were identified by Skærbæk and Tryggestad (2010, 
p.118), who stressed the importance of people outside the company’s accounting department 
and top management team. They labelled them ‘accountants in the wild’. This group of people 
problematised the management accountants’ calculations and developed new calculations to 
re-direct the company’s strategy.  
As to focus, when accounting information plays a role in strategic actions on a day-to-
day basis, it covers a broad range of financial and non-financial information (Ahrens and 
Chapman 2005, Hansen and Mouritsen 2005, Jørgensen and Messner 2010, Miller and 
O’Leary 2005, Skærbæk and Tryggestad 2010). For example, investment calculations, 
responsibility center organisation, SWOT analysis and value-chain analysis provided 
information mobilised to intervene in the strategic decision-making process within the studied 
company (Skærbæk and Tryggestad 2010). Furthermore, in their study of accounting and 
strategising in a product development setting, Jørgensen and Messner (2010) found that some 
critical decisions were based on non-financial information about functionalities, quality and 
production design. These considerations were used by the managers as indications of the 
financial implications of the decisions made. Some of the information used is in aggregated 
form, but mainly it is disaggregated. Hansen and Mouritsen (2005) described BSC as being 
designed and used within the companies studied to handle a specific organisational problem, 
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and the BSC applications created different solutions for the companies. Skærbæk and 
Tryggestad (2010) illustrated how particular accounting tools such as payback calculations 
were mobilised in specific situations to affect certain strategic choices. Similar results are 
found in other studies in which disaggregated accounting information intervened in strategic 
decision-making (Ahrens and Chapman 2005, Jørgensen and Messner, 2010).  
The orientation of the information used is mainly internal (Ahrens and Chapman 2005, 
Jørgensen and Messner 2010, Skærbæk and Tryggestad 2010). Jørgensen and Messner 
(2010), for instance, showed that a development project needed to fulfil certain payback and 
contribution targets to continue to a next phase. However, some external sources have been 
used. Skærbæk and Tryggestad (2010) illustrated the importance of sources such as the 
governance budget and non-financial accounting information about environmental 
consequences of a competing project in influencing strategic development. The direction of 
the information flow is primarily unilateral: people within the company collect internal and 
external information in order to make more informed decisions (Ahrens and Chapman 2005).  
 
2.3 SMA in close inter-organisational relationships 
Building on the emergent view of strategy, a recent body of strategy literature emphasises the 
importance of close inter-organisational relationships (Baraldi 2008, Baraldi et al. 2007, 
Gadde et al. 2003, Halinen et al. 1999, Harrison and Prenkert 2009). Through this theoretical 
lens, the core of a company’s strategy is to build and maintain close relationships with other 
organisations, and this shifts the primary aim of any strategy from being the pursuit of victory 
over others to being a collaborative procedure together with others (Baraldi et al. 2007, 
McLoughlin and Horan 2002). Through these close relationships, resources and activities are 
made available, which can be mobilised and exploited by a company with the intention of 
enhancing its own performance (Baraldi 2008). Customers and/or suppliers are seen as an 
active part in strategic decision-making, and not simply part of a passive environment to 
which one adapts (Harrison and Prenkert 2009, McLoughlin and Horan 2002). Because the 
determination of strategy in close relationships also involves reacting to close customers’ 
and/or suppliers’ actions, strategic change is not always planned and, therefore, this line of 
research opposes the deliberate view of strategy (Baraldi 2008). Much of what companies do 
and many of their stable patterns of actions were never formally planned, so in many cases the 
strategy realised may differ from the strategy originally planned by top management. The 
dynamics of strategy are therefore driven by both planned and unexpected events in close 
inter-organisational relationships (Harrison and Prenkert 2009, McLoughlin and Horan 2002). 
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We argue that such a view on strategy creates opportunities for developing and refining the 
SMA concept. The following paragraphs advance some propositions about SMA in close 
inter-organisational relationships. These propositions should, however, be seen as tentative, to 
be confirmed or altered based on the observed use of accounting information in the strategic 
decisions in our case company. 
Regarding recipients, the literature on strategy proposes that those involved in the close 
relationships often make the strategic decisions (Baraldi et al. 2007). Therefore, the focus 
expands beyond top management to also include middle and lower level managers and key 
specialists (Baraldi et al. 2007, Harrison and Prenkert 2009). This is in line with the calls for 
future research on SMA (Langfield-Smith 2008, Nixon and Burns 2012). As Langfield-Smith 
(2008, p. 224) put it: ‘Given the spread of management accounting work to other functions, 
the organization future research should not just be focused on the output of accounting 
departments. Understanding how management accounting practices come to the attention of 
organizational actors and how they are implemented and developed will continue to be a 
source of interesting research.’ The preparers can be management accountants as well as 
other groups of actors who support decision makers. Thus, the preparers are likely to be 
‘accountants in the wild’ as Skærbæk and Tryggestad (2010) labelled them. In close 
relationships, these preparers can be middle managers or key specialists, but it is important to 
acknowledge that because strategy builds on interacting, adapting and learning in close inter-
organisational relationships (Harrison and Prenkert 2009), individuals working for the close 
partners can also provide important information for strategic decision-making.   
The focus of the accounting information used can range widely from financial 
information, such as budgets, revenues, costs and investment calculations to non-financial 
information regarding capacity utilization, customer satisfaction, throughput time and quality 
(Gadde et al. 2003). People in the collaborating companies often need to exchange 
information to handle unexpected problems and opportunities that arise in close relationships 
(Baraldi et al. 2007). They therefore use detailed financial and non-financial accounting 
information about both their own company and the other company’s operations to support 
them in identifying improvements, making adaptations and initiating change (Baraldi 2008). 
Aggregated information about products and markets is often not a relevant source of data 
because a company’s products or services are seldom given in industrial markets (Harrison 
and Prenkert 2009). Rather, the information is expected to mainly concern the company’s 
unique connections to close customers and/or suppliers because of the interdependence 
created by adaptations of resources and activities (Gadde et al. 2003). Some close 
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relationships have been shown to require considerable investments in terms of time and 
resources, but sometimes these relationships are not associated with a large profit margin 
(Baraldi et al. 2007). However, these close relationships can contribute by introducing indirect 
benefits, such as channelling important knowledge that can be leveraged in other relationships 
(Gadde et al. 2003). The outcome of investments in one close relationship often appears as 
decreased costs or increased revenues in other relationships. This implies that, if they are to be 
of significant value, accounting techniques used in connection with SMA in close inter-
organisational relationships need to capture the direct effects of a company’s decisions on the 
company itself and on its relationships, as well as the indirect benefits for third parties 
(Baraldi et al. 2007). 
The orientation of information is expected to have a range from internal details to 
external information about close customers and/or suppliers (Baraldi 2008, Gadde et al. 2003, 
Harrison and Prenkert 2009). The interdependence and high adaptations of activities, 
resources and actors between the company and its close partners create a need not only to 
collect information, but also to disperse information to close customers and suppliers. Hence, 
the information flow between the company and its close partners can be expected to be 
bilateral. Each of the close partners needs to receive a unique set of information to make it 
possible for each of them to identify improvements. Table 1 summarises how SMA is viewed 
and analysed in the existing literature to enable comparisons to be made with the use of SMA 
in close inter-organisational relationships. As shown in the table, SMA in close relationships 
shares some important characteristics with the ‘accounting and strategising’ literature, mainly 
regarding recipients and preparers. However, there are also important differences. These 
concern the importance of acknowledging individuals working for the close partners as 
preparers, the use of disaggregated accounting information about unique connections to close 
partners and about indirect benefits to third parties, and the importance of bilateral 
information flow.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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3. Methodology: studying strategic management accounting in close inter-organisational 
relationships 
 
3.1 Research setting – industrial robots 
This paper presents a case study of Robotics, a business unit of ABB, a large multinational 
company. Robotics develops, manufactures, and sells robots and is one of the world’s largest 
robot manufacturers. The annual turnover of Robotics is about 250 million Euros and the 
company employs 600 people. All of the major functions of Robotics, such as product 
development, marketing, purchasing and production are located in Västerås, Sweden. The 
annual sales volume varies between 8 000 and 10 000 robots. An industrial robot is comprised 
of two main parts, a robot, which performs the actual activities, and an industrial control 
system, which steers and controls the robot’s actions. In the robotics industry, long-term 
decisions concerning future revenue and cost streams are largely dependent on involving 
close customers (Katila 2002, Katila and Ahuja 2002). Relying on theoretical sampling 
(Eisenhardt 1989), Robotics offered two compelling reasons for making the study: First, it 
operates in an industrial market with strong technical and financial interdependencies to close 
customers, and we wanted to study SMA in a setting where close inter-organisational 
relationships are important. Second, Robotics offered a good opportunity to study the role of 
accounting in emergent strategies as we requested and were granted access to the top 
management and management accountants as well as the middle and lower level managers 
and key specialists.   
 
3.2 Research design – a single case study using a focal actor strategy  
The decision was made to conduct a single case study of Robotics because of the need to 
capture individuals on multiple levels and to describe the various SMA practices related to 
strategic decision-making in close relationships. A large number of interviews was needed to 
grasp the complexity inherent in the development and manufacturing of robots. In addition, 
since close relationships in this industry are complex, involving individuals and processes on 
several hierarchical levels, there was a need to restrict the research scope to one case study. 
Focusing on one single case study has also been favoured by several researchers studying 
strategy in close customer relationships (e.g. Baraldi et al. 2007, Halinen and Törnroos 2005).  
Another aspect of our research design was the choice to study close relationships from 
the perspective of one company (Halinen and Törnroos 2005). This has been criticised as it is 
perceived to give a one-sided view of inter-organisational relationships because of the risk 
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that the accounts examined are biased and that important aspects of the topic under 
investigation are missed (Caglio and Ditillo 2008). We acknowledge this criticism; however 
our choice to concentrate on a focal actor was made because we were interested in exploring 
how SMA was used in strategic decision-making by Robotics. In this way, this is not an 
investigation of inter-organisational accounting in general, but rather, it is a study that, from 
one company’s perspective, considers SMA practices that involve close inter-organisational 
relationships. Another more pragmatic argument relates to the above-mentioned inherent 
complexity of the robotics industry. There was a need to delimit the research and a large 
number of interviews were needed to understand Robotics, the evolution of its strategy over 
time and the related SMA practices adopted in this context.  
 
3.3 Data collection and data analysis  
Our case analysis draws primarily on semi-structured interviews conducted between 2002 and 
2009. These interviews were part of a larger study that also involved interviews with 
Robotics’ staff about accounting and inter-organisational new product development. The first 
set of interviews in the fall of 2002 investigated primarily Robotics’ use of accounting in its 
cooperation with customers and suppliers. It became clear that large contracts and product 
development played a crucial role in Robotics, and many of the interviewees explained the 
complex technical issues involved in developing industrial robots. From 2003-2005, therefore, 
interviews became focused on the use of accounting in large contracts and the importance of 
such contracts for the company’s strategic development. It became evident that the then 
current product-development projects were linked to a major strategic re-orientation in 
Robotics, i.e. the increased focus on close customer relationships with automotive companies 
in North America. Thus, the interviews were conducted with key individuals involved in this 
re-orientation. Finally, the interviews conducted between 2007 and 2009 were solely focused 
on the actors involved in the strategic re-orientation and on the role of accounting in the 
strategic decisions taken. The major factor behind this long period of data collection was the 
complexity of the setting, our own learning process, and the possibility of continuously 
returning to Robotics to pose more focused questions and to obtain clarification where 
required. As several authors have highlighted, case study research rarely follows a linear 
course (Eisenhardt 1989, Langley 1999, Lukka 2005). Instead, researchers often return in 
several iterations to theory and to empirics as new discoveries are made.  
The interviews were typically conducted in company offices and then transcribed and 
coded. A total of 23 persons were interviewed, many of them several times, with the average 
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duration of an interview being about one hour. In total, 46 interviews were made with 
employees at several levels in the company, including the top management and people 
working within different parts of Robotics, such as, purchasing, development, quality, 
logistics, production, accounting and sales, with the intention of ensuring that different 
perspectives would be represented. Interviewing people in different positions was vital as the 
strategist might be a top manager, but people below the top management might also be 
involved (Baraldi et al. 2007). The informants were also chosen because they had worked in 
Robotics for such a long time that they had experienced the strategic re-orientation being 
studied. Table 2 provides further details about the interviews.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Each interview began with an introduction by the informant in which he/she clarified his or 
her current role and explained what he/she had been doing in his/her previous positions within 
Robotics. This introduction was followed by somewhat specific questions related to the role 
of accounting information in strategic decision-making and to the nature of the cooperation 
with customers. Finally, the informants were asked to recount other experiences that they 
deemed relevant to issues raised during the interview.  
The interviews were complemented with direct observation and with internal and 
external documents. With the intention of obtaining a feel for how the site operated, one of 
the researchers was given a desk in Robotics’ office landscape, and was granted access to all 
internal documents available on the intranet. He was able to interact with engineers, 
purchasers, and quality and production managers and had access to strategic plans and other 
documents. He was also given financial information concerning the content of contracts, and 
overall sales and profits. In total, 22 days were spent at Robotics.  
Since our focus is on realised strategies in Robotics, this means that the informants, by 
necessity, needed to refer to the past when they identified and discussed the key strategic 
decisions. When interviewees talk about the past, however, there is always the possibility that 
their memories might have become distorted over time. There is also a danger that, when 
people refer back to earlier events, there is some romanticisation of previous actions. The 
authors tried to overcome these potential problems by asking many people to give their own 
account, on the basis that not all of them could possibly have misremembered. Different 
descriptions of the same issue were compared, and complemented with documents whenever 
possible.  
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3.4 Data analysis  
Our research process followed an abduction approach (Dubois and Gadde 2002, Dubois and 
Gibbert 2010), where data collection, data analysis and theoretical development emerged 
iteratively. In the data analysis, each interview transcript, the notes from the direct 
observation and the internal and external documents were read carefully by the researchers 
and the contents were manually coded and analysed in the context of the theoretical concepts 
of the study. Theory was used to form a skeletal framework, to sensitise the research to 
particular issues and to provide a way of illuminating the relevant aspects of the case 
(Laughlin 1995, 2004). For example, the material on SMA was related to preparers, 
recipients, focus and orientation of information.       
 A central issue during the data analysis was to select and describe key strategic 
decisions from material that included a large number of interviews, direct observation and 
internal documentation. As several authors have highlighted (Dubois and Gadde 2002, Dyer 
and Wilkins 1991, Eisenhardt 1989), this can be a daunting task, or as Langley (1999, p. 694) 
put it: ‘… this is where the central challenge lies: moving from a shapeless data spaghetti 
toward some kind of theoretical understanding.’ Given the importance of automotive 
customers, it became natural to start with the strategic transformation process that Robotics 
had gone through, when the company had increased its focus on close relationships with large 
automotive customers in North America. One additional key strategic decision soon emerged; 
the decision to sign the largest contract in Robotics’ history. However, as pointed out by 
Halinen et al. (1999), the determination of what constitutes a key strategic decision is very 
much an empirical matter, and as previously mentioned, we used Baraldi et al.’s definition: a 
choice that has significant consequences for the company’s economic performance over time 
and that it becomes committed to. With this definition, Robotics’ decision to sign the large 
contract with General Motors was clearly a strategic one. The commercial magnitude of the 
contract was unheard of for Robotics in particular and the robot industry in general. Up to that 
point, no robot manufacturer had signed a contract for more than 1000 robot systems. 
Normally, a large order for Robotics was around 400-500 systems so selling more than 1000 
robot systems in one deal had a huge commercial impact. Robotics gained market share and 
became the largest robot manufacturer in the world. By winning the order and beating the 
Japanese robot manufacturer Fanuc (General Motors’ preferred supplier at the time), Robotics 
surpassed Fanuc and took over the number one spot in the global market. Furthermore, due to 
the volume advantages, Robotics’ profitability increased in the years after the contract. In 
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fact, Robotics became one of the top performing divisions within the ABB group. In addition 
to this internal and external recognition, Robotics also positioned itself as a profitable growth 
company, which allowed it to start one of the largest investment programmes in the 
company’s history, an important long-term commitment. The contract with General Motors 
also impacted heavily on Robotics’ product portfolio. For example, the new generation of 
industrial control systems was tested and evaluated by General Motors. As a consequence, 
many of the features in the new industrial control system were directly linked to feedback 
from General Motors’ engineers and production personal. 
 
4. Case analysis: Strategic management accounting at Robotics  
To analyse SMA at Robotics, we will focus on the largest strategic transformation in the 
company’s history. In the following sections, this transformation will be analysed in light of 
two key strategic decisions. They are: the decision to increase the focus on close inter-
organisational relationships with automotive customers in North America, and the decision to 
sign the above-mentioned contract with General Motors. This includes the role of strategic 
management-accounting practices in these decisions. First, we will provide some general 
information about Robotics and its customers to further our understanding of the two strategic 
decisions.  
 
4.1 Robotics and its customers 
The robot industry consists of two major customer groups. The first group is ‘automotive 
customers’, who buy large volumes of robots; Robotics has close inter-organisational 
relationships with members of this group. Examples of such customers are Volvo, BMW, 
Peugeot and General Motors. The second group is ‘non-automotive customers’ who are all the 
other customers based in industries such as foundry, plastics, packaging, electronics and food 
industries. These customers buy robots in smaller volumes than the first group, and with few 
adaptations. In the close inter-organisational relationships with the automotive customers, 
there are both technical and organisational adaptations. As previously mentioned, a robot 
system consists of both an industrial control system and the robot. Owing to the complexity of 
the robotic systems, Robotics develops industrial control systems and robots (of various sizes) 
in separate development projects. In most product-development projects, automotive 
customers are highly involved both in deciding the primary functionality and in conducting 
field tests before a new product is officially released.  
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There are also important adaptions on a systems level because automotive customers 
integrate the robots into a larger production system. This requires that Robotics ensures that 
there is suitable ‘systems functionality’, i.e., the possibility to integrate several robot systems 
with one another. Since the interface between Robotics and the automotive customers 
includes both product and system adaptions, there is also a need for large organisational 
adaptations. For example, to coordinate product development, there is a cross-functional team 
at Robotics which meets with a cross-functional team from the automotive customer. In 
contrast, for the non-automotive customer group, the relationships are arm’s-length. The sales 
process is led by a single salesperson who meets the customer and talks about the benefits of 
one robot. Often, these customers are first time buyers, so there is a need for some education 
or training, which is done through standardised brochures and manuals. There might be 
customisations, but customers select these from a pre-order list and Robotics then charges 
accordingly.  
Before Robotics decided to increase its focus on North America, it already had close 
inter-organisational relationships with many of the large automotive manufacturers, such as 
Volvo, BMW, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler. Thus, the scope in North America was not 
to develop entirely new customer relationships, but instead grow market share within ‘the big 
three’: General Motors, Ford and Chrysler.  
 
4.2 Strategic decision 1 — increased focus on close inter-organisational relationships with 
automotive customers in North America  
Even though Robotics was the largest European robot manufacturer, this position had, 
primarily, been acquired from the company’s success in arm’s-length relationships with 
customers from the foundry, plastics, packaging, electronics and food industries. However, 
total sales to these customers were not enough to cover the increasing costs of product 
development. The top management in Robotics needed, therefore, to aim to obtain customers 
likely to enter into larger purchases and thereby spread out the increased fixed costs over a 
more substantial volume. Robotics’ top management saw considerable growth potential with 
large automotive customers in North America. The main competitor, Fanuc, had a joint 
venture in place with General Motors, so Robotics’ initial ambition was to focus attention 
primarily on Ford and Chrysler. As previously mentioned, automotive customers are 
experienced buyers that require customised solutions. A normal size automotive factory has 
hundreds of large, medium and small robots which are combined into different production 
cells. Thus, the large automotive customers were considered to be ideal partners for providing 
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Robotics with both large volumes and important insights for the product development of 
current and future generations of robots. One sales manager described the importance of the 
decision by saying: ‘We decided to start to listen to the automotive customers... We said, let’s 
do what they ask us to do.’ 
However, despite an increased focus on automotive customers, Robotics still needed a 
large number of arm’s-length customers. Financially, large automotive customers could 
represent considerable volumes of sales, but with low margins. Arm’s-length customers paid 
200-300% more than the production costs, and even though the volume associated with each 
arm’s-length customer was small, in combination, they gave Robotics an acceptable sales 
volume while also, and more importantly, providing good profit margins.  
 
4.2.1 Strategic management accounting  
The role of accounting in this first key strategic decision corroborates the propositions 
developed in the ‘mainstream SMA’ literature. The management accountants were the 
preparers and the top management the recipients: all interviewees in Robotics agreed on the 
important role the management accountants played in providing the information needed for 
top management to make the decision. It was the management accountants who mapped the 
growth trends in different customer segments relative to Robotics’ market share and collected 
the information about robot usage (see below). Thus, as in Tillman and Goddard’s findings 
(2008), the management accountants were called upon to help top managers to understand the 
situation and to make it more transparent.  
When it comes to the focus of the information used, Robotics used financial and non-
financial accounting information such as competitor cost assessment, competitive position 
monitoring, strategic costing and value-chain analysis in making its strategic decision. For 
strategic costing, statistics were collected about robot usage, and Robotics’ top management 
realised that robot penetration was relatively low in the United States compared to Japan and 
Europe. Another example of strategic costing was the mapping of growth trends in different 
customer segments and examining the results relative to Robotics’ market share. This analysis 
showed that there was considerable potential in an increased focus on large automotive 
customers.  
Competitive position monitoring provided Robotics’ managers with the information that 
Fanuc had a well-established relationship with General Motors, which resulted in Robotics’ 
initial ambition to focus on the relationships with Ford and Chrysler. Robotics used 
accounting information in aggregated form to understand its position in the market and the 
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value chain. For instance, by using competitor cost assessment, i.e. the systematic analysis of 
competitors’ costs, the CEO of Robotics motivated a major cost-cutting program (called P25) 
with aggregated information relating to different competitors’ costs. A technical manager 
explained how the CEO showed powerpoint slides: 
 
‘That’s when the big cost-hunt started, the P25 program… and… the background was that 
our CEO compared us with our competitors… I remember he had a favourite slide 
showing the price developments here and in different parts of the world … he concluded 
that prices would be harmonised and that we had to cut costs by 25% to stay competitive.’ 
 
Given these challenges, value-chain analysis was seen as an important way to reduce costs in 
the P25 program. However, the accounting information used was still mainly in an aggregated 
form and did not consist of unique detailed information about specific customers and 
suppliers. Through value chain analysis, Robotics exploited links to its suppliers by adapting 
or eliminating all activities with an associated cost that did not create value.  
With regards to orientation, the information included internal and external details when 
accounting information was used to compare customers, suppliers, competitors and the 
company’s own operations in terms of various features, such as price, cost structures and 
market propositions. The direction of the information flow was unilateral; Robotics collected 
information from the external environment in order to make more informed decisions and to 
improve its competitive position.   
 
4.3 Strategic decision 2: Signing the General Motors contract 
The geographical expansion to North America proved to be more challenging than expected. 
To further improve service delivery, Robotics created so-called ‘dedicated cross-functional 
sales teams’ for the large automotive customers General Motors, Ford and Chrysler. The 
teams were comprised of six or seven people and included middle managers with experience 
from sales, engineering and quality management. The resultant combination of skills was 
deemed necessary as it was difficult for a single salesperson to discuss complex engineering 
solutions with automotive companies.  
Even though the initial plan was to aggressively target Ford and Chrysler, General 
Motors unexpectedly became Robotics’ largest customer in North America. An important 
driver behind this was the increased power exercised by the purchasing department at General 
Motors. To drastically reduce costs, the purchasing department wanted to challenge Fanuc by 
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giving more volume to its second-source supplier, Robotics. However, just before delivery, 
General Motor’s factory management refused to accept the robots from Robotics, as they 
wanted to continue working with Fanuc. Tensions between the purchasing and production 
departments built up, and, to resolve these tensions, the robots from Robotics were placed in 
different divisions. This happened to be a lucky turn of events because it meant that Robotics’ 
dedicated cross-functional sales team increased their network of personal contacts within 
General Motors. Robotics started to position itself as a key player for the upcoming contract 
for General Motors’ large robot investment program.  
In the initial bid, Robotics chose to offer its existing product, called S3. At this point, 
Robotics’ new industrial control system was still undergoing testing. It consisted of two 
development projects: one involving the software and the other the hardware for the industrial 
control system. However, just days before General Motors was due to decide, Robotics’ 
dedicated sales team was informed that S3 was considered to be technically outdated. This 
was a surprise, and the team had to act quickly. They decided to show General Motors the 
new software. As one of the production managers involved described it: 
 
‘I was called to a meeting with one of their [General Motor’s] superintendents. He said, 
let’s go down and have a look. We went down and I tried to explain the advantages of our 
[new software] system. Nothing touched him! It was not until I said that we had more 
computer power in the programmable interface than we had in the entire S3 generation 
that he was triggered. ‘Does that mean you can run parallel execution?’ he said, ‘Yes,’ I 
replied. ‘Good, book the entire day tomorrow and I will have my best technicians ready to 
go through the system,’ he said.’ 
 
By quickly improvising and changing the product being offered, the Robotics’ sales team 
thereby managed to convince General Motors’ technical engineers that their product was 
interesting, and, in combination, with a low price, Robotics managed to secure the contract. 
The initial volumes were estimated to be 1073 robots, which was more than double the size of 
any previous order. The chief financial officer expressed the value of the winning the GM 
contract: ‘General Motors was number one. There was no question about it. They bought 
10 % of our robots… I mean, what a customer!’  
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4.3.1 Strategic management accounting 
The SMA practices implemented when bidding for the contract corroborate the propositions 
defined in this paper for SMA in close inter-organisational relationships. The recipients 
included not only the top management in Robotics, but also those individuals who were most 
deeply involved in the relationship with General Motors, and the latter proved to be important 
strategists. Succinctly, the boundary-spanning middle-level managers with expertise in sales, 
quality and engineering used financial and non-financial information to deal with unexpected 
opportunities or unforeseen problems to put Robotics in a position to win and sign the GM 
contract. For example, one main reason the General Motors engineers were so impressed with 
the new Robotics software was that the Robotics managers on site could show that this 
software would enable a much faster and more cost-efficient production process.  
Regarding preparers, our interviewees stressed that the management accountants were 
not involved in these decisions because in the automotive industry the technical complexity of 
orders is so high, and it was often the case that the cross-functional team needed to act on 
unexpected events and to discuss its recommendations quickly with Robotics’ top 
management. There was simply no time to involve the management accountants. The majority 
of the middle-level and top managers involved in winning the General Motors contract were 
engineers who had worked for a long time in various positions in Robotics and had relevant 
technical competence. These engineers had also been trained in accounting to be able to make 
quick decisions based on both technical and financial considerations. In addition, purchasers 
and engineers from General Motors were important preparers who provided Robotics’ cross-
functional sales team with the vital information required to win the contract.  
With respect to focus, Robotics had little use for the aggregated accounting information 
about products and markets. Rather, the financial and non-financial accounting information on 
the unique connections between Robotics and General Motors was of overriding importance 
for winning the large contract. This included a business case with a detailed internal rate of 
return (IRR) calculation. The resulting IRR was compared with the cost of capital in Robotics 
to estimate the profitability. The business case was discussed in meetings between the 
members of the dedicated cross-functional sales team and top managers. The calculations 
were based upon a ten-year perspective and included the initial sale of the robots, the 
subsequent sales of spare parts, and the service provided as a result of the robot orders. As the 
technology director put it:  
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‘There was a large Excel sheet with numbers and numbers, on volumes and revenues for 
the robot sales, our costs for the robots and product development, service revenues, spare 
parts revenues and associated costs.’  
 
The price level was quite rigid, so the prognoses focused on the other important input 
variables. For example, the interviewees argued that the most important part of the calculation 
was the gap between the current cost level for the robot and the (much lower) cost level that 
was assumed from year 2 and onwards. Several managers explained that, when making the 
bid for the contract, they were unable to fully comprehend how the difference could be made 
up. As the technology director described the situation: ‘We knew we could not make all these 
cost savings on our own, nor with the help of our suppliers, but if we got to work with 
General Motors, we assumed we would get good input from them.’ Similarly, a product 
manager explained:  
 
‘The calculations were important because we knew our current cost level and we knew 
what we had included in our 10-year calculation in terms of lower costs. This meant we 
had a gap. And this gap needed to be filled largely with the help of General Motors’ 
input. We had an idea of what we needed to do, but we had not worked everything out 
when we signed the deal. Some of the cost savings still needed to be figured out, and we 
needed General Motors for this.’  
  
Thus, Robotics’ calculations assumed input would be given indicating how to lower costs 
through their close interaction with General Motors. One example was to exchange hardware 
for software because this would significantly lower the cost of material. As a product manager 
put it: ‘We thought: what if we could redesign the product to include software instead of 
hardware. This would give a totally different cost picture: we would save a lot through these 
types of changes. And General Motors was the expert in robots, with its own laboratory, 
etcetera.’   
However, even with the future cost savings included in the calculations, the internal rate 
of return on the business case for the contract was lower than Robotics’ cost of capital. The 
chief financial officer explained: ‘We did not cheer at the numbers — low margins and bad 
profitability.’ Still, the top management decided to bid for the contract at the price indicated 
by General Motors. One important reason was the qualitative incorporation of indirect 
benefits. The overriding consideration was the assumption that General Motors would invest 
370
  
time and effort in Robotics’ technological development and thereby improve Robotics’ 
prospects for attaining revenue gains in its relationships with other customers. The managers 
in Robotics did not put numbers on these indirect benefits, nor did they include them in the 
calculation. The potential benefits were discussed qualitatively in a systematic way. As the 
sales manager put it:  
 
‘Over time, with a close relationship with an important customer like General Motors, 
you receive lots of knowledge from the customer. When we made the decision to bid, we 
assumed that this information would provide an important input in revealing how to lower 
costs and in identifying what important trends were to come in the future. This would 
improve our margins in our deals with other customers from general industry and 
improve our development of future generations of robots. Of course, this had a high value 
for us.’ 
 
Another indirect benefit was that the large order was seen as a way to stir up some action in 
the company and to get everyone to focus on achieving cost savings. As the supply chain 
director put it: ‘With the largest order in history, of course we thought we would get action. 
We gained momentum and speed; there would be pressure to become more efficient if we got 
this large order.’  
Concerning orientation, the information used had primarily an external focus and the 
information flow was bilateral, Robotics collected and unexpectedly received information 
from General Motors, but it also dispersed information to General Motors. Describing the 
importance of informal personal contacts for winning large contracts, the sales manager said: 
 
‘You’ve got to have local people out there who work on their [General Motor’s] top 
management. If you don’t have the right individuals it’s damned difficult to sell. If the 
individuals have the right connections, they get a lot of information.’  
 
The non-financial information about the out-dated S3 product that Robotics unexpectedly 
received from General Motors was picked up by the members of Robotics’ dedicated cross-
functional sales team during their informal contacts with General Motors’ staff. In their turn, 
this team also spread the information about their new software informally to General Motors’ 
engineers. This information exchange was vital for Robotics to bid for and win the contract. 
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5. Discussion 
It is evident from the case analysis presented here that focusing on close inter-organisational 
relationships with automotive customers in North America became a core part of Robotics’ 
strategy (Baraldi et al. 2007, Gadde et al. 2003). Through the relationship with General 
Motors, resources and activities were made available to Robotics that could be mobilised and 
exploited. Robotics’ interdependence with General Motors became, therefore, an important 
source of competitive advantage (Harrison and Prenkert 2009). Customers from other 
industries, involved in activities such as plastic fabrication, packaging and foundry were not 
prioritised in the same way as Robotics maintained arm’s-length relationships with them.  
Table 3 summarises the SMA practices in Robotics. Our findings suggest that Robotics’ 
use of SMA in the first key strategic decision largely corresponds with the results from the 
‘mainstream SMA’ literature. This is not surprising since Robotics was predominantly 
involved in arm’s-length relationships when it started courting the automotive industry, and 
the strategic decision did not involve unique connections to a specific close customer. The 
management accountants acted as preparers in that they provided the top management, i.e., 
the recipients, with the information needed to make the strategic decisions, for example, on 
the growth potential in different customer segments (Bromwich 1990, Tillmann and Goddard 
2008). With respect to focus, financial and non-financial accounting information was 
primarily in an aggregated form and involved techniques such as competitor cost assessment 
(Bromwich 1990), competitive position monitoring (Simmonds 1986), strategic costing 
(Shank and Govindarajan 1988) and value chain analysis (Shank and Govindarajan 1992). 
Concerning orientation, the information had an external focus and the direction of 
information flow was unilateral, in that Robotics collected information from the external 
environment to enable it to make more informed decisions and improve its competitive 
position (Bromwich and Bhimani 1994, Shank and Govindarajan 1993).  
However, as seen in Table 3, the SMA practices related to signing the contract with 
General Motors differed from what has been discussed in the existing SMA literature. In the 
following, these practices are analysed. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.1 Strategic management accounting in close inter-organisational relationships 
As was pointed out in the introduction of this paper, the existing literature on SMA has not 
analysed the importance of close inter-organisational relationships for strategic decision-
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making. The decision to sign the General Motors contract increased the focus on such a 
relationship for Robotics and entailed several unexpected problems and opportunities. The 
handling of these problems and opportunities gradually shaped the strategy of Robotics. Thus, 
SMA in close inter-organisational relationships did not primarily arise because of activities 
that had already been planned, but rather, because financial and non-financial information was 
valuable for solving the unexpected problems that had arisen and for exploiting emerging 
opportunities.  
When it comes to the recipients, our findings suggest that not only top management’s 
planning, but also ad-hoc and unexpected events involving middle managers and key 
specialists within Robotics, shaped the strategies realised by Robotics. In the close 
relationship with General Motors, the strategists were those people who were most deeply 
involved in the interactions with General Motors staff, and these were, in the main, middle 
level managers and key specialists from the operational units. This supports the findings in the 
‘accounting and strategising’ literature because these results illustrate that strategy is not 
something that exists prior to accounting, but an activity that is developed in tandem with it 
when calculations are performed by individuals on different levels within a company (e.g. 
Chapman 2005, Chua 2007, Jörgensen and Messner 2010, Skærbæk and Tryggestad 2010). 
We augment these findings by illustrating the importance of close inter-organisational 
relationships for understanding the role of accounting in strategising.  
Such an analysis can be connected to previous empirical research in the ‘accounting and 
strategising’ literature. More specifically, even though previous studies have focused on intra-
organisational activities, anecdotal evidence suggests that an inter-organisational perspective 
is important. For instance, the study by Jörgensen and Messner (2010) describes a strategy 
emerging from a concrete problem at one of the focal firm’s closest and most important 
customers. Furthermore, the results in Jörgensen and Messner (2010) indicate that adaptations 
to different customers create variety so that modularisation eventually becomes necessary to 
facilitate work with these customers. For example, a senior manager in that study described 
how modularisation became the answer to developing new customer relationships with large 
customers such as Heinz Ketchup. The Heinz example is comparable to Robotics’ interaction 
with General Motors. Like Heinz, General Motors was a large potential customer that would 
require customer specific functionality. Our findings therefore suggest that the strategising 
activities that Jörgensen and Messner (2010) label as intra-organisational may also have an 
important inter-organisational dimension where individuals on multiple levels within the firm 
and within the customer firm are involved. Thus, our findings add to the ‘accounting and 
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strategising’ literature because they not only show that ‘operational’ and ‘strategic’ issues are 
intertwined (e.g. Ahrens and Chapman 2005, 2007, Fauré and Rouleau 2011, Jörgensen and 
Messner 2010), but also how these processes evolve interactively through collaboration with 
close customers. 
Regarding preparers, our case indicates that, in close relationships, SMA practices were 
mainly established by middle-level managers and key specialists who used financial and non-
financial information to assess unexpected opportunities and unforeseen problems. The role of 
management accountants in these SMA practices was limited. These findings challenge the 
prevailing view in the ‘mainstream SMA’ literature (Shank and Govindarajan 1993, Tillmann 
and Goddard 2008). Our findings support the ‘accounting and strategising’ literature, where 
middle managers, key specialists and their use of accounting information can all be seen to be 
an important part of the SMA practices (e.g. Ahrens and Chapman 2005, Hansen and 
Mouritsen 2005, Jörgensen and Messner 2010, Skærbæk and Tryggestad 2010). However, our 
findings also extend this literature by illustrating that important strategists involved in SMA 
were also actors outside the focal company. For instance, purchasers and engineers from 
General Motors provided Robotics’ cross-functional sales team with vital information 
required to win the contract.  
Our results also add to the debate on the need for management accountants to participate 
more frequently and more proactively in strategic decision-making than is generally the case 
(e.g. Nyamori et al. 2001). Simmonds (1981), for instance, suggested that the management 
accountants were the ideal people to collect and analyse data relevant for strategic decision-
making. By gaining operational knowledge and communication skills, the management 
accountants could be important actors in formal cross-functional teams, and assume the role 
of liaison across functional boundaries and between different levels of management (Coad 
1996, Roslender and Hart 2003). Our findings point in another direction: The management 
accountants were not involved in the strategic decisions concerning the close relationship with 
General Motors because the technical complexity was too high, and because there was often a 
need to act on unexpected events. There was simply no time to involve the management 
accountants, and their lack of in-depth technical knowledge was a barrier to useful 
participation. The majority of the middle-level and top managers, as well as the key 
specialists, were engineers who had worked for a long time in various positions in Robotics 
and had the requisite technical competence. These engineers had also been trained in 
accounting to enable them to make quick decisions based on both technical and financial 
considerations. Langfield-Smith (2008, p. 223) posed an interesting question when she asked: 
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‘Does it matter if the SMA developments are not managed or ‘owned’ by the accounting 
function? The key issue is to consider whether management accountants have any specific or 
unique skills that would benefit SMA implementations and management.’ Our findings show 
that, in an environment of technical complexity such as the manufacturing of industrial robots, 
it was preferable for Robotics to educate their technical experts in the application of a certain 
amount of accounting practice, and this enabled them to assess the financial implications of 
certain decisions.  
Regarding focus, in its close relationship with General Motors, Robotics had little use 
for the aggregated accounting information about products and markets put forward in the 
‘mainstream literature’ on SMA (Bromwich 1990, Guilding 1999). Formal financial IRR 
calculations made visible to Robotics the future cost savings required by a bid for the General 
Motors contract. The managers explained that when the bid was made, they did not know 
exactly how these cost savings could be achieved. In their calculations, Robotics assumed that 
they would receive input on how to lower costs from their close interaction with General 
Motors. In other words, Robotics understood the value of a close customer relationship with 
General Motors, sought it out and included this inter-organisational dimension in its prognosis 
for cost savings. However, even with the future cost savings included in the calculations, the 
IRR for the contract was lower than Robotics’ cost of capital. But Robotics’ managers made 
the strategic decision to bid for the contract anyway because additional qualitative 
information on indirect benefits was of overriding importance. Thus, SMA in close inter-
organisational relationships included indirect benefits, something mainly neglected in the 
existing literature on SMA (Tomkins and Carr 1996, Jörgensen and Messner 2010). Our 
findings show that the indirect benefits involved the belief that General Motors would invest 
time and effort in Robotics’ technological development, thereby contributing to Robotics’ 
ability to attain revenue gains through its relationship with other customers. Another indirect 
benefit was that the large order was seen as a way to promote action in the company and to 
get everyone to focus on achieving cost savings. 
Concerning orientation, the information had mainly an external focus and the 
information flow was bilateral as Robotics not only collected and unexpectedly received 
information, but also dispersed information to General Motors. Our findings point to the 
importance of both formal and informal bilateral information exchange, something neglected 
within the existing SMA literature. Tomkins and Carr (1996) stated, in their reflections on the 
papers in the Management Accounting Research special issue on SMA (1996, p. 272, 
emphasis in original), that: ‘researchers need to incorporate (i) both the informal and formal 
375
  
and (ii) both the accounting and non-accounting elements of information transmission into 
research studies [on SMA]’. Our findings support their statement. Non-financial information 
on technically outdated software and the potential of Robotics’ new software was vital when 
Robotics won the General Motors contract, and this information was informally exchanged 
between the cross-functional sales team and General Motors’ engineers. Furthermore, through 
informal conversations, Robotics dispersed information, but also obtained input from General 
Motors on important trends relevant to the future development of industrial robots, thereby 
stimulating future product development.  
 
5.2 Connections to the literature on inter-organisational accounting 
Even though our primary aim was to contribute to the literature on strategic management 
accounting, the results of this study can also be discussed in the context of the related 
publications on inter-organisational accounting. Following Anthony Hopwood’s call for more 
research on inter-organisational accounting (Hopwood 1996), there have been special issues 
in Accounting, Organizations and Society (1996, 2004, 2008) and Management Accounting 
Research (2006, 2011) as well as edited volumes (Håkansson et al. 2010). As a consequence, 
the inter-organisational accounting literature includes an interesting variety of empirical 
settings and theoretical perspectives (see Caglio and Ditillo 2008, Håkansson and Lind 2007 
for reviews). Recently, this stream of research has highlighted the need to move from static 
towards more dynamic perspectives on inter-organisational accounting (Caglio and Ditillo 
2008, Håkansson et al. 2010). However, what have been largely neglected are the strategic 
implications of these changes. For instance, many of the empirically based papers study inter-
organisational accounting from an operational perspective in functions such as logistics (Coad 
and Cullen 2006, Cäker 2008, Dekker 2003, Mouritsen et al. 2001), purchasing (Agndal and 
Nilsson. 2010, Cuganesan and Lee 2006, Free 2008, Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003), 
product development (Cooper and Slagmulder 2004, Dekker 2004, Mouritsen et al. 2001, Van 
der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens 2008) and sales (Cäker 2007, Håkansson and Lind 2004), 
without analysing how these operational issues may or may not impact on the company’s 
strategy. In light of the results in our paper, this seems like a missed opportunity.  
The study by Mouritsen et al. (2001) is an exception. By outsourcing product 
development (NewTech) and production (LeanTech), the two companies aimed to reduce 
costs and lead-times and increase flexibility. A key finding was that inter-organisational 
accounting in the form of target costing and open-book accounting unexpectedly changed the 
companies’ core competences and thereby impacted on the strategy development of the 
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companies. Our study contributes to the inter-organisational accounting literature by 
conceptually and empirically developing the findings in Mouritsen et al. (2001). 
Conceptually, we draw on strategy literature (e.g. Baraldi 2008, Harrison and Prenkert 2009) 
that emphasises that close inter-organisational relationships have intra-organisational strategic 
effects. With this theoretical perspective, the strategic implications of inter-organisational 
accounting techniques, seen as an unexpected outcome of the study in Mouritsen et al. (2001) 
and hence not analysed in any detail, would rather be considered expected and an important 
starting point for analysis. Empirically, our study provides nuances and details which develop 
the findings in Mouritsen et al. (2001). For example, rather than analysing suppliers as a 
collective, our empirical study of Robotics focuses on one critical close customer relationship 
that contributes to strategic change. This empirical focus is important because it helps to tease 
out details of the role of accounting in the inter-organisational micro-processes of strategising. 
For example, as we have shown, a number of boundary-spanning individuals on lower and 
middle management levels used accounting information both internally within Robotics but 
also interactively to discuss, convince and negotiate activities with General Motors. The use 
of such information is not strategic per se, but in the case of Robotics it concerned the most 
important customer and the accounting information had important strategic consequences. 
Another contribution of our paper is, therefore, to bring the literatures on ‘inter-organisational 
accounting’ and ‘accounting and strategising’ closer both conceptually and empirically. For 
the ‘inter-organisational accounting’ literature, a natural next step is to link strategic decision-
making more explicitly with the current interest in the role of accounting in inter-
organisational dynamics. For the ‘accounting and strategising’ literature, there is, as 
mentioned previously, both theoretical and empirical support for including detailed analysis 
of how the use of accounting information in close customer and/or supplier relationships plays 
a critical role in the emergence of new strategies.  
 Our findings have implications for other debates within the inter-organisational 
accounting literature, too. For example, they raise new questions for the stream of research 
that focuses on inter-organisational cost management. One such study is Cooper and 
Slagmulder (2004). In their study of Komatsu and the supplier Toyo Radiator, the authors 
showed how large cost reductions were made possible through concurrent cost management 
that involved intense interaction and information sharing between the companies. Based on 
the insights from our study, a natural extension for this type of research would be to ask – are 
there strategic implications for Komatsu from this use of concurrent cost management? The 
magnitude of the capacity increase (40 %) in the Komatsu case was seen as a huge success 
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and therefore holds the potential to influence Komatsu’s emergent strategies. Similarly, work 
of this kind speaks to Langfield-Smith’s call (2008), in her review of the SMA literature, to 
analyse whether – and if so how – the use of cost-management techniques subtly affect more 
general practice and influence a company’s strategic development. Furthermore, in relation to 
the stream of research that focuses on inter-organisational product development, Miller and 
O’Leary (2007) demonstrate, in their study of Intel, that technology road maps act as 
important coordinating devices on an industry level. For example, it is through the technology 
road maps that different actors within the semiconductor industry determine when and how to 
make large strategic investments. However, like Mouritsen et al. (2001), Miller and O’Leary 
(2007) offer relatively little detailed description of close customer and supplier relationships. 
We do not know whether or how Intel interacts specifically with certain customers and 
suppliers to influence the industry technology roadmap that is developed. For future research 
in this area, our study indicates an important potential in complementing the industry level 
data with data from close customer and/or supplier relationships to enable a richer 
understanding of how technology road maps emerge as a result of activities on an industry 
level, an inter-organisational level and an intra-organisational level. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This research has made several contributions to the existing literature on SMA (e.g. Cadez 
and Guilding 2008, Chapman 2005, Chua 2007, Jörgensen and Messner 2010, Ma and Tayles 
2009, Nixon and Burns 2012, Simmonds 1981, Skærbæk and Tryggestad 2010, Tillmann and 
Goddard 2008). First, it provided a conceptual comparison between the ‘mainstream SMA’ 
literature, the ‘accounting and strategising’ literature and ‘SMA in close inter-organisational 
relationships’. This demonstrated that SMA in close relationships shares some important 
characteristics with the ‘accounting and strategising’ literature, mainly related to recipients 
and preparers. However, there were also important differences, mainly concerning the role of 
individuals working for close partners as preparers of strategic information, the role of 
disaggregated accounting information about unique connections to close partners and the role 
of indirect benefits that follow from close connections, and finally the role of bilateral flow of 
accounting information, i.e., the company not only collects information but also disperses 
some information within close inter-organisational relationships.   
Second, through an intensive single case study of a global robot manufacturer, Robotics, 
this paper also provides novel empirical evidence on ‘SMA in close inter-organisational 
relationships’. For instance, SMA practices included indirect benefits, something mainly 
378
  
neglected in the existing literature on SMA. These indirect benefits followed from General 
Motors’ willingness to invest time and effort in Robotics’ technological development and 
thereby contribute to Robotics’ ability to attain revenue gains in its interactions with other 
customers. Another indirect benefit that was important in strategic decision-making was that 
the significance of the order was seen as a way to energise the company and get everyone to 
focus on achieving cost savings.  
Our study raises important implications for practice. To start with, managers need to 
shift their mind-set to realise that improvisation and inter-organisational collaboration can be 
the key to success. For example, for managers at Robotics, it was critical to understand the 
implications of the close relationship with General Motors. Rather than analysing a 
homogeneous and anonymous market, it was the interaction and joint problem solving with 
close customers that enabled Robotics to grow into the largest robotics company in the world. 
Given this foundational shift in mind-set, we offer three pieces of practical advice: First to 
train key personal involved in close customer relationships in basic accounting and to 
establish when and how they can make important decisions and when they need to consult 
headquarters for advice. As shown in our case, middle managers and key specialists were 
central in developing the relationship with General Motors. Often, there was no time to ask 
management accountants and top managers for advice. Instead the middle managers and 
specialists had to improvise and use accounting to make important decisions. Second, our 
findings highlight the need for managers to not only encourage the collecting of information 
from close customers, but also the dispersal of information to these customers. Such bilateral 
information flow created mutual learning between Robotics and General Motors which 
affected Robotics’ strategic development. Our study also showed the importance of indirect 
effects from the close relationship with General Motors and other important relationships in 
Robotics' customer portfolio. A third piece of advice is therefore that managers working for 
companies involved in close inter-organisational relationships need to make sure that strategic 
decision-making incorporates indirect benefits, either qualitatively as in the Robotics’ case, or 
quantitatively. Related to this, since many companies organise their sales force into key 
account teams, we see a risk that without this additional focus on indirect effects, these teams 
might focus too much on ‘their customer’ rather than investing time in sharing and learning 
from other close customer relationships. Since our study has shown the importance of close 
inter-organisational relationships for strategic decision-making, such knowledge sharing and 
learning should occur systematically regarding both positive (i.e. indirect benefits) and 
negative experiences.     
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As our investigation is the first paper of its kind analysing SMA in close inter-
organisational relationships, we identify a need for further research to investigate such SMA 
practices in order to build on and extend the conceptual and empirical findings in our paper. 
More in-depth case studies are needed as the strategic decision-making may involve the top 
management, management accountants, dedicated cross-functional teams and selected 
personnel from close customers and/or suppliers. In the context of research within the 
‘mainstream SMA’ literature, our findings imply that it may not be appropriate to make an a 
priori classification of accounting techniques as strategic or not, as has been done. Rather, 
management accounting is considered to be SMA when it is used in strategic decision-
making. Thus, it is important for this line of research to explicitly define the key strategic 
decisions under investigation and then analyse the role of accounting in these decisions. 
Furthermore, if researchers conduct case studies by relying only on interviews with the top 
management and management accountants, it might be difficult to obtain a reliable picture of 
SMA practices because the views of middle and lower level managers, key specialists and 
personnel from close customers and/or suppliers are ignored. Tillmann and Goddard (2008), 
for instance, investigated a large German chemical company, making a methodological choice 
to interview management accountants primarily, however, complementary descriptions of the 
roles of other actors would have given a more nuanced picture of SMA practices. Relatedly, 
we also see further analytical potential in taking a broader view of the role of management 
accounting in close inter-organisational relationships, not only for strategic decision-making 
purposes (as in our case), but also for strategy implementation purposes.   
Our findings illustrate how ‘operational’ and ‘strategic’ issues are intertwined (e.g. 
Ahrens and Chapman 2005, 2007, Jörgensen and Messner 2010, Skærbæk and Tryggestad 
2010), but also how these processes evolve interactively through collaboration with close 
customers. Therefore, we see great potential for future research to more explicitly integrate 
knowledge from the literatures on ‘accounting and strategising’ and ‘inter-organisational 
accounting’. Our study has taken an important step in this direction, but there is room for a 
great deal of further development. One avenue would be to focus on how the dynamics of 
emergent strategies are linked to the portfolio of close inter-organisational relationships. A 
starting point for creating such a ‘network perspective on accounting and strategising’ is 
Tomkins (2001). As he put it: ‘any effort to manage the network must normally be couched in 
terms of negotiated adjustments to something that exists rather than the creation of something 
new… so there is a managerial issue concerned with network design’ (Tomkins 2001, p.183). 
Even though Tomkins (2001) does not explicitly relate network design to processes of 
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strategising, network design through ‘negotiated adjustments’ can be taken as a starting point 
for integrating the two literatures. For instance, one could consider which role(s) does 
accounting play in the process of ‘negotiated adjustments’, and what are the strategic 
implications of these adjustments?   
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Table 1: A conceptual comparison of three streams of SMA research  
 
Dimensions of SMA Mainstream SMA  Accounting and 
strategizing 
SMA in close inter-
organisational 
relationships 
Recipients 
 
Top management. 
 
Top management, but 
also local managers and 
other actors. 
 
Top management, but 
also middle and lower 
level managers and key 
specialists. 
Preparers Management accountants.  Management accountants 
important, but challenged 
by other groups, such as 
project managers. 
Most important are the 
boundary-spanning 
individuals who are 
deeply involved in 
interactions with close 
customers and/or 
suppliers. These can be 
management 
accountants, middle and 
lower level managers and 
key specialists. 
Individuals working for 
the close partners can 
also provide important 
information.  
Information 
characteristics 
- Focus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Orientation 
 
 
Financial and non-financial 
accounting information. 
Some accounting 
information in disaggre-
gated form but most is in 
aggregated form and is 
expressed through the 
position in the market or 
value chain. It rarely 
consists of unique detailed 
information about specific 
customers and/or suppliers. 
 
 
 
Some internal focus but 
mostly external focus: 
accounting information 
about competitors, 
customers and/or suppliers. 
The information flow is 
unilateral, i.e., people within 
the company collect 
information.  
 
 
Financial and non-
financial accounting 
information. Some 
accounting information 
in aggregated form but 
most is in disaggregated 
form related to a specific 
organisational 
problem/situation. It 
rarely consists of unique 
detailed information 
about specific customers 
and/or suppliers. 
 
 
Some external focus but 
mostly internal focus. 
The information flow is 
unilateral, i.e., people 
within the company 
collect information.  
 
 
Financial and non-
financial accounting 
information. Some 
accounting information 
in aggregated form but 
most is in disaggregated 
form related to unique 
connections to close 
customers and/or 
suppliers and about 
indirect benefits to third 
parties. 
 
 
 
Some internal focus but 
mostly external focus: 
accounting information 
about customers and/or 
suppliers. The 
information flow is 
bilateral, i.e., the 
company collects 
information, but it also 
disperses diverse 
information within 
different close inter-
organisational 
relationships. 
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Table 2: Interview details 
 
Company level and role Number of 
interviews 
Average 
length  
Time of interview 
Top management 
 Technology Director 
 Supply Chain Director 
 Chief Financial Officer 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
65 min 
60 min 
60 min 
 
Fall 2002 
Fall 2002 
Fall 2002 
Development 
 Project manager A 
 Project manager B 
 
 Technical manager A 
 
 Technical manager B 
 
2 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
75 min 
70 min 
 
50 min 
 
50 min 
 
Spring 2003, summer 2005 
Fall 2002, spring 2003, 
summer 2005 
Spring 2004, summer 2005, 
spring 2008 
Spring 2004, fall 2008, 
summer 2009 
Purchasing 
 Purchaser 
 Supply chain project manager 
 
2 
2 
 
55 min 
60 min 
 
Spring 2003 
Fall 2002, spring 2003 
Quality 
 Quality engineer A 
 Quality engineer B 
 
2 
2 
 
55 min 
60 min 
 
Spring 2003 
Fall 2002, spring 2003 
Logistics 
 Logistics manager 
 Material planner 
 
2 
1 
 
70 min 
60 min 
 
Fall 2002 
Fall 2002 
Production 
 Production manager 
 Production manager 
 Production engineer 
 Production tester 
 
2 
2 
2 
2 
 
60 min 
70 min 
65 min 
60 min 
 
Fall 2002, summer 2005 
Fall 2002, spring 2004 
Fall 2002, spring 2004 
Spring 2003, summer 2005 
Accounting 
 Management accountant A 
 Management accountant B  
 
3 
2 
 
75 min 
70 min 
 
Fall 2002 
Fall 2002 
Sales 
 Sales manager A 
 
 Sales manager B 
 Customer order manager 
 Product manager A 
 
3 
 
2 
1 
2 
 
65 min 
 
60 min 
65 min 
70 min 
 
Spring 2004, summer 2005, 
spring 2007 
Summer 2005, summer 2008 
Spring 2004 
Summer 2005, summer 2009 
Total 46   
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Table 3: Strategic management accounting in Robotics 
Strategic decision An increased focus on close inter-
organisational relationships with 
automotive customers in North 
America 
Signing the General Motors 
contract 
Recipients – The top managers in Robotics 
were the strategists. 
– Top managers and middle 
managers from the cross-
functional sales team in Robotics 
were important strategists.   
Preparers 
 
– Management accountants who, 
for instance, mapped growth 
trends in different market 
segments and provided 
information on competitors’ 
prices. 
 
– Management accountants were 
not involved. The middle 
managers and key specialists , 
who had a technical background, 
had learnt sufficient accounting 
skills to be able to include both 
technical and financial 
considerations in the strategic 
decision-making. Engineers from 
General Motors were also 
important preparers. 
Information 
characteristics 
– Focus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
– Orientation 
 
 
 
 
– Financial and non-financial 
accounting information took the 
form of competitive positioning, 
value chain analysis and strategic 
costing. 
–Information concerning the 
position of Robotics vis-à-vis its 
competitors was in an aggregated 
form.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
– External focus. The direction of 
the information flow was 
unilateral, in that Robotics 
collected information from the 
external environment. 
 
 
– Financial accounting 
information in the form of 
internal rate of return 
calculations and gap-analysis of 
the current cost level compared 
to assumed future costs. 
– Focus on information gained in 
and relevant to the unique 
connection with General Motors. 
– An inter-organisational 
dimension was included in the 
calculations as Robotics needed 
General Motors’ input to lower 
its costs. 
– Indirect benefits discussed 
qualitatively. 
 
– External focus. The 
information flow was bilateral: 
Robotics collected and 
unexpectedly received 
information from General 
Motors, but it also dispersed 
information to General Motors. 
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Abstract 
 
Our paper explores the interplay of different management controls in relation to the 
coordination of activities in a complex, professional organization. We present a case study of the 
coordination of services between the anaesthesia department and orthopaedic surgery in a large 
university hospital in Norway, two departments that are hierarchically separated, but which are 
also highly dependent as they treat individual patients at the same time. Analyses of our findings 
suggest that administrative, vertical controls create challenges for such horizontal coordination, 
although the interplay between different forms of controls enables a degree of operational 
flexibility. 
 
 
Introduction 
We keep hearing the anaesthesia department say: “We cannot increase the activity”. It 
gets frustrating, and I think: OK, if you can’t, why don’t you prove it? (Controller, 
orthopaedic clinic) 
 
Traditional management control systems exist to provide transparency and accountability 
between managers and employees at different levels of an organization. Management tools such 
as budgeting are adopted as mechanisms to deliver information up and down the hierarchical 
levels, and such systems tend to perform more smoothly (though not necessarily more 
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successfully) when an organization is predominantly structured around simple and vertically-
oriented designs. But, what happens when there is greater complexity in organizations? What 
happens, for instance, when organizational sub-units have horizontal dependency, and yet quite 
distinct, vertically-oriented and unconnected control systems? This was the puzzle presented to us 
in our case study.  
Our paper highlights the interplay of different management controls in a large Norwegian 
hospital. The quote (above) epitomises a tension that existed between two clinics within this 
organization, namely the orthopaedic clinic and the anaesthesia clinic, the latter on whom 
orthopaedics are totally dependent for their services. Put simply, if anaesthesia personnel are not 
present in surgery theatres, then no orthopaedic surgeries can be performed. Thus, horizontal 
cooperation between these two clinics is of crucial importance to the hospital’s performance.  
During the past two decades, Norwegian hospitals have gone through several rounds of 
“New Public Management” reforms, to increase operational efficiency and make hospital 
managers accountable for their use of resources. The overarching feature of these reforms has 
been the formalization of vertical coordination and control, which in turn has driven hospital 
units towards more specialized and hierarchical organization.  
This vertical-orientation may influence the ability of different units to collaborate and 
coordinate activity on a horizontal level, by creating a need for separate management control 
systems (Kraus and Lindholm, 2010). An example of this could be where an organizational unit 
adopts activity-based financing, where that unit has suitable, measureable activities. Such control 
systems can create strong incentives for increasing activity in hospital units where activities are 
easily measured. Whereas, in other hospital units, where activities are less easy to measure, and 
where financing is undertaken using fixed budgets, the incentives faced can be quite different.  
The situation described creates significant control challenges since the creation of value in 
a hospital occurs in the composition of medical services from various functions across the 
hospital. Thus, the need for coordination is significant, yet the more traditional and formal control 
framework may be questionable in such a situation. Consequently the main purpose of our study 
was to investigate how different controls, both formal and informal controls, might interplay and, 
over time, contribute towards the coordination of medical services across hospital departments 
which treat the same patients? 
In addition to the horizontal-vertical controls conundrum, there is also an added 
complication of embedded and taken-for-granted assumptions within hospitals, more specifically 
the phenomenon that one of the most generally acknowledged control mechanisms in hospitals is 
accountability to patients (Albernethy, 1996). The common objective among doctors and nurses 
to always put the patient's needs first is often set in contrast to the management control system’s 
focus on accountability to the budgets and objectives set by the top management. Thus, hospitals 
are often described as decoupled organizations, meaning that the medical professions and the top 
management live in separate worlds in relation to management control (Llewellyn, 2001; Nyland 
and Pettersen, 2004). 
Theoretically, we begin with Hopwood's (1974) classic framework of administrative, 
social and self-controls, which enable us to analyse the influence of managerial and non-
managerial controls on behaviour. The interplay between different sources of control has long 
been recognized as important for managers to understand (Hopwood, 1976). Nevertheless, it is 
still a relatively under-explored area (notable exceptions include Malmi and Brown, 2008; 
Sandelin, 2008; Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995; van der Meer-Koistra and Vosselman, 2000; 
van der Meer-Koistra and Scapens, 2008, and; Caglio and Ditillo, 2008). In this paper, we aim to 
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contribute towards greater understanding of how different controls interact in complex, 
professional organizations.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we outline our initial theoretical influences, 
focusing particularly on the theorization of alternative sources of control and their interaction. 
Next, the context of our focus and purpose is described in more detail, and different sources of 
influence and the use of control mechanisms in coordinating medical services in the two 
departments are discussed. Then, we describe and discuss our case study findings, followed by 
some concluding remarks concerning our contribution and implications for future research.  
 
 
Theoretical perspective 
 
The control framework 
 
Hopwood (1974) discusses three different influences on behaviour, namely: (1) managers; (2) 
groups within or even outside the organization; and (3) individual values and characteristics. 
These sources of influence are respectively described as administrative control, social control and 
self-control. The control process may be described as the combination of administrative, social 
and individual pressure during ongoing competition for influence from these three sources 
(Hopwood, 1974; Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995). 
Administrative controls are measures and tools that managers use to influence employee 
behaviour and job performance (Hopwood, 1974). The concept includes what we usually 
perceive as the formal management control system, which is composed of rules, policies and 
systems to which employees must relate. Drawing on Malmi and Brown (2008), this may include 
mechanisms for planning, budgets, financial and non-financial measures, balance scorecards, 
reward and compensation mechanisms, governance structures, and other procedures and policies.  
These control elements may be based on the desired outcome (outcome control) or on desired 
behaviour (behavioural control) (Ouchi, 1979).  
An important foundation for many administrative controls is accounting, and there has 
been considerable increase in the use of accounting-based administrative controls across the 
global public sector during recent decades. This trend tends to include such mechanisms as 
activity-based financing, performance measurements and benchmarking. But, public sector 
managers may also use less formal administrative controls, such as training and socialization 
processes, and recruitment policies. 
Social control may be understood as the influence of common norms and commitments 
that develop within a group; which in turn shapes a common perception of what is deemed 
acceptable behaviour, and where informal guidelines may be adopted (Hopwood, 1974). 
According to Hopwood (1974), social controls are not instigated by managers; but, informal 
norms and guidelines may have a strong influence on how organizational work is performed 
(Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995).  
In the management control literature we can find other concepts with similar meanings. 
Ouchi (1979) uses the concept of clan control, argued to be a form of control that is suited to 
organizations such as hospitals, where quality of the output is difficult to measure. Cultural 
control (Malmi and Brown, 2008) is another concept that highlights the importance of such 
mechanisms as clans, values and symbols, the sorts of mechanisms which some have referred to 
as informal controls (Dekker, 2004).  
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Administrative controls may also be poorly suited to organizations that are dominated by 
professionals performing complex tasks, and where an alternative direction might be to trust the 
professionals to make key decisions based on their expertise and experience. (Ouchi, 1979; 
Dekker, 2004). This situation implies confidence in individuals seeking the information they 
require; and, in turn, this need for information requires flexibility and adaptability, including 
where individuals may also collect information outside the formal control system (Jonsson and 
Grønlund, 1988). 
An employee is affected by management and the various groups one relates to. However, 
individual goals, values and abilities also affect how the work is performed, and this brings us to 
Hopwood’s third source of control. According to Hopwood (1974), self-controls are related to an 
individual’s own view, integrity, and overall approach to their role as a professional. In a 
hospital, professional affiliation will influence behaviour in various ways, such as through 
common norms and values that develop within groups of professionals (i.e., social controls). In 
addition, each individual’s integrity and overall approach to their work as, say a doctor or a nurse, 
will be influenced by their education and socialization.  
In his model of control, Hopwood (1974) emphasizes the combination of influence of 
managers, groups and individuals. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Model of control (Hopwood, 1974, p.22). 
 
The arrows in the figure indicate interaction between the different sources of influence. The 
figure shows two levels of interaction. First, as shown by the inner set of arrows, control is 
conceptualized as a combination of administrative, social and personal pressures that 
simultaneously compete for influence. This means that when discussing the impact of different 
funding systems in two departments that are going to cooperate, we should at the same time take 
into consideration that there are other forms of control present that may affect activity in a 
complementary way, or which may counteract the effect of the funding system.  
Control  
(operational 
level) 
Administrative 
controls 
(managers) 
Social controls 
(groups) 
Self- controls 
(individuals) 
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 Second, the outer set of arrows indicates a mutual interaction between different sources of 
influence. As such, although the various sources of influence are seen as separate categories of 
control, Hopwood indicates that managers may affect the existence and strength of social controls 
through the use of administrative controls, and vice versa. 
From a control perspective, these interactions are important to understand, i.e. how 
managers may control the impact of the other forms of controls and/or how one source of 
influence may counteract another. It is usually assumed that social and self-controls may support 
administrative controls, and that training and socialization processes may help in balancing 
individual and organizational goals and values (Ouchi, 1979). Thus the various controls may be 
seen as complementary. Managers may seek to influence the development of norms and values 
within professional groups or restrict employees' decision space through the use of administrative 
controls. However, sometimes group or individual values may be quite different from those 
pursued by the organization, and an important question is what happens when people are 
influenced by different forms of controls that are pointing in opposite directions. 
 
Prior research on management control in hospitals 
 
The control system can be seen as an instrument to draw boundaries to surround people in the 
organization in order to encourage, enable and sometimes force managers and employees to 
perform in the interests of the organization. Management control systems have traditionally been 
designed to increase transparency and accountability between managers at different levels within 
the organization. Budgeting, planning and evaluation mechanisms have been designed to bring 
knowledge from the bottom of the organization to the top, or to inform down on the goals that are 
to be pursued.  One main problem when creating boundaries of control in hospital settings is the 
hierarchical and functional organization of the institution, which is often based on an 
organization of departments according to medical specialties and non-medical functions (with 
further hierarchies within departments). These elements turn hospitals into complex structures 
when defining administrative entities. Furthermore, patients are administered according to 
clinical decisions which may cross numerous administrative boundaries as they travel through the 
hospital. Thus, the framework of accountability in areas where ambiguous boundaries are found 
will make it difficult to operate systems set up to control and measure the results of an entity’s 
activities (Nyland and Pettersen, 2004).  
There is great demand for a clear definition of areas of responsibility in an organization 
where high quality care is produced in project teams with joint responsibility for patients. 
Nevertheless, this has been an important element in the Norwegian reforms (Nyland and 
Pettersen, 2004). Accounting, auditing and accountability systems are often introduced in order to 
gain relevant information, make managers responsible and enhance efficiency. As the vertical 
dimension of control is enhanced, an important question is whether this may hamper 
collaboration between the control entities. 
The literature within management control in hospitals has mainly focused on the effect of 
administrative controls on decision-making within local hierarchies (Abernethy, 1996; Jacobs, 
1998; Jones and Dewing, 1997; Lapsley, 2001; Llewellyn, 2001; Nyland and Pettersen, 2004; 
Kurunmäki et al., 2003; Kurunmäki, 2004). However, the importance of alternative sources of 
influence has also been central to this research; therefore professional norms and individual 
values and characteristics are presented as important controls. The literature emphasizes that 
these sources of influence may be seen as alternative forms of control that may hamper, for 
394
 
 
example, the effects of budgetary control, thereby suggesting countervailing effects between 
administrative and social controls. 
Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1995) study the conflict that occurs when strong professional 
groups (doctors and nurses) who are trained to perform complex tasks, and whose behaviour is 
primarily controlled through social and self-control mechanisms, are faced with administrative 
controls that restrict their autonomy. They find that professionals who feel that they are limited 
by output controls (e.g. strict budgetary control) experience higher levels of role conflict, and 
achieve lower job satisfaction and performance. They conclude that “not only will these controls 
[administrative output control] not operate effectively, they are likely to have adverse individual 
and organizational effects” (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995, p.13).  
The literature is not conclusive about how different forms of controls interact. Hospitals 
are discussed as loosely coupled organizations where plans and budgets are more or less 
decoupled from activity. March and Olsen (1976) wrote about decoupling due to different logics, 
which are clearly apparent in professional organizations like hospitals, where administrative logic 
is based on the logic of consequentiality, and clinical logic is based on the logic of 
appropriateness.  Abernethy (1996) puts forward a similar explanation for decoupling when she 
suggests that doctors, as the dominant professional group in a hospital, have their primary loyalty 
to the profession and to the patients, and not to their employing organization. Based on similar 
arguments, a broad set of studies have concluded that increased use of vertical administrative 
controls did not change behaviour on the operational level in hospitals (Jones and Dewing, 1997; 
Nyland and Pettersen, 2004; Broadbent et al., 2001; Jacobs, 2005; Llewellyn. 2001).  
Other studies show conflicting results, indicating tighter coupling between administrative 
controls and behaviour (Jacobs, 1998; Kurunmäki et al., 2003; Kurunmäki, 2004; Abernethy and 
Stoelwinder, 1995). According to this part of the literature, we may expect increased use of 
vertical administrative controls to hamper coordination between control entities.  
In our case, the two local hierarchies in the hospital are controlled by one common top 
management. However, the local hierarchies are initially perceived as autonomous entities facing 
quite conflicting incentives. Such a setting calls for a study of the horizontal dimensions of 
control, how information is processed and how decisions are made between different units within 
the same hierarchical level. This focus makes the literature on inter-organizational control 
relevant.  
 
Lessons learned from inter-organizational control 
There is an extensive literature that studies the horizontal control between organizations, such as 
the relationship between manufacturers and their suppliers (see Caglio and Ditillo [2008] for an 
overview). According to van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens (2008), findings from this literature 
may also be relevant for understanding the relationship between departments within an 
organization. 
While it was previously assumed that coordination between organizations was primarily 
based on formal administrative controls like transactional contracts, Cäker (2008) finds that social 
mechanisms and trust may also be important in these settings. Trust may create the necessary 
flexibility in a relationship that is essentially characterized by strict administrative controls. Social 
controls may be especially important at the operational level due to high complexity, while trust 
may originate from prior experiences and shared norms and values. Håkansson and Lind (2004) 
suggest that frequent interaction between groups may drive the development of shared norms and 
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values, and thus facilitate cooperation across organizational boundaries. They suggest that both 
informal and formal interaction, such as the development of joint plans and systems, may 
contribute to the adaptation of common goals and accountabilities.  Regular contact contributes to 
the development of a common culture, enabling units to develop common knowledge and make 
decisions that contribute to common goal achievement through the establishment of venues for 
joint problem solving – even if they do not belong to the same organization. 
When horizontal relations at the operational level are characterized by high mutual 
dependence, high complexity and continuous changes, it is impossible to design a formal control 
system that addresses all possible challenges. When senior managers do not possess the necessary 
operational knowledge, their subordinates will be expected to control their own lateral 
relationships. According to van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens (2008) it is important that 
managers facilitate and support control by creating a decision space that enable decisions at the 
operational level in such situations. 
 
Method 
In exploring the different sources of influence in the collaboration between two different 
functions within the hospital, we required information on both the vertical and the horizontal 
control systems surrounding the said interrelationships. To understand the actual operation of 
these systems, it was necessary to go beyond purely descriptive accounts, and study how key 
decision-makers understand the systems, and the consequences for internal control processes. 
Against this background, we chose to conduct a case study in order to understand a complex 
system in practice (Yin, 1994). 
Our case was carefully chosen, as the functions are met with different incentives from the 
administrative control system, something that is believed to further increase the challenges 
inherent in collaboration. In the following, we seek to identify how managers, different groups, 
and individual values and skills influence the coordination of activity between functions in a 
hospital at an operational level.  
Our study was conducted in two stages. The first stage was completed in spring 2012, 
where the focus was on coordination at a hospital/clinic level. Interviews were conducted with 
the CEO, the CFO and three different clinic managers. This gave insight into the context of the 
collaboration between the two functions. Documents were also used to draw the formal chart of 
the organization of the hospital. Interviews were also made at an operational level, focusing on 
the effects and challenges the differences in the financial system were creating. A total of 11 
interviews were conducted in this phase (see Table 1). Then, building on our findings parting 
stage one, we conducted five in-depth interviews with formal decision-makers at the operational 
level (see Table 1, also). Since there are relatively few formal decision-makers at this level, the 
number of respondents in this part of the study is also relatively low. 
All interviews were conducted by two researchers. The interviews were taped and 
transcribed, before a summary of the transcriptions were sent to the respondents for comments 
and corrections. Each interview lasted between 45 and 120 minutes. The key informants have 
provided most of the information used in this study. While this may have introduced elements of 
bias to the study, the notion of key informants is well recognized in the qualitative research 
literature (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). This research method is well suited to increasing knowledge 
relevant to our research question. However, our findings can only be generalized to other hospital 
relations to a limited extent.  
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(Table 1 about here) 
 
Date Function  
Stage 1   
21.03.2012 CFO of the hospital  
21.03.2012 Constituted leader for doctors in the anaesthesia department (AN)  
21.03.2012 Clinic manager and department manager of orthopaedic surgery (OS)   
22.03.2012 CEO of the hospital  
26.03.2012 Controller of orthopaedic clinic   
26.03.2012 Department manager of doctors (AN)   
30.03.2012 Medical leader of the orthopaedic clinic   
11.04.2012 Controller of the anaesthesia clinic   
11.04.2012 Clinic manager of the anaesthesia clinic  
17.04.2012 Department manager of nurses (OS)   
17.04.2012 Department manager of the emergency surgery rooms   
Stage 2   
12.12.2012 Department manager of the emergency surgery rooms   
18.12.2012 Department manager nurses (AN)   
20.12.2012 Coordinator nurses (AN)   
02.01.2013 Department manager of nurses (OS)   
02.01.2013 Coordinator nurses (OS)  
Table 1.   Interviews  
 
 
Empirics  
 
Context for the collaboration 
 
The hospital is one of the largest in Norway, with almost 10 000 employees and a total budget of 
1 billion euro. It is organized into 19 clinics, located in seven different buildings so as to 
strengthen both the professional environment within each medical specialty and enable strong 
vertical control. The clinics are further divided into a number of different departments, and the 
department managers hold both financial and clinical responsibilities. Our research focus is 
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centred on the horizontal coordination of activity between two departments within two different 
clinics: one medical clinic providing services to specific patients, and one service clinic providing 
services to other medical clinics (Figure 2). 
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
 
Figure 2. The control context: horizontal coordination between departments belonging to 
different hierarchies (clinics).  
 
 
The anaesthesia department (AN) is part of a huge service clinic, and includes ten departments 
providing all kinds of emergency services. AN provides anaesthesia services during surgeries and 
medical investigation for the whole hospital. Their largest customer is department of orthopaedic 
surgery (OS), which is part of a medical clinic consisting of seven different orthopaedic 
departments (medical and surgical). OS perform scheduled (elective) surgery within eight 
different operating theatres located in the Centre of Orthopaedics, which is the building next to 
the emergency centre where AN is located.  
As all other departments within this medical clinic, OS is financed based on their activity. 
The higher the activity performed, the higher the budget. Activity is measured in terms of number 
of DRG1 points; payment per DRG point is parallel to the state's funding of the hospitals. Thus, 
the hospital has no financial risks associated with giving the departments a flexible budget. 
However, this model applies only to clinics having their own patients and where the activity can 
be measured using the DRG system. AN performs their services on patients belonging to other 
departments (e.g. OS), but the DRG system is not suitable for measuring AN's activity. Thus, AN  
is financed with a fixed budget based on last year’s budget, and is facing a dilemma as a 
consequence: whether to keep activity and costs low and keep within their budget limit, or to 
                                                 
1 DRG (Diagnosis Related Groups) is a system used worldwide for classifying and measuring clinical activity in 
hospitals. DRG points represent a norm for the use of resources associated with a selection of patients.  
a 
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support the medical clinics in their ever-increasing demands for higher activity.  
The total capacity for anaesthesia resources is fixed at the beginning of the year. This causes 
intense fights for these resources among the different receiving units, who experience pressure to 
increase their level of activity from both the hospital management and from their patients. It is 
hard for the medical clinics to accept that they do not have access to the necessary resources from 
AN. According to the clinic manager and the department manager in OS, they do not trust that 
AN uses their capacity efficiently. They become frustrated when AN says no to requests to 
increase their resources without documenting how they make use of their existing capacity.  
 
You know very little about what happens at the other centres and clinics. When you know 
little, it's easy to think: I’m being cheated. (Clinic manager, orthopaedic clinic) 
 
The criticism from the medical clinics is widely acknowledged within the management of AN, 
who believe that they are being blamed for patients not being operated on: 
 
I find it difficult to see that our customers trust our arguments. We have been blamed for 
everything: waiting lists that are exceeded, patients that do not receive services they are 
entitled to…. And, regarding all these resources, it is almost 90 nurses and 60 doctors. It 
sounds like an ocean of resources ... what do they all do? That's the question posed from 
other clinics. (Department manager, AN) 
 
One obvious way to increase the capacity of AN would be through internal trade arrangements 
with the receiving clinics. However, such a strategy is not supported by the hospital's CEO due to 
the disproportionately strong bargaining position AN would hold. Hence, a formal system of 
transfer pricing between AN and medical clinics have not been established. Scepticism related to 
the AN’s effectiveness is also characterizing the dialogue between the clinic and the top 
management of the hospital.  
 
This is primarily a verbal discussion .... It's word against word. AN is standing alone 
against the other clinics. At the same time, I am convinced that they have not done 
enough internally yet. But I cannot reveal anything that I can show off and say, "Look 
here!” One would think that they would take initiatives themselves to document what they 
may have done. Who should bear the burden of proof? (CFO of the hospital) 
 
According to the department manager for AN, their total budget is too low in relation to the 
demand from OS and other receiving units. 
 
When you open the budget and see that you do not have enough to cover the cost of the 
staff, and the finance department says “go anyway”... On the first of January, five minutes 
past midnight. Then we know that the budget is going to be exceeded. (Department 
manager, AN)  
 
This is creating a challenging framework for cooperation between the medical clinics and AN. 
However, we still find that the cooperation between AN and OS is working fairly well at an 
operational level within the surgery theatres: patients are getting high quality services; waiting 
lists are kept low; and the number of cancelled surgeries is low. Our empirics will shed light on 
the collaboration within the theatres, by focusing on core elements of management control, 
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namely: planning, implementation and evaluation of activity.  
 
Planning of activity 
 
As a general rule, employees in AN are organized into permanent teams that serve the various 
clinics. In addition, some employees belong to a flexible team that can be used across different 
receiving clinics. This is done to create professional communities in the clinics and 
simultaneously address the need for flexibility. Consequently, a team of nurses and doctors from 
AN is permanently located at OS.  
OS operates eight surgery theatres open on a regular basis between 7.30 a.m. and 3.30 
p.m. Patients who have been signed up for surgery, often planned several months in advance, are 
operated upon. At the theatres, doctors and nurses from AN work closely together with surgeons, 
nurses and technicians from OS. To coordinate the activity in the surgery theatres, AN and OS 
have appointed respective coordinators. The coordinators are responsible for the collaboration 
without being formal managers, i.e. they have no budget or personnel responsibilities.  
Regarding the allocation of capacity to the various clinics, a challenge has been the insufficient 
understanding of AN's framework. At each surgery theatre, AN has decided to have one doctor 
and 1.5 anaesthesia nurses present during opening hours; one nurse present at each theatre; and 
one present when needed for covering two theatres. These norms set by AN are quality controlled 
by external experts. The management of AN has also arranged joint meetings with all its 
receiving units to encourage dialogue about how the hospital can make use of AN's total 
resources. According to the department manager in AN, such meetings have helped to create 
networks and communications, thus reducing the degree of mistrust and fear that someone may 
have hidden agendas. Eventually, several units have taken initiatives to purchase services from 
AN using the unit’s norms for capacity usage.  
 
It is perhaps somewhat accepted that one cannot increase activity without involving 
anaesthesia in the decision. Here we just pass the ball back, and tell them that if a clinic 
manager wants to have an extra surgery theatre in the middle of the year, we will manage 
to organize it if he will pay what it costs: one and a half nursing position for each surgery 
theatre. (Department manager, AN)  
 
This has been done in OS on two occasions during the last year, both of which were organized as 
two projects. One was keeping the operating theatres open throughout the summer – a period 
which is ordinarily scheduled with low activity and staffing; the other was extending opening 
hours for some weeks to reduce waiting lists for a specific patient group. In these projects, OS 
pay wages for the additional resources that AN makes available. Initiatives for this simplified 
form of internal trading have come from the operational level through the coordinators, rather 
than from formal managers, and the practical arrangements are solved at the departmental level. 
This pragmatic solution has not been announced higher up in the hospital hierarchy. 
The Orthopaedics Plan, a detailed plan for the activity in the operating theatres, is created 
twice a year. This work is formally carried out by the OS, but AN is involved through the 
coordinator.  According to our respondents, the partnership has benefited from several projects 
that are organized across departmental boundaries. Such projects have intended to identify the 
logistics within the operating theatres; estimated the time for an anaesthesia nurse to give an 
anaesthetic; for a surgical nurse to wash an area; for the surgeon to perform his work; for the 
patient to wake up, and so on. This has provided a basis for operational planning by not simply 
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providing norms for the use of resources; in addition, this work has influenced the climate of 
cooperation. 
 
More and more we have to work together. Because we have been facing major challenges 
... the hospital management has initiated several projects across organizational 
boundaries. For example, we had a project on the logistics in the operating theatres. As a 
spin-off of this; we have become more familiar with each other. And that obviously 
means more cooperation. (Department manager, AN) 
 
Other similar examples of such inter-departmental collaboration are the creation of fast-tracks: 
streamlined, standardized patient pathways for selected patient groups. 
 
Implementing activity 
 
The capacity of the surgery theatres is planned to be fully booked, but it often happens that 
surgeries are delayed, and consequently the surgery program cannot be completed within the 
scheduled opening hours. Whether the program is to be postponed to another day, or completed 
using overtime or extra shifts, is a decision the coordinators of AN and OS are supposed to make 
together. Authority to use overtime and extra shifts is thus delegated to the coordinators. 
Delays in the surgery program happen all the time, and the attitude among the staff is that 
the budget should not be an obstacle for a patient prepared for surgery to get their treatment. This 
attitude is evident among the staff, coordinators and the department manager. Therefore, it is 
rarely difficult to get employees to work overtime to get patients through the program: 
 
It is the patient that is most important for everyone here. It is important that patients are 
satisfied. Everybody knows that when a patient comes to get his or her surgery at the 
hospital, the patient has taken time off from work and has organized babysitting and so 
on. We need very good reasons to skip the surgery just because the budget does not fit to 
this … It's a very collective spirit in that respect. And most people think of the patient … 
We have performed almost 300 surgeries on overtime this year. (Coordinator, AN) 
 
The working environment at the surgery theatres is characterized by people knowing each other 
and knowing how to work together. Informal mechanisms are emphasized as important in this 
regard. An initiative taken up by several of our respondents include common parties, where staff 
from different professions within the two departments meets. This is claimed to be of great 
importance to cooperation since it contributes to the understanding of each other's functions and 
challenges, and thus an understanding that everyone is part of a larger context. AN and OS 
personnel work closely together, giving rise to a common identity; several of our respondents talk 
about “us in the surgery theatres”. According to the coordinators, staff in the surgery theatres is 
not aware that they actually belong to different departments in their daily work.  
 
To further facilitate collaboration, the two coordinators for AN and OS share desks in the same 
office. The initiative for this arrangement was taken by the coordinators a few years ago, and the 
cooperation on how to organize the activity in the theatres seems to have improved significantly. 
According to the coordinators, they no longer need to have formal meetings, but sit together and 
solve problems as they occur. Their office is located as close to the surgery theatres as possible, 
contributing to the closeness of the staff and the ability to closely follow the activity in the 
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 theatres. The department manager also recognizes the value of this localization: 
 
This is a new arrangement that works pretty well. The previous coordinator [OS] was 
located in the office next to me. Then the two boys had the idea that sharing an office 
closer to the surgery theatres would be both enjoyable and convenient. And I see in 
retrospect that this was a smart move. (Department manager, OS) 
 
Both coordinators express loyalty to each other's department. For example, the coordinator of AN  
is concerned with the impact on OS’ earnings in situations of delays in the surgery program. This 
creates a holistic perspective among the coordinators:  
  
Thus, on average OS earns 35 000 NOK [about 4 500 euro] per patient – it varies of 
course. If we remove a patient from the schedule, then we lose this money and save one 
hour of overtime. I do not think that makes good business. (Coordinator, AN) 
 
Both coordinators are originally nurses. According to their working schedule, they are not 
supposed to perform clinical duties. Nevertheless, they sometimes work in the surgery theatres to 
be able to keep in touch with their profession and to know how the staff works together.  
 
It is important to be able to feel in your bones how people are, and to take part as the 
surgery occurs. It is important not to lose touch entirely. (Coordinator, OS) 
 
Evaluation of activity 
 
Evaluation processes take place at different levels; both vertically and horizontal, they seem 
informal, and are characterized by mutual trust and close relationships. The environment is 
transparent: people know each other well through many years of collaboration, both in the 
surgery theatres and within different projects across professional and departmental boundaries. 
Although the department manager for AN has the ability to control the activity through their 
access to activity data, most of the time she chooses to not use these data.  She trusts that the 
coordinators take the right decisions, since they have the right skills and the necessary closeness 
to the activity. In the vertical dimension, the coordinators have been delegated authority to use 
overtime and extra shifts, without formally being assigned responsibility for the budget. 
According to the department manager for AN, they nevertheless have a “collegial” responsibility 
for the budget that they have to share with her.  
 
The coordinators have to deal with the pressure. They are informed about the budget 
situation; I have meetings with them once a week, and then we review the financial 
situation. If not every week, then every other week .... So, the financial awareness is 
significant. It is discussed among the staff as well. We talk about austerity; we do not 
need to drive a Mercedes when we just as well may settle for a Volkswagen ... We do not 
have to formalize everything or include clinical managers in all situations. My 
coordinators in the various centres, they fix almost everything on their own. (Department 
manager, AN) 
 
The coordinators seem to accept this informal accountability and do whatever they can to avoid 
hiring additional personnel; for example, through reallocating available resources between the 
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 eight theatres. The location of the joint office close to the surgery theatres contributes to the 
valuable exchange of information with the staff; the coordinators may keep track of all activity 
and intervene whenever necessary. In addition, recorded data is used at this level; according to 
the coordinators, it is easy to see everything that is happening within the theatres by studying 
activity data on the computer. 
 
My manager got to just trust that I am doing what I should. She sees the result. 
(Coordinator, OS) 
 
But even though the budget causes some surgeries to be removed from the surgery schedule – 
and although certain parts of the increased costs are covered by OS – AN experiences increasing 
budget deficits. The coordinator for AN has great difficulties saying no to overtime when the 
patient is ready, all other resources are available and one of his nurse anaesthetists is willing to 
work overtime to complete the program. According to the coordinator, this is accepted by his 
manager; their shared responsibility for the patients has to outweigh their responsibility to the 
budget. Thus, according to him, the most important control information when it comes to 
evaluation is the measurement of patient satisfaction. 
 
We face great challenges. But the good thing in all this is that we are we able to produce a 
service that provides very high scores on patient satisfaction. And it's very positive. It 
feels good. Although we disagree a bit internally and are struggling a bit internally, we 
can still provide good services to our patients. And they are happy. And we operate more 
than before. So really I think that we have much to be proud of. (Coordinator, AN) 
 
Discussion 
 
Our research question focused on how different sources of influence might contribute to 
horizontal coordination at the operational level between anaesthesia and orthopaedic surgery. We 
have described a broad mix of controls that shape cooperation. 
 
 Administrative controls 
(managers2) 
Social controls 
(groups) 
Self-controls 
(individuals) 
Planning 
activities 
 
 
 Norms for allocation of 
capacity. 
 Organizing: regular 
teams, flexible team, use 
of coordinators. 
 Network meetings with 
customers. 
 OS plans. 
 Organizing project teams 
 Involving AN in OS’ plans. 
 Expanding capacity 
through internal trading. 
 Employees 
that know 
each other 
well  
                                                 
2 Since coordinators are not responsible for personnel or finances, they are not considered managers. Thus, 
administrative controls are defined as controls implemented by the department manager or managers at higher levels 
in the hierarchy. 
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across professional and 
departmental 
boundaries. 
 
 
Implementing 
activities 
 
 
 Personnel with long 
experience from different 
parts of the hospital. 
 Accepting internal 
trading. 
 Accepting use of 
overtime/extra shifts. 
 
 Coordinators sharing an 
office located close to the 
surgery theatres. 
 Expanding capacity 
through use of overtime 
and extra shifts. 
 Parties across 
professional and 
departmental 
boundaries. 
 Common culture (“us in 
the surgery theatres”). 
 
 Loyalty to the 
patients among all 
clinical personnel 
involved (also 
managers). 
 A holistic 
perspective 
among the 
coordinators.  
Evaluating 
activities 
 Weekly meetings for 
following up on the 
budget situation. 
 Informal meetings and 
dialogue with 
coordinators. 
 Patient satisfaction 
measurement. 
 Use of activity data. 
 Trust in coordinators. 
 An informal joint 
responsibility to the 
budget. 
 Focus on patient 
satisfaction. 
 Observing activity. 
 Coordinators taking part 
in clinical activity. 
 Close networks among 
staff and coordinators 
across departmental 
boundaries 
 
 
Table 2. Design of controls in the coordination of activities between AN and OS. 
 
Despite the fact that the departments are facing quite different incentives through different 
funding system and evaluation regimes, these controls seem to contribute to what is at least 
perceived as being well-coordinated services in the surgery theatres. In the following discussion, 
we will highlight three particular findings which augment our understanding of how one source 
of influence may affect another. 
Social controls appear to be highly influential at the operational level 
 
Our findings suggest that social controls, such as a common culture, shared values and close 
networks between coordinators and other employees in the surgery theatres, are important for 
coordination at the operational level. This supports findings from Cäker (2008) on the importance 
of trust for coordination at this level. Joint activity in the operating theatres entails strong 
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interdependence between the departments. According to van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 
(2000), this will further increase the importance of trust. 
Our case suggests close links between various social controls. For example, the sharing of 
offices, and even the sharing of desks, allows employees to interact closely and thereby develop a 
shared understanding of objectives. This seems to form the basis for good working relationships 
without regard to departmental borders, and with a mutual understanding of each other's 
operating framework. This also seems to align to prior research which suggests that frequent 
interaction drives the development of shared norms (Håkansson and Lind, 2004).  
Our findings are also consistent with the literature on control in hospitals, which 
emphasizes a common loyalty to the patients among medical staff (Abernethy, 1996). Staff from 
both departments talk about "us in the surgery theatre," while, according to the coordinators, 
employees make no distinction as to who works for AN or OS. Loyalty to the patients seems to 
outweigh loyalty to the departments, and we notice a more holistic reflection among the clinical 
staff than was the case higher up in the hierarchy. Drawing on Hopwood’s (1974) model of 
control (Figure 1), this indicates a strong relation between self-controls and social controls.  
 
Administrative and social controls are closely related 
 
Our findings suggest that administrative controls influence the relationships between the entities 
more than at a higher level within the hierarchies. At the hospital level, managers are focusing on 
different financing systems and the lack of credible activity measures. Top managers in the two 
clinics express considerable scepticism about each other’s intentions regarding cooperation, 
pointing to administrative controls as a driving force behind this situation. Thus, we could expect 
that the financing systems and separate budgets may prevent cooperation.  
However, this is not apparent at the operational level to the same extent. And, this finding 
may indicate a decoupled organization, which would be consistent with prior research on control 
in hospitals (Jones and Dewing, 1997; Nyland and Pettersen, 2004; Broadbent et al., 2001; 
Jacobs, 2005; Llewellyn, 2001). Nevertheless, a closer look into our case suggests that 
administrative controls also affect cooperation at the operational level in several ways.  
The coordinator of AN has been delegated authority to issue use of overtime, extra shifts 
and hiring of additional personnel whenever needed, without having a corresponding budget 
responsibility. Still, when exercising this authority, it is evident that the budget situation is 
perceived as a constraint for action. When the interests of individual patients already scheduled 
for surgery warrants it, extra capacity is hired. This does not entail major consequences for the 
budget. When the waiting list situation implies the need for a greater increase in capacity, the 
coordinators in both departments form an agreement of internal trading to avoid a budget deficit 
within the AN department. Here we observe a link between administrative and social controls; 
the budget situation is forcing a local consensus to be formed, and such an informal contract 
between the groups in the operating theatres makes it possible to still maintain a certain level of 
budgetary control at the department level. The existence of this local initiative indicates that this 
is not a decoupled organization regarding the use of budget control. Staff in the operating theatres 
even requests a more permanent system of internal trading, since this would give more flexibility 
to further increase the level of activity. This suggests that budget limits influence behaviour at the 
operational level by affecting the way groups of employees interact and how they make use of 
their decision space. In some ways, professional groups behave as though they are accountable to 
the budget despite the fact that they have no formal budget responsibility.  
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 Our analysis also suggests ways in which administrative controls influence social 
controls. Organizing permanent staff of nurses and doctors from AN working at OS is probably 
an important precondition for the development of a shared culture, while the recruiting of 
experienced staff with tight networks within the hospital makes collaboration easier. Thus, we see 
how managers influence the extent of interaction – and thus the influence of social controls – 
through the use of administrative controls. In relation to Hopwood’s (1974) definition of control 
(see Figure 2), this relates to the importance of including the outer set of arrows to understand 
how various sources affect cooperation between the two departments. Only including the direct 
effects of administrative, social and self-controls may seem like a narrow approach that would 
hardly reveal the whole picture. 
 
The middle manager as facilitator of operational cooperation 
 
Hospitals are professional organizations with a potential conflict between the organization and 
the medical professions’ objectives. The purpose of control is to reduce the impact of this conflict 
and to get all employees to perform in the interests of the organization. Middle managers are 
expected to translate, communicate and follow up on signals and demands from senior 
management further down the hierarchy, and take responsibility for the performance of the 
professions, which is then communicated up in the organization. Several studies point to the 
important role of middle managers in hospitals as links between the senior management and 
professionals, which is often described as contributing to the decoupling of the organization 
(Nyland and Pettersen, 2004; Llewellyn, 2001).  
In our study we see that the manager has an important role in terms of balancing the 
various sources of influence to facilitate cooperation. The control focus at the operational level is 
largely horizontally oriented. This would hardly have been possible if employees at this level – 
particularly coordinators within the operating theatres – did not have sufficient space to make the 
decisions necessary to coordinate services. There may be less focus on budgets, but there is 
instead a common culture of always doing what is best for the patient and also endeavour to act 
in favour of the organization. 
It seems that pragmatism is highly valued, and pragmatic solutions require loose control 
regarding the overall control system. This loose control occurs in our case at the departmental 
level. The department manager of AN withdraws strict supervision of budget deficits or statistics 
of activity; on the contrary, she trusts the coordinators to have the necessary expertise to make the 
best decisions. When professional groups within the surgery theatres propose internal trading of 
additional capacity from anaesthesia personnel, the department manager accepts this, despite the 
fact that such arrangements are not supported by the hospital management. The operational level 
appears to be protected from the formal administrative control system.  AN seems to be vertically 
loosely controlled to allow for a horizontal collaboration with OS at an operational level. The 
department manager of AN serves more as a facilitator than as a strict controller, leaving the 
coordinators to control operations according to the needs that arise in the surgery theatres. 
According to van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens (2008), this is a typical feature of lateral 
relationships within an organization, whereby the management system must strike an adequate 
balance between strict administrative control and flexibility so as to ensure good coordination.  
 
Concluding remarks 
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Our study shows the importance of including the interaction between different sources of 
influence when studying the effects on control at the operational level. Managers’ influence may 
be attributed to some extent to how they enable social controls in order to have an influence. The 
direct effect of administrative controls for operational activity may be considered less important, 
something that may be interpreted as implying a decoupled organization. Inclusion of, and 
highlighting the outer arrows in Hopwood’s (1974) model control, are thus important for 
understanding the influence of various categories of controls. 
Our findings have some practical implications. The study emphasizes the importance of 
managers as facilitators in professional organizations, to enable the professionals to have an 
influence regarding operational activities and coordination. According to previous studies, this is 
especially important when the task in question is complex and the interdependence between the 
different units is large (van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens, 2008). The importance of complexity 
and mutual dependency between the collaborating units is interesting. It is highly possible that 
different sources of controls during cooperation between less dependent units may contribute 
quite differently from what our study suggests. We therefore call for more studies into the impact 
of contextual factors like complexity and dependency between the cooperating entities on the 
relationship between the various controls. 
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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to investigate how the budget when split into projects can act as a 
management tool to stabilise festival uncertainty    
Design/methodology/approach – A case study is used to discuss the budget in a large 
Norwegian festival. Simons´ levers of control framework is applied for the analysis. The 
framework focuses on design and use of the budget and how the budget is aligned with the 
specific characteristics of the festival as an economic organisation.  
Findings – The findings support the assumption that budgets may stabilise an organisation 
which is unstable as to activity, costs and income and reduces uncertainty in the organisation.  
Originality/value – It contributes to the understanding of how a budget can stabilise the 
organisation in an environment with a high degree of uncertainty.  
Keywords - Budgets, Budget critique, Functions of budgets, Levers of control framework.   
Paper type – Research paper 
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Introduction  
 
Festivals are major actors in the diversity of cultural markets. Many municipalities and 
counties have one or more festivals, and they show a great variety as to content and size. 
There are music festivals, film festivals, cabaret festivals, band festivals, children’s festivals 
food festivals and so on. Very often these festivals can be characterized as businesses 
organised with professional boards, managers and annual budgets including numerous staffs 
and performing artists. Further, these festivals often have economic importance in their local 
surroundings. 
On the other hand, festivals also share a number of characteristics which make them different 
from ordinary businesses, as their main performance takes place during a short and very 
intense period of time, they are  normally organised as very small administrative bodies which 
grow rapidly due to a large number of volunteers during the festival period, they attract a lot 
attention in the society and media during the performance period,  and the value of 
performance is created by different artists from year to year. Obviously, there is a dilemma 
between the characteristics of festivals as large economic organisations and their deep rooted 
cultural norms which are not only different from but may also be conflicting with the business 
logics. It can then easily be imagined that this dilemma can create destabilising forces. 
Consequently, a relevant research question to be discussed in this paper is how the budget as a 
management tool is designed and used in a festival, and the motivation for this question is the 
assumption that budgets, among many functions, may play stabilising functions in such 
organisations.   
The economic conditions for festivals are often associated with unmanageable costs and large 
budget deficits. So is also the case for many Norwegian festivals, most of which are arranged 
during the summer months. In the autumn one can often read about one festival deficit after 
the other in the media. There is therefore a general impression that many festivals are poorly 
managed over the years, and that they struggle to run within budget limits. This paper deals 
with a case which has shown another and more successful picture when it comes to budgets. 
The case discussed here turned from a situation with recurring economic problems towards 
years with budget surpluses.  
The St. Olav Festival in Trondheim, one of the most traditional and largest Norwegian 
festivals, is performed during about 10 days in July and August every year. Within these days, 
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approximately 200 arrangements are offered to an audience counting nearly 200 000 people. 
In 2008 the St. Olav Festival had a major economic crisis, and several dramatic steps were 
taken to save the festival from breaking down. The designing and implementing a new budget 
system was one of these steps. From 2009 to 2013 the festival turned from economic disaster 
to a situation with stable budget control, and the key actors claim that the budget control 
system is a central factor in their overall success with the festival. On this background, this 
paper presents a case where the budget is used over several years and turns out to fill a 
number of functions. The study addresses the research question as to how the budget is 
designed and used in the St. Olav Festival, including the focus on why the budget has been 
perceived relevant and useful by the key actors.  
This research also contributes to the more theoretical discussions on the functions of budgets 
as management control tools. Prior research has criticized the budgets mainly due to major 
flaws such as that the budgets constrain flexibility, that it is not relevant in uncertain 
environments, that it is not easily combined with strategic decisions and that budgeting is too 
time-consuming (Hope and Fraser, 2003, Neely et al., 2003, Bogsnes, 2009). Despite the 
critique of budgets, the budget is still seen as the dominating tool for management control in 
most organisations (Ekholm and Wallin, 2000, Libby and Lindsay, 2010, Hansen and Van der 
Stede, 2004), and only a small number of organisations have deserted budgets (Ekholm and 
Wallin, 2000, Libby and Lindsay, 2010). Bjørnenak and Olsen (2012) claim that even if there 
is an acknowledgement of the relevance of this critique, budgets are still found to be used and 
perceived as useful. Most prior research has also paid little attention to the multiple use of the 
budget (Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004). as the focus has been primarily on the budget in 
performance evaluation (Hartmann, 2000).    
Consequently, knowledge should be gained as to how management control systems are 
practiced (Tuomela, 2005, Mundy, 2010, Hofmann et al., 2012).This paper contributes to fill 
this knowledge gap as to how budgets can be used as tools to turn economic problems 
towards more stable and controllable situations. To go deeper into this field and analyse the 
focal festival, the Simons´ (1995) levers of control is elaborated as a theoretical framework to 
explore the use of the budget in the specific contexts such as the festival. This framework 
enables a discussion of how a management control system can promote learning and 
innovation while still exerting control over the organization’s goal achievement (Mundy, 
2010).  
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The paper is organized as follows. First, an overview of the theoretical framework is offered. 
This section discusses the functions of the budget and also including critical issues on 
budgets. Especially, Simons´(1995) levers of control framework is presented. Then a brief 
presentation of the research methods is given and the case is presented. The paper ends with 
the analysis and the discussion of the empirical findings, and last there are some concluding 
remarks.   
 
Theoretical frameworks 
Budgets may have numerous purposes, such as control, management, planning and also to act 
as political instruments. Horngren et al. (2006) emphasise that budgets can be used for 
coordination, communication, as a framework for performance evaluation and as a tool for 
motivation. Other functions such as operational planning, performance evaluation, 
communication of goals and strategy formation are mentioned (Hansen and Van der Stede, 
2004).  
The functions of budgets  
According to Horngren et al. (2006: 7) a budget is the quantitative expression of a proposed 
plan of action by management and is an aid to coordinating what needs to be done to 
implement that plan. Traditionally, budgets have been taken for granted as a central part of the 
management control systems (Hope and Fraser, 2003, Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004, Libby 
and Lindsay, 2010) and it is claimed budgeting can be viewed as the cornerstone of the 
management control process in organisations (Hansen et al., 2003). Literature has, however, 
particularly criticized the use of budget for performance evaluation (Hartmann, 2000, Jensen, 
2001, Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004). On the other hand, research also focuses on the 
annual budget which fill real needs, as they take the demands of tomorrow into account. 
(Ekholm and Wallin, 2000: 528).   
Research also shows that the budget is the most used control tool in both private companies 
and the public sector (Ekholm and Wallin, 2000, Bjørnenak and Olsen, 2012). Bjørnenak and 
Olsen (2012) find that even if the budget critique to some extent also is overall relevant for 
the public sector, all the studied entities within this sector report that they use budgets. In 
general, budgets are perceived to have high relevance in organizational planning and 
management and budgeting systems play a key role in management control systems (Libby 
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and Lindsay, 2010). However,  Libby and Lindsay (2010) also find in their sample that budget 
gaming is perceived to be a problem and Ekholm and Wallin (2000)suggests that budgets are 
not sensitive enough to changes in the environment, which indicate rigid planning and 
motivation to incremental thinking among actors.  
Hansen et al. (2003) sum up the critics against budgets by questioning the relevance of 
budgets within the categories planning and performance evaluation. Inspired by their work,   
the analysis of budgets in festivals will be based on the four categories dynamics, uncertainty, 
strategy and time-consumption. These concepts will guide the presentation of the empirical 
findings, and they are briefly described below.   
One of the prominent critiques of the budget is the lack of dynamics. Neely et al. (2003) claim 
that a major problem with budgets is that they are too infrequently updated.  Bogsnes (2009) 
discuss the problematic alignment between uneven and unpredictable business rhythms and 
that the budget cannot meet this rhythm since it is based on an annual autumn ceremony, and 
Wallander (1999) states that the budget is an unsuitable tool in a changing environment. This 
literature therefore concludes that the budget cannot capture instability (Hansen et al., 2003, 
Otley and Berry, 1980).  
As organizational environments have become more uncertain and unpredictable, and thus 
predictions about the future are also more likely to be wrong, and budgets tend to lose their 
relevance. In modern organizational life unpredictability can be considered the usual situation, 
and making plans therefore becomes problematic (Chenhall and Morris, 1986). These 
arguments are also in line with Ekholm and Wallins´ (2000) findings of negative relationships 
between unpredictability and the perceived usefulness of fixed annual budgets. Chenhall 
(2003) proposes that an uncertain environment calls for a more open and organic management 
accounting system in order to meet the continuous unpredictability that will unfold.  In the 
literature, the term uncertainty and unpredictability indicate different dimensions. Otley 
(1980) refers to unpredictability as uncertainty, non-routineness and dynamism, and Simons 
(1995) uses the term strategic uncertainty, and describes this as assumptions or external 
shocks that may block the achievements of the organisations visions.   
Festivals have got some central unpredictabilities or uncertainties inhibit, one of these is that 
the festival is performed by different artists every year. At the beginning of the planning the 
administration start from scratch, knowing that at a certain date next year a festival containing 
approximately 200 different projects will start. The cultural landscape means constantly 
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changing conditions as artists vary in their popularity, new and interesting artist occurs and it 
can prove difficult to agree on contractual conditions. Changing conditions moves the balance 
of the totality in the projects and are unpredictabilities that according to Otley (1980) should 
be incorporated into the accounting system. Further, festivals generate costs without knowing 
the future ticket revenues. In the case of the St. Olav Festival this risk is reduced because of 
the governmental funding, but they still, however depend on generating about 1/3 of the total 
budget through ticket sales. Finally, there are a number of unpredictable elements that may 
turn up during the festival, mainly due to the complex logistics necessary to manage all the 
different projects scheduled during the festival days. Such unpredictability comprises bad 
weather, technical problems, accidents, supply problems, incidents because of bad planning 
etc.  
Budgets are also criticised for having weak coupling with strategy (Neely et al., 2003) These 
weak couplings stem from budgets that are rarely strategically focused and they tend to be 
bureaucratic and discourage creative thinking. Most often budgets are considered to be too 
rigid to facilitate organisations’ need for continuous adaptation to changing conditions. 
Consequently, budgets tend to promote rigid and slow planning and incremental thinking, and 
at the end, budgets are considered to be a barrier to creative thinking and change.  
Further, budgeting tends to be time – consuming processes (Neely et al., 2003). It takes a lot 
of time both for managers and for staff in general to put together a budget.  Although the more 
critical literature has provided insight into dysfunctional characteristics of budgeting, other 
strands of research suggests that budgets play important roles in the management control 
processes in most organisations (Ekholm and Wallin, 2000, Libby and Lindsay, 2010).  
There has been an increased interest in studying the use of management control systems 
(Simons, 1994, Simons, 1995) and the different roles of management control systems 
(Chapman, 1997) in the recent years. Chapman (1997) points at the distinction between 
accounting as being an answer machine and a learning machine, and Simons (1995) 
introduces a framework to analyse how control systems can be used in order to implement an 
organization’s strategy consisting of four different levers of control. The focus in Simons´ 
(1995: 91) framework is the tension between creative innovation and predictable goal 
achievement and different styles of use of a management control system that can be applied to 
manage this tension. On this background the framework may provide insights that may help to 
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understand how the budget is used in the current context and in the framework is therefore 
presented below. 
The levers of control framework  
In this framework the control system, such as a budget, consists of four levers of control that 
can be classified into three categories: beliefs systems, boundary systems and feedback and 
measurement systems which comprise two styles of use, interactive and diagnostic control 
systems (Bisbe and Otley, 2004) A main issue in this framework is not viewing the use of a 
distinct lever alone, but rather to focus on the interaction between the different levers and how 
they complement each other.  
The first lever is considers a control system as a beliefs system, where core values are to be  
communicated to motivate the organization’s key actors  to search, explore, create and engage 
in actions to reach goals (Widener, 2007: 759). Second, the control system can be seen as a 
boundary system to communicate the action that should be avoided by the key actors and with 
a purpose of motivating towards innovation. The third use of a control system differs from the 
two first levers and includes feedback and measurement. Simons (1995) emphasise that 
control systems can be used both interactively and diagnostically, and the empirical findings 
will elaborate on these use of the budget as a control system, as prior empirical studies have 
shown that these terms may suit well to describe the use of management control systems and 
the relation with control of strategy and resources (Mundy, 2010).  
By diagnostic control managers may monitor organizational outcomes and correct deviations 
from pre-set standards or critical performance variables. Three features of a diagnostic control 
system are stressed by Simons (1995: 59); the ability to measure the outputs of a process, the 
existence of standards against which actual results can be compared, and the ability to correct 
deviations from standards. The primary function of using a control system diagnostically is, in 
principle, to align the employees´ behaviour with the organization’s objectives, measuring the 
result of their actions and use this information in order to reward performance (Hofmann et 
al., 2012).   
Simons (1995) claims that at in a complex organization it is possible to achieve goals without 
the manager having full oversight because a diagnostic use of budgets allows managers to 
manage by exception. But, Simons (1995) also argues that such command-and-control 
techniques have lost their relevance in environments where creativity and employee initiative 
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is critical for success, and  diagnostic use of budgets may also motivate dysfunctional side 
effects such as measuring the wrong variables, building slack into targets, gaming, smoothing, 
biasing and illegal actions.  
Interactive use of control systems such as budgets is characterized by Simons (1995) to 
comprise some central dimensions. Information generated by the system is used to direct 
attention to what is considered to be the important strategic uncertainties. and the 
unpredictability described  above to be central for the St. Olav Festival captures uncertainty as 
it is characterized  in the levers of control framework. In order to reduce the strategic 
uncertainties there is frequent and regular attention from operating managers, and the 
interpretation and discussions happens in face-to-face meetings between superiors, 
subordinates and peers. Thus, of the existence of uncertainties are acknowledged as a constant 
state of flux. Simons (1995) motivates an interactive approach to control systems as a 
continuous process in which managers ask themselves about the changing assumptions and 
strategic uncertainties. Hence,  the interactive approach can enhance the search of new ways 
of positioning the organisation in a dynamic landscape (Widener, 2007) and Bisbe et al. 
(2007) emphasise that it encompass several theoretical properties such as tightness vs. 
looseness, double-loop learning, mindful patterns of attention and autonomous behaviour. 
Interactive and diagnostic use of control systems in the levers of control framework is 
described to be both simultaneous and conflicting, and this tension is discussed in the 
literature (Widener, 2007, Henri, 2006). Whereas diagnostic use can be regarded as 
mechanistic controls, interactive use promotes opportunity seeking, emergence of 
communication processes and emerging strategies and Simons (1995) stress that balancing 
these forces may create positive effects.  
The empirical study 
Research method  
A case study was performed to provide an in-depth exploration of the research question 
(Thomas, 2011).  According to Yin (2009) a case study may give multiple sources of 
evidences with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion. The second important 
feature which is central to a case study is the focus on the case itself. Both primary and 
secondary sources of data were collected for the study as semi-structured interviews and 
archival documents. In order to provide an understanding of the use and role of the budget at 
an operating level, the data collection has not been restricted to data gathered from only the 
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top management, but also from respondents throughout the organisation to increase the 
validity. Since the St. Olav Festival during the year is a small organisation, was the number of 
respondents is limited. The main focus is thus on the key decision makers to provide insights 
to the use of budgets.  
The interview guide was structured around central issues. The history of the festival, 
particularly the large deficit in 2008 was crucial for understanding the design and later use of 
the budget, and the respondents with the necessary historical knowledge were asked about the 
background for implementing a new budget system. Next, the interview guide was concerned 
with the use of the budget and the budgeting process throughout the year before the different 
functions or roles were covered. The questions regarding the different roles of the budget 
were followed up by asking the respondents about their perception of how well the budget 
performs for the different functions. Next, the interview-guide followed up with questions 
regarding the particular time-dimension for the festival and the perception of the budget 
systems adaption to this. Last, the respondents were asked about the relevance of the budget at 
the time of the interview and reflections around reasons for the relevance. In order to validate 
the data, the quotes used in the article were sent to the informants for feedback. The 
interviews were audio-taped and all except two interviews were transcribed in full. The last 
two interviews were listened to and excerpts were extracted.  
The archival data comprises printed excerpts from the computerized budgeting system. 
Further, the interviewer observed the budget system by viewing the Booking Managers´ and 
the Finance and Administration Managers’ computers in practice. In order to get an overview 
over the financial situation, annual reports were collected from a national register (The 
Brønnøysund Register Centre).  Another important document in the study was the report 
written by the Municipality Auditor in Trondheim after the large deficit in 2008. In this 
document, the old budget system and routines were heavily criticised, and the information in 
the report was used in the design of the new budgeting system. Because of the richness of 
information in this report, it has also provided important information for gaining deep 
knowledge to the organisation. Other documents that have informed the study are different 
government documents such as parliament proposals and other reports as well as a number of 
newspaper articles. The data from the different sources; interviews, reports and newspaper 
articles in particular, were repeatedly reviewed and studied in order to see the patterns in the 
case.  
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The research site  
The St. Olav Festival was established in 1962 around the Feast of St. Olav (28th July). During 
the 1990s the festival went through major changes, and from 1998 to 2006 the number of 
performances increased from 112 to 188, and the number of concerts increased from 16 in 
1998 to 95 in 2006 and 239 in 2012 (The St. Olav Festival, 2012).Because of the anchoring in 
the Feast of St. Olav, the profile of the festival is closely related to the ecclesiastical tradition. 
However, the purpose of the festival is also cultural, and the festival has for many years now 
offered a wide range of secular activities such as concerts, theatre, opera, seminars, 
exhibitions, courses, a rich family program and children’s activities. In 1999 The St. Olav 
Festival achieved a national status among 10 other large Norwegian festivals, which gave this 
festival special funding from the state.  The St. Olav Festival has achieved the national status 
because of its profile as a church-music festival and it is one of the festivals which receive the 
largest amount of state funding.  Thus, the large (secular) concerts are commercially 
necessary for the St. Olav Festival in order to reach economic targets, according to the 
Booking Manager who said:  
In our total landscape, we have about 140 arrangements with ticket income. Six of these 
accounts for 75 % of the total ticket revenues (Booking Manager). 
In 2013 the St. Olav Festival had a total budget on 3, 751 million Euros; of these were 1, 85 
million Euros public funding (49%). The public funding is split between the National 
Governments (60 %), Sør-Trøndelag County (15 %) and Trondheim Municipality (25 %). The 
remaining income in 2013 were ticket revenues on 981 000 Euros (26 % of total revenues), 
sponsor revenues on 595 000 Euros (16 % of total income) and other sales on 317 000 Euros 
(8 % of total income). From 2009 to 2013, the festival increased the total budget with 813 000 
Euros. Throughout the year, the St. Olav Festival is a small organization with about 10 people 
employed on permanent basis. In addition the festival hires about 6-7 people as project 
employees on short term (annual) contracts. In the very last phase before the actual festival, 
during and in the days after the festival, the festival also engages project – and venue 
managers. When the festival takes place, an additional 400 volunteers are involved, in 
addition to, of course, all the involved artists, bands and other performers.  
1 Exchange rate 4.11.2014 (https://www.dnb.no/kursliste/historiske) 
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In 2008, the festival had a major financial crisis. Out of a total budget of about 2, 9 million 
Euros, the deficit was on 962 000 Euros. Normally festivals have a rather clear picture about 
the financial result when the festival ends. This was not the case for the St. Olav Festival at 
that time. During 1999 to 2007, the Festival Director increased the budget with about 153 %, 
but the administrative staff was not expanded and still included only the Festival Director and 
a secretary. The rest of the staff was on part time contracts on project basis.   
The Festival grew rapidly through the early years of the 2000s. The Festival Director acted as 
an entrepreneur and was the only one with detailed overview over the festival and its financial 
situation. He did not delegate control tasks to others, not even when an accountant was hired 
(Trondheim Municipality Auditor, 2008), and the staff describes the financial management as 
a «one-man-show». The Festival Director at that time also claimed to be in control in 2006, 
although the festival had a deficit on 215 000 Euros (of a total budget on ca. 3, 15 million 
Euros). Thus, the tension between the Festival Director and the board increased from 2006, 
and the board decided to increase the permanent employments by five in order to gain control.  
The Festival Director did not agree on the decision, and consequently, the board decided to 
replace the Director at the end of his fixed-term post, and the director left his position in 
December 2007. The board did not succeed in finding a new director until 2008, and the 
board decided to arrange the festival in 2008 with a temporary split top management, one 50 
% administrative leader position and one 100 % artistic leader position. The split temporary 
management did not manage to exert control over the festival, and consequently, the 
administrative leader got his position raised to a 100 % position less than 2 months before the 
festival started. This period was very difficult for the festival management, as little 
information was available from the former Festival Director of the festival projects as to 
information about agreements that were made and general budget and control information.  
The new Festival Director was hired after the festival in August 2008, and she experienced 
that the festival was running into a large budget deficit, which by September amounted to 
about 960 000 Euros of a total budget of 2, 9 million Euros. The auditor in the city 
municipality was asked to investigate this large deficit, and the auditor report raised a number 
of critical issues, of which one was the weaknesses in budget control. In order to gain control 
over the festival, a new budget tool was developed and implemented.  
Empirical findings 
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The new budget tool which was to be implemented after the economic crisis in 2008 will be 
analysed below according to the analytic framework presented above. Especially, the 
empirical findings will be presented and structured according to the budgets’ relevance with 
strategic decisions, the dynamics in the budgets’ use, the ability of budget practices to handle 
uncertainty and unpredictability and the perception of budgets to be time consuming. Last, the 
discussion will be focused on the festival’s use of budgets as interactive and diagnostic 
decision management control tools.     
The link between strategy and budgets  
This festival director, who was in the position from 2008 to 2013, is educated within music 
and she had been a cultural journalist before she was engaged by the St. Olav Festival:  
This was one of the toughest processes I have been through, as  I was entering a landscape I 
did not own, I did not know the tribal language. I do not know what to compare it to.. You 
could have taken a banker and put him in to violin training and within three months expect 
him to play a violin concerto (Festival Director 2008-2013).  
Although she had no managerial experience, she obviously understood the organization she 
was set to manage. The new chairman and the board set an expectation for the festival in 2009 
to run with a surplus, which implied an improvement from 2008 on nearly 1, 2 million Euros. 
This was obviously a big challenge for the administration.   The Festival Director and the 
Booking Manager (educated within business administration) were in charge of designing the 
new budget tool, and the main challenge was to design a tool which facilitated control and 
accountability and also simultaneously providing opportunity for creativity to fill the 
numerous projects with relevant artistic content of high quality.  In order to dig into the 
budgeting challenges, they engaged one of the large consultancy companies. But there were 
introductory challenges for the administration:  The Booking Manager explains: 
… (the consultancy company) wanted to do something entirely different. They had this whole 
book on how to build an organization from A to Z (Booking Manager) 
We notice here that there were different understanding of the “reality” between the 
consultants and the festival management. The Festival Director got the impression that the 
consultancy company did not understand the specific characteristics of the festival: 
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… (the consultancy company) just came in with their… they were so square. They had no idea 
about the world I had to describe (Festival Director, 2008 – 2013) 
However, the management convinced the consultancy company that they had to look beyond 
the standard templates and to design the budget based on analyses of the specific 
characteristic dimensions of the festival. This step was important in order to match strategy 
with budget decisions. The budget was separated into two parts; an operating budget and a 
festival budget. The operating budget was defined as the budget which was unaffected2 with 
the tasks of arranging the festival. This budget followed traditional annual budget thinking. 
The second part was the festival budget which varies according to the festival projects. The 
festival budget was in addition divided into project budgets and venue budgets. In this way, 
this part of the budget was based on project thinking, and thus, it was able to be connected 
with the strategies based on the cultural activities in the festival. The project budgets 
comprised costs that could be directly traced to each project such as fees, travel and 
accommodation costs and particular technical equipment. However, there are arrangement 
costs which were not so easily traced to the single arrangement. These costs were venue 
related costs, and they were not influenced by the specific arrangements, typically backline 
(standard equipment in concerts such as stage, sound and lights etc.) for concert venues or 
security. These costs were hence directly related to one of the 10 of 25 venues.   
By dividing between project and venue budgets, and thus match strategy with culture, the 
management was faced with the challenge of defining the interface between the various 
budgets. In order to make this interface as correct as possible, the management defined clearly 
what kind of standard equipment that was registered on each arena, and consequently, the 
budget was divided into arenas and projects. In this way, the budget responsibility could be 
defined and related to direct cost, which amounted to about 40% in the budget for 2013. As 
seen in the table below, budget control was regained within one year from 2008 to 2009.   
Year Budget (EUR) Profit (EUR) Equity (EUR) 
2008 2 897 270 -961 615 -127 247 
2009 2 930 996 194 674 67 426 
2010 3 164 279 147 316 214 742 
2011 3 341 131 117 409 332 151 
2012 3 988 088 64 300 396 452 
2013 3 743 870 25 124 421 575 
2 Unaffected at a short term.  
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 Table 1: Financial performance 2008 – 2013 (The St. Olav Festival, 2012, The St. Olav 
Festival, 2008, The St. Olav Festival, 2009, The St. Olav Festival, 2010, The St. Olav Festival, 
2011, The St. Olav Festival, 2013). 
The strategic focus in the St. Olav Festival was to re-establish and strengthen Trondheim as a 
national ecclesiastical and cultural centre. To secure this purpose back in 2008 during the 
crisis, the strategy on short term basis was to save the festival from bankruptcy and 
eventually, to make the festival sustainable. After 2008 the management had a budget focus in 
their strategic thinking and actions.  
So in a sense, both the accounting and budget tool we used at the time gave clear guidelines 
for everything we did. But we succeeded in saving and restoring the festival and to make it 
sustainable (Festival Director, 2008 – 2013).  
One of the measures was to program big secular artists with the capability of earning large 
ticket revenues, which came from the big secular concerts. Thus, such concerts were 
prioritized. In the 2009-festival the big draw was the world famous artist Katie Melua, and 
they also programmed some famous Norwegian artists. In a report commissioned by the 
Ministry of Culture from the Arts council Norway in 2012 it is concluded on the basis of the 
programming in the years 2007 – 2010 that the breadth of the program has been at the 
expense of artistic specialisation within church music (Report Arts Council, 2012).  The 
report hence illuminates a tension between the Festival’s standing as an ecclesiastical festival 
and the more commercial profile.  
In order to decrease this tension, the Festival Director in 2008 launched “moments that moves 
you” as a direction for the festival. Consequently, she divided the festivals activities into three 
different angels or rooms; a playful room, an intellectual room1 
and a spiritual room, arguing that a human being can b enter all of these rooms, so that a 
playful room (commercial concerts) may very well be combined with or be a door opener into 
a  spiritual room (church music). The Booking Manager is convinced that the implementation 
of this purpose was a good strategic move which matched the budget limits with the strategic 
developments. 
I was here before … (the Festival Director from 2008-2013) came, and this (“moments that 
moves you”, authors comment) is probably one of the most important thing that she has 
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made. During the 50 year long history of the festival, it has almost been a continuous 
contradiction between the secular program and church music and the art on the opposite 
side. Through the splitting in three rooms with different approaches, we have come past the 
discussion and the contradiction which has been a problem for a long time (Booking 
Manager, quote from Heggen (2012)).  
In this way, an innovative manager was able to mix a diversity of genres with budget frames, 
and consequently, this mixture secured stable and positive economic development for the 
festival in the years to come.  
How the budget faced unpredictability  
The split of the budget into two parts made the responsibility lines clearer as to the operating 
costs. This information contributed to stabilize the financial situation, as the Festival Director 
was able to make decisions in due time. Table 1 illuminates that the economic situation was 
stabilized during the years after the crisis. However, a major challenge the Festival Director 
faced both before and after the implementation of the new budget tool was the extraction 
information from the financial accounts for control purposes.  
In 2008 I think that the fees were 1, 65 million Euros. However, the fees for the artists were 
much less, what was behind this number? It proved to be attorneys' fees, fees for the 
headhunting of me, fees for this and that, directors' fees, fees for everything that had the word 
fees. It was all stuffed into the same bag (Festival Director, 2008 – 2013).  
In addition to implementing the budget tool in 2009, the Festival Director wanted to tighten 
the management control, and in 2010 an accountant (the Finance and Administration 
Manager) was employed, and the contract with the accountancy company was terminated. 
The financial accounts for 2010 was reposted in order to gain further control, and the Finance 
and Administration Manager  decided to keep the division between the operating budget and 
the festival budget, which also  was reflected at the account level in the financial accounts.   
I have made a clear separation between the operational side and the festival side. I think the 
solution is in the accounts. One cannot have the same account for both sides (Finance and 
Administration Manager). 
The budget system had gradually been developed to support relevant decision making, and 
especially the split between two parts of the budget gave information to diagnose financial 
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problems, according to Simons´ diagnostic use (Simons, 1995). From 2011 the budget system 
with the responding financial accounts was implemented, and the managers perceived it as 
useful.  
The budget was also perceived to provide limits in the making of the festival; the respondents 
indicated that these limits provided them with a space of opportunity which gave space for 
security to enhance creativity and artistic formation.   
I would say it gives me confidence. It provides me with opportunities, within, I mean, 
everyone understands that if you are going to arrange an event, it will cost you money. But I 
want to know what it will cost, when it costs…. and this gives me peace of mind (Producer).  
This point was also emphasized by the Chairman of the Board: 
I mean that the budget is not a constraint. It's just an adjustment of the direction, finding the 
opportunities we have. Of course there is a limitation; it can say that "we cannot afford this." 
Then we cannot afford it. So, you can see that - I'm very positive about the budget (Chairman 
of the Board).  
This view was also supported among the staff as acceptance of the necessity of the budget: 
A tool for motivation, no, I think financial matters are boring, so for me personally it is not; 
there is no motivation at all. It's like that extra chore, but I realize that of course I have to 
create individual budgets for each project, right, because we have to have control, I need to 
know how much I can plan for, and I need to know what kind of leeway I have, and I must 
know how much I should cut and what the result is (Festival Coordinator).  
 
The budgets facilitated dynamic changes 
The respondents in the study were asked about the relevance of the potential reasons to budget 
also derived from (Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004): allocating resources and authorizing 
spending and the use of the budget as a tool for providing limits, a tool for providing 
opportunities and a tool for motivation. The Chairman of the board responded: 
Well, all of these are - to a greater or lesser extent relevant (referring to the list of functions). 
But if you ask what is systematically used, then there is of course the first point (planning) 
that is crucial (Chairman of the Board).  
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As the quote from the Chairman illustrates, the budget is seen as important for planning and 
to give an overview over the totality of the festival before the intense days of the festival 
period.  One of the specific characteristics for the festival is the time dimension, as the 
planning ranges for a very long time compared to the actual production of value, and we see 
that the budget tool has a  design which  enables it to be a strong planning tool in this 
particular context. This planning activity seems to give more room for being innovative when 
it comes to planning the cultural activities.  
Further, the information from the budget is perceived to be an important part of the 
communication in the organization.  As the budget is actively communicated, and based on 
dialogue, this enhances the exchange of ideas and secures continuous movement in the budget 
from this flow of information.  
In the St. Olav Festival, the management used the budget in the evaluation phase after the 
festival period, and in this context the scope of budget performance evaluation was aiming at 
learning. There were  no rewards or bonuses tied to performance in the festival budgets, and 
the motivation for using the budget in the evaluation was to raise the quality of the budgeting 
for next year, and thus to find space for innovative planning.  Because of the initial 
decentralised budgeting where project and venue managers were  involved in filling out 
budget templates, the Finance and Administration Manager consider it important to constantly 
improve the budgeting competence.  
[…] not necessarily to evaluate performance but to evaluate how good you are at budgeting. 
And get a feeling of if you are careful in the budgeting, if you are realistic or whether you are 
optimistic (Finance and Administration Manager) 
 
The budget as an interactive tool  
Interactive use of budgets supports attention on changing conditions  which are of strategic 
importance, and it will  expand opportunity seeking and learning (Bisbe and Otley, 2004). The 
data supports that the budget is used interactively.  
The planning for next year’s festival started informally after the festival, however in the last 
year, the planning cycle has changed from 12 to 18 months. During the fall, they set the total 
budget frame. In broad terms, the income of the festival depends on funding from the state 
authorities, ticket income, sponsorships and other sales. The governmental funding is 
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published in the Norwegian State Budget in October. Ticket income and other sales were  
based on estimates from historical numbers and sponsorships are based on contracts. Ticket 
income, other sales and sponsorships are variable sources of income, and flexibility regarding 
these sources of income were also taken in to the budget process. The planning of the more 
detailed projects proceeded in the last months of the year, and the project and venue managers 
had the opportunity to influence the artistic content of the festival. One of the venue mangers 
said: 
… (the Booking Manager) asks me after the festivals: “Have you got any ideas for what may 
function in … (the venue) for next year?” (Venue Manager) 
The venue managers and project managers are engaged in the festival planning and in January 
they systematically filled in the budget templates for each of the venues and proposed 
projects. The budget templates only included costs and had a limited number of accounts. The 
templates were thereafter collected and integrated into the total festival budget. From this 
point on, the major discussions on budget matters about artistic portfolio were made by the 
management group consisting of the Festival Director, the Booking Manager, the Producer 
and the Finance and Administration Manager. 
During the initial process with the informal dialogue about the budget templates and the initial 
festival budget, an overview over the festival was created, and the festival administration had 
a broad background for discussions on both details in the festival program as well as detailed 
costs. From January and until spring, the budget was discussed in several arenas, particularly 
in the management group. Further discussions were also made in the weekly staff meetings 
which included the whole staff. In these meetings they discussed the composition of the 
program, artistic issues and also budget issues. Budget issues could include cost-benefit 
analyses, where benefits were more than direct monetary income. Projects could be 
considered beneficial for example if the artistic value or value with regards to the festivals 
national status as a church music festival. The budgets were also used for monetary 
benchmarking including historical benchmarks using the budget information. These 
observations indicate that the festival management developed a culture for internal dialogues, 
and the staff seemed to be in a constant bargaining process where the resources were allocated 
and balanced off in the different projects. Consequently, the budget can be viewed as a 
network of projects where each project has its own plan and strategy.  
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As the planning progressed, artistic projects were gradually booked and contracts were signed 
with performing artists.  The degree of budgetary freedom or opportunity range was gradually 
reduced as plans were fixed.  However, it was observed that the opportunity range did not 
decreased linearly:  
A good booking can cause an increase in the opportunity range (Booking manager)  
In this way, the interactive process also included dynamic elements. The booking manager 
said that if the festival books a well-known artist, they know that this will generate costs, but 
the revenues may exceed the costs, and this is a situation that will increase the opportunity 
range.   
Two more budget events were observed: the full revision of the budget and the “lock down” 
of the budget. The full revision of the budget includes a systematic consideration of the costs 
for all the project and venues. This revision took place around April, but for the last festival 
the revision has been pushed closer to the board meeting in early June where the program is 
fully presented. Thus, the revision and the “lock down” of the budget have become closer in 
time. From the “lock down” to the festival starts, only small changes are supposed to occur. 
However, the Booking Manager said that even if the opportunity space was reduced close to 
the festival period, there had to be certain budgetary flexibility in order to provide the 
opportunity to “pick the golden ball”. It could also be other unexpected events that may had 
budgetary impacts. 
It may turn out that when a band was playing in Stavanger last weekend (the weekend before 
they are supposed to play at the festival, auth. comment), there was unrest – we then need to 
strengthen the security (Producer).  
The above discussion implies that the budget is used interactively all the way up to the start of 
the festival and in the following section a discussion and some concluding remarks is 
provided.   
Discussion and conclusion  
The current study contributes to extant literature by identifying a case where the budget is 
perceived as relevant and useful by the managers in in line with Libby and Lindsay (2010). 
The case has some specific characteristics as being a type of organization within the arts 
sector, which is normally not associated with extensive use of budgets and budgetary control. 
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In order to provide a further understanding as to why the budget is perceived as relevant and 
useful by the managers of the festival, Simons´ (1995) levers of control framework and the 
concepts of interactive and diagnostic use of the budget as a control system has been included 
as an analytic framework. This framework provided insight into a balance between a dynamic 
(interactive) and more conventional (diagnostic) use of the budget. By balancing these two 
uses in the long time spam of the planning of the festival, the budget gained ownership by 
many actors in the festival organization 
Theoretical contribution 
Prior research has investigated the usefulness of budgets, and findings indicate that the budget 
is, by far, the most used control tool. However, the budget has also undergone extensive 
criticism. The current study presents a case which indicates that the budget is both used and 
found useful as control tool in the organization. Prior research (Libby and Lindsay, 2010) also 
argue that the budget often is designed and used more sophistically than suggested by the 
leading critics. In this case, the actors perceive the budgets as relevant and that they play an 
important part in the planning and conducting of the festivals. Further, the findings suggest 
sophistication in both the design and use of the budget, which are central reasons for the 
active role the budget is playing in this festival. 
The above findings have been concentrated on the issues of the links between the strategy and 
the budgets, how the budget is used to face unpredictability and how the budgets were 
developed to include dynamic changes. A main finding is that the interactive nature of the 
budgets facilitated the ability to include sudden and unplanned elements during the periods 
before the festivals were to be performed.  This case has also shown that a major crisis 
motivated or even forced the management of the festival to revise the way budgets were said 
to support sustainability and success of the future festivals.  
Practical implications 
Dynamics  
By the interactive use of the budget, the festival budget is frequently updated and discussed. 
This finding contradicts with the criticisms towards budgets as stated by Neely et al. (2003), 
claiming that budgets are not dynamic and that they are updated too infrequently. In the 
current case it is argued that the budget is used interactively in a rather long planning phase, 
and secures that changes occurred are given proper attention and debate, and consequently 
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incorporated into updated budgets. The budget in the Festival is discussed in weekly staff 
meetings, and changes are made on background of these debates.  
Strategy  
Budgets are criticized for being too rigid for strategic alignment and too concerned with short 
term financial achievement (Hope and Fraser, 2003, Neely et al., 2003) The findings on the 
contrary indicate that the strategy and budget of the St. Olav Festival are aligned, and that 
even that the strategy is informed by the budget. The Festival Director developed the strategy 
in 2009, and this strategy made the arguments for long term sustainability possible.  
Time-consumption  
Budget critics have pointed at the fact that budgeting is time consuming. Although The St. 
Olav Festival use much time on budgeting, the festival managers perceive that the time spent 
on budgeting is both necessary and useful. The budget control system provides the decision 
makers with updated information, and they are convinced that the system increases the control 
and also produces information which stabilizes the uncertainty during the planning and 
operating phases of the festival.   
The following figure illustrates the use of the budget in the St. Olav Festival: 
 
1st Oct 1st Oct
Interactive use
«Closed» budget
Festival
Evaluation
1st June
Opportunity range
 
Figure 1: Interactive use of the Budget in the St. Olav Festival 
As displayed in the figure, the planning of the festival starts around 1 October and terminates 
when the festival starts. During this period, the findings indicate an interactive use of the 
budget as a control tool, also after the closing of the budget. The decreasing lines illustrate the 
opportunity range.  As time evolves this range will decrease, because projects and venues are 
contracted. This means that the discussions decline as the festival approaches. However, the 
interactive process and constant dialogue regarding the budget and its components due to the 
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constantly changing conditions, increase the accuracy in the budget and hence the perceived 
control.  
On this background it seems as if the crisis laid the foundation for a particular focus on 
staying in control of their budget. This was the starting point for developing and designing a 
suitable budget tool which also enabled interactive use through the festivals´ long planning 
phase. The findings suggest that the design and use of the budget in the festival is perceived 
as relevant and necessary and leads to a calm in the organisation.  
Conclusion 
The findings in this study suggest that the budget fills a number of purposes and functions in 
the festival. The respondents confirm that the budget serves purposes of planning, providing 
limits and opportunities, communication, motivation, benchmarking and evaluating 
performance. The managers of The St. Olav Festival perceive that the budget is important in 
planning phases particularly, but it is also perceived as a tool for providing limitations and 
opportunities and communication.  
The respondents have a more diverse perception of the budget as having a role in strategy 
formation and motivation. The former festival director claimed that budgetary logics 
influenced strategic choices for the festival in a critical period after the large deficit. Others, 
such as the producer and the new festival director state that the strategy is more ideology-
driven than budget-driven.  
One of the central critiques against the budget is the problematic issues regarding the use of 
budget for performance evaluation, such as e.g. gaming (Hope and Fraser, 2003, Bogsnes, 
2009). In our case the managers claim that the budget is an appropriate instrument for 
performance evaluation. However, it should be noted that the St. Olav Festival does not use 
bonus systems for motivation or evaluation, and the performance evaluation is based on more 
total approaches and is focused more towards learning purpose for coming years. A rather 
large number of employees are involved in the budgeting process, thus enhancing more 
ownership to the budgets as processes and also enhancing a more continuous learning focus. 
This learning focus both enhances enough stability to reduce the effects of unpredictability 
and increases the perceived control which consequently gives more space for innovation and 
creativity.  
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